Thailand: 2020 Student Protests and U.S.-Thai Relations

Thailand: 2020 Student Protests and U.S.-Thai Relations

October 29, 2020
Thailand: 2020 Student Protests and U.S.-Thai Relations
Protesters have taken to the streets in Thailand, challenging
of dollars of assets through the Crown Property Bureau.
the country’s military-led government and, notably, the role
The Thai army has close links with the palace, and both
of the country’s powerful monarchy. Protesters are
have retained deep influence despite the development of
demanding constitutional reform, the resignation of Prime
civil political institutions. King Maha Vajiralongkorn, who
Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, and limitations on the powers
succeeded his widely revered father in 2019, is deeply
of the monarchy—a deeply sensitive issue in Thailand.
unpopular with the public for his lifestyle and behavior,
Previous periods of mass protests in Thailand have
which critics describe as lavish, brazen, and irreverent.
challenged the country’s political institutions, and on
The internet and social media have also played a role in the
numerous instances have resulted in violent clashes
2020 protests. Taking the example of similar democratic
between competing factions as well as with the Thai
activism in Hong Kong, Thai activists have leveraged
military. Since becoming a constitutional monarchy in
various media outlets to publicize the movement to a global
1932, Thailand has experienced over 22 attempted coups
audience. Thai “netizens” have joined activists from similar
(13 successful), the most recent in 2014.
movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan to form the Milk
The current protests, which have largely been described as
Tea Alliance, an online pro-democracy coalition. Protest
peaceful, began in February, after the Constitutional Court
logistics and operations have been largely streamlined and
of Thailand (CCT) dissolved the widely popular Future
effective. Plans are communicated via social media
Forward Party (FFP) over claims that it broke election
(Facebook) and secure messaging apps (WhatsApp and
finance laws. Protest leaders are mostly younger Thais, who
Telegram). The movement has a decentralized leadership
have expressed disillusionment in speeches and interviews
rather than a small group of highly visible leaders who
with more than a decade of political turmoil and what they
could easily be targeted.
see as a weakening of the country’s democratic institutions.
The FFP’s
Protesters’ Demands
strong showing in the March 2019 election was
On August 10, 2020, student activists staged a large pro-
largely attributed to the party’s popularity among millions
democracy rally at Thammasat University in Bangkok,
of first-time voters, which propelled the FFP to third place
where protest leaders issued the Thammasat Manifesto, a
among several dozen parties
10-point declaration of demands to reform the monarchy
The controversial ruling to dissolve the FFP came several
and the 2017 military-backed constitution. The organizing
months after the United States walked back restrictions on
group—The United Front of Thammasat and
military aid that it imposed in 2014 following Thailand’s
Demonstration—disseminated the official declaration via
second coup in eight years. The State Department certified
Facebook and other popular social media platforms.
the 2019 election as having been conducted democratically;
however, critics argued that the reinstatement of U.S. aid
The Thammasat Manifesto
risked legitimizing an election that was skewed to favor the
military’s political party. The new wave of unrest has
1. Strip the monarch of legal immunity.
renewed concerns of democratic backsliding in Thailand
2. Revoke Thailand’s lèse-majesté (defamation of the
among democracy advocates, and raises questions about
monarchy) law and pardon all accused/jailed for the
how the United States can strike a balance between
crime.
protecting its strategic interests with a military ally,
3. Disclose the extent of the king’s royal assets.
promoting democratic reform, and countering China’s
4.
growing influence in Thailand.

Reduce tax money that supports the crown.
The Protests
5. Abolish all royal offices in government.
6.
Since 2006, anti-government protests have largely been

Open all money given to royal charities to public scrutiny.
viewed as a struggle between the rural, low-income
7. Forbid the monarch (a figurehead) from exercising royal
populists (“Red Shirts”) and the urban, pro-military
prerogative to express political opinions to sway politics.
bureaucracy (“Yellow Shirts”). However, the current pro-
8. Cease all propaganda and education that excessively and
democracy movement has galvanized the support of youth
one-sidedly glorify the monarchy.
from across the political spectrum. Many of the protesters
9. Investigate the disappearances and murders of anti-
are children of the traditional, military-aligned royalists.
establishment critics, including activists and journalists.
Thousands of student activists have taken to the streets in
10. Prohibit the king from endorsing future coups to
protest of the monarchy, contravening long-standing laws
overthrow democratically-elected governments.
against criticizing the monarchy. Thailand’s King is the
Source: CRS, New Mandala, and media outlets.
head of state; the royal palace retains widespread
prerogatives and recently expanded its control over billions
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Thailand: 2020 Student Protests and U.S.-Thai Relations
Protesters also demanded the resignation of current Prime
relationship. Since 1982, Cobra Gold, hosted by Thailand,
Minister—former army general Prayuth Chan-ocha—and
has been the largest multilateral exercise in Asia.
an overhaul of the current military-drafted constitution,
However, the bilateral relationship has been tense in recent
which was enacted in 2017. The manifesto thus represents a
years, since the United States curbed military assistance to
direct challenge to the power of both the monarchy and the
Thailand following the 2014 coup, as required under U.S.
military, the most powerful institutions in Thailand.
law. Cobra Gold was initially scaled back, and primarily
Government Response
focused on noncombat operations, such as humanitarian
Prime Minister Prayuth’s administration responded to the
assistance and disaster relief. Although the U.S. military
current protests by declaring an Extreme State of
has restored its participation to pre-coup levels, there are
Emergency for Bangkok on October 15 (coronavirus
some concerning signs about the future of the exercises, as
restrictions had been enacted after the first wave of protests
a number of Thai military officials have reportedly
broke out in February). His administration’s Ministry of
questioned the utility of the exercises in recent years.
Digital Economy and Society (MDES), a regulatory body to
Renewed Security Cooperation
enforce internet and media censorship, reportedly moved to
The State Department’s July 2019 certification of the Thai
suspend the use of the Telegram app. The government also
election allowed for the full restoration of diplomatic and
issued a warning that it would jail social media users who
military ties that had been proscribed following the 2014
publicize protest activities on their online platforms.
coup, and was welcomed by Thai and U.S. military
Some members of parliament have expressed concerns that
officials. However, critics of the announcement, including a
what they view as extreme activism could potentially
number of foreign policy experts, stated that the approval
trigger a repeat of the 1976 Thammasat Massacre, a violent
legitimized an election that was skewed to favor the junta.
military crackdown at Thammasat University in which
U.S. and Thai security officials have engaged in a number
dozens of student activists were killed.
of high-level meetings since the reinstatement of U.S.
military ties. In November 2019, the two countries signed
“Restricting people’s access to information could
the Thai-U.S. Joint Vision Statement 2020, which outlines
prompt more people to join the protests and make
five points of collaboration for security and defense.
the political situation more delicate and susceptible to
Several months later, U.S. and Thai military officials signed
violence.” -Joint statement from Thai media groups
another Strategic Vision Statement designed to (1)
recalibrate and enhance the bilateral army-to-army
The king has signaled his support for cracking down on the
relationship, and (2) reaffirm the United States’
movement by publicly praising royalist counter-protesters
commitment to allies in the Indo-Pacific.
and supporters. Thai riot police have employed aggressive
The China Factor
tactics, such as using water cannon mixed with chemical
China is Thailand’s largest trading partner, and its links to
irritants to disperse protesters. Dozens of activists have so
the Thai military have grown rapidly in recent years. Since
far been arrested. If charged with sedition and/or lèse-
the 2014 coup and the U.S. imposition of restrictions on
majesté, critics can face lengthy prison sentences (7, 15,
military ties, Thailand has counterbalanced its bilateral
and 35 years) under Thailand’s strict anti-defamation laws.
relationship with the United States by seeking closer ties
The Constitutional Court’s Ruling
with China. Thailand has increasingly sought to acquire
On February 21, 2020, the CCT ruled that the FFP had
Chinese military equipment, which carries a lower price tag
received an “illegal donation” to finance its 2019 election
and no human rights and democracy-related conditions. The
campaign, and ordered the party to disband. The ruling also
two countries have signed 10 major arms deals, including a
banned 16 FFP executives, including the charismatic leader
$1 billion deal for diesel-electric submarines and tanks,
and founder—Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit—from
Thailand’s largest defense purchase to date according to the
participating in politics for 10 years.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Founded in 2018, the FFP advocated curbing the military’s
Considerations for Congress
power in Thai politics and promoting social and economic
The protests present Congress and other U.S. policymakers
equity, which resonated with millions of first-time voters,
with challenges in balancing U.S. advocacy for democracy
many of whom came of age during the five-year period of
and human rights with the desire to maintain the U.S.-
military rule following the 2014 coup. In the 2019
Thailand alliance amid challenges from a more assertive
elections, the votes of over six million new voters propelled
China. Decisions about whether and how to support
the FFP to its third-place standing. U.S. and international
protesters, and about how to conduct military-military and
diplomats warned that the court’s verdict would
other relations, may be guided by developments including
disenfranchise millions by robbing them of their
whether the military ultimately responds with a violent
representation in government, thus undermining core
crackdown, whether the military-led government finds
aspects of the democratic process.
some sort of compromise that resolves the tension, and
Challenges Facing U.S.-Thai Relations
whether the palace’s ultimate role in Thai politics and
society changes in response to the public’s criticism.
Thailand has long been considered a key security ally of the
United States in Asia, and served as a democratic model
Kirt Smith, Research Assistant
and diplomatic leader in Southeast Asia for some time
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs
following the Cold War. Military-to-military cooperation
Ben Dolven, Specialist in Asian Affairs
has traditionally been the strongest pillar of the U.S.-Thai
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Thailand: 2020 Student Protests and U.S.-Thai Relations

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