Ukrainian Armed Forces

Ukrainian Armed Forces

Updated January 26, 2022
Ukrainian Armed Forces
In 2014, the Ukrainian military, which observers noted had
however, often mean defense spending in real terms is
been weakened by years of neglect and underfunding, faced
lower (around 2.5% of GDP). Ukraine’s 2021 defense
Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and
budget is 117.6 billion hryvnia ($4.2 billion), 127 million
invasion of eastern Ukraine. Since that time, the Ukrainian
hryvnia ($4.6 million) less than 2020’s budget.
armed forces have made considerable improvements; they
Additionally, Ukraine’s defense budget allocations are split
have undertaken efforts to adopt NATO standards and
between funds necessary to maintain the military and funds
received significant NATO and U.S. assistance. Many of
to support its ambitious reform program.
these reforms began out of the experience of defending
against Russian aggression. Reforms range from the tactical
Ukraine inherited a sprawling defense industry from the
to the strategic levels and include both political measures
Soviet Union, producing a wide range of products,
(e.g., increasing transparency, countering corruption, and
including tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft, radars and
ensuring civilian control over the military) and military
electronics, missiles, and ships. Defense conglomerate
reforms (e.g., modernizing equipment, reforming command
Ukroboronprom oversees the defense industry, which
and control, and increasing professionalization).
comprises over 130 state-run companies. In recent years,
Ukrainian officials have made reforming Ukroboronprom
Significant hurdles remain, however, and the reform
and increasing transparency key goals, including passing a
process is complicated by Ukraine’s Soviet legacy and the
new law, On Defense Procurement, in July 2020 to
continued Russian occupation of parts of Ukraine. Since
implement NATO standards in defense procurement.
late 2021, Ukraine has faced a massive buildup of Russian
Despite some progress, significant challenges remain with
forces on its borders and a potentially imminent threat of
regard to corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency and political
further Russian aggression. Members of Congress have
infighting, and low transparency.
expressed interest in understanding Ukraine’s military
capabilities to help guide policymaking to support
Command and Control
Ukraine’s defense of its territorial integrity. (For more, see,
Command and control has been a central reform focus.
CRS Report R45008, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with
Ukraine now requires the defense minister to be a civilian, a
Russia, and U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt.)
key NATO requirement. Some observers see continued
threats to civilian control of the military, as former general
Key Policy and Strategy Documents
Andriy Taran replaced Andriy Zagorodnyuk, the first
Multiple military and national security documents lay out
civilian and pro-reform defense minister, in 2020.
Ukraine’s military strategy, reforms, and defense policy.
Ukraine’s 2016 Strategic Defense Bulletin outlined priority
The military also has shifted toward a command system
reforms to achieve NATO standards, and its subsequent
more in line with NATO standards. Currently, the military
State Program for the Development of the Armed Forces
reports to the commander in chief of the armed forces.
(2017-2020) outlined implementation steps. In 2018,
Under the commander in chief, reforms split responsibilities
Ukraine continued the reform process with the Law on
between the chief of the general staff, responsible for
National Security, which created a framework to coordinate
strategic and force planning, and the commander of the
and simplify Ukraine’s defense planning and to implement
joint forces staff, responsible for operations. The shift
civilian control over the military.
toward NATO-style command and control is an ongoing
process, as many officers appear to remain influenced by
Ukraine updated its National Security Strategy and its
their Soviet and post-Soviet military training despite an
Military Security Strategy in 2020 and 2021, respectively,
increase in NATO training and educational opportunities.
laying out the country’s security and defense policies and
objectives. The National Security Strategy defines the main
Figure 1. Ukrainian Military Command Structure
principles of Ukraine’s national security, which include
identifying Russia as a long-term threat to its national
security and developing closer relations with the European
Union, NATO, and the United States. Ukraine’s March
2021 Military Security Strategy replaced its 2015 Military
Doctrine.
Budget and Defense Industry
The 2018 Law on National Security required that at least
5% of gross domestic product (GDP) be spent on security,

with 3% of the total going to defense. Economic realities,
Source: Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.
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Ukrainian Armed Forces
Army
Air Force
In 2014, Ukraine’s defense minister said the country had
Like Ukraine’s navy, its air force suffered significant losses
6,000 combat-ready troops. Today, Ukraine’s army
during Russia’s invasion. Russia captured or shot down
numbers around 145,000-150,000 troops and has
multiple fighters, fighter-bombers, helicopters, and
significantly improved its capabilities, personnel, and
transport aircraft during the conflict. These losses weakened
readiness. The army is the largest component of Ukraine’s
the air force, which previously had suffered from years of
military and includes mechanized, armored, missile and
neglect and underfunding. Most of Ukraine’s planes and air
artillery, army aviation, and air defense units. The army
defense systems are over 30 years old.
continues to implement reforms in line with NATO
standards but remains heavily influenced by its Soviet
In 2020, the air force launched an expansive modernization
legacy. Ongoing reform priorities include modernizing
plan, Vision 2035, which committed 320 billion hryvnia
equipment, training, and improving personnel management.
($12 billion) to purchasing new multi-role fighters, trainer
jets, transport aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (including
Most equipment are heavily upgraded versions of legacy
Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones), and air defense systems.
systems in need of modernization. The army also continues
This figure, however, is an ambitious projection (three
to improve training at both the individual and unit levels,
times Ukraine’s annual defense budget) and likely will be
which was a significant weakness in 2014. NATO and U.S.
revised given Ukraine’s defense budget realities.
support are crucial to training efforts, although most
training is limited to the battalion level..
Air Assault and Special Operations
Forces
Ukraine operates a mix of conscript and professional
Ukraine’s air assault brigades played a key role combatting
soldiers on contracts. By law, conscripts cannot serve on
Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine. Considered elite
the frontlines but have the opportunity to sign short or long-
troops, air assault units originally were light infantry under
term contracts upon the expiration of their terms of service.
the army’s command. Out of necessity and experience,
Ukraine has sought to create a professional
Ukraine’s air assault forces increased in size and
noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, based on NATO
transitioned into an independent command with heavier
standards. Low salaries, lack of educational opportunities,
equipment.
and a shortage of housing arguably contribute to a high
turnover rate and limit the retention of professional soldiers
Analysts generally agree that the creation of Ukraine’s
and NCOs.
special operations forces is one of the most significant
improvements since 2014, despite the small size of the
Navy
force. Formed with U.S. and NATO assistance, Ukraine’s
Ukraine’s navy lost 70% of its vessels and numerous
special operations forces operate along NATO standards
officers after Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea
and principles; Ukraine’s 140th Special Operations Forces
region. In the aftermath, Ukraine’s political and naval
Center passed NATO certification in 2019, allowing it to
leadership debated reforming the navy back into a balanced
deploy as part of the NATO Response Force.
fleet, a traditional mix of large and small vessels, or a
“mosquito fleet,” focusing on smaller vessels.
National Guard and Territorial Defense
Due to the conventional military’s limitations, Ukraine
In 2018, the Ukrainian navy adopted the Strategy of the
relied on volunteer battalions to help combat Russia’s 2014
Naval Forces of Ukraine Until 2035 and selected the
invasion of eastern Ukraine. These battalions operate as
mosquito fleet strategy, citing Russia’s dominant naval
light infantry, with some limited armor and artillery
position in the Black Sea and Ukraine’s limited resources to
capabilities. Observers raised concerns regarding
procure larger vessels. Additionally, due to advances in ship
government control, since oligarchs, political parties, and
design and missile technology, Ukraine’s leadership argued
some right-wing extremist groups created or funded most
that smaller vessels could accomplish maritime deterrence
battalions. These concerns led Ukraine to consolidate most
and defend Ukraine’s coastline and maritime zone. Progress
volunteer battalions under the command of the National
has been slow, however, with a combination of Ukrainian
Guard, created in 2014 within the Interior Ministry.
naval and defense industry interests advocating for a larger-
vessel fleet.
Ukraine also created a new reserve force based on the law
On the Foundations of the National Resistance, which came
In addition, the navy includes two Marine Infantry brigades
into force on January 1, 2022. The Territorial Defense
and numerous coastal defense units, equipped with artillery
Forces (TDF) are locally organized units of 25 brigades
and anti-ship missile capabilities. Marine Infantry are
(one per region) and 150 battalions (one per administrative
considered elite units, with one brigade permanently
district), as well as a separate branch of service. Ukraine
deployed outside of Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov. Ukraine
plans to recruit 130,000 reservists around a core of 10,000
also recently deployed the new domestically produced
full-time soldiers.
Neptune coastal defense system, which includes a new anti-
ship missile.
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
Affairs
IF11862
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Ukrainian Armed Forces

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