Taiwan’s Position in the World

Taiwan’s Position in the World

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April 29, 2024
Taiwan’s Position in the World
Introduction
countries are choosing to forego diplomatic relations with
Taiwan, the self-governing Asian democracy that also calls
the PRC and to recognize Taiwan diplomatically as the
itself the “Republic of China” (ROC), has struggled to
ROC (see Figure 1). When Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen
maintain “international space” for itself in the world. The
took office in May 2016, Taiwan had 22 diplomatic
People’s Republic of China (PRC), with its capital in
partners. Since then, 10 partners have switched diplomatic
Beijing, has never controlled Taiwan, but claims
recognition to the PRC: Sao Tome and Príncipe (2016),
sovereignty over it and has vowed to “unify” with it, by
Panama (2017), Dominican Republic (2018), Burkina Faso
force if necessary. As part of its effort to pressure Taiwan to
(2018), El Salvador (2018), Solomon Islands (2019),
accept unification, the PRC has spent decades seeking to
Kiribati (2019), Nicaragua (2021), Honduras (2023), and
isolate Taiwan internationally.
Nauru (2024). An eleventh partner, the Gambia, broke
relations with Taiwan in 2013 and established diplomatic
The United States terminated diplomatic relations with the
relations with the PRC in 2016, after Tsai’s election but
ROC on January 1, 1979, in order to establish diplomatic
before her inauguration.
relations with the PRC. Following this diplomatic break,
Congress passed the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L.
Figure 1. Taiwan’s Diplomatic Partners (April 2024)
96-8; 22 U.S.C. §§3301 et seq.). Section 4(d) of the TRA
offers U.S. support for Taiwan continuing to occupy one
form of international space: membership in international
organizations. The provision states, “Nothing in this Act
may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or
expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any
international financial institution or any other international
organization.” Since a Taiwan policy review in 1994, U.S.
policy has been to support Taiwan’s membership in
international organizations for which statehood is not a
requirement for membership, and to encourage “meaningful
participation” for Taiwan in organizations in which its
membership is not possible. Other major areas of U.S.
effort today include helping Taiwan shore up its remaining
diplomatic relationships and expand its unofficial
relationships around the world.
The Biden Administration has argued for a need to support
Taiwan’s ability to “contribute its valuable expertise to
address global challenges.” Also driving U.S. government
efforts appears to be an assessment that efforts to broaden
and deepen international support for Taiwan could help
deter the PRC from seeking to absorb Taiwan by force. The
PRC alleges that, “To help Taiwan expand its ‘international

space,’” the United States is, “inducing other countries to
Source: CRS graphic by Mari Y. Lee.
interfere in Taiwan affairs, and concocting Taiwan-related
bills that infringe upon the sovereignty of China.” The PRC
Taiwan relies on its diplomatic partners to advocate for it at
charges that these and other U.S. efforts feed resistance in
the United Nations and in other international fora from
Taiwan to peaceful unification—or in the PRC
which it is absent. Taiwan’s diplomatic partners also
government’s words, “incite separatist forces to create
provide opportunities for Taiwan leaders to make official
tension and turmoil in cross-Straits [sic] relations.”
trips abroad—and transit visits through the United States on
Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for its part, accuses
the outbound and inbound legs of such journeys. (See CRS
the PRC of having “never ceased in its attempts to suppress
In Focus IF12371, Taiwan Presidents’ U.S. Transit Visits.)
Taiwan’s international space” and “acted with malign intent
Although the U.S. government itself does not recognize
to disrupt Taiwan’s relations with diplomatic allies.”
Taiwan diplomatically, it seeks to dissuade other countries
from breaking diplomatic relations with Taiwan. When
Taiwan’s Diplomatic Partners
Nauru switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the
As a condition for establishing diplomatic relations, the
PRC in January 2024, a Department of State spokesperson
PRC requires all its diplomatic partners to agree to engage
acknowledged the action as “a sovereign decision,” but said
with Taiwan only unofficially. As of April 2024, a dozen
it was “nonetheless a disappointing one.” In March 2024,
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Taiwan’s Position in the World
the White House stated that it “strongly opposes” Senate-
“the United Nations considers ‘Taiwan’ as a province of
passed S.J.Res. 62, which would nullify a Department of
China with no separate status.”
Agriculture rule opening the U.S. market to beef from
Paraguay, Taiwan’s last remaining diplomatic partner in
A statement of congressional findings in Section 5516 of
South America. Among the White House’s objections was
the TERA, on the other hand, states that UNGA Resolution
that, “Access to the U.S. market is critical for Paraguay ...
2758 “does not address the issue of representation of
to withstand pressure from the PRC to withdraw diplomatic
Taiwan and its people at the United Nations, nor does it
recognition of Taiwan.”
give the PRC the right to represent the people of Taiwan.”
TISA would amend the TAIPEI Act to state that UNGA
The Taiwan Allies International Protection and
Resolution 2758 “did not address the issue of representation
Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-
of Taiwan and its people in the United Nations or any
135), as amended by the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act
related organizations,” and that it is U.S. policy to instruct
(TERA; Title LV, Subtitle A of the James M. Inhofe
U.S. government representatives to advocate for
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2023,
international organizations “to resist the [PRC’s] efforts to
P.L. 117-263), states that it is U.S. policy “to support
distort the decisions, language, policies, or procedures of
Taiwan’s diplomatic relations with governments and
such organizations regarding Taiwan.”
countries.” In the 118th Congress, the House-passed Taiwan
International Solidarity Act (TISA, H.R. 1176) would
In 2021, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken encouraged
amend the TAIPEI Act to encourage U.S. allies and
U.N. member states to join the United States “in supporting
partners “to oppose the [PRC’s] efforts to undermine
Taiwan’s robust, meaningful participation throughout the
Taiwan’s official diplomatic relationships and its
U.N. system and in the international community.” Since
partnerships with countries with which it does not maintain
then, representatives of the U.S. Department of State and
diplomatic relations.” U.S. efforts to assist Taiwan in
Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs have met twice-yearly
strengthening its relationships with its diplomatic partners
to discuss “expanding Taiwan’s participation at the United
include joint development assistance and private sector
Nations and in other international fora.”
investment cooperation.
Taiwan is a full member of such bodies as the World Trade
Taiwan’s Unofficial Relations
Organization (WTO), the Asian Development Bank (ADB),
Taiwan maintains unofficial representative offices in 62
and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum,
U.N. member states, plus the European Union and the self-
as an economy or a separate customs territory, not a state,
declared republic of Somaliland. It opened three new such
and, at the PRC’s insistence, not under the name “Taiwan.”
offices in 2023, in Montreal, Milan, and Mumbai. In the
(In the ADB, it is “Taipei, China.” In APEC, it is “Chinese
United States, Taiwan’s unofficial office is known as the
Taipei.”) The PRC has sought to exclude Taiwan from
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office
other organizations, including U.N. specialized agencies.
(TECRO). U.S. government efforts to support Taiwan’s
Taiwan is not a member of the World Health Assembly
unofficial relationships include the Global Cooperation and
(WHA)—the governing body of the World Health
Training Framework (GCTF), a platform for Taiwan to
Organization—for example, or of the International Civil
share its expertise with global partners through training
Aviation Organization (ICAO). With PRC assent, Taiwan
workshops in Taiwan and abroad. Launched in 2015, GCTF
attended the WHA as an observer from 2009 to 2016. After
now counts Australia’s and Japan’s unofficial offices in
President Tsai’s election in 2016, the PRC objected to
Taiwan as co-administrators. Congress made available $4
Taiwan’s WHA participation and invitations to Taiwan
million for GCTF in FY2023 (P.L. 117-328), and $4
stopped. The PRC acquiesced to Taiwan’s attending
million again in FY2024 (P.L. 118-47).
ICAO’s 2013 triennial meeting as a guest of ICAO’s
president, but Taiwan has received no invitations since.
International Organizations
The ROC was a founding member of the United Nations in
The TAIPEI Act, as amended by the TERA, states that it is
1945. It retained the “China” seat in the General Assembly
U.S. policy to advocate “for Taiwan’s membership in all
and on the Security Council after 1949, when its
international organizations in which statehood is not a
government retreated from mainland China and re-located
requirement and in which the United States is also a
to Taiwan. In 1971, U.N. General Assembly (UNGA)
participant,” and “for Taiwan to be granted observer status
Resolution 2758 (XXVI) recognized representatives of the
in other appropriate international organizations.” Section
PRC as “the only legitimate representatives of China to the
5518 of the TERA directs the Secretary of State to identify
United Nations,” and expelled “the representatives of
“no more than 20” international organizations in which the
Chiang Kai-shek,” the ROC’s then-president. PRC
U.S. government “will prioritize for using its voice, vote,
representatives replaced those of the ROC in both UNGA
and influence to advance Taiwan’s meaningful
and the Security Council, as the PRC assumed the rights
participation” from 2022 to 2025. In the 118th Congress, the
and obligations of China as a U.N. member state.
House-passed Taiwan Non-Discrimination Act (H.R. 540)
would require U.S. support for Taiwan’s membership in the
Interpretations of UNGA Resolution 2758 vary. In a 2022
International Monetary Fund, a U.N. specialized agency
government White Paper, the PRC insisted that the
that confines membership to “countries.”
resolution “settled once and for all the political, legal and
procedural issues of China’s representation in the U.N., and
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
it covered the whole country, including Taiwan.” The U.N.
Secretariat’s Office of Legal Affairs stated in 2010 that,
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Taiwan’s Position in the World

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