The War and Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan

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Updated January 22, 2025

The War and Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan

The conflict in Sudan that began in 2023 between rival elements of the security forces has fueled the world’s largest displacement crisis and largest hunger crisis. The war has pushed over 12 million people from their homes. More than half the population, over 25 million people, reportedly face acute food insecurity, and famine is spreading. The warring parties have been implicated in atrocity crimes and other gross human rights abuses. Fatality figures are not reliable, given access constraints, but by some estimates as many as 150,000 people may have died in the first year of the conflict alone.

The war that began as a fight for power between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF, the military) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has roots in how Sudan has been ruled, primarily by military regimes and central elites, since independence. Islamist military leader Omar al Bashir, who took power in a 1989 coup, faced multiple rebellions in the marginalized peripheries. He armed Sudanese Arab militias known as the Janjaweed to help the SAF counter rebels in the western Darfur region in the early 2000s, and the United States, among others, labeled their atrocities against non- Arab communities genocide. Bashir formed the RSF from the Janjaweed to counter other insurgencies, allowing it to seize gold mines and other assets, and deployed it to Yemen as part of the Gulf-led coalition fighting the Houthi rebels, which provided revenue that bolstered the RSF’s autonomy.

Sudan’s security chiefs used pro-democracy protests in 2019 as justification to oust Bashir, with reported support from some Arab countries. The junta, led by the SAF’s Abdel Fattah al Burhan and RSF’s Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemedti, resisted handing power to civilians, but later conceded under pressure to share power with a “civilian-led” transitional government (CLTG). It led reforms and secured U.S. sanctions relief and international debt relief. The SAF and RSF generals usurped power from the CLTG in 2021 (Sudan’s sixth coup since independence) and violently suppressed ensuing mass protests. Under growing pressure to restore civilian authority and merge their forces in security sector reforms, a long-simmering rivalry between the SAF and RSF erupted in April 2023.

Almost two years later, the SAF and RSF continue to fight over the war-torn capital, Khartoum, and its adjacent cities, once home to 10 million people. SAF-held Port Sudan now serves as the de facto capital. As the conflict has spread, rebels, former rebels, and communities are being drawn into an increasingly complex civil war. The RSF took control of much of Darfur in late 2023 and has besieged El Fasher, the North Darfur capital where the SAF fights to hold its last garrison in the region. Fighters from non-Arab groups in Darfur like the Zaghawa, once targeted by the Janjaweed, have aligned with the SAF to defend the area. The RSF advanced southeast in 2024, disrupting farming in Sudan’s agricultural heartland and fueling further displacement. The SAF recaptured some of that territory in January 2025.

Figure 1. Map of Sudan

Source: CRS graphic, with approximate areas of control based on reports/maps by Sudan War Monitor, Thomas Van Linge, and others.

Famine and Aid Access Constraints

Despite denials by the junta, experts confirm that famine— possibly the worst in decades—is unfolding in Sudan. Some humanitarians have described the aid response as “deeply inadequate.” UN officials have cited funding shortfalls and access restrictions, including attacks on aid workers and health facilities, bureaucratic impediments, and operational interference. Experts have accused both warring parties of using starvation as a weapon. The SAF has restricted access to RSF-occupied areas, and, in early 2024, ordered aid agencies to stop cross-border operations into Darfur. Under diplomatic pressure, the junta authorized use of a major crossing point in August 2024, and has since allowed some additional crossline access, but significant constraints persist. The RSF has also limited access, looted aid supplies and crops, and laid siege to SAF-held urban areas.

Atrocity Crimes and Other Abuses

Grave abuses have been reported during the war, including attacks by the RSF and allied militia in West Darfur that experts say have systematically targeted ethnic Masalit and other non-Arabs. In late 2023, the State Department issued a determination that the RSF and SAF had committed war crimes and members of the RSF and allied militia had committed crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The UN-authorized Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan had similar findings, reporting on ethnic- based attacks, killings, torture, child soldiers, airstrikes and indiscriminate shelling on civilians, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. The Mission highlighted “large- scale” sexual violence by the RSF, noting similar patterns in RSF attacks in Darfur and southeast Gezira state, where the RSF has been implicated in mass killings.

The War and Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan

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In January 2025, the State Department announced its conclusion that members of the RSF and allied militias had committed acts of genocide, an assessment some experts and Members of Congress made in 2024. In line with the determination, the Biden Administration sanctioned RSF leader Hemedti for his role in systemic atrocities and the RSF’s mass rape of civilians in Darfur. The Administration sanctioned SAF leader Burhan, the de facto head of state since 2019, a week later, citing the SAF’s atrocities and aid obstruction, and Burhan’s refusal to participate in ceasefire talks and obstruction of a transition to civilian government.

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is investigating the situation in Darfur under a 2005 UN Security Council referral of jurisdiction. The UN Fact- Finding Mission has recommended that the Security Council expand the jurisdiction of the ICC and the existing UN arms embargo, both specific to Darfur, to cover the entire country. The Mission, among others, has also called for a multinational force to be deployed to protect civilians.

The Fight for El Fasher

The UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum have warned of a risk of genocide in and around El Fasher, which hosts over half a million internally displaced people (IDPs), many of whom have lived in camps around the city since the ethnically- targeted violence of the early 2000s. Food security experts verified famine in Zamzam, the largest camp, in 2024, but the hostilities and RSF siege severely constrain aid access. The fighting has cut trade routes and restricted farming; shelling and airstrikes have hit markets and health facilities. The RSF has reportedly burned scores of nearby villages.

External Support for the War

Some foreign powers appear to have taken sides in the war, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which UN sanctions monitors have named as backing the RSF, as well as Iran, Qatar, and Egypt, which have reportedly supported the SAF. Unnamed U.S. officials confirmed the UAE’s use of an airport in Chad to support RSF drone operations and smuggle weapons into Darfur in 2024, purportedly using humanitarian aid as cover. The UAE denies the allegations.

Press reports suggest the RSF and SAF have also received support from Russia and Ukraine. Russia, which reportedly benefited from gold smuggled from Sudan to help finance its invasion of Ukraine and circumvent sanctions, has been linked to both parties. Early in the war, the U.S. Treasury Department identified Russia’s Wagner Group as supplying surface-to-air missiles to the RSF. Ukrainian forces, meanwhile, have reportedly provided some support to the SAF. Moscow has since reportedly offered support to the SAF-led government as part of a deal that could enable Russia to build a naval outpost on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.

International Responses

Some observers have described Sudan as a “forgotten” crisis, and, in an already fragile region, some warn that Africa’s third largest country risks becoming a failed state. Peace initiatives have proliferated, but have not stopped the fighting. UN Security Council action since the war began has been limited. The UN estimates $4.2 billion will be needed for the humanitarian response in 2025. The United States, Sudan’s largest humanitarian donor, provided over $1 billion in FY2024 humanitarian aid for the crisis.

U.S. Peace Efforts

The United States has been involved in peacemaking in Sudan for over 25 years, and Congress has been active in shaping U.S. policy toward the country. U.S. relations with Bashir’s Islamist regime were poor, and his exit spurred optimism and warming ties. Members of Congress expressed broad support for a transition to democracy in Sudan, including after the 2021 coup. U.S. diplomats pushed a deal to resolve the post-coup crisis; some critics say the plan became a “pressure cooker” that escalated tensions among the generals. After the fighting started in 2023, the U.S. embassy in Khartoum suspended operations and evacuated personnel; some later relocated to Ethiopia.

The United States partnered with Saudi Arabia in 2023 to cohost ceasefire talks between the SAF and RSF in Jeddah. Early on, the parties signed a declaration committing to maintain Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, respect international humanitarian law, and protect civilians; they have not adhered to it. Some observers criticized the Jeddah process, which collapsed in late 2023, for excluding civilians and key external actors like the UAE and Egypt.

President Joe Biden appointed a Special Envoy for Sudan, former congressman Tom Perriello, in early 2024, and the United States launched a new platform for talks mid-year. The U.S. initiative, termed the ALPS Group, was cohosted by Switzerland and Saudi Arabia with the UN, African Union, Egypt, and UAE as observers. It sought to reach a cessation of hostilities, enable aid access, and develop a mechanism to confirm compliance with any deal. The RSF attended; the SAF did not. Some observers attributed the SAF boycott to divisions in the military-led government; others questioned whether either side was ready to stop fighting. ALPS Group pressure led to commitments from both parties to open aid routes, but impediments persist.

The new administration and Congress will face decisions on whether and how to pursue peace in Sudan. The United States has played a leading role among international actors there, but U.S. engagement has drawn some critiques, including from Members of Congress, and some say Sudan lacked high-level attention under Biden. U.S. relations with actors in the Middle East add complications. Some experts have called for more U.S. focus on civilian protection and humanitarian access; some urge more support for local aid efforts. Some have called for a review of U.S. sanctions strategy. The Biden Administration sanctioned 14 persons and 17 entities under Executive Order 14098, issued after the war began. Congress and the Trump Administration may debate options for increasing pressure on the warring parties and their external facilitators. As officials weigh proposals for stabilizing Sudan and pursuing accountability, some advocates argue for more focus on civilian initiatives to chart Sudan’s future; some regional actors may push for a new power-sharing deal with Sudan’s generals. P.L. 118- 159 requires the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint a new Special Envoy for Sudan.

Legislation in the 118th Congress included S.Res. 933, H.R. 10268, S. 5327, S.Res. 831, H.Res. 1328, S. 4475, S.Res. 559, H.Res. 982, S.Con.Res. 24, and H.Res. 585.

Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs

IF12816

The War and Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12816 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED

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