National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center

National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center

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September 30, 2022
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center
The National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center
Commission”). Among the Commission’s
(NCBC), originally established by Congress in 2005 as the
recommendations included establishment of a National
National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC), is one of
Counter Proliferation Center to play a “management and
three mission centers within the Office of the Director of
coordination function by overseeing analysis and collection
National Intelligence (ODNI), along with the National
on nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons across the
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the National
Intelligence Community.” Acting on the Commission’s
Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC).
recommendation, Congress established the National
Since its establishment, NCBC has been the primary U.S.
Counteproliferation Center in 2005 through a provision of
intelligence organization managing the collection, analysis,
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
and dissemination of intelligence on the proliferation of
(IRTPA) of 2004 (P.L. 108-458, codified as 50 U.S.C.
nuclear, biological, radiological, and chemical weapons of
§3057).
mass destruction (WMD), their technologies, materials,
expertise, and delivery systems.
NCBC Overview
In the context of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) appoints the
19) pandemic, Congress has expressed interest in improving
NCBC director, who reports directly to the DNI. The
collaboration among experts inside and outside the
NCBC director is the intelligence community’s manager for
government on matters relating to public health
WMD, responsible for advising the DNI on WMD issues,
emergencies. Congress enacted Section 401 of the
and overseeing requirements and coordinating collection
Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Year (FY)
and analysis on WMD-related intelligence from different
2022 (Division X of P.L. 117-103) to provide NCPC with a
elements of the intelligence community.
new biosecurity mission. This provision amended the
NCBC’s organization includes four directorates: the
National Security Act of 1947 to rename NCPC as the
Directorate of Resource Management and Investment, the
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, and
Directorate of Intelligence Integration, the Directorate of
expanded the Center’s authorities to include management of
Interdiction and Counterproliferation Facilitation, and the
intelligence on “emerging foreign biological threats,
Directorate of Advanced Concepts and Tradecraft.
including diseases with pandemic potential.”
Together, these directorates focus on five mission areas (see
Background
Figure 1).
The rationale for establishing an intelligence center
Figure 1. NCBC Mission Areas
dedicated to managing and integrating intelligence on
proliferation of WMD developed from incidents that
underscored the threat to U.S. national security of terrorists
using these weapons. In 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo sarin
nerve agent attack on the Tokyo subway, which killed 14
people and wounded thousands, led to President William J.
Clinton to issue Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39,
U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism. PDD 39, in part, directed
government departments and agencies to take protective
measures against terrorist use of WMD and stated that:
The United States shall give the highest priority to
developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent
defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear,

biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons
Source: CRS graphic based on 50 U.S.C. §3057.
use by terrorists.
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the National
WMD Counterproliferation Support
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
The initial focus of the Center was the threat of the use of
(the “9/11 Commission”) recommended establishing a
WMD by foreign terrorists or government adversaries. The
national intelligence center to manage intelligence related
Center is the primary organization in the United States to
to WMD proliferation. On February 6, 2004, in response to
manage the integration of intelligence on the proliferation
the debate over the apparently erroneous 2002 intelligence
of WMD, their delivery systems, technology and materials.
assessment that Saddam Hussein possessed chemical
The Center’s statutory responsibilities include:
weapons at that time, President George W. Bush signed
 ensuring full access to intelligence supporting
Executive Order (E.O.) 13328 establishing the Commission
counterproliferation programs, and disseminating timely
on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
intelligence on proliferation threats to the President,
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (the “WMD
Congress, and appropriate departments and agencies;
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National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center
 maintaining a central repository of intelligence on
 promoting information sharing on intelligence and
proliferation threats;
information related to foreign biological threats; and


conducting net assessments and warnings of
identifying gaps in the capabilities of the intelligence
proliferation threats;
community to collect on biosecurity and foreign

biological threats.
coordinating counterproliferation plans and activities of
Other elements of the intelligence community, such as the
various U.S. departments and agencies; and
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security
 conducting strategic operational counterproliferation
Agency (NSA), and Defense Intelligence Agency through
planning.
its National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI), have
For much of its existence, the Center’s focus has also been
the capability to support NCBC’s mission with the
on the potential for Al Qaeda, or other foreign terrorists to
collection of foreign intelligence on biosecurity threats.
acquire and deploy chemical or biological weapons. The
Potential Questions for Congress
intelligence community also has devoted attention to
Congress may consider the following lines of inquiry as it
Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea’s WMD technology
conducts oversight of NCBC activities.
and proliferation activities. Some observers have suggested
that the overwhelming superiority of U.S. conventional
What is NCBC’s strategy for recruiting and
forces could provide greater incentive for otherwise
outmatched foreign adversaries to use WMD, underscoring
retaining analysts with the requisite
the importance of the Center’s capabilities to provide
expertise to support its expanded
detection and early warning of proliferation developments.
Evolution of NCBC’s Biosecurity Mission
biosecurity mission?
The Director of National Intelligence’s annual Worldwide
 In what ways has NCBC been able to expand its
Threat Assessments briefed to Congress have regularly
collaboration with public health professionals in the
included a general warning underscoring the potentially
private sector and other agencies of the government to
devastating human and economic costs posed by the threat
support its biosecurity mission?
of a pandemic or global health emergency. With the
 In what ways has NCBC promoted the sharing of
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing
releasable information on biosecurity issues with its
Innovation Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-22 §402, enacted June 24,
partners in the government and private sector?
2019), the intelligence community became integrated with
the government-wide Public Health Emergency Medical
Related CRS Products
Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) network. The
CRS In Focus IF11537, Intelligence Community Support to
purpose of this network is to enable the U.S. government to
Pandemic Preparedness and Response, by Michael E. DeVine
more effectively monitor and respond to a global health
emergency. Despite this legislation, the COVID-19
CRS In Focus IF10525, Defense Primer: National and Defense
pandemic generated congressional concern as to whether
Intelligence, by Michael E. DeVine
the intelligence community gave adequate priority and was
sufficiently resourced to address intelligence requirements
Relevant Legislation
related to a similar public health emergency. A 2021 House
50 U.S.C. §3057, National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) study
Center
concluded that the intelligence community could be better
postured to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence
50 U.S.C. §3024, Responsibilities and Authorities of the Director of
that provided warning of foreign biological threats.
National Intelligence
Addressing the same concern in an address to intelligence
50 U.S.C. §3025, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
professionals at the Office of the DNI, July 27, 2021,
42 U.S.C. §300hh, Public Health Emergency Medical
President Joseph R. Biden remarked, “You’re going to have
Countermeasures Enterprise
to increase your ranks with people with significant
scientific capacity relative to pathogens.” Congress acted to
Other Resources
strengthen the authorities of the Center to more effectively
respond to similar public health threats in the future. The
E.O. 12333, United States Intelligence Activities
FY2022 IAA (P.L. 117-103) gives NCBC responsibility for
Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39, U.S. Policy on
managing intelligence on biosecurity threats, including,
Counterterrorism, June 21, 1995 (declassified)
 ensuring that elements of the intelligence community
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon
provide timely and effective warning to the President
the United States (the “9/11 Commission Report”), 2004
and DNI on emerging foreign biological threats,
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
including diseases with the potential to develop into
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President
pandemics;

of the United States, March 31, 2005.
overseeing and coordinating the collection, analysis and
dissemination of intelligence on biosecurity and foreign

biological threats in support of the intelligence
requirements of the Federal departments and agencies
Michael E. DeVine, Analyst in Intelligence and National
responsible for public health;
Security
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National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center

IF12223

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