Protecting Against Rogue Drones

Protecting Against Rogue Drones

Updated September 3, 2020
Protecting Against Rogue Drones
Rules for Unmanned Aircraft
fragments of the drone were found. The following month, a
As of September 2020, the Federal Aviation Administration
drone struck a chartered turboprop near Quebec City,
(FAA) had registered about 1.7 million unmanned aircraft
Canada. That aircraft also was damaged but managed to
systems (UAS), often referred to as drones. More than 70%
land safely. According to National Transportation Safety
are operated by recreational users. FAA estimates that by
Board data, there have been three confirmed collisions
2024, about 2.3 million UAS, including 1.5 million
between drones and manned aircraft in the United States so
recreational drones and model aircraft and about 800,000
far, and a similar number of manned aircraft have been
commercial UAS, will be registered to fly in U.S. airspace.
damaged from incidents that plausibly involved UAS.
As the UAS market expands, there may be an increasing
FAA-sponsored research has found that collisions with
risk that rogue drones that either fail to obey safety rules or
drones weighing eight pounds or less can cause more
are operated for nefarious purposes could threaten manned
structural damage than collisions with birds of similar
aircraft operations, airports, critical infrastructure facilities,
weight. Experts fear that a collision between a small drone
and high-profile events. These concerns have prompted
and a manned aircraft, or a drone being ingested into a jet
Congress to examine options for detecting and interdicting
engine, could be catastrophic.
drones.
Airport officials have treated drone threats with
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L.
considerable caution. In December 2018, hundreds of
112-95) mandated that FAA develop a plan to integrate
flights at London’s Gatwick airport were canceled over a
UAS into the national airspace and promulgate regulations
three-day period after multiple drone sightings near the
allowing certain commercial drone operations. In 2016,
runway. Three weeks later, London’s Heathrow airport was
FAA issued regulations (14 C.F.R. Part 107) allowing
also briefly shut down due to a drone sighting, as was
routine operations of commercial UAS weighing less than
Newark-Liberty Airport in New Jersey in January 2019.
55 pounds so long as they are conducted during daylight
In addition to careless and reckless drone operations,
hours, in good visibility, and at low altitude, provided the
homeland security and law enforcement agencies have
drones remain within the operator’s visual line of sight and
uncovered incidents involving drones transporting illegal
away from airports and manned aircraft. FAA may grant
drugs across U.S. borders, dropping contraband into prison
waivers to these restrictions on a case-by-case basis.
yards, and conducting industrial espionage. The Federal
UAS flown strictly for noncommercial purposes, including
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has warned of an escalating
recreational drones and radio-controlled model aircraft that
threat that terrorists and criminal organizations might
can sometimes be much larger than the 55-pound limit for
launch domestic drone attacks on critical infrastructure
commercial UAS, were exempted from these rules and,
facilities, landmarks, and high-profile mass gatherings,
instead, operate under safety guidelines set by recreational
citing the use of reconnaissance and weaponized drones by
user groups. Like commercial operators, recreational users
insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. In 2011, the FBI
must register with FAA and may do so through an online
thwarted a terrorist plot to attack the Pentagon and the U.S.
registration system. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
Capitol with explosives -laden model aircraft.
(P.L. 115-254) imposed additional requirements for
Controlling the Threat
hobbyists, limiting recreational drone flights to altitudes
FAA has encouraged UAS manufacturers to incorporate
below 400 feet and mandating testing to assess operators’
technology that could reduce the risk of rogue operations,
knowledge of airspace and safety regulations. FAA is in the
such as built-in “geofencing” capabilities that prevent the
process of implementing these testing requirements.
drone from entering airspace that is off-limits to UAS.
Potential Threats from UAS
These systems, however, may not have current information,
These requirements that recreational drones remain at low
as they usually require the operator to keep airspace data up
altitudes and that operators learn safety rules were imposed
to date. FAA has also developed the Low Altitude
following close calls and collisions with manned aircraft.
Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC)
Between 2016 and 2019, airline pilots reported, on average,
system to disseminate information regarding low-altitude
more than 100 drone sightings per month to FAA, and
controlled airspace in the vicinity of airports and to grant
social media have transmitted photos and videos taken by
airspace access to certain commercial UAS operations on a
drones in close proximity to airports and passenger
case-by-case basis. In the future, FAA envisions that these
airliners. In September 2017, a hobby drone launched from
resources will be integrated with “Remote Identification”
a park in Brooklyn, New York, was intentionally flown
capabilities to monitor compliance.
beyond its operator’s line of sight and collided with a U.S.
Remote Identification
Army Black Hawk helicopter patrolling a temporary no-fly
The FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (P.L.
zone around New York City. The helicopter landed safely,
114-190) required FAA to develop standards for the remote
but the incident damaged the main rotor assembly, where
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Protecting Against Rogue Drones
identification of UAS and to coordinate with the National
drone-related incidents. P.L. 114-190 directed FAA to
Aeronautics and Space Administration to develop
establish procedures for imposing unmanned aircraft
technologies for managing UAS traffic. P.L. 115-254
restrictions around critical infrastructure and other sensitive
authorized FAA to require remote identification for all
“fixed site” facilities, including amusement parks, and to set
drones, including recreational drones. FAA recently
up a pilot program to detect unmanned aircraft near
published a proposed rule that would require all UAS to
airports. P.L. 115-254 expanded the list of eligible fixed-
transmit location and identification information. This
site facility types and also included language explicitly
requirement could necessitate extensive retrofitting or
prohibiting operators from affixing dangerous weapons to
replacement of existing drones. Educating operators about
unmanned aircraft.
compliance and enforcing remote identification
P.L. 115-254 established criminal penalties for operators of
requirements on older UAS could pose significant
challenges to effective implementation.
drones that interfere with firefighting, law enforcement, or
other emergency response to wildfires. It directed the
Detection and Interdiction Technologies
Department of Transportation to work with the Department
Given the potential threat posed by rogue drones, there is
of Defense to streamline the deployment of counter-UAS
considerable interest in deploying counter-UAS systems
technologies and required FAA to establish a pilot program
that can detect and interdict unauthorized unmanned
to assess the use of remote detection and identification
aircraft. Commercial airports have a particular interest in
technologies to conduct safety oversight and carry out
drone detection technologies because they have a regulatory
enforcement actions against drone operators. P.L. 115-254
responsibility to inform airlines about airfield conditions
also authorized the Department of Justice and the
that may adversely affect the safety of flight operations.
Department of Homeland Security, including the Coast
Guard, to interdict hostile or unauthorized drones in certain
U.S. airports and state and local law enforcement agencies
instances to protect critical infrastructure and designated
that protect them do not have specific legal authority to
high-profile events and mass gatherings (see Figure 1). The
deploy counter-UAS technologies. FAA has warned that
language parallels authorities granted to the Department of
these technologies pose potential risks to manned aircraft
Defense and the Department of Energy in the National
and to surveillance, navigation, and communications signals
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (P.L. 114-
used by air traffic control. Moreover, a multiagency legal
328) to protect certain military and nuclear facilities in the
advisory published in August 2020 cautioned nonfederal
United States from drones.
public and private entities that UAS detection technologies
could run afoul of a wide gamut of federal statutes and
Figure 1. Department of Homeland Security
regulations pertaining to privacy and the use of
Counter-UAS Authorities
radiofrequency spectrum, while systems designed to
interdict drones could violate federal laws and regulations
regarding aviation safety and security and prohibitions
against jamming or interfering with radio communications
or impeding navigation through the airspace.
While interdicting drones near airports is particularly
difficult because of potential safety implications, protecting
other facilities and high-profile events may depend on
effective interdiction capabilities to neutralize drone threats.

Available interdiction systems rely primarily on jamming
Source: Department of Homeland Security.
devices that disrupt flight control signals between the drone
While these federal agencies have been granted limited
and the controller, but these may not be able to stop fully
authority to deploy counter-UAS systems, FAA has issued
autonomous drones and may interfere with air navigation
stern warnings to event organizers and local authorities that
signals and other radio transmis sions. Other techniques
have deployed such systems of their own accord to protect
involve systems that transmit signals to spoof drone
high-profile events. Unauthorized use of counter-drone
guidance systems or take over control of the drone, capture
technologies is potentially in violation of both FAA and
drones in nets, or disable or destroy drones with lasers.
Federal Communications Commission regulations, as well
These technologies are nascent, and may not be as effective
as federal aviation laws. The National Football League,
as some manufacturers and advocates may assert. The
which has teamed with FAA to educate fans about drone
absence of standards raises questions about performance
restrictions, has urged Congress to extend counter-UAS
and safety of interdiction technologies, especially near
authorities to state and local law enforcement in order to
airports where radiofrequency jamming could impact flight
enforce temporary flight restrictions around large sporting
operations, and mass gatherings where interdiction could
events. In considering such requests, Congress faces
pose a hazard to people on the ground.
complex trade-offs in weighing the inherent risks of
Legal Restrictions and Authorities
expanding counter-UAS authorities against the level of
Certain civil and criminal penalties have been enacted to
threat posed by rogue drones.
punish violations involving UAS, and, in some instances,
unlawful drone flights have been prosecuted. FAA relies
Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy
extensively on assistance from federal, state, and local
IF11550
public safety and law enforcement agencies to investigate

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Protecting Against Rogue Drones

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