An Introduction to Oversight of Offices of Inspector General

An Introduction to Oversight of Offices of Inspector General

Updated January 12, 2023
An Introduction to Oversight of Offices of Inspector General
Who watches the watchers? is a frequently posed question
The Integrity Committee is a body within CIGIE created
when people consider the role of oversight bodies,
under Section 11(d) of the IG Act and tasked with receiving
including offices of inspector general (OIGs). However, the
and reviewing allegations of wrongdoing against IGs and
organization of OIGs may pose unique challenges that
OIG staff. Investigative reports of the Integrity Committee
make it more difficult to conduct oversight of their
are provided to both the appropriate congressional
activities. In particular, the level of independence from
committees and the President (or agency head if that
agency leaders that allows inspectors general (IGs) to
official appoints the agency’s IG). Congress has maintained
conduct their audits and investigations with less risk of
a regular interest in this work and included provisions in the
actual or perceived interference also makes it more difficult
FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 117-
to identify and remedy issues that arise within an OIG by
263) that expand the information on investigations that the
limiting their supervision by senior agency officials.
Integrity Committee must report to Congress, including on
investigations concluded without findings of wrongdoing.
While oversight of OIGs may create specific challenges for
Congress and other stakeholders, the efficient and effective
The IG community also conducts regular peer reviews in
operation of OIGs, like the agencies and officials they
which OIGs evaluate each other’s procedures and recent
oversee, is important to the successful operation of the
work to determine compliance with government audit,
government.
investigation, and inspection standards. These reviews
provide regular opportunities for OIGs to receive expert
Congress has established mechanisms for oversight of
evaluations of their activities.
inspectors general through the Inspector General Act of
1978 (IG Act; 5 U.S.C. App.). While Section 3(a) of the act
Other Oversight Offices
states that each IG “shall report to and be under the general
In addition to reviews within the IG community, other
supervision of the establishment” in which they serve, it
federal entities may also oversee OIGs in some
also states that agency leadership may not “prevent or
circumstances. The Government Accountability Office
prohibit the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out,
(GAO), in particular, has the authority to investigate the
or completing any audit or investigation.” In practice, these
operations of OIGs and to improve their effectiveness and
provisions mean that OIGs typically operate with less
compliance with laws, regulations, and best practices for
supervision from agency leaders than other officials do.
audits and investigations. For instance, in April 2021, GAO
published a preliminary report on its review of the
While the overall focus of the IG Act is oriented toward
Department of Homeland Security OIG at the request of the
independence for IGs, particularly from those officials
House Committee on Homeland Security and appeared at a
whom they oversee, it does contain several discrete
hearing on the subject before the committee (GAO-21-
provisions that facilitate or require specific forms of
452T).
oversight of OIGs.
Under Section 4(b) of the IG Act, OIGs are also required to
This In Focus details how the IG Act addresses oversight of
comply with GAO auditing standards. GAO may conduct
OIGs and provides information on government
compliance reviews to ensure that each OIG is adhering to
organizations that have formal and informal oversight roles
those standards and make recommendations related to the
with regard to the IG community, including the IG
operations of OIGs.
community itself, other oversight offices, the President,
agency leaders, and Congress.
In addition, officials within OIGs may be subject to the
jurisdiction of the Office of Government Ethics and the
The Inspector General Community
Office of Special Counsel in some circumstances. Potential
A consistent form of oversight of OIGs comes from the
violations of federal criminal law may be reviewed by the
inspector general community itself. The Council of
Department of Justice.
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) is
composed of inspectors general and certain other oversight
The President
officials who are tasked with, among other things,
One of Congress’s principal design decisions in the creation
increasing the “professionalism and effectiveness” of OIGs.
of OIGs has been to provide a relatively high degree of
CIGIE conducts oversight of particular OIGs through two
independence from the President and agency leaders. When
principle mechanisms: its Integrity Committee and OIG
Presidents have been perceived to act against that
peer reviews.
expectation of independence, even when they are acting in a
manner allowed under the IG Act, they have typically been
met with bipartisan criticism in Congress. For more
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An Introduction to Oversight of Offices of Inspector General
information, see CRS In Focus IF11546, Removal of
Congress
Inspectors General: Rules, Practice, and Considerations
While each of the entities discussed above plays a role in
for Congress, by Ben Wilhelm.
the oversight of OIGs, the primary responsibility for
overseeing OIGs and ensuring that they are accountable
Nonetheless, regardless of past practice and stakeholder
may ultimately fall upon Congress.
expectations, the President does have authority to remove
presidentially appointed IGs so long as he or she provides
Congress’s direct role in the selection or removal of IGs is
written notice, including a substantive rationale, to
through the exercise of the Senate’s Advice and Consent
Congress 30 days before the removal of the IG (IG Act
authority for presidentially appointed IGs and the
§3(b)).
establishment of general qualification criteria for IG
nominees through the legislative process.
While a President can remove an IG that he or she believes
is not performing to the standards of the IG community or
More significantly, Congress impacts OIGs through the
the IG Act, these actions have tended to focus attention on
appropriations process and its authority to amend statutes to
IG independence rather than the specific reason the IG was
alter the organization and authority of OIGs. Congress
removed. Nonetheless, there may be circumstances in
regularly considers legislative proposals related to IG
which the presidential removal of an IG would be
authority, reporting, and independence and has approved
considered justified by other IG community stakeholders.
three major packages of IG Act amendments since 2008.
One recent example of such a situation is illustrated by an
Further, Congress’s ability to conduct hearings, request
April 14, 2021, letter from the CIGIE Integrity Committee
investigations, and publicly comment on the activities of
to President Joe Biden recommending that he consider
OIGs can be another important tool for ensuring that OIGs
“substantial disciplinary action up to and including
operate in an effective manner that is consistent with the
removal” for Federal Housing Finance Authority IG Laura
expectations of policymakers.
Wertheimer. This recommendation was based on
allegations of official misconduct reported to and
In addition, Congress is a principal stakeholder for the IG
investigated by the Integrity Committee. While IG
community and regularly relies upon OIGs to identify
Wertheimer chose to resign from her position in July 2021,
compliance issues in agencies; conduct independent, expert
there were calls for President Biden to remove her, which
reviews of complex or controversial topics; and issue
he did not do in the months before her resignation.
recommendations that can help Congress and agencies
resolve identified problems.
Agency Leadership
While OIGs are under the “general supervision” of their
Congress, therefore, occupies an unusual position as both a
agency leadership, agency officials are not supposed to play
regular user of OIG work products and a body that can
a role in OIG decisions about investigations and audits in
oversee OIG performance. This combination may mean that
most circumstances, except that they are to be kept
Congress brings its own perspective on the effectiveness of
informed of the findings and recommendations arising from
OIGs that not only includes compliance with legal and
the work of their agency’s OIG (IG Act §4(a)(5)). As a
professional standards but also extends to broader questions
practical matter, the relationship between agency and OIG
about OIG priorities and the value of their work. Of course,
leaders might be complex, but OIGs typically operate
agencies and Presidents might also have their own views on
without direct interference. This arrangement is supported
the performance of OIGs, but they have fewer tools at their
by the ability of an OIG to report to Congress on any
disposal than Congress does to make changes to the
agency leadership attempt to interfere with its work.
operations and authority of OIGs.
Despite this general limit on agency capacity to oversee
Finally, Congress may also be the stakeholder best
OIGs, there are two notable exceptions.
positioned to take a long-term, institutional view of the IG
community, because a robust and effective IG community
First, IGs who serve in a Designated Federal Entity (DFE)
can enhance the effectiveness of Congress as it performs
as defined in Section 8G of the IG Act are appointed by and
both its legislative and oversight functions.
can be removed by the leadership of the agency they
oversee rather than by the President. Removal of an IG by
Further Reading
the head of a DFE is subject to the same notice requirement
Charles A. Johnson and Kathryn E. Newcomer, U.S.
as removal by the President, and a removal action might
Inspectors General: Truth Tellers in Turbulent Times
lead to the same concerns as removal by the President.
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020),
pp. 121-162.
Second, while the issue of IG jurisdiction is distinct from
oversight of OIGs, it should be noted that some agency
CRS Report R45450, Statutory Inspectors General in the
heads (including, for example, the Secretary of Defense and
Federal Government: A Primer, by Ben Wilhelm.
the director of the Central Intelligence Agency) have the
authority, with notification to Congress, to prevent OIGs
Ben Wilhelm, Analyst in Government Organization and
from reviewing specific matters under some circumstances.
Management
IF11869
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An Introduction to Oversight of Offices of Inspector General

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