Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs)

Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs)

September 16, 2020
Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Over the last decade, Russian private military companies
personnel are highly experienced and trained ex-members
(PMCs) have appeared globally in various conflicts.
of Russia’s elite forces or intelligence services. Others
Observers believe the Russian government is increasingly
appear to be less qualified or trained and reportedly are paid
using PMCs to project power cheaply and deniably.
significantly less. Analysts have reported instances of
Russian PMCs often operate alongside local militias,
qualified, experienced Russian PMC personnel being used
volunteers, criminal groups, and other non-state actors. In
for specific operations and then gradually replaced by less
many cases, such PMCs appear closely connected to and
competent personnel.
controlled by the Russian government; in other cases, the
extent of government control is uncertain. Members of
Multiple Russian PMCs are registered both domestically
Congress may be interested in examining the scope of
and internationally, including in Cyprus and Hong Kong.
Russian PMC operations to understand the full range of
Often companies are dissolved and reconstituted under new
Russian tactics and operations when evaluating Russia’s
management and names, often to obscure their true
efforts to advance its foreign policy.
ownership. The most well-known PMC is the Wagner
Group (and entities related to it), allegedly financed and
History and Legal Status
operated by wealthy state-connected businessman Yevgeny
During the 1990s, Russia experienced an increase in
Prighozin (through his holding company, Concord
internal demand for security services, which resulted in the
Management and Consulting). The U.S. government has
growth of a large domestic private protection industry. The
imposed sanctions on Prigozhin, the Wagner Group, and/or
fall of the USSR left many former soldiers , members of
related individuals and entities for actions tied to Russia’s
elite special forces, and intelligence professionals jobless;
invasion of Ukraine, U.S. election interference, and support
many of these former soldiers formed associations with
to the former government of Sudan.
veterans of their old units and created new private security
companies. Gradually, these firms and associations began
Media reporting suggests the Wagner Group and its related
to look internationally for business but were met with stiff
entities maintain close connections to Russia’s military
competition from Western private security companies.
intelligence agency (GU). Reporting also has identified
Additionally, a 1996 law forbade Russian citizens from
Wagner training camps close to the bases of Russian
participating in armed conflict abroad for financial gain.
spetsnaz (special forces) brigades. Other firms appear to
PMCs ostensibly remain illegal under Russian law, despite
have close connections to Russia’s Ministry of Defense and
several attempts to pass legislation that would give them
other state security services. In some cases, tensions
legal status. Observers suggest this may be due to
between PMC outfits and their security service or military
opposition from the official security services and sections
patrons reportedly have resulted in infighting and arrests.
of the military, which seek to ensure Russian security
agencies retain control over these private actors and manage
A defining feature of Russian PMCs is the blending of
competition from them.
private and Russian state interests. For example, the U.S.
Treasury Department identifies the Wagner Group as “a
Growth and Evolution
designated Russian Ministry of Defence proxy force”
By 2010, several internationally focused, operational
despite it allegedly being operated by a private citizen.
Russian private security companies, primarily run by
former military and security service officers, appeared to
The Russian government initially used PMCs extensively
have close connections with the Ministry of Defense.
during its invasion of Ukraine and its intervention in Syria.
Initially, these companies offered traditional training and
As the role of PMCs increased, the political and economic
protection services for private firms, including anti-piracy
power of their owners also increased. Over time, and as the
services. Often these groups worked for, or had connections
Russian government’s needs changed, Russian PMCs
to, Russian state-run oil and gas companies. Gradually, new
apparently began to pursue more commercially beneficial
companies were formed that emphasized combat services,
opportunities less directly connected to Russian foreign
which included not only training and coordinating local
policy objectives. Some analysts argue that, in some cases,
forces but also participating in direct combat. This combat-
PMC owner/operators are pursuing financial opportunities
oriented focus constitutes a main difference between
in exchange for carrying out Russian state directives.
Russian PMCs and Western security contractors, which
tend to focus on logistics and support.
Russian PMC Doctrine and Strategy
The rise of Russian PMCs coincided with developments in
The type, extent, and competency of Russian PMCs appear
Russian military doctrine and strategy concerning the use
to vary widely both across and within conflicts. Information
and role of non-state actors in conflict. According to the
on these groups and their activities is often imprecise. Some
U.S. Treasury Department, “Russia relies on a highly
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Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs)
sophisticated apparatus consisting of state and non-state
Country
Deployment Actions
agents and proxies, decades of experience carrying out
influence operations around the globe, and the strategic
Libya
Combat, training, asset protection
direction of Russian president Vladimir Putin.” The Russian
military believes the importance of information and
Central
Training, asset protection, supplying
political influence has increased in modern conflicts,
African
weaponry
making nontraditional forms of coercion particularly
Republic
important. The Russian state may use PMCs prior to
Sudan
Training, asset protection, supplying
conflict to prepare the battlefield, and it may deploy PMCs
weaponry
during conflict to increase Russia’s low-cost power-
projection capabilities PMCs also generally increase speed
Mozambique
Combat, training
and flexibility in conducting operations. Overall, PMCs
Source: Compiled by CRS based on public U.S. government
offer four potential benefits to the Russian state:
documents, media reports, and U.N. sanctions monitoring reports.
Deniability. PMCs may allow the Russian government to
Ukraine: PMCs played a key role in Russia’s 2014
deny and deflect accusations of direct involvement in
invasion of Ukraine, both in direct combat and in the
conflicts. Although the level of deniability is often tenuous,
training and oversight of various rebel forces. Most PMC
the Russian government appears to use PMCs to confuse
personnel appear to have been highly qualified and well
and complicate attribution rather than to fully hide its
trained. The GU appears to have controlled their
responsibility. This strategy often reduces the political costs
deployment, and there are allegations PMCs assassinated
of interventions and undermines international responses.
rebel leaders who Russia found problematic. Analysts cite
Ukraine as the first appearance of the Wagner Group.
Casualty Avoidance. By using PMCs, the Russian
government can avoid official casualties, which may
Syria: PMCs have seen extensive service in Syria, ranging
increase domestic opposition and attention to foreign
from oil field protection to direct combat, including
operations. PMC losses are not subject to the same scrutiny
engagements with U.S. forces . Analysts and media reports
as Russian military losses, and Russian officials may
have noted a range of goals and quality in personnel. Some
consider PMC personnel more expendable than regular
operations appear to be commercial—such as protecting oil
troops.
fields—and often are conducted by less skilled personnel.
Other actions, such as combat and training of local allied
Rapid Deployment and Withdrawal. PMCs provide the
forces, appear to be conducted by highly skilled personnel
Russian government with an easily scalable fighting force.
and closely coordinated with the Russian military.
They also provide increased flexibility, with the ability to
inject, or withdraw, fighting forces on short notice.
Libya: Russian PMCs, specifically the Wagner Group,
have played a relatively large role in supporting Libyan
Low Cost. Using PMCs is cheaper than using conventional
National Army leader Khalifa Haftar since 2018. Support
Russian forces. PMCs require less logistical support, and
has included direct combat, training and advising, and
the combination of public and private motives means PMCs
overseeing the deployment of air defense systems and
often can sustain their presence through private financial
aircraft.
ventures (e.g., asset protection of valuable natural resource
deposits) when not directly in service of the Russian state.
Central African Republic (CAR): Since 2018, when
Russia transferred a shipment of weapons to the
PMCs also come with potential disadvantages. As noted,
government of CAR—having obtained a U.N. Security
some analysts have identified a wide range in quality
Council exemption from an arms embargo imposed on the
among PMC operations and outfits. PMCs also offer less
country—Russian PMCs reportedly have provided security
capability and capacity than Russian forces to decisively
services, military training, and personal protection for top
defeat committed opponents. Armed primarily with small
CAR officials (including the president). Russian firms
arms, PMCs generally are limited to acting as force
connected to PMCs also have concluded mining contracts
multipliers and are exposed without the support of
with the state and established a presence at rebel-held
conventional forces.
diamond mines that are subject to international sanctions.
Opaque ownership and varying levels of direct government
Sudan: Since 2018, the Wagner Group and related entities
control complicate attribution and assessment of Russian
have been documented in Sudan training local s ecurity
intent. Nevertheless, the growth of Rus sian PMCs and
personnel (including troops from CAR) and protecting gold
extensive operational experience mean their use may
sector investments.
increase in the future.
Selected Russian PMC Deployments
Mozambique: In 2019, Wagner Group personnel

reportedly deployed to Mozambique’s far north to train and
Country
Deployment Actions
support government forces against a local Islamist
insurgency with ties to the Islamic State. The PMC
Ukraine
Combat, training, assassinations
appeared to suffer serious losses, however, and reportedly is
no longer involved in such activity.
Syria
Combat, training, asset protection
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Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs)

IF11650
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
Affairs

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