Considering the Source: Varieties of COVID-19 Information

Considering the Source: Varieties of COVID-19 Information

May 19, 2020
Considering the Source: Varieties of COVID-19 Information
Introduction
exacerbating societal divisions and creating chaos, as the
In common parlance, the terms propaganda,
truth becomes more difficult to discern.
misinformation, and disinformation are often used
interchangeably, often with connotations of deliberate
Disinformation Definition
untruths of nefarious origin. In a national security context,
Unlike misinformation, disinformation is intentionally
however, these terms refer to categories of information that
false, intending to deceive the recipient. In the international
are created and disseminated with different intent and serve
security context, governments and foreign actors seek to
different strategic purposes. This primer examines these
use disinformation to their advantage. Examples of
categories to create a framework for understanding the
disinformation include covertly planting deliberately false
national security implications of information related to the
news stories in the media, or altering private and/or
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
classified communications before their widespread public
release. Coordinated disinformation campaigns often seek
Categories of Information
to exploit existing fissures within certain demographics,
causing further political polarization and the erosion of trust
Propaganda Definition
in public institutions. These campaigns may cause decision
There is no commonly accepted definition for what
paralysis, where decisionmakers are overwhelmed with
constitutes propaganda. To some, it connotes the spread of
contradictory or otherwise unreliable information. Some
false information from a governmental source, intended to
disinformation may be easily detected and discredited, such
have persuasive effects. For others, propaganda is merely
as fraudulent accounts or suspicious news media websites
any promotional material related to organizations both
that may be full of typographical errors. Some viral videos
public and commercial. For purposes of this discussion,
and images give the appearance of documentation, but in
propaganda is defined as the intentional propagation of an
reality have been computer-generated or altered in a way
idea or narrative in order to influence and persuade a target
that is virtually undetectable to the naked eye. These “deep
audience. Although it may contain factual information,
fakes” are an example of disinformation that is increasingly
propaganda is intended to persuade rather than merely to
ubiquitous and particularly difficult to combat.
inform. By this definition, an organization or government
Psychological phenomenon such as confirmation bias,
communicating its intent, policies, and values through
defined as the tendency of individuals to interpret new
speeches, press releases, and other public affairs can be
information as confirmation of their existing beliefs, may
considered propaganda. Some forms of propaganda present
render attempts to discredit sources of disinformation
selective information that is intended to manage perceptions
ineffectual. Disinformation may continue to spread
of the truth. Other forms may be unverifiable rhetorical
throughout cyberspace even after it has been exposed as
devices, such as slogans, illustrations, editorials, and
false.
opinion pieces that lack factual content. These
communications can create perceptions that affect behavior
Sources: Cyberspace as Medium for Transmission
and steer decisionmakers toward a certain course of action.
Cyberspace presents a force multiplier for groups in other
countries seeking to amplify a message or narrative.
Misinformation Definition
Through the use of social media platforms, all three forms
Misinformation is unintentionally false information.
of information discussed here may proliferate throughout
Examples include unfounded conspiracy theories, rumors,
the internet, with the combined effect of fomenting discord
and web hoaxes spread through social media by users
and confusion. Much of today’s information is transmitted
believing them to be true. Misinformation may be the result
in cyberspace, leading many to associate information
of laypersons’ misinterpretations of scientific material. In
operations with cybersecurity. Yet on its own,
some cases, misinformation results from theoretical
cybersecurity, if defined as securing cyberspace from
preliminary scientific research being interpreted as accepted
attack, may be insufficient to prevent the spread of
fact. In other cases, the scientific material may be well-
potentially harmful information.
researched and documented, but later proven to rely on
faulty premises. Major news outlets and governmental
Cyberattacks on Information Sources
sources sometimes unintentionally spread misinformation
While cyberspace is the medium for information
by reporting on rapidly changing events. While the
transmission, cyberspace operations can be used to achieve
reporting itself may be caveated as unconfirmed, the
strategic goals. For example, an offensive cyberattack on
information contained therein may then be widely
sources of information may be used to create psychological
disseminated by well-intended users and platforms. Though
effects such as doubt and mistrust. A cyberattack may be a
unintentional, misinformation can have the effect of
demonstration of ability, intended to project power through
cyberspace regardless of the level of sophistication evident
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Considering the Source: Varieties of COVID-19 Information
in the attack methods. An unsophisticated cyberattack on a
COVID-19 and Misinformation
high-value target may give the appearance of vulnerabilities
Reports of early medical studies on the communicability
in the target and capabilities greater than what the attacker
and prevention of COVID-19 may have had the
may possess, thereby creating a false sense of panic. Some
unintentional effect of misinforming the public, as such
cyberattacks instill fear of worse attacks to come, or carry
reporting was interpreted as having been scientifically
threats of attacks in the physical world. Using this fear and
proven. Examples include the efficacy of face masks in
uncertainty, the cyberattacker may attempt coercion or
preventing transmission, whether transmission occurs by
other forms of exploitation. A cyberattacker may also deny
airborne or droplet presence of the virus, whether younger
or degrade access to information, overwhelming a website
persons are relatively less susceptible, and whether certain
with internet traffic and rendering it unusable. Some
blood types are more susceptible to contracting the disease.
attackers tamper with legitimate websites through
The proliferation of conflicting reports and studies that
defacement and placement of other forms of propaganda.
were later disproven could cause individuals to disregard all
Websites and other platforms of online communication may
medical advice or to take measures that may in fact be
be compromised when an attacker covertly implants
counterproductive. Another potentially dangerous aspect of
malicious code to infect the computers of anyone using
misinterpreting information is the “paradox of warning,”
those services. Similarly, the communications themselves
where alerts of an imminent crisis lead to policies and
may be compromised, such as by emails containing
behavior changes that prevent or slow the crisis. This in
attachments and links with malicious code that downloads
turn leads some observers to conclude that the initial risks
to the receiver’s computer when opened.
were overstated. This interpretation can encourage risky
behavior capable of contributing to a resurgence in
The COVID-19 Information Case
infection rates.
COVID-19 and Propaganda
COVID-19 and Disinformation
In large part, propaganda efforts center on controlling the
Disinformation around COVID-19 may closely resemble
narrative around the origin of the virus and management of
propaganda, making it difficult to distinguish between the
the outbreak. Chinese and Russian media manipulation, for
two. As part of their disinformation efforts, foreign powers
example, has exploited uncertainties in the origin of
may be fabricating stories of COVID-19’s creation by the
COVID-19, encouraging conspiracy theories on the
United States as a weapon of war and deliberately planting
coronavirus as a deliberately engineered creation brought to
false accusations in online media. Governments may
China by the United States rather than a naturally occurring
likewise be fabricating their own crisis handling and rates
phenomenon. Other state-sponsored propaganda places a
of infection, or they may be exaggerating, manipulating, or
positive spin on the government’s positive crisis response,
presenting incomplete sets of facts in an attempt to control
participation in global relief efforts, and ability to contain
the narrative. As a propaganda technique, selective
infection rates compared with other nations. This is often
omission of factual information can have the same effects
aided by suppression of information that complicates a
as that of commission or active fabrication.
preferred narrative.
On March 23, 2020, the U.S. State Department released a
According to CRS Report R46354, COVID-19 and China:
fact sheet documenting Iran’s disinformation attempts,
A Chronology of Events (December 2019-January 2020), it
which include false claims of having evidence of COVID-
appears that Chinese officials and state-controlled media
19 as a “biological attack.” Russia and China have
initially downplayed the severity and scope of the outbreak,
reportedly attempted to support and amplify Iranian claims
releasing incomplete information on the spread and
that COVID-19 was created by the U.S. government as a
prevention of the disease and blocking access to some
biological weapon. In a convergence of messaging, all three
Chinese and foreign news reports. At least eight individuals
governments have criticized the U.S. government’s inability
who attempted to share early information were reprimanded
to contain the pandemic.
by public security officials for “spreading rumors” and
creating “negative social influence.” After elevating
Cyberattacks on COVID-19 Information Sources
containment to a national priority, Chinese officials and
In a time of crisis, government and citizen decisionmaking
media shifted to public claims of successful crisis
requires timely information. Cyberattackers can capitalize
management, with official numbers released to media
on this need using cyber tools to suppress information on a
outlets showing the epidemic coming under control. As
large scale, gain intelligence, and compromise users and
other countries have struggled to contain the disease, the
devices. One attack method is to implant malware in factual
Chinese government appears to promote the narrative of
sources such as government websites and trusted viral
China as world leader and the Chinese system of
information materials. Another method is to target the
government as superior. Human rights groups such as
platforms of producers and disseminators of information
Reporters Without Borders allege that China monitors and
through attacks that inhibit access to these resources. For
suppresses independent news sources that depart from this
example, recent reported denial-of-service attacks on the
narrative.
Department of Health and Human Service’s public-facing
website could have been intended to suppress information
The accuracy of China’s COVID-19 statistics, as well as
flow on COVID-19. Such attacks may have other effects,
those from Russia, Iran, and North Korea, has been
such as undermining source credibility and eroding trust in
questioned by U.S. officials.
otherwise accurate sources of information.
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Considering the Source: Varieties of COVID-19 Information

Catherine A. Theohary, Specialist in National Security
Policy, Cyber and Information Operations
IF11552

Disclaimer
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