Considerations for Possible Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State

Considerations for Possible Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State

CRS Insights
Considerations for Possible Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State
Matthew C. Weed, Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation (mweed@crs.loc.gov, 7-4589)
September 16, 2014 (IN10147)
The armed offensive of the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL or ISIS) in northern and western Iraq
and northeastern Syria has raised significant concerns for the Middle Eastern governments and the
United States. Since June, President Obama has ordered multiple deployments of U.S. troops to Iraq to
provide security to diplomatic personnel and facilities, advise Iraqi security forces, and conduct
intelligence gathering and reconnaissance. He has also ordered U.S. military airstrikes on IS forces in
Iraq as part of at least four military operations since August 7. In a September 10, 2014, speech, the
President also laid out plans for expanded use of military force against the Islamic State in Iraq and
possibly Syria. Concerned with a perceived piecemeal build-up of troops, the President's plans for
expanding uses of military force, the lack of opportunities for congressional consultation and oversight,
and a possible expansion of the use of military force into Syria, several Members of Congress have
expressed the view that continued use of military force against the Islamic State requires congressional
authorization. Members differ on whether such authorization should be provided.
Authority to Deploy Troops and Use Military Force Against the Islamic State
Although the President in his notifications to Congress of deployments and airstrikes has relied upon his
powers as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive under Article II of the Constitution, Obama
Administration officials have stated that two enacted authorizations for use of military force (AUMFs)
might apply to U.S. military strikes against the Islamic State. These two AUMFs, one in response to the
September 11, 2001, terror attacks and targeting those responsible, and one to counter the threat
posed by the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, might not be considered to authorize strikes against the
Islamic State. If Congress decides the AUMFs do not cover such use of military force, it could consider
the President as conducting military operations without congressional authorization, and could demand
an end to hostilities or enact a new authorization to use military force against the Islamic State.
Possible Elements of a New AUMF Targeting the Islamic State
A new AUMF targeting the Islamic State could both authorize presidential use of military force beyond
what is considered valid under the President's Article II war powers, and circumscribe and limit such
use of force. Language in a new AUMF could either broaden the purpose of military force to include
unspecified U.S. national security interests, or narrow the scope of authorization to specific objectives
related to degrading or destroying the Islamic State. Congress could limit the AUMF's geographic scope,
authorizing force only in Iraq where hostilities have taken place, or approve an expansion to Syria.
With continued uncertainty surrounding the Iraqi government, Congress might include authorization to
use U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq in furtherance of political stability objectives. Provisions in any AUMF
targeting the Islamic State might address the possible effect that targeting the Islamic State in Syria
and Iraq could have on the ongoing conflict in Syria.
Other provisions might include
the requirement that the President certify that use of military force pursuant to the authorization
was necessary and no other course of action was available;
a provision requiring the President to submit a strategy for conducting the conflict with the
Islamic State;
a sunset provision, limiting the President's authority to a set period of time, possibly with the
option of extension through a presidential certification process;
the prohibition on the use of appropriated funds for the use of military force outside the
parameters of the specified authorization;
congressional notification and reporting requirements on a periodic or incident-specific basis;

the requirement that the President identify and certify potential targets of military force as forces
or other elements of the Islamic State; and/or
language stating that the authorization is intended to supersede other AUMFs.
Application of War Powers Resolution
In the case of strikes against IS forces, the President has cited his Article II powers, and arguably has
not relied on congressional authorization to strike IS targets. As mentioned above, however, the Obama
Administration has asserted that U.S. military action against the Islamic State is authorized under both
the 2001 9/11 and 2002 Iraq AUMFs. Under the War Powers Resolution (WPR; P.L. 93-148), when the
President introduces U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities, he must usually withdraw them within 60 days
unless Congress authorizes continued action. If Congress were to decide against passing a new AUMF,
it need not enact any legislation. If Congress decides that the existing AUMFs apply, congressional
authorization exists and the withdrawal requirement no longer applies. If Congress decides instead that
the AUMFs do not apply, the President would be required to cease hostilities and remove U.S. Armed
Forces involved in such hostilities from Iraq within 60 days. There is some question, however, about
the determination of when the 60 days is triggered and when it is reset. If the U.S. airstrikes in Iraq
could be deemed a continuous set of hostilities, the 60-day clock might be considered running since
the first airstrikes in August 2014. If each airstrikes notification, however, is meant to represent a
discrete instance of hostilities lasting a few days with a complete "withdrawal" as soon as the operation
ends, the 60-day clock might be considered reset. This uncertainty over the operation of the 60-day
period might spur legislative action if Congress decided a cessation of hostilities were desirable. The
WPR states that at any time after U.S. Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities, the President must
withdraw such forces if directed by Congress in a concurrent resolution.
Current Legislative Proposals
Several legislative proposals have been introduced that relate to the use of military force against the
Islamic State. H.Con.Res. 105 would prohibit maintaining U.S. Armed Forces in a "sustained combat
role" in Iraq without congressional authorization. H.R. 5415 would authorize the use of military force
"against international terrorism" generally, including force against the Islamic State. S.J.Res. 42 would
authorize force against the Islamic State to "prevent terrorist attacks on the people and interests of the
United States and our allies," and includes a three-year sunset. H.J.Res. 123 would authorize force "to
defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)," with a 120-day sunset. The measure would also repeal the 2002
AUMF for Iraq, and contains a number of reporting requirements. S.J.Res. 43 would authorize the use
of "all necessary and appropriate force" to protect U.S. national security against the Islamic State, and
would require the President to provide Congress with a strategy to defeat the Islamic State, and
periodic reports on implementation of the strategy.
H.J.Res. 58 would prohibit the use of funds by any U.S. government department or agency for the U.S.
use of military force in Syria. Section 9013 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2015
(H.R. 4870), prohibits the use of funds with respect to Syria in contravention of the WPR.
Related Issues Before Congress:
Defense Strategy, Military Operations, and Force Structure
Middle East and North Africa