The Army’s Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model

The Army’s Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model

Updated September 22, 2022
The Army’s Regionally Aligned Readiness and
Modernization Model
Why Is Army Readiness Important
high tempo for soldiers. Our soldiers and families
to Congress?
can deal with a lot of tempo, but unpredictability
The Army defines readiness as the capability of its forces to
results in an incredible amount of stress on the
conduct the full range of military operations and defeat all
force.
enemies regardless of the threats they pose. Readiness is
Past and Current Army
generally considered a function of how well units are
Readiness Models
manned, equipped, trained, and led. Congress, in its
lawmaking, oversight, and authorization and appropriations
The term “Readiness Models” refers to a process by which
roles, plays a vital role in ensuring the Army is capable of
the Army generates ready forces that are made available to
conducting its full range of military operations.
Combatant Commanders for operations. From the 1980s
until 2006, the Army employed a Tiered Readiness Model
The Army’s Regionally Aligned
with units manned, equipped, and trained at different levels
Readiness and Modernization Model
or tiers (often referred to as “C” ratings or levels) focused
(ReARMM)
on fighting potential overseas adversaries. Reserve
In the past, the Army has claimed it has suffered from poor
Components (RC) (Army National Guard [ARNG] and
readiness due to a number of factors, including personnel,
U.S. Army Reserve [USAR]) were largely relegated to the
equipment, training, a high operational tempo (generally
role of strategic reserve (i.e., to be employed in the event of
defined as a soldier’s and/or unit’s time away from home
a crisis or emergency exceeding the Regular Army’s [RA’s]
station for training or operations), and lack of funding. In
capacity). In 2006 in the aftermath of September 11, 2001,
October 2020, the Army announced its new Regionally
and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army adopted the
Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM),
Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN), designed to
which it hoped to have in place by 2022. This model was
provide fully manned, equipped, and trained forces for
intended to better balance operational tempo (OPTEMPO)
rotational deployment for those conflicts. ARFORGEN
with dedicated periods for conducting missions, training,
consisted of three distinct annual cycles (a postdeployment
and modernization. The Army maintained that to correct its
Reset cycle, a Train and Ready cycle; and a Deploy cycle)
readiness problems, it had invested significant resources
through which all units progressed in order to achieve a
and leadership to improve readiness and equipment
prescribed level of readiness. Under ARFORGEN, most
modernization so units would have the most up-to-date
RA units operated on a three-year cycle and RC units were
equipment.
on a five-year cycle (RA: two years preparation, one year
deployed; RC: four years preparation, one year deployed).
The Army admitted its past “readiness focus resulted in an
unsustainable OPTEMPO and placed significant demands
In 2014, as the United States began to decrease troop levels
on units, leaders, and soldiers and families and stress on the
in Iraq and Afghanistan and refocused on threats from
force.” The Army expects ReARMM will not only improve
Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, the Army determined
readiness and modernization but also ease the stress on both
ARFORGEN was no longer adequate for its needs. The
soldiers and their families.
Army began implementing the Sustainable Readiness
Model (SRM) in FY2017. The Army’s goal under SRM was
The Readiness and Modernization
to achieve two-thirds (66%) combat readiness of RA and
Challenge
ARNG brigade combat teams (BCTs) by 2023. Unlike
Lieutenant General Leopoldo Quintas, then-Deputy
ARFORGEN, under SRM, there were no fixed progressive
Commander of Army Forces Command (FORSCOM),
cycles for RA units, and the RC was to remain on a five-
described the Army’s current readiness and modernization
year train up and deployment cycle.
challenge:
How ReARMM Is Intended to Work
Army units operate in an environment of
As originally envisioned, ReARMM was intended to
unpredictability, and arguably even instability.
allocate Army units to different theaters for approximately
Units are placed on rotational missions based on
one year to assist units in developing expertise in the parts
their availability, and these missions vary in
of the world to which they might deploy during a conflict.
location, length, manning, readiness requirements
Units would also acquire new and theater-specific
and equipment just to name a few. Modernization
equipment for potential operations. The model also
today occurs when we can find a window to fit it in,
intended to provide soldiers more predictability so units
or simultaneous with other activities. Every week,
would have time to refine doctrine, and reorganize, if
month and year is filled with constant change and
necessary, based on theater-specific requirements.
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The Army’s Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model
According to the Army, some of ReARMM’s advantages
change of this magnitude for the Total Army raises a
are said to include
number of potential issues for congressional oversight,
including, but not limited to, the following:
 aligning units against regional priorities;
 Why is the Army now using eight-month cycles for
 optimizing time available to plan, train, and modernize;
Active forces as opposed to the previously planned six-
month cycles?
 creating predicable windows to field capabilities to
units;
 ReARMM represents the Army’s third readiness model
in 15 years. Because these models significantly
 enabling the Army to transform into a multi-domain
influence the manning, equipping, and training of Army
force and provide a predictable supply of ready units for
units, is it possible changing readiness models every
the Army and the Joint Force; and
four to five years, in and of itself, has also contributed to
stress on Army forces, soldiers, and families?
 building predictability for the RC, equippers, and
personnel managers.
 As a result of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of
Ukraine, the Army initially deployed elements of the
The Army has claimed ReARMM was designed to facilitate
82nd Airborne Division, the 1st Infantry Division, and the
consistent, manageable OPTEMPO, increase predictability
3rd Infantry Division, and is presently replacing those
for training and force employment, and prioritize
units with other forces. Were these deployments in
modernization efforts. Originally under ReARMM, the
accordance with the ReARMM model or did the
Army intended to create predictable six-month cycles to
urgency and scale of required forces necessitate another
field new equipment to units as opposed to the current
readiness approach? If past and current deployments are
practice of delivering equipment to units during their
in accordance with ReARMM, what lessons have been
training cycle. Also as part of ReARMM, the Army
learned as to the model’s practicality and utility? Does
intended to have at least three units of the same size, type,
the Army plan to modify ReARMM based on this
and modernization level aligned against known Joint Staff
deployment, or has the experience deploying Army
requirements for forces. It was also to provide rotational
forces to reinforce NATO validated ReARMM’s
forces, with no overlap between rotating units, for
original intent?
Combatant Commands. Army units aligned under a
Combatant Command were to have had the same assigned
 Does ReARMM align with or support the other
modernization level to ensure commonality of equipment
Service’s readiness models, and how does this affect the
and weapon systems. The Army also noted ReARMM
readiness of the Joint Force?
would not create additional forward stationing of units or
immediate changes to existing regional alignment of Army
 The Reserves are a major source of Army forces and
forces.
capabilities. What role did the Reserves play in
developing ReARMM? ARFORGEN and SRM had
October 2021 ReARMM Implementation
different “rules” and processes for the Reserves. Will
In October 2021, the Army adopted ReARMM for use and
this also be the case with ReARMM?
plans for its Full Operational Capability by January 2023.
Active forces are now to cycle through eight-month phases
 How does ReARMM intend to better manage and
of modernization, training, and mission eligibility instead of
potentially reduce OPTEMPO for soldiers and units?
the six-month cycles originally planned for. Guard and
How does this differ from previous readiness/force
Reserve units will have extended phases, though the time
generation models?
lengths were not provided by Army officials. The Army
contends that regional alignment:
 In 2020, then-Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy
noted the Army’s readiness focus is on individual,
Enables units to develop additional knowledge of
squad, platoon, and company-level training. The goal is
the terrain, culture, and people where they are most
to build unit-cohesion at lower-levels to address spikes
likely to operate. Joint Force commanders also gain
in suicide, sexual assault, and potential
by leveraging habitual, trusted relationships
racism/extremism issues. How specifically does
between Army formations and Allies and partners.
ReARMM intend to address these issues?
It takes care of people by reducing operational
Related CRS Product
tempo and maximizing predictability and stability
to commanders, soldiers, and families.
CRS In Focus IF11409, Defense Primer: Army Multi-
Domain Operations (MDO), by Andrew Feickert.
Potential Issues for Congress
While the Army has publicly stated expectations for and
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces
perceived benefits of ReARMM, little has been discussed
about how the model actually functions. Furthermore, a
IF11670

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The Army’s Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model

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