Insurgency in Northern Mozambique: Nature and Responses

Insurgency in Northern Mozambique: Nature and Responses

Updated July 5, 2022
Insurgency in Northern Mozambique: Nature and Responses
An armed Islamic State-linked insurgency in
IS-M often attacks security force posts and convoys,
Mozambique’s far north—launched in 2017 with an attack
civilian state workers and facilities (e.g., schools and
on several police posts in Cabo Delgado province—remains
clinics), and rural villages and road traffic. Its fighters
highly active and poses challenges to U.S. peace, security,
frequently loot or burn food and other property, and injure,
and development goals in the country. The insurgency and
kill, or kidnap residents, especially youths and women. The
state security responses to it have resulted in many serious
rationale for IS-M’s attacks often is unclear, but some,
human rights abuses and killings, widespread social trauma
notably several mass beheadings—a notorious IS tactic
and property destruction, and massive population
globally—appear intended to punish perceived IS-M foes,
displacements, creating a complex humanitarian crisis.
such as state workers, those who resist IS-M recruitment,
Insurgent attacks also prompted the French energy firm
including children, or persons whom IS-M suspects of
TotalEnergies (Total) to declare force majeure and suspend
cooperating with authorities.
a $20 billion, partially U.S. government-financed natural
Occasionally, IS-M has warned civilians of impending
gas processing project, one of several major projects
attacks, limited arson to state or large business facilities,
designed to tap large gas fields discovered offshore in 2010.
distributed looted food, and preached to locals. It also
Congressional hearings have monitored the insurgency and
reportedly endeavors to religiously indoctrinate its captives.
responses to it, and the House is considering H.Res. 720
IS-M reportedly recruits on the basis of ideology; by force;
(Jacobs (CA)), which calls for enhanced efforts to counter
by offering payments to fighters; and by financing micro-
the insurgency and promote human rights. In April 2022,
entrepreneurs, whom IS-M then may extort for revenue or
the Biden Administration chose Mozambique to receive
intelligence It also kidnaps for ransom and may receive
new U.S. aid under the Global Fragility Act (2019).
funds and other aid from IS supporters abroad.
Capacity. IS-M’s military prowess has grown since 2017;
The insurgents, locally dubbed Al Shabaab (“the youth,”
it has repeatedly executed complex operations (e.g.,
also the name of a separate Al Qaeda-linked Somali group),
concurrent attacks on multiple targets or major towns, boat-
also are known as Ahlu Sunna Wa-Jamo (“Adherents of the
Sunnah” or
based maritime assaults on local sea traffic and islands, and
ASWJ; spellings vary) and other names. In
cross-border attacks into Tanzania). It also has held
2019, ASWJ reportedly pledged fealty to the Islamic State
territory, such as the port town of Mocímboa da Praia
(IS or ISIS), which often claims the group’s attacks and had
(between August 2020 and 2021), and regularly seeks to
counted it as a member of the IS Central Africa Province,
infiltrate security forces and civilian populations. IS-M
jointly with a group in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
fighters often wear state military uniforms and reportedly
In May 2022, IS appeared to elevate ASWJ, labeling it the
use arms looted from state forces, as well as drones and
IS “Wilayah [Province] Mozambique.”
locally atypical weapons, suggesting they may have access
Figure 1. Cabo Delgado
Some observers have
to illicit arms trade networks.
Province, Mozambique
questioned the extent and
In March 2021, IS-M attacked Palma, a coastal town and
import of ASWJ-IS ties,
site of the large natural gas processing plant being
but U.N. global terrorism
developed by the Total-led energy firm consortium. The
monitors and U.S. officials
attack resulted in mass fatalities, including multiple
assert that they have
beheadings, and threatened the plant, which was under
operational linkages. In
construction, and its workers. Thousands of Palma residents
March 2021, the State
seeking safety fled to the plant site’s perimeter, which IS-M
Department, labeling
did not breach. During the attack, state security forces
ASWJ as “ISIS-
assigned to protect the Total site remained embedded there
Mozambique” (ISIS-M or
while IS-M fighters overran Palma, though other state
IS-M), designated it as a
forces later cleared Palma of insurgents. Nonetheless, Total

Foreign Terrorist
Source: CRS.
suspended the project and withdrew its staff, pending a
Organization. Two IS-M
return to long-term stability in and around the site.
leaders, a Tanzanian and a Mozambican, were later named
U.S. Specially Designated Global Terrorists. The United
Events following the attack highlighted poor behavior by
States also has sanctioned an alleged IS-M financier. These
some national forces. After the attack, a group of soldiers
actions freeze any U.S.-based IS-M property and ban
reportedly extensively looted banks in Palma. In addition,
transactions between IS-M and U.S. persons.
internally displaced persons (IDPs) who remained near the
Total site after the attack also reported that security forces
Tactics. Initially, IS-M used bladed weapons and some
extorted bribes from those seeking to flee and sold food
guns, but since 2018, IS-M has become increasingly
supplies to stranded IDPs at inflated prices. Months after
well-armed and hit progressively more significant targets.
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Insurgency in Northern Mozambique: Nature and Responses
the attack, in July 2021, Rwandan troops deployed to
cannot flee the country as refugees, as Tanzania, the
Mozambique (see below) and since have reportedly
country nearest to Cabo Delgado, reportedly often forcibly
stabilized Palma and nearby districts.
returns to Mozambique those seeking refuge.
Drivers. A confluence of local socioeconomic grievances
U.N. agencies and other humanitarian actors often lack
and religious aims appear to motivate IS-M, which seeks to
access to the northeastern Cabo Delgado due to insecurity
supplant the secular state with Islamic Sharia law-based
and bureaucratic obstacles. In areas where aid agencies
governance. In explaining the insurgency’s evolution,
have access, they are providing food, basic supplies, and
however, researchers debate the relative strength, logic, and
psychosocial help for the many IDPs traumatized by
nature of linkages between these and other factors, such as
exposure to severe violence. Food insecurity is widespread
local versus foreign influences that may shape the group.
across Cabo Delgado, as are unmet healthcare needs; the
A key grievance is the state’s historical marginalization of
conflict also has damaged or forced about a third of health
Cabo Delgado, one of Mozambique’s poorest regions, and
facilities to close. As of April 2022, 16% of a $437 million
resulting high rates of poverty, socioeconomic inequality,
U.N.-wide humanitarian appeal centered on Cabo Delgado
and youth unemployment. The state’s displacement of some
was funded. U.S. humanitarian aid for Mozambique,
villagers and transfer of their traditional lands to the Total
including $55 million in FY2022 (as of May 18, most
gas project, the perceived low share of gas sector jobs given
recent data), is primarily allocated to Cabo Delgado and
to locals, disruptions of livelihoods, and the influence of
bordering provinces hosting IDPs.
foreign extractive industry actors also have driven tensions.
Other Responses. National military-led efforts to counter
Human rights abuses and corruption in the context of
IS-M, backed by paramilitary police and military
counterterrorism operations also have spurred discontent.
contractors, have had mixed success. Key challenges have
Local and national elites’ efforts to control valuable local
included low levels of public trust in security forces,
natural resources (e.g., land, precious stones, gold, and
logistical gaps, and lack of capacity to concurrently protect
timber) through political influence, corrupt dealings, and
state-controlled areas, respond to IS-M attacks, and take
force, also have spurred resentments. Other corruption in
offensive action. In mid-2021, the government accepted
Cabo Delgado is reportedly tied to trafficking in natural
foreign offers of combat troops and trainers. In early July,
resources, persons, and illegal drugs, though the drug trade
Rwanda deployed 1,000 combat troops to Cabo Delgado
appeared to move south as insurgent violence grew. Some
under a bilateral agreement, and may now have as many as
analysts have suggested that IS-M may exploit such illicit
2,000 troops on the ground. Weeks later, the Southern
activity, but open-source evidence to that effect is lacking.
African Development Community (SADC) began to deploy
its own regional intervention force to Cabo Delgado. In the
Insurgency: Makeup and Origins
ensuing months, these foreign forces were able to stabilize
large areas, kill many insurgents, and seize IS-M camps. IS-
IS-M reportedly evolved from one or more dissident Muslim
M has nonetheless remained highly active and in May and
sects that rejected the authority of and clashed with local,
June 2022 launched attacks in new areas. Meanwhile, U.S.
predominantly Sufi Muslim leaders. Sect beliefs appear to have
Special Operations Forces have been training Mozambican
been influenced by Islamists from other East African countries,
military forces, is the European Union.
some of whom reportedly pursued anti-state attacks in
Tanzania before fleeing to Cabo Delgado to escape a violent
In addition to military efforts, many observers contend that
crackdown by Tanzanian authorities. Returnees from Islamic
ending the insurgency would require programs to increase
study abroad also may have introduced violent jihadist
social cohesion, including in religious contexts, and restore
precepts. Sect members reportedly adopted their own form
livelihoods and social services, followed by longer-term
of dress; rejected secular justice, schools, health services, and
development investments. The World Bank is financing a
voting; and advocated for Sharia law-based governance.
plan by the state’s nascent Northern Integrated
Arrests of alleged insurgents, eyewitness accounts, and other
Development Agency focusing on such ends, as well as
sources suggest that IS-M leaders include Tanzanians and
several other projects benefitting vulnerable populations in
locals, who, along with members of various other nationalities
the north. This aid is worth roughly $550 million. Prospects
comprise its fighting forces. Local fighters include members of
for success arguably are mixed, given the ongoing conflict
the coastal, Muslim Mwani people and the largely non-Muslim,
and the scope and complexity of the challenges at issue.
inland Makonde ethnic group.
U.S. Interests & Responses. The insurgency affects
substantial U.S. interests, notably a $4.7 billion U.S.
Humanitarian Situation & Responses. As of early 2022,
Export-Import Bank loan for the Total project and up to
at least 784,000 people had fled insurgency-linked violence
$1.5 billion in U.S. International Development Finance
in Cabo Delgado, including most of Palma’s prior 75,000-
Corporation political risk insurance for a separate planned
person population; some estimates suggest that the IDP
ExxonMobil-led gas project. A range of U.S. foreign aid
population may as large as 1 million. Up to 70% of IDPs
and security cooperation programs aim to build national
security forces’ capacities, foster economic dev
may not be officially registered, as many lack ID papers,
elopment,
making them ineligible for relief aid and hindering travel
and counter violent extremism. Some of this aid is separate
from broader, non-insurgency-specific U.S. bilateral
and access to public services. A series of attacks in southern
Cabo Delgado in May and June 2022 have caused new
assistance worth an estimated $537 million in FY2021.
displacement. Many IDPs, about half of whom are children,
Nicolas Cook, Specialist in African Affairs
live in host communities, primarily in southern Cabo
Delgado, though some live in temporary camps. Most IDPs
IF11864
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Insurgency in Northern Mozambique: Nature and Responses

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