The Three Seas Initiative

The Three Seas Initiative

link to page 1 link to page 2

Updated April 26, 2021
The Three Seas Initiative
The Three Seas Initiative (3SI) is a regional effort in
According to EU data, the 3SI region remains less well-off
Europe to expand cross-border energy, transportation, and
economically compared with the rest of the EU; the 3SI
digital infrastructure and boost economic development in
countries together comprise just under 30% of EU territory
the area between the Adriatic Sea, Baltic Sea, and Black
and 22% of its population but account for 10% of the EU’s
Sea. Twelve countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the
gross domestic product (the EU data predate Brexit and so
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
include the United Kingdom). Infrastructure gaps are
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia), all of which are
considered a factor behind regional economic disparities.
members of the European Union (EU), participate in the
According to EU data, road and rail travel in the 3SI region
3SI (see Figure 1).
take, on average, roughly two to four times longer than
comparable travel in the rest of the EU.
The U.S. government, including some Members of
Congress, have indicated strong backing for the 3SI. In
Figure 1. Three Seas Initiative
November 2020, the House of Representatives passed a
bipartisan resolution “expressing support of the Three Seas
Initiative in its efforts to increase energy independence and
infrastructure connectivity thereby strengthening the United
States and European national security” (H.Res. 672, 116th
Congress). Officials from the Biden Administration and the
Trump Administration have expressed diplomatic support
for the 3SI, and high-level U.S. officials (including then-
President Trump in 2017) have joined its annual summits.
Initiative Overview
The Three Seas Initiative was launched in 2015 by the
presidents of Croatia and Poland, and the first annual
summit was held in 2016. The 3SI is structured as a flexible
platform for generating funding and promoting deeper
cooperation among its participating countries; an
overarching goal is to develop a north-south infrastructure
corridor in the region. In part as a legacy of the Soviet
Union’s Cold War-era dominance over most of the region,
east-west infrastructure remains considerably more
developed than north-south linkages. Particularly with
regard to energy security, the dominance of east-west
pipelines and limited alternatives to them have been factors

in continuing energy dependence on Russia. The United
Source: Map created by CRS.
States and the 3SI countries frequently have expressed
concern over Russia’s energy supply dominance in the
High-level officials from the United States, the EU, and
region. Such concerns have increased with the construction
other EU member states, such as Germany, have joined
of Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream, pipeline projects that
annual 3SI summits to express their support as interested
would expand Rus sia’s capacity to deliver natural gas to
partners. The next summit is expected to be held in 2021 in
Europe. Many observers consider the expansion of energy
Sofia, Bulgaria.
infrastructure, including liquefied natural gas (LNG)
terminals, necessary for opening up new routes for
Priority Projects and Financing
alternative suppliers. Supporters also view the 3SI as a
Mechanisms
potential counterbalance to China’s interest in participating
At the 2018 summit, the 3SI countries developed a list of 48
in regional infrastructure projects as part of its global Belt
priority interconnection projects spanning the energy,
and Road Initiative.
transportation, and digital sectors (see Table 1).
Another objective of the 3SI is to stimulate economic
development and reduce regional disparities within the EU.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

The Three Seas Initiative
Table 1. Three Seas Initiative Priority Project Examples by Sector
(proposed and in-progress projects)
Energy
 An LNG terminal in Krk, Croatia (completed in late 2020), with a connecting pipeline through Hungary and Slovakia
 The Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania (GIPL), a pipeline that would connect Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to the wider
European gas network
 The Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria (BRUA) pipeline, which would supply Romanian Black Sea gas to the region
Transportation
 The completion of Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) north-south road and railway corridors that would connect the
Baltic (Poland) with the Adriatic (Slovenia and Italy) and with Greece via the Western Balkans
 Viking Train, a railway to connect the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, via Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine
 FAIRway Danube, a project to improve infrastructure and navigation conditions for water traffic on the Danube River in Romania,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, and Slovakia
Digital
 The Three Seas Digital Highway, a series of projects to improve data transfer and enhance communications infrastructure,
including 5G technology and fiber optics
 3SI Marketplace, seeking to boost trade and investment in the region by connecting smal - and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
to investment capital
 The SmartCity Forum, seeking to accelerate innovation and foster investment in innovation in regional cities
Source: Three Seas Initiative Summit Bucharest, September 17-18, 2018, Three Seas Initiative Priority Interconnection Projects.
The Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund, a mechanism
Members of Congress also may be interested in U.S.
intended to draw in private-sector financial support, was
financial support for the 3SI. The Trump Administration
launched in 2019 with an initial commitment of €500
pledged up to $1 billion in support through the U.S.
million (about $602 million) from development banks in
International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). In
Poland and Romania. As of April 2021, 9 of the 12 3SI
December 2020, DFC approved a $300 million investment
countries have pledged contributions totaling about €1
in the fund to be used “primarily for projects focused on
billion ($1.2 billion). The fund’s current target is to raise €3
energy security.” This investment approval was facilitated
billion to €5 billion ($3.6 billion to $6 billion).
by the European Energy Security and Diversification Act of
2019, which eases country-income-level restrictions for
The EU is a source of significant financial support for
certain energy infrastructure projects in Europe. In February
member state connectivity projects and other regional
2021, a bipartisan group of Members urged the Biden
development initiatives. According to EU data, more than
Administration to continue the previous Administration’s
€150 billion (about $180 billion) in regional development
pledged financial support for the 3SI and called on DFC to
and cohesion funds was allocated to the 3SI countries under
finalize its approved $300 million investment, citing
the EU’s 2014-2020 budget framework; over one-third of
concern over infrastructure deficiencies that make the 3SI
this amount was for investments in transport, energy, and
region “overly dependent on Russia and China for energy
digital connectivity projects. Many of the 3SI priority
and economic needs.” For additional information about the
projects have been approved for partial financial support
DFC, see CRS In Focus IF11436, U.S. International
from various EU funds or for loans from the European
Development Finance Corporation (DFC), by Shayerah
Investment Bank. The Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), a
€30 billion (about $
Ilias Akhtar and Nick M. Brown.
36 billion) EU funding instrument,
shares the 3SI’s emphasis on strategic investments in large-
Some Members of Congress have demonstrated strong
scale transport, energy, and digital infrastructure networks.
support for a range of efforts to deter potential Russian
According to EU data, as of 2018, over 90% of CEF
aggression and perceived malign influence in Europe. Some
funding for natural gas projects went to the 3SI countries.
Members of Congress also have expressed increasing
Issues for Congress
concern over strategic competition with China in Europe
and may have an interest in potential avenues to
The objectives of the 3SI appear to align with a number of
counterbalance the influence of China’s financial
broad U.S. security and economic goals that have received
investments and diplomatic engagement in the region. In
congressional interest and support. In recent years, some
the context of these broad strategic concerns, Members of
Members of Congress have demonstrated a growing interest
Congress may be interested in U.S. involvement with the
in European energy security and sought to encourage
3SI as a complement to the United States’ already extensive
reduced energy reliance on Russia, including by promoting
diplomatic, security, and economic cooperation with the
U.S. LNG exports. The Further Consolidated
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), includes the
European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019
Sarah E. Garding, Analyst in European Affairs
(Division P, Title XX) and the Eastern Mediterranean
Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 (Division J,
Derek E. Mix, Specialist in European Affairs
Title II).
IF11547
https://crsreports.congress.gov

The Three Seas Initiative

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permissio n of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11547 · VERSION 2 · UPDATED