Defense Primer: What Is Command and Control?

Defense Primer: What Is Command and Control?

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Updated November 14, 2022
Defense Primer: What Is Command and Control?
The Department of Defense (DOD) defines command and
systems that enable commanders to communicate their
control (C2) as “[t]he exercise of authority and direction by
decisions to geographically distributed forces. This
a properly designated commander over assigned forces in
technical approach to command and control can be
the accomplishment of the mission.” At its most
summarized as, “how do you command forces?”
fundamental level, C2 represents how DOD makes
operational decisions. One can view C2 through the context
Other variables of command and control answer separate
of five variables: who, what, when, where, and how (see
questions: which systems and units are being commanded
Figure 1). Traditionally, Congress has focused on the
(“what”), the temporal aspect (“when”), and geography
authorities (the “who”) and technology (the “how”)
(“where”). Congress has historically expressed interest in
variables, and less so on the force mix (“what”), temporal
each of these variables in the context of specific, rather than
(“when”), and geographic (“where”). China and Russia
general, issues. For example, rather than considering
have developed strategies to disrupt or potentially deny
general purpose forces, Congress has focused on issues
DOD its ability to make decisions; as a result, DOD is
regarding nuclear forces and authorities associated with
modernizing systems and processes to command and
special operations (“What forces are being commanded?”).
control military forces.
Regarding the “when,” Congress has expressed interest in
Figure 1. C2 Conceptual Model
command and control associated with quick response to
nuclear and cyber operations, and to a limited extent in
terms of electromagnetic spectrum operations. However, a
sensitivity on “when” generally is more tactically focused
(e.g., when to have aircraft on target, when an assault on a
building should begin); these decisions are often delegated
to operational commanders.
The geographic component (“where”) presents unique
challenges for commanding U.S. forces. Congress and the
executive branch traditionally explore and debate these
issues through the lens of the National Security Strategy.
This debate focuses on the U.S. role in the world and the
locations and interests of its rivals, as well as potentially
discussing authorization of the use of military forces.

Source: Congressional Research Service
What are strategic competitors doing?
Key strategic competitors identified in the 2022 National
The first variable that Congress has traditionally focused on
Defense Strategy (NDS), like China and Russia, have
reflects the authority a commander has to execute an
observed U.S. military operations for the past 30 years,
operation. This line of discussion focuses on the chain of
noting that disrupting C2 systems could be one cost-
command, reflecting the differences between the military
effective solution to mitigating U.S. military advantages. As
services—charged with organizing, training, and equipping
a result, potential adversaries have developed systems and
U.S. forces (e.g., the Army provides infantry battalions and
strategies to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. command and
the Air Force creates fighter squadrons)—and the
control systems.
combatant commands who decide what those units should
do and give them orders. This variable can be summarized
China’s military strategy has been informed by the concept
by the question: “who commands forces?”
of “systems confrontation,” which is similar to the U.S.
concepts of sharing information with multiple systems. The
The second variable represents the hardware and systems
systems confrontation concept assumes that victory in
that enable commanders to make these decisions and
modern warfare does not necessarily require annihilation of
transmit them to the field. Terms like command, control,
adversary forces on the battlefield, but instead can be
communications (C3), C3 plus computers (C4),
achieved by paralyzing major operational systems, such as
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
command and control or logistics. To this end, China’s
enter the discussion. This technical dimension of command
military modernization has emphasized developing—for
and control looks at the data (and method of collection) that
example—the ability to reduce the effectiveness of
commanders use to make decisions (i.e., ISR is the data to
adversary satellites and communications systems and thus
enable decisionmaking), the processing power to transform
prevent adversary forces from connecting weapons systems
data into information (the computer element), and the
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Defense Primer: What Is Command and Control?
and sharing data and information. To facilitate this, China’s
surveillance, and reconnaissance data, transmitting across
military in 2015 established the Strategic Support Force
many communications networks, to enable faster
(SSF), which combines cyber, space, and electronic warfare
decisionmaking (see Figure 2). JADC2 is intended to
functions into a unified effort and supports the use of these
enable commanders to make better decisions by collecting
capabilities by the military’s ground, air, naval, and missile
data from numerous sensors, processing the data using
forces.
artificial intelligence algorithms to identify targets, then
recommending the optimal weapons—both kinetic and
Similarly, Russian military strategists and planners focus on
nonkinetic (e.g., cyber or electronic weapons)—to engage
countering adversaries’ command, control,
the target.
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities. A central focus is striking
Figure 2. Visualization of JADC2 Vision
critical targets to paralyze an adversary’s military ability
and political willingness to sustain a fight. Russian
strategists take a holistic approach, often referred to as
“disorganization” in Russian military doctrine, to disrupting
an adversary’s command and control capabilities through
the integrated use of all available systems (including
information, cyber, electronic, air defense, air, and missile
strike forces). To do so, Russia combines defensive and
offensive capabilities to target an adversary’s ability to
conduct and sustain operations by deflecting attacks on key
Russian systems, while disrupting an adversary’s command,
control, and communications systems. Russian strategists
view the initial period of war as decisive and believe that

deflecting attacks while simultaneously degrading an
Source: https://www.monch.com/mpg/news/ew-c4i-channel/7334-
enemy’s capabilities will allow Russia to win a conflict
saic-and-usaf-partner-for-jadc2.html.
through attrition. Like China, Russia focuses on destroying
Some analysts take a more skeptical approach to JADC2.
the ability of adversary forces to operate effectively rather
They raise questions about its technical maturity and
than physically eliminating them.
affordability, and whether it is even possible to field a
What is DOD doing to modernize C2?
network that can securely and reliably connect sensors to
shooters and support command and control in a lethal,
DOD officials have argued that future conflicts may require
electronic warfare-rich environment. Analysts also ask who
decisions to be made within hours, minutes, or potentially
would have decisionmaking authority across air, land, sea,
seconds compared with the current multiday process to
space, and cyberspace given that, traditionally, command
analyze the operating environment and issue commands.
authorities are delegated in each domain rather than from an
They have also stated that the department’s existing
overall campaign perspective. Some also question how
command and control architecture is insufficient to meet the
much a human would be needed for JADC2 to make
demands of the NDS. DOD proposes the Joint All-Domain
decisions in real time, and whether it is appropriate to
Command and Control (JADC2) concept as a method to
reduce the amount of human involvement in military-
counter potential adversaries’ ability to disrupt U.S. forces’
related decisions.
combat operations. The JADC2 concept envisions
connecting sensors from all of the military services—Air
CRS Products
Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Space Force—into
CRS In Focus IF10542, Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military
a single network, thus eliminating the possibility that an
Operations, coordinated by Nathan J. Lucas
adversary could cripple a U.S. force by taking out a single,
key sensor. This contrasts with the tradition of each of the
CRS In Focus IF10521, Defense Primer: Command and Control of
military services developing its own tactical network that
Nuclear Forces, by Amy F. Woolf
was incompatible with those of other services (e.g., Army
CRS In Focus IF10537, Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations,
networks were unable to interface with Navy or Air Force
by Catherine A. Theohary
networks).
CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF):
DOD uses ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert
describe its desired end state for JADC2. Uber combines
CRS Report R44891, U.S. Role in the World: Background and
two different applications—one for riders and a second for
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
drivers. Using the respective users’ position, the Uber
CRS In Focus IF11493, Joint All-Domain Command and Control
algorithm determines the optimal match based on distance,
(JADC2), by John R. Hoehn
travel time, and passengers (among other variables). Uber
then provides directions for the driver to follow, delivering

the passenger to their destination. Uber relies on cellular
and Wi-Fi networks to transmit data to match riders and
John R. Hoehn, Coordinator, Analyst in Military
provide driving instructions.
Capabilities and Programs
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
Proponents of JADC2 claim that it will provide a cloud-like
environment for the joint force to share intelligence,
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Defense Primer: What Is Command and Control?

IF11805
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
Affairs

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