2022 Nuclear Posture Review

2022 Nuclear Posture Review

December 6, 2022
2022 Nuclear Posture Review
On October 27, 2022, the Department of Defense (DOD)
must never be fought,” and that “nuclear weapons should
published the unclassified 2022 Nuclear Posture Review
serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent
(NPR). (Unless otherwise noted, all quotations and
war.”
statements of U.S. positions are from the NPR text). DOD
The United States “will not use or threaten to use nuclear
published this review, the first since 2018, in the same
weapons” against nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to the
document as the 2022 National Defense Strategy and the
nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that are “in
2022 Missile Defense Review. The NPR describes U.S.
“nuclear strategy, policy, posture, and forces” and
compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation
“reaffirms a continuing commitment to a safe, secure, and
obligations.” The review rejects declaratory policies known
as No First Use and Sole Purpose because such policies
effective nuclear deterrent and strong and credible extended
deterrence.”
“would result in an unacceptable level of risk” given “the

range of non-nuclear capabilities being developed and
For Congress, the NPR covers subjects such as nuclear
fielded by competitors.”
weapons employment guidance, as well as nuclear weapons
“Central to U.S. deterrence strategy is the credibility of our
production and associated infrastructure, that directly affect
nuclear forces to hold at risk what adversary leadership
legislative and oversight considerations. The U.S.
government “will update nuclear weapons employment
values most,” the NPR states, adding that effective nuclear
guidance,” last published in 2020.
deterrence “requires tailored strategies for potential

adversaries that reflect our best understanding of their
The United States aims to “continue to deploy a nuclear
decision-making and perceptions.” The document, however,
triad consisting of nuclear warheads” deliverable by aircraft
neither explains the reasoning underlying target selection
and submarine- and land-based missiles. The United States
nor provides detail about specific U.S. nuclear-weapons
is “fully committed” to nuclear weapons modernization
missions.
programs, but it does not plan to conduct nuclear explosive
The United States “would only consider the use of nuclear
tests or resume producing fissile material. The NPR
weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital
similarly expresses support for modernizing the U.S.
interests of the United States or its Allies and partners,”
nuclear command, control, and communications system, as
according to the review, which also discusses the potential
well as the production and support infrastructure.
role of nonnuclear U.S. capabilities in deterring nuclear
The nuclear weapons modernization programs include the
attacks. Part of a schema termed “integrated deterrence” by
Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program
the NPR, this approach is meant to incorporate “suitable
(formerly known as the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent)
non-nuclear capabilities tailored to specific threat
to replace the Minuteman III ICBM; the COLUMBIA-class
scenarios.” The NPR lists three roles for nuclear weapons:
ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to replace the OHIO-
deter strategic attacks, assure allies and partners, and
class SSBN; the W93 program to produce a new warhead
achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails.
for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); B-52H
bomber modernization; the B-21 bomber to replace the B-
Deter Strategic Attacks
2A Spirit long-range bomber; the long-range standoff cruise
The U.S. nuclear arsenal must deter “all forms of strategic
missile to replace the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM);
attack,” including “nuclear employment of any scale
and the W76-2 low yield SLBM warhead. The NPR also
directed against the U.S. homeland or the territory of Allies
announces retirement of the B-83-1 gravity bomb and
and partners,” according to the NPR, which adds that any
cancelation of the nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise
“adversary use of nuclear weapons ... would fundamentally
Missile program.
alter the nature of a conflict, create the potential for
uncontrolled escalation, and have strategic effects.”
The NPR stipulates several times the need for “flexible”
U.S.
“capability to deter limited nuclear attacks” is necessary for
U.S. nuclear forces. The document does not define this
deterring attacks with nonnuclear weapons because some
term, but names assets such as ALCMs, the W76-2 SLBM
potential adversaries “may rely on the threat of nuclear
warhead, globally deployable bombers, and dual-capable
escalation in order to terminate a [conventional] conflict on
fighter aircraft as examples.
advantageous terms.” The United States requires nuclear
Purpose of Nuclear Weapons
weapons to deter “a narrow range of other high
The “fundamental role” of the U.S. nuclear a
consequence, strategic-level attacks.”
rsenal is to
deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies and
Repeatedly citing the Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals
partners. The NPR reiterates a January 2022 statement by
as key drivers of U.S. nuclear posture, the NPR posits that
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
the United States will “face two major nuclear powers as
States stipulating that “a nuclear war cannot be won and
strategic competitors and potential adversaries” by the
https://crsreports.congress.gov

2022 Nuclear Posture Review
2030s. This situation will “create new stresses on stability
posture.” Since 2014, “NATO has taken steps to ensure a
and new challenges for deterrence, assurance, arms control,
modern, ready, and credible” nuclear deterrent, including
and risk reduction.” Moreover, the U.S. nuclear arsenal
“modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons forward-deployed in
must be able to deter “opportunistic aggression” from China
Europe” and “transitioning to a new generation of fighter
or Russia if the United States is engaged in a military
aircraft.” However, additional steps “are needed to fully
conflict with the other country.
adapt these forces to current and emerging security
conditions.”
China is “a growing factor

in evaluating” the U.S. nuclear
deterrent, because Beijing “has embarked on an ambitious
Achieve U.S. Objectives If Deterrence Fails
expansion, modernization, and diversification of its nuclear
forces.”
The NPR does not describe this mission in detail. But the
China’s acquisition of additional nuclear options
could allow China to “include nuclear coercion
document does explain that, should deterrence fail, “the
and limited
United States would seek to end any conflict at the lowest
nuclear first use” in Beijing’s nuclear employment strategy.
The U.S. “flexible deterrence strategy and force posture” is
level of damage possible on the best achievable terms”—
meant to prevent Beijing “from mistakenly concluding that
language implying that the United States might use nuclear
weapons for purposes other than deterrence.
it could gain advantage through any employment of nuclear
weapons.”
Other Missions
Russia “continues to emphasize nuclear weapons in its
The NPR emphasizes the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in
strategy, modernize and expand its nuclear forces, and
preventing an escalation of conventional military conflicts
brandish its nuclear weapons in support of its revisionist
and the attendant risk of nuclear weapons use. U.S.
security policy.” Moscow’s “combination of strategic and
deterrence strategies “will follow guidelines for managing
non-strategic nuclear forces” enables nuclear weapons uses
escalation risk,” and the United States “will seek to manage
“ranging from large-scale attacks on the homeland to
escalation risk by addressing” potential “adversary
limited strikes in support of a regional military campaign.”
misperceptions ... regarding U.S. resolve, capabilities,
Russia is likely to deploy additional nuclear weapons, the
strategic intentions, or war aims.”
NPR indicates, adding that flexible U.S. nuclear capabilities
“are key to ensuring that Russia’s leadership does not
The NPR suggests that the United States may use nuclear
weapons in circumstances that do not involve potential
miscalculate regarding the consequences of nuclear use on
adversaries’
any scale.”
potential use of nuclear weapons. For example,
Such a U.S. posture would help dissuade
nuclear weapons must deter a limited number of “high
Moscow from either initiating a “conventional war against
NATO” or contemplating
consequence, strategic-level attacks,” according to the
employing “non-strategic nuclear
document, which implies that Chinese or Russian strikes
weapons in such a conflict.”
with chemical or biological weapons or “cyber, space,
The NPR warns that any North Korean use of nuclear
information,” or advanced conventional capabilities might
weapons “against the United States or its Allies and
constitute such attacks. The review also asserts that an
partners ... will result in the end of that regime.” The review
“effective nuclear deterrent is foundational to broader U.S.
also notes that U.S. nuclear weapons “play a role in
defense strategy,” but does not elaborate.
deterring” North Korean regional nonnuclear attacks,
possibly a reference to potential North Korean use of
Arms Control
chemical, biological, or conventional weapons.
The NPR explains that, in addition to nuclear deterrence,
“arms control, risk reduction, and nuclear nonproliferation
Assure Allies and Partners
play indispensable roles in further reducing nuclear
The NPR explains that “U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is
dangers” and are “mutually reinforcing tools for preserving
foundational” to the “network” of U.S. alliances and partner
stability, deterring aggression and escalation, and avoiding
countries; assuring such governments that U.S.
arms racing and nuclear war.” The review asserts that the
commitments to those countries are “credible is central to
United States “will pursue new arms control arrangements
U.S. national security and defense strategy.” Extended
that address the full range of nuclear threats.”
deterrence also “contributes to U.S. non-proliferation goals”
The NPR expresses support for negotiation of “a new arms
by obviating those countries’ perceived need for their own
control framework to replace” the New START treaty with
nuclear weapons.
Russia, which expires in 2026. Such negotiations “will need
The document also notes that the United States “will
to account for the PRC’s nuclear expansion,” according to
collaborate with Allies and partners to tailor extended
the document, which also advocates U.S. talks with China
deterrence and assurance policies.” Regarding the Indo-
on a “full range of strategic issues,” including “military de-
Pacific region, the NPR explains that the United States
confliction, crisis communications, information sharing,
“will continue to field flexible nuclear forces suited to
mutual restraint, risk reduction, emerging technologies, and
deterring regional nuclear conflict,” and expresses the need
approaches to nuclear arms control.” The review also
for “a cooperative approach between the United States and
expresses support for the NPT and other components of the
Allies in decision-making related to nuclear deterrence
nuclear nonproliferation regime, as well as adoption of the
policy.”
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and negotiation of a Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty.
As for the Euro-Atlantic Region, the review explains that,
along with British and French nuclear forces and NATO’s
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
“nuclear burden-sharing arrangements, U.S. nuclear forces
remain essential to the Alliance’s deterrence and defense
IF12266
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2022 Nuclear Posture Review

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