Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy

Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy

August 20, 2020
Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy
Members of Congress may have an interest in the evolution
conflict. Subsequent Russian actions in Ukraine strongly
and current state of Russian military doctrine and strategy
reflected this view, as they were characterized by the
to assess Russian intentions and capabilities. Russia has
extensive use of non-state armed actors, information and
expanded its military capabilities over the last decade,
disinformation operations, and other non-kinetic strategies.
which has been displayed in its invasion of Ukraine and
intervention in Syria. Enhanced military capabilities have
“The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of
enabled the Russian government to expand its policy
nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic
options and pursue more aggressive foreign policy
goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have
decisions. These changes pair with recent statements and
exceeded the power of force of weapons in their
adjustments to Russian military doctrine that provide
ef ectiveness.”
insight into how Russian leaders think about using force to

advance foreign policy objectives.
General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staf
Russian Military and Security Strategy
of the Russian Federation
Documents
Russia’s official security doctrines are detailed in its 2014
Gerasimov described the Russian military’s awareness of
Military Doctrine and 2015 National Security Strategy.
the complex and interconnected nature of modern warfare,
Other key strategy documents include the 2016 Foreign
increasingly defined by a mix of non-kinetic tactics and
Policy Concept, 2017 Naval Strategy, and 2020 Principles
conventional military force. Gerasimov’s description was
of Nuclear Deterrence Strategy. These documents offer
the culmination of various debates in the Russian military
insight into how Russian leaders perceive threats and how
about what it perceives as the changing nature of war, or
Russian military and security policymakers envision the
what it calls new generation warfare (NGW). NGW
future of conflict. In addition, the Military Doctrine and the
describes a holistic approach to modern war that
National Security Strategy identify the importance of
encompasses a range of political, military, information, and
information and the danger of internal, as well as external,
economic tools across situations and locations. It presumes
threats.
conflict will often be preceded by psychological and
informational contests to weaken an adversary’s morale and
The 2014 Military Doctrine divides the perceived nature of
capability to sustain conflict. NGW does not lower the
threats to Russia into two categories: military risks and
importance of military power; instead, it recognizes the
military threats. Military risks are a lesser designation,
added importance of non-kinetic and asymmetric tools.
defined as situations that could “lead to a military threat
under certain conditions.” A military threat is
Gerasimov’s conception derived from a belief that Western
“characterized by a real possibility of an outbreak of a
countries were already using political strategies against
military conflict.” Once fighting breaks out, Russian
adversaries, including supporting democracy movements to
military theory and doctrine identify a typology of conflicts
undermine or overthrow regimes. The Russian military and
relating to the extent and type of conflict, gradually
security leadership viewed the so-called color revolutions,
increasing in intensity: armed conflict, local war, regional
democratic protests in Ukraine, and overthrow of Muammar
war, large-scale war, and global (nuclear) war. These levels
al Qadhafi in Libya as examples of this Western strategy.
of conflict are important for understanding how the Russian
military envisions the scale, nature, actors, and levels of
Use of Force
escalation in war.
Russia’s military strategy identifies the use of kinetic force
as only one component in support of wider political or
Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev
diplomatic objectives. Rather than seeking to dominate a
stated in July 2019 that Russia would update its National
battlespace, Russia prioritizes flexibility and the ability to
Security Strategy in 2020. Although a new version has not
adapt to changing conditions in a conflict. This can result in
yet appeared, most analysts expect its publication in the
the injection of conventional forces, a reliance on irregular
near future.
and non-state actors, or both, depending on circumstances
New Generation Warfare
and situations. During Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine,
for example, Russia relied on irregular and non-state actors
In a 2013 speech, and in a subsequent article in the Russian-
backed by the limited injection of Russian troops to defeat
language newspaper Military-Industrial Courier, Russian
Ukrainian forces.
Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov described
Russia’s conception of the nature of war in the modern era,
Russia’s preference for the measured use of force, however,
defining it by the use of nonmilitary tools and politically led
does not imply a trade-off between the decisive use of
military power and escalation management. Russian
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Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy
military strategy prioritizes the threat of further punishment.
Strategic Deterrence and Escalation
It would introduce high-end conventional firepower when a
Management
low-cost strategy appears insufficient, and it could escalate
Russian military doctrine emphasizes a concept of
or de-escalate force depending on the situation. Military
deterrence that is broader than just nuclear deterrence.
power is therefore calibrated to alter the situation on the
Referred to as strategic deterrence in official Russian
ground and to demonstrate the potential for further
military doctrine, this concept includes nuclear weapons,
escalation; it is applied as a component of Russia’s overall
strategic conventional weapons, and nonmilitary
coercive bargaining strategy. One example is Russia’s
measures—including concepts such as NGW—across both
heavy reliance on air power and bombing to support Syrian
peacetime and conflict. Russia would apply all of these
government ground offensives.
capabilities to deter an adversary and manage escalation in
the event of conflict. Additionally, Russian doctrine
Military Doctrine
identifies units and capabilities as strategic by the mission
Operationally, Russia has historically emphasized mass fire
they are intended to perform and not by type.
offensive strategies. The concentrated use of artillery and
rocket artillery, along with large tank units, remains at the
In June 2020, for the first time, Russia publicly revealed its
core of Russian military doctrine. Russian military units,
official nuclear deterrence policy, On the Fundamentals of
including tank and motor rifle units, have large numbers of
the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of
artillery and rocket artillery that provide high levels of
Nuclear Deterrence. In it, Russia sought to lay out the
firepower. The Russian military is prioritizing the
nature of threats and conditions for the use of nuclear
development of reconnaissance and targeted strike
weapons, as well as its overall nuclear deterrence strategy.
capabilities to increase the accuracy of its artillery and
Russia made clear it would view the launch of any ballistic
improve the military’s capacity to impose costs and target
missile toward Russia as nuclear due to the impossibility of
an adversary’s command and control. As a result,
knowing whether the warhead was conventional or nuclear.
information, targeting, and coordination capabilities are
increasingly central in Russian military doctrine. Russia
In the 1990s, Russia’s conventional military weakness
combines this operational strategy with an increasing
forced military doctrine to rely heavily on nuclear weapons,
emphasis on coordination and integration across service
including both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons
branches. The Russian military views this integration as
(NSNW). In the 2000s, as its conventional capabilities
crucial for the creation of combined arms armies across its
grew, Russian military doctrine recognized the importance
various military districts. Due to geography, Russia’s forces
of strategic conventional weapons. Today, conventional
are stretched thin, making a combined arms approach
weapons play an important role in Russia’s concept of
important for Russia to deal with threats in multiple
deterrence, although the Russian military views its deterrent
strategic directions.
capabilities as insufficient on their own. As a result, many
analysts assert that Russia maintains an “escalate to de-
Russia’s military doctrine also focuses on the initial period
escalate” strategy, where Russia might threaten the use of
of war. In the event of large-scale war, Russia fears surprise
nuclear weapons early in a crisis if it risked losing a
attack, a fear reinforced by its experience in World War II.
conflict.
The Russian government perceives its own demographic,
economic, and technological limitations in any long-term
Other analysts contend, however, that this explicit policy
conflict—such as one potentially initiated by the United
does not exist. They note that Russian military doctrine
States and NATO using long-range precision strike
focuses on escalation management rather than thresholds
capabilities from both air- and sea-based platforms. These
for nuclear use and escalation control. Additionally,
capabilities present a serious threat to Russia’s command
Russian doctrine gives policymakers flexibility in
identifying the type and nature of its responses and does not
and control capabilities and critical infrastructure.
exclude the possible use of NSNW. However, damage
In response to Western capabilities, and recognizing that
would be applied progressively and in doses to demonstrate
modern warfare is defined by speed and technological
the potential for further punishment and provide incentives
sophistication, the Russian military is heavily influenced by
for settlement. Accordingly, Russian military doctrine
an offensive doctrine that guides its concepts of deterrence
appears to utilize escalation management to control the
and defense. As a result, Russian military doctrine seeks to
growth of conflicts, deter outside actors, and support
decisively engage and resolve conflicts on terms favorable
resolutions that are acceptable to Russia.
to Russia. The goal is not to seek to deny area access by an
Russia’s newly published nuclear doctrine
adversary (which some analysts compare with China’s
notwithstanding,
defensive capabilities and doctrine, commonly known as
some ambiguous language and the secretive nature of the
Area Access and Air Denial, or A2AD). Rather, Russian
topic means that analysts continue to debate the true nature
doctrine focuses on integrated defenses (especially
of strategic deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons in
aerospace defense forces) that treat the enemy as a system.
Russian military doctrine. For more, see CRS Report
It seeks to disrupt, deflect, and eventually punish an
R45861, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and
attacker in the initial stages of a conflict. These defenses are
Modernization, by Amy F. Woolf.
designed to operate in coordination with Russia’s other
capabilities to ultimately target and degrade an adversary’s
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
critical infrastructure and ability to sustain combat.
Affairs
IF11625
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Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy

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