Twenty Years of Military Operations in Afghanistan: Key Questions

Twenty Years of Military Operations in Afghanistan: Key Questions

September 27, 2021
Twenty Years of Military Operations in Afghanistan:
Key Questions
After 20 years of operations, training, investment and
Different coalition countries led Provincial Reconstruction
capacity building, the swift collapse of the Afghan National
Teams (PRTs) and clustered their military forces’ presence
Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), followed by the
and activities around their respective PRT’s activities.
Taliban’s takeover of the country, is prompting debate on
National capitals therefore had de facto decisionmaking
how such a significant strategic setback could take place.
input when it came to the conduct of operations in the
Many observers attribute such failures to the decisions
provinces, which was at times in tension with directives
made by the United States and its European and other
from the Regional Command (RCs) or ISAF Headquarters.
partners at the time the Taliban was ousted from power in
Other countries placed de jure limitations on the activities
late 2001, including how to structure post-Taliban
their forces could perform (e.g., restricting night
governance and Afghan security forces. The outcome of the
operations), called caveats.
campaign also provides an opportunity to reflect on how the
Afghanistan-wide, the United States conducted a number of
U.S. military conducted its operations alongside its
military or paramilitary efforts that were arguably distinct
coalition partners, as well as the overall efficacy of the
enough to be considered campaigns in their own right:
military as an instrument for achieving strategic goals.
 Security operations, largely performed by battalion-
Section 1080 of H.R. 4350 (H.Rept. 117-118), the Fiscal
sized task forces, intended to create the conditions
Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act, would
whereby governance building and development
establish a Commission on Afghanistan that would assess
activities could take place. Later in the campaign these
the war in Afghanistan and make recommendations to
inform future operations. Senate action is pending.
operations were conducted by partnering with ANDSF.
Complicating matters somewhat, the ANDSF organized
Learning from the Past to Prepare for
its corps structures along different geographical
the Future?
boundaries than the ISAF/coalition RCs.
Some observers contend that too much focus on adopting
 ANDSF capacity development operations designed to
lessons learned from the Afghanistan into extant doctrine,
train and equip hundreds of thousands of Afghan forces
training, and operational approaches risks the United States
to be subsequently fielded across Afghanistan. Other
adapting to fight previous wars, rather than future ones.
nonmilitary U.S. government elements established and
Others maintain that such scrutiny is necessary, because
trained separate Afghan paramilitary units, primarily
capabilities that were utilized during the Afghanistan
used for counter-terrorism purposes.
campaign, such as foreign military capacity building and
whole-of-government operational approaches, can
 Counter-terrorism operations, some of which were
potentially be adapted to better allow the U.S. to contend
conducted by U.S. and coalition Special Operations
with great power competition, hybrid and gray zone
Forces. The compartmented nature of some of their
warfare, and other contingencies. Further, many of the
activities meant that, at times, coalition partners did not
perceived critical deficiencies in the Afghan campaign were
have visibility into such activities happening in their
present at levels of decisionmaking in Washington DC,
areas of responsibility.
coalition capitals, and Kabul—making it difficult to
The organization of the military campaign arguably caused
translate gains on the ground into overall success. Taken
unhelpful frictions and seams among components. A key
together, these choices could indicate broad systemic issues
question is whether, and to what extent, the manner by
with the manner by which the United States, alongside its
which military efforts in Afghanistan were organized
coalition partners, prosecutes its wars. Left unaddressed,
contributed to the overall failure of the campaign.
such problems might hamper future U.S. war efforts.
Campaign (In)Coherence?
Campaign Continuity?
In part due to studies showing that since 1945 successful
Unity of command, that is, a clear delineation of who
counterinsurgencies last an average of 14 years (see Jones,
reports to whom in a military hierarchy, is a key principle
“Further Reading”), experts and officials argued that
for military operations. To some observers, the organization
succeeding in Afghanistan would likely require a long-term
of operations in Afghanistan, both geographically and
approach. Yet deployment cycles (often between six
functionally, “failed to achieve unity of command or unity
months to a year during the Afghanistan campaign),
of effort,” for significant durations of the campaign.
designed to balance operational needs with the morale and
Geographically, the International Security Assistance Force
welfare of servicemembers and their families, arguably
(ISAF, 2003-2014) phase of the campaign was organized
resulted in short-term approaches to operations. As a result,
by province as well as by region.
many observers described campaign continuity as a
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Tw enty Years of Military Operations in Afghanistan: Key Questions
significant problem, asserting that the United States did not
than the State Department or U.S. Agency for International
fight one 20-year war, rather, it fought 20 one-year wars as
Development. It has been suggested by one commentator
troops and key leaders rotated in and out of theater. Efforts
(see Livieratos, “Further Reading”) that
to mitigate that problem through programs designed to
the military offer[ed] positive assessments only a
build greater on-the-ground situational and cultural
few individuals had the requisite knowledge to
awareness—such as Human Terrain Teams or the Af/Pak
challenge, [and] there were few incentives for
Hands program—were arguably stymied by bureaucratic
inertia and management challenges. Policymakers might
civilians to stop rewarding the military, which
reinforced the military’s existing approach. For the
consider whether alternative methods to mitigate the U.S.
structural bias toward short-term campaign mindsets might
military, Congress’ tacit approval and the
be feasible.
distribution of individual and organizational
rewards created perverse incentives for officers at
The Metrics Conundrum?
all levels to misrepresent information. This
Measuring progress in the campaign in order to know
mutually beneficial process became self-reinforcing
whether the United States was succeeding or failing was an
for both military and civilian leadership, making it
inherently difficult and ultimately ineffective analytic
extremely difficult to change strategy or end the war
endeavor. Considerable weight was placed on measuring
entirely.
inputs, such as how many ANDSF were trained, rather than
outcomes, such as whether Afghan troops could and would
As described above, much of the problem—aside from
support the Kabul-based government. Further, strategic
credible metrics—appears to be cultural, which will likely
objectives for the campaign shifted over time—moving
require efforts by all parties, including Congress, to rectify.
from creating stability to counterinsurgency to training the
The Institutional Impact on the U.S. Military?
ANDSF. It therefore became more difficult to define what
success actually looked like and, relatedly, what needed to
Many observers have compared military efforts in
be measured to understand whether the United States was
Afghanistan to the Vietnam War, in large part because both
achieving its goals. Policymakers may rethink and revitalize
conflicts resulted in the fall of U.S.-supported security
military operational analytic capabilities, so as to better
institutions. The U.S. military after Vietnam was reportedly
assess whether the U.S. is succeeding in future wartime
plagued with widespread drug abuse, discipline problems,
efforts.
and racial tensions, and was considered demoralized and
ineffective. Experts generally agree it took at least a decade
Whole of Government?
to rebuild and reform the U.S. military after Vietnam. Some
Officials from successive Administrations repeatedly
experts (see Barno & Bensahel, “Further Reading”) contend
argued that succeeding in Afghanistan would require
that “losing a war can be debilitating for any military
marshalling the appropriate resources and capabilities of all
organization and can deeply erode morale and confidence”
the agencies in the U.S. government. Yet bureaucratic
and “left unaddressed, they could imperil the long-term
stovepiping and ineffective overall coordination seemingly
health and effectiveness of the all-volunteer force.” To
translated into inter-agency friction and a failure to execute
address the institutional health of the U.S. military, some
a truly whole-of-government campaign. Some maintain that
suggest that it examine what went wrong during the 20
this is because the only executive branch institution where
years of war and demonstrate that it has processed and
agencies come together to coordinate such activities is the
learned from those lessons; that U.S. military leaders should
National Security Council, which is not statutorily designed
clearly identify what went wrong with the evacuation from
to be an operational body in charge of complex military
Afghanistan and take full responsibility for their part; and
operations. Efforts in the mid-2000s to study and redesign
that senior DOD leaders and service leadership should
the interagency to improve whole-of-government activities
guide the U.S. military to somehow absorb the loss of the
and operations such as the Project on National Security
war in Afghanistan constructively.
Reform did not lead to institutional changes that could have
potentially improved operational coherence amongst
Further Reading
departments and agencies during the Afghanistan campaign
and beyond. If whole-of-government approaches might be
Seth Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, The
needed in future wars, policymakers might examine
RAND Corporation (2008), p. 10.
whether, and why not, U.S. national security institutions are
designed to deliver “whole of government” solutions.
David Barno & Nora Bensahel, “When America’s Al -
Volunteer Force Loses a War,” War on the Rocks,
Campaign Resourcing?
September 21, 2021.
Related to the above, over the course of 20 years,
assessments of the efficacy of military efforts vis-a-vis
Cole Livieratos, “The Subprime Strategy Crisis: Failed
civilian programs changed significantly. Initially, military
Strategic Assessment in Afghanistan,” War on the
commanders briefed that significant progress was being
Rocks, September 15, 2021.
made in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and training
and equipping the ANDSF. In 2017, then-Secretary of
Defense James Mattis reportedly stated, “We were not
Kathleen J. McInnis , Specialist in International Security
winning the war in Afghanistan.” Despite recognition of the
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces
declining efficacy of the military in the campaign, the
Department of Defense received the lion’s share of the
IF11935
resources associated with prosecuting the campaign, rather
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Tw enty Years of Military Operations in Afghanistan: Key Questions

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