China and the World: Issues for Congress

China and the World: Issues for Congress

December 7, 2022
China and the World: Issues for Congress
The Biden Administration has described the United States
energy; acquire foreign technology and related
as engaged in “a strategic competition to shape the future of
capabilities; and build infrastructure. Members of
the international order,” with the United States’ main
Congress have sought to address the growing role of the
competitor being the People’s Republic of China (PRC or
PRC state (i.e., Communist Party, military, and
China), led by the Communist Party of China (CPC). U.S.
government) in the commercial ecosystem and in
policymakers and analysts assess many CPC ambitions and
supporting and directing PRC industries’ operations,
PRC actions as challenging the U.S. national interest and
both overseas and domestically. Members have also
U.S. global leadership. Debates concerning China,
sought to address asymmetrical market access terms the
including in the U.S. Congress, center on how to respond to
PRC sets for foreign firms, under which China restricts
or counter negative aspects of the PRC’s growing global
foreign firms’ ability to compete in China even as PRC
influence, including PRC actions that may be coercive or
firms expand and acquire foreign firms and capabilities
otherwise undermine longstanding international rules and
in the same sectors overseas. Members have sought to
norms. Legislation and congressional oversight have often
strengthen U.S. authorities and collaboration with like-
sought to press the executive branch to act in areas in which
minded countries to address PRC industrial policies that
it has existing authorities, but, in Congress’s assessment,
require technology transfer to China and incentivize
has not acted sufficiently to address PRC activities.
China’s acquisition of foreign technology by all means,
including theft.
China’s Stated Ambitions
 Belt and Road. Through its Belt and Road Initiative
At the CPC’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022, China’s
(BRI), also known as “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR),
top leader, CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping, outlined goals
launched in 2013, the PRC has sought to develop China-
the CPC has set for China to reach in the lead up to 2049, the
centered and China-controlled global infrastructure,
centennial of the founding of the PRC.
transportation, trade, production networks, and

standards. The PRC states that it has signed documents

By 2027, the CPC’s aims include to “further increase
China’s international standing and influence” and “enable
outlining BRI cooperation with 149 countries and 32
China to play a greater role in global governance.”
international organizations. In 2018, Congress passed
legislation to restructure existing U.S. development

By 2035, the CPC’s aims include to “[s]ignificantly
financing authorities to provide developing countries
increase economic strength, scientific and technological
alternatives to PRC investment and financing.
capabilities, and composite national strength,” “[b]ecome

a leading country in education, science and technology,
International Organizations. China has sought
talent, culture, sports, and health,” “significantly enhance
influence in the United Nations and global technical
national soft power,” and “achieve basic modernization
bodies to legitimize its approach to such diverse issues
of national defense and the armed forces.”
as Taiwan, human rights, and the role of the state in the
economy. As China’s economic heft has grown, so has

By 2049, the CPC’s aims include to build China into “a
its ability to affect outcomes within these institutions.
great modern socialist country that leads the world in
China has steadily increased its role in the World Bank,
terms of composite national strength and international
the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade
influence,” and to make its military, the People’s
Organization. It has also increased its involvement in
Liberation Army (PLA), a “world-class” force.
technical and standard-setting bodies of the UN and
Regarding Taiwan, the self-governed island democracy of 23
other institutions. Members have sought to counter
mil ion people over which the PRC claims sovereignty, Xi
China’s influence in these bodies by seeking to expand
stated, as he has done before, that “realizing China’s complete
the U.S. role and by pressing for more active
reunification”—meaning achieving PRC control of Taiwan—is
collaboration with like-minded countries in these fora.
“a natural requirement for realizing the rejuvenation of the
 Coercion. The PRC has increasingly engaged in
Chinese nation.” Xi said the CPC would “continue to strive
sustained, punitive campaigns of diplomatic and
for peaceful reunification,” while reiterating that it would
economic pressure against governments and commercial
“never promise to renounce the use of force.”
actors the CPC deems to be challenging China’s
interests. In 2021, the PRC cut off direct and secondary
The PRC’s Global Presence
trade with U.S. ally Lithuania over Vilnius’ approval of
Examples of the PRC’s
an unofficial Taiwanese Representative Office. In 2020,
growing global presence and
the PRC targeted U.S. ally Australia after Canberra
congressional responses include:
called for an independent inquiry into the origins of the
 Trade and Investment. China has become a top global
COVID-19 pandemic. Members have sought to support
investor and financier as its companies have moved
governments and firms subjected to such coercion.
offshore to access raw materials, commodities, and
https://crsreports.congress.gov

China and the World: Issues for Congress
 Discourse. The PRC has increasingly sought to shape
With U.S. encouragement, the North Atlantic Treaty
global discourse about China and the United States. It
Organization (NATO), the European Union, and individual
has invested heavily in expanding the global reach of its
U.S. allies and partners have joined the United States in
state media organizations, undertaken disinformation
expressing concerns about PRC ambitions and activities.
campaigns, and pressured international organizations,
Maintaining policy alignment has nonetheless proved
governments, and corporations to include PRC-
challenging at times. Factors such as economic dependence
approved language in their official documents and
on China, geographic proximity to China, discomfort with
speeches. Members of Congress have responded, in part,
the Biden Administration’s framing of competition in terms
by establishing the State Department’s Global
of democracy versus autocracy, and concerns about
Engagement Center and increasing funding for entities
competition leading to conflict shape some governments’
overseen by the U.S. Agency for Global Media.
responses. The Administration’s NSS notes that, “Some
 Diplomacy. The PRC has established new fora to
parts of the world are uneasy with the competition between
facilitate its engagement across whole regions, such as
the United States and the world’s largest autocracies,”
its Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. The PRC has
adding, “We do not seek conflict or a new Cold War.”
also sought to expand the influence of other groupings
Congress’ Role in China Policy
that do not include the United States, including the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whose eight full
Congress has sought to influence U.S. policy toward China
members include Russia. Members have sought to step
in both its oversight and legislative roles. Hearings during
up U.S. regional engagement, including through
the 117th Congress, for example, covered such topics as
appropriations earmarked for countering PRC influence.
Taiwan policy, U.S.-China relations, U.S.-European

cooperation on China, China’s role in Latin America and
Military Operations. The PLA maintains a regular
the Caribbean, countering the PRC’s “Economic and
presence in China’s immediate maritime periphery and,
following House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022
Technological Plan for Dominance,” and the impact of PRC
lending on international debt architecture.
visit to Taiwan, increased its military activity around
Taiwan. The PLA also increasingly operates beyond the
Legislative approaches take many forms, from sense of
Western Pacific. The PLA Navy has conducted
Congress statements to legislative directives to legislative
continuous anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden since
restrictions and funding denials. In the 117th Congress, both
2008, undertaken military diplomacy around the world,
chambers undertook committee action on comprehensive
and conducted joint military exercises and patrols with
China-related bills, including S. 1260 and H.R. 3524.
its partners—primarily Russia—in the Bering Sea,
Among those bills enacted into law were P.L. 117-78,
Mediterranean Sea, Central Asia, Baltic Sea, East China
which bars the import of goods made with forced labor in
Sea, and elsewhere. Members of Congress have sought
China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and
to strengthen the U.S. military’s ability to compete and
the
to bolster Taiwan’s defenses.
CHIPS Act (P.L. 117-167), which seeks to strengthen U.S.

technological competitiveness through investments in U.S.
 Military Ties. The PRC also maintains military ties
semiconductor manufacturing. In addition, H.R. 7776
with U.S. partners and allies, such as Thailand and the
would include multiple provisions related to China and
Philippines, is a top contributor of personnel to UN
Taiwan, including the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act.
peacekeeping missions, and operates a military base in
Djibouti. The U.S. Department of Defense reports that
Questions for the 118th Congress
the PRC may be considering the establishment of
Some Members have announced plans to establish a House
multiple new military bases around the world.
select committee on China in the 118th Congress. Questions
U.S. and Ally/Partner Responses
the 118th Congress may face include how best to deter the
PRC from use of force against Taiwan, how to effectively
In its October 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), the
support human rights in China, and how to build on areas of
Biden Administration assessed China’s ambitions as being
common concern and address areas of misalignment with
“to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-
allies and partners on China policy. In considering
Pacific and to become the world’s leading power.” The
coordination with like-minded countries, Congress may
NSS describes the PRC as, “the only competitor with both
face questions concerning how best to address China’s
the intent to reshape the international order and,
statist economic and technology practices and reinforce the
increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and
principles underlying the current global system. More
technological power to advance that objective.”
broadly, Congress may face questions of whether the
United States should seek to maintain primacy in the Indo-
The Administration has focused on coordinating with allies
Pacific and globally, and if so, what costs, risks, and
and partners to shape the strategic environment in which
benefits would be required to resource long-term military,
China operates. This approach seeks to amplify U.S.
economic, and diplomatic competition with China.
messages and make it harder for the PRC to play U.S. allies
and partners against each other. The Administration has
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
stated that it seeks to “invest in the underlying sources and
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
tools of American power and influence” and maintain “an
enduring competitive edge over the PRC.” The Department
Karen M. Sutter, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
of Defense treats China as its “pacing threat,” with a
IF12271
Taiwan contingency the “pacing scenario” for which the
U.S. military is preparing.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

China and the World: Issues for Congress

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12271 · VERSION 1 · NEW