China Primer: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

China Primer: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

Updated September 26, 2023
China Primer: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Overview
Authoritative PRC sources indicate China’s military
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the military arm of
strategy focuses primarily on preparing for a conflict
the Communist Party of China, the ruling party of the
involving the United States over Taiwan—the self-ruled
People’s Republic of China (PRC or China). Since 2021,
island of 23 million people off the coast of mainland China
the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has referred to
over which the PRC claims sovereignty. (See CRS In Focus
China as the “pacing challenge” for the U.S. military. DOD
IF12481, Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues, for a
reported in November 2022 that China’s leaders aim to use
discussion of Taiwan’s security.) The PLA also focuses on
the PLA, in part, to “restrict the United States from having
securing and defending China’s territorial claims over
a presence in China’s immediate periphery and limit U.S.
disputed areas in the South China Sea and East China Sea,
access in the broader Indo-Pacific region.” Congress has
and along the China-India border. As China’s economic and
responded in part by focusing on resourcing and conducting
diplomatic interests have expanded beyond its immediate
oversight of U.S.-China security competition.
periphery, PRC leaders have tasked the PLA with global
PLA Organization
missions such as distant sea lane protection and United
Nations peacekeeping operations. The PLA established its
Established in 1927, the PLA predates the founding of the
sole overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017. According
PRC in 1949. The PLA encompasses four services: the
to DOD, the PRC may be considering the establishment of
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force, as well as two
multiple new military bases around the world.
quasi-service entities, the Strategic Support Force and the
Joint Logistics Support Force. The Communist Party
PLA Modernization and Key Capabilities
oversees these forces through its Central Military
Since 1978, China has engaged in a sustained and broad
Commission (CMC), which serves some of the same
effort to transform the PLA from an infantry-heavy, low-
functions as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CMC also
technology, ground forces-centric military into a leaner,
oversees a paramilitary force, the People’s Armed Police
more networked, high-technology force with an emphasis
(which includes the China Coast Guard), and China’s
on joint operations and power projection. Xi has set the
militia forces. Xi Jinping, who serves concurrently as
goal of transforming the PLA into a “world-class” force by
Communist Party general secretary and PRC president, has
2049, the 100th anniversary of the PRC’s founding and the
chaired the CMC since 2012.
year by which Xi has stated he aims to achieve “the great
In 2015, Xi launched the most ambitious reform and
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
reorganization of the PLA since the 1950s. This overhaul
A guiding principle of PLA modernization and strategy
likely had two overarching objectives: (1) reshaping and
improving the PLA’s structure to enable joint operations
since the mid-2000s has been the concept of

“informatization,” or the application of advanced
among the services; and (2) ensuring PLA loyalty to the
information technology across all aspects of warfare. More
Party and Xi. The PLA continues to fine-tune and
recently, China’s leaders also have called for the
institutionalize these changes.
“intelligentization” of the PLA, reflecting widely-held
Opacity surrounding high-level personnel changes has led
expectations that artificial intelligence and related
some observers to raise questions about political cohesion
technologies will have a transformational effect on warfare.
and the status of anti-corruption efforts in the PLA. In the
The PLA is expanding its operational reach, strengthening
summer of 2023, Xi removed the top two officials in charge
its ability to conduct joint operations, and fielding
of the PLA Rocket Force. CMC member Li Shangfu, who
increasingly modern weapons systems. Key features of
serves concurrently as State Councilor for defense affairs
PLA modernization include:
and Minister of Defense, had not been seen in public for
several weeks as of late September 2023. U.S. officials
• An approximately 340-ship navy that includes modern
reportedly assess that Li is under investigation.
and advanced platforms such as submarines, aircraft
China’s Military Strategy and Goals
carriers, and large multi-mission surface vessels,
advancing the PLA’s ability
The stated goal of China’s national def
to conduct naval combat
ense policy is to
safeguard the country’s
operations in its immediate periphery and sustained non-
sovereignty, security, and
development interests. The concept of “active defense”—
combat operations further afield.
the defining characteristic of PRC military strategy since
• Air forces increasingly capable of conducting joint and
1949—prescribes how China can use defensive and
over-water missions, featuring a fighter fleet with
offensive operations and tactics to achieve these goals in
several hundred fourth-generation fighter aircraft and
the face of a militarily superior adversary.
growing numbers of fifth-generation fighters. (China
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China Primer: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
and the United States are the only countries to have
vis China in various military domains and geographic
developed fifth-generation stealth fighters.)
contexts. Faced with competing priorities and limited
resources, policymakers and experts are debating how to
• A conventional missile force designed to enable China
respond to China’s growing military capabilities. Some
to deter third-party intervention in a regional military
argue the United States must maintain military primacy
conflict, featuring at least 1,950 missiles, including
over China to ensure the United States can credibly deter—
approximately 300 intercontinental ballistic missiles,
and if necessary, deny and punish—PRC military
missiles armed with hypersonic glide vehicles, and anti-
adventurism, particularly over Taiwan. Others assess that
ship ballistic missiles to target adversary surface ships.
maintaining long-term U.S. military dominance over China
in the Western Pacific is unrealistic given China’s growing
• An expanding and diversifying nuclear force. (DOD
military resources and “home field” advantages, and U.S.
estimates China’s nuclear warhead stockpile exceeds
domestic challenges and global commitments. Based on this
400 with the potential to reach 1,500 by 2035.)
assessment, some experts argue the United States should
adopt strategies to check PRC aggression that do not rely on
• A Strategic Support Force that centralizes information
force-on-force dominance in all domains and scenarios.
warfare capabilities in the cyber and space domains
The annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is
(the PRC refers to these as the “new commanding
heights in strategic competition”) as well as
the primary legislative vehicle by which Congress has
electronic
sought to enhance the United States’ ability to compete
and psychological domains.
with China in the national security realm. Recent NDAAs
have included numerous provisions explicitly aimed at
These advances notwithstanding, many of the capabilities
competing with China, in addition to provisions that relate
the PLA is developing remain aspirational. In 2022, for
or could relate to China (see Figure 1).
example, DOD assessed that the PLA’s ability to carry out
joint operations to counter third-party intervention beyond
Figure 1. References to China in the NDAA
the first island chain (which runs from Japan through
Taiwan and the Philippines to enclose the South China Sea)
is “in its infancy.” The PLA’s battlefield performance is
also uncertain: China last fought a war in the 1970s, and it
is not clear how successfully the PLA would operationalize
its new and largely untested post-reform organizational
structure. Moreover, analysts debate the extent to which
corruption, opacity, a highly centralized command and
control apparatus, and an intensive focus on political
education and Party fealty, might affect the PLA’s
operational effectiveness.
China’s Defense Expenditures

PLA modernization has been enabled by China’s growing
Source: National Defense Authorization Acts, FY2000-FY2023.
economy and a defense budget that has increased steadily
Notes: Includes references to the words “China,” “Chinese,”
since the 1990s. China’s officially-disclosed defense budget
“Taiwan,” and “Hong Kong.”
was about $225 billion in 2023, though PRC military
spending likely is much higher. In June 2023, Senator Dan
The James M. Inhofe NDAA for FY2023 (P.L. 117-263)
Sullivan stated on the Senate floor that U.S. intelligence
included dozens of provisions related to China. Among
officials assess China’s military budget to be close to $700
these is the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, which
billion. China seeks to augment its military strength by
included provisions to strengthen deterrence of PRC
leveraging commercial advances—particularly in high-tech
military aggression against Taiwan. The FY2023 NDAA
areas—through a sprawling and ambitious initiative it calls
also authorized $11.5 billion to extend the “Pacific
“military-civil fusion.” PRC defense contractors in the
Deterrence Initiative” (PDI) established in the FY2021
aerospace, microelectronics, and other sectors benefit from
NDAA (P.L. 116-283) to fund and oversee U.S. military
foreign joint ventures and technology licensing, as well as
capabilities and cooperation with partners in the Indo-
the alleged theft of technology from the United States and
Pacific region. The House and Senate versions of an
elsewhere. At the same time, China’s leaders seek to make
FY2024 NDAA (H.R. 2670 and S. 2226) would authorize
PRC defense industries less reliant on foreign technology
additional appropriations for the PDI (§1301 in former and
and supply chains.
§1344 in the latter). Both bills would include reporting
requirements. S. 2226 would require reports on the
Issues for Congress
consequences of war with the PRC (§1355) and China’s
U.S. policymakers and observers increasingly describe
defense budget (§1357). H.R. 2670 would require reports
China’s military buildup as a threat to U.S. and allied
on China’s defense budget (§1315), modifications to
interests. This view reflects concerns about PLA
DOD’s annual report to Congress on China’s military
capabilities, China’s growing economic and geopolitical
(§1312 and §1317), and modifications to U.S. government
power, and China’s leaders’ regional and global intentions.
reporting on PRC military-linked companies operating in
the United States (§1311).
Congress may face questions of whether and, if so, how the
United States should seek to sustain military primacy vis-à-
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov

China Primer: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

IF11719

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