The “Quad”: Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia

The “Quad”: Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia

Updated July 25, 2022
The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States,
Japan, India, and Australia
Overview
New Delhi may be motivated to promote the Quad as a way
The Biden Administration has boosted the profile of the
to keep America engaged in the region.
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, aka “the Quad,” as a
centerpiece of its Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at
Questions remain about how the Quad defines itself and its
strengthening the United States’ position in and
goals. Will the partners maintain Quad cohesiveness despite
commitment to the region. The four-country coalition,
their different responses to the war in Ukraine or other
comprised of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia,
geopolitical shifts? Does it compete with or complement
claims a common platform of protecting freedom of
other regional groupings? Will it remain limited to the four
navigation and promoting democratic values in the region.
countries or open its membership to other countries? Is it
The first leader-level summit, held virtually in March 2021,
durable in the face of leadership changes in member
produced the first-ever joint leaders’ statement. A
countries? Can the Quad be effective without a strong
September 2021 Quad Leaders’ Summit produced an
economic pillar to counter China’s dominance in regional
expanded statement outlining four broad areas of
trade agreements? These questions may be of critical
cooperation: vaccine production and distribution; climate
importance to Congress given its oversight responsibilities,
change mitigation efforts and clean energy development;
interest in security alliances, and growing concern about
the promotion of transparency and high-standard
China’s power and influence in the Indo-Pacific.
governance in the field of critical and emerging
technologies; and the development of a regional
Security Cooperation
infrastructure partnership. Working groups in these areas
Annual Malabar joint naval exercises are a leading
are pushing forward with efforts to flesh out these priorities.
demonstration of Quad security cooperation. The exercises,
originally bilateral between the United States and India,
Since Biden took office, the Quad has focused on areas
later added Japan as a permanent member in 2015, and
beyond traditional security, but concerns about China’s
since 2020 have included Australia. U.S. Defense officials
growing influence and military assertiveness appear to
say Malabar could be a potent war-fighting exercise that
undergird the initiative’s motivates. The most recent (May
deepens trust and interoperability among the four militaries
2022) joint statement does not explicitly reference China,
in the air and sea domains. All four militaries operate
but reiterates the Quad’s commitment “to uphold the
compatible anti-submarine warfare systems, making this a
international rules-based order where countries are free
particularly promising area of cooperation.
from all forms of military, economic and political
coercion.” An accompanying fact sheet notes establishment
In addition to Malabar, Quad countries are increasing
of a new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain
bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral exercises with one
Awareness, and lays out numerous Quad initiatives on
another that may accelerate the ability of the four countries
climate, emerging technologies, cybersecurity, space, and
to build integrated capabilities. Examples of these exercises
infrastructure, among others. The Biden Administration in
include the India-Australia biennial AUSINDEX naval
May also launched a new Indo-Pacific Economic
exercise, the Japan-India JIMEX exercise in the North
Framework for Prosperity that includes the four Quad
Arabian Sea, and the large multilateral biennial Rim of the
members and nine other regional states.
Pacific (RIMPAC) maritime exercise, which includes all
four countries. As U.S. treaty allies, Australia and Japan
When the partners first held a series of Quad meetings in
regularly hold large-scale exercises with the U.S. military.
2007, China denounced them as an attempt to encircle it.
The effort dissipated amidst member leadership transitions,
Criticisms of the Quad
concerns about economic repercussions from China, and
Critics point to the Quad’s inability to speak with one voice
attention to other national interests. Revitalization of the
on regional issues, the absence of collaborative democracy
group began in 2017 and has accelerated since 2020,
promotion efforts, a dearth of joint military operations, and
bringing similar accusations from Beijing, and crystallizing
a lack of institutional structure as limits on its effectiveness.
the geopolitical and economic risks for Quad members.
India and Australia have in the past expressed wariness of
China is among the top three trading partners for all four
provoking China. Despite Japan’s acute sense of threat
countries, and each is reliant on Chinese supply chains.
from China, it has looked to stabilize relations with Beijing.
All three may be hard-pressed to maintain a balance
For Japan, Australia, and India, alarm about China’s
between advancing Quad cooperation and maintaining ties
intentions may be coupled with a perception that U.S.
to China, given that further Quad-based initiatives are likely
influence in the region is waning. Tokyo, Canberra, and
to come under more criticism from Beijing.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia
The exclusion of other regional countries and the potential
Pacific. Australia has responded to growing geopolitical
marginalization of traditional bilateral alliances also draws
uncertainty by passing foreign interference legislation,
criticism. U.S. treaty ally South Korea is not in the Quad,
expanding diplomatic ties, and increasing its defense
despite being a democracy with maritime interests and
budget, with plans to expand the size of its military.
growing naval capabilities. Korean President Yoon Suk-
yeol has indicated he would like to work with the Quad’s
Australia and Japan have solidified security and economic
working groups. While the United States professes to
ties with a series of bilateral agreements. In June 2020,
support Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Prime Minister Scott Morrison and Prime Minister
centrality in regional multilateral efforts, member countries’
Narendra Modi of India signed a Mutual Logistics Sharing
varied capabilities and views of China may make ASEAN
Agreement and announced the elevation of their bilateral
members hesitant to cooperate with the Quad.
ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
Japan’s Role
India’s Motivations
Japan has led recent efforts to invigorate the quadrilateral
Delhi’s pursuit of “strategic autonomy” in foreign affairs
arrangement; former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was
has led to an aversion to international alliances and
assassinated in July 2022, was a leading champion of the
wariness toward formalized multilateral engagements. India
concept. Japan’s eagerness to pursue the Quad appears
is the only Quad member operating outside of the U.S.-led
driven above all by its concern over China’s increasing
security alliance system and the only to share a land border
power, influence, and assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific
with China, although the two have no direct maritime
region, as well as its own territorial disputes and history of
disputes. Delhi’s skepticism about U.S. strategic intent in
conflict with China. Japan is anxious to establish a regional
Asia lingers, and many analysts cast doubt on India’s ability
order that is not defined by China’s economic, geographic,
to be a net-provider of security in the broad Indo-Pacific
and strategic dominance.
region. India’s neutrality on the war in Ukraine—Russia is
a decades-old “strategic partner” to India—makes it an
While the U.S. alliance remains fundamental to its security,
outlier among Quad members, leading to questions about
Japan has worked steadily to build closer security ties with
Delhi’s commitment to core Quad values. These factors
both Australia and India. For the past decade Japan has
lead some observers call India the “weak link” of the Quad.
deepened defense relations with Australia, and the two
concluded a Reciprocal Access Agreement (similar to a
Still, Indian leaders identify China as their primary security
Status of Forces Agreement) to define rules and procedures
challenge, and relations became more acrimonious after
for visiting troops. Australia uses practices and equipment
Indian and Chinese troops clashed along their disputed
similar to those of Japan, which may make cooperation
frontier in 2020. Two years later, that military standoff
relatively more accessible. Japan has inked an Acquisition
continues, and Delhi has become more enthusiastic in
and Cross-servicing Agreement with India, along with
joining with external actors to balance against Chinese
agreements concerning the protection of classified military
“transgressions.” Ongoing Chinese economic and military
information and transfer of defense equipment and
support for India’s traditional rival, Pakistan, increased
technology. Bilateral exercises with both countries have
Chinese naval deployments to India’s region, and major
grown in number and sophistication.
Chinese infrastructure investments along India’s periphery
undergird Delhi’s concerns. India has rejected participation
Australia’s Evolving Strategic Posture
in both Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Regional
Australia views the Quad as a pillar of its Indo-Pacific
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in apparent
agenda and a key diplomatic network that complements its
resistance to a China-led Asia order.
other bilateral, regional, and multilateral relationships. To
some Australians, the Quad’s context appears to be “about
India’s strategic partnerships with other Quad members
the values, norms, rules and standards that should shape the
have deepened significantly in recent years. Major defense
future,” as well as about securing economic, military, and
purchases from the United States include heavy lift aircraft
technological advantages.
and anti-submarine warfare platforms, and 2020 saw the
conclusion of the fourth and final “foundational” U.S.-India
Australia and the United States also cooperate through the
pact to deepen security relations and facilitate defense
Five Eyes intelligence group, which includes Canada, New
trade. India also has inked logistics support and base access
Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The 2021 Australia,
agreements with both Japan and Australia. However, many
United Kingdom, United States (AUKUS) pact will give
Indians remain uncertain about how the Quad mechanism
Australia access to U.S. and U.K. nuclear propulsion
will fit into India’s regional strategy. India is likely to
technology for its new fleet of submarines, as well as access
continue moderating the pace at which the grouping
to other weapons systems and military capabilities.
operationalizes its initiatives, particularly in security goals.
Australia is updating its national security posture, including
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Coordinator, Specialist in Asian
its relations with allies and partners, in large part because
Affairs
relations with Beijing continue to deteriorate due to China’s
K. Alan Kronstadt, Specialist in South Asian Affairs
use of coercive statecraft in an effort to expand its influence
Bruce Vaughn, Specialist in Asian Affairs
in Australia. Australia is concerned about China’s recent
security pact with the Solomon Islands, which some fear
IF11678
will open the way for a PRC military presence in the South
https://crsreports.congress.gov

The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia

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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11678 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED