Convergence of Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare

Convergence of Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare

August 13, 2019
Convergence of Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare
Over the past two decades, cyberspace operations have
 microwaves for tactical data-links, radars, and satellite
become an important element in military operations.
communications;
Electronic warfare (EW) has been a component of military
 infrared for intelligence and to target enemies; and
operations since the advent of the radio at the beginning of
the 20th century. These two types of operations are
 lasers to communicate, transmit data, and potentially
becoming somewhat analogous as technical capabilities
destroy a target.
converge, yet historical divides between EW and cyber
operations remain in Department of Defense (DOD)
Modern militaries rely on communications equipment that
organization and doctrine.
uses broad portions of EMS to conduct military operations.
This allows forces to talk, transmit data, provide navigation
Both cyberspace operations and EW are efforts to dominate
and timing information, and to command and control forces
aspects of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) that
all over the world. They also rely on the EMS to determine
transmit packets of information. As such, EW and
where adversaries are and what they are doing, where
cyberspace operations have traditionally been used as part
friendly forces are, and what effects weapons achieve.
of a broader information operations (IO) campaign, and
Because of this dependency, modern militaries attempt to
previously existed in joint doctrine as two of the five pillars
dominate EMS through electronic warfare.
of IO (along with psychological operations, military
deception, and operations security). These capabilities are
From the perspective of military operations, there are three
increasingly being used in support of operations in the
broad divisions of electronic warfare:
information environment (IE)—the aggregate of social,

cultural, cognitive, technical and physical attributes that
Electronic protection involves actions to protect access
ultimately affect action. Current and evolving DOD
to EMS for friendly military assets.
doctrine refers to EMS operations and cyberspace
 Electronic attack uses electromagnetic energy to
operations as separate but related to operations in the IE.
degrade or deny an enemy’s use of EMS.
Cyberspace Operations (CO)
 EW support identifies and catalogues emissions of
Cyberspace operations are defined by DOD as the military,
friendly or enemy forces either to protect U.S. forces or
intelligence, and ordinary business operations of the DOD
develop a plan to deny an enemy’s access to EMS.
in and through cyberspace. Military cyberspace operations
These subsets of EW often mutually support each other in
use cyberspace capabilities to create effects that support
operations. For example, radar jamming (electronic attack)
missions in both physical domains and cyberspace.
can serve a protection function for friendly forces to
penetrate defended airspace; it can also prevent an
DOD categorizes cyberspace operations as follows:
adversary from having a complete operating picture. EW

may attack and defend the EMS using cyber capabilities,
Offensive cyberspace operations, intended to project
while cyber operations may target parts of the EMS that are
power by the application of force in and through
vulnerable to EW.
cyberspace. These operations are authorized like
operations in the physical domains.
Differences and Overlap
 Defensive cyberspace operations, intended to defend
Part of the convergence involves not just similarities in
DOD or other friendly cyberspace. Defense operations
technical capabilities, but also cyberspace operations being
are both active and passive conducted inside and outside
used to provide EW effects, and vice versa. Cyberspace
of DOD information networks (DODIN).
operations attempt to deny an adversary access to their
computer networks using software and computer codes. EW
 DODIN operations, to design, build, configure, secure,
affects communications between networks using radio
operate, maintain, and sustain DOD communications
jamming or other spectrum controls, while cyber operations
systems and networks across the entire DODIN.
use computer code to provide a range of effects from
Electronic Warfare (EW)
disruptive (e.g., denial of service attacks) to destructive
(e.g., physically damaging computer components and
Since the introduction of two-way radios, militaries have
platforms).
become highly dependent on the EMS. This reliance has
expanded over the past century to include nearly every
The most recognizable convergence of electronic warfare
weapon system. Applications include
and cyberspace operations is when forces transmit
 radio frequencies to communicate with friendly forces;
computer code to inject it into an adversary’s network. In
these types of operations, radios can transmit data packets
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Convergence of Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare
on Wi-Fi networks, even if these networks are closed (i.e.,
Operations in the Information
not connected to the internet). Similarly, if an adversary
Environment
operates a closed wired network, forces can potentially tap
Recognizing the importance of information superiority in
into the connections and listen to transmissions or even
military conflict, DOD’s Joint Publication 1 recently named
plant nefarious applications.
information as a seventh joint function (along with
command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and
Figure 1. EC-130H Compass Call
maneuver, protection, and sustainment). In 2010,
cyberspace was designated as a global warfighting domain
that exists within the information environment, which in
turn is defined as the aggregate of individuals,
organizations, and systems that collect, process,
disseminate, or act on information. Operations in the
information environment attempt either to limit or distort a
potential adversary’s access to information, thereby limiting
their situational awareness and potentially altering
adversary decisions. CO and EW are both tools to achieve
these ends. Yet, the activation of US Cyber Command and
the creation of a national cyber mission force may have had
the effect of separating cyberspace operations as
conceptually and operationally distinct, focusing more on
the use of hardware and software to create effects rather
than controlling information itself. While some
Source: https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/
organizations within DOD have folded former EW
104550/ec-130h-compass-cal /.
functions under a new cyberspace directorate and refer to
Notes: The EC-130H Compass Cal is normal y used to jam enemy
“cyberspace electromagnetic activities,” such integration
radars and communications. However, in recent years it has been
remains inconsistent across the services. Given that the
used to transmit computer code to wireless devices using radio
2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes information
frequencies.
warfare and the integration of information as an element of
national power, some military analysts argue that a new,
Both CO and EW can affect space operations. Satellites are
unified Information Warfare Command may be able to
controlled using ground control systems that rely on
remove operational stovepipes that exist between EMS and
computers to maintain orbit parameters and direct onboard
cyberspace operations, particularly as both cyberspace and
sensors, particularly to maintain stable orbits; radios
the electromagnetic spectrum exist as dimensions of the
transmit computer commands to the satellites. Computer
information environment.
code transmitted directly to satellites in orbit can potentially
allow remote control of the system, preventing others’
access to onboard sensors or communications systems.
CRS Products
Adversaries could similarly enter ground control systems
CRS Report R43848, Cyber Operations in DOD Policy and Plans:
and issue alternative orders to satellites to move them out of
Issues for Congress, by Catherine A. Theohary
position or shut off critical systems. Because satellites
CRS In Focus IF10537, Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations,
routinely receive commands using radio frequencies, an
by Catherine A. Theohary
adversary might attempt to shut off sensors or directly gain
control of the spacecraft, rather than trying to issue orders
CRS In Focus IF11155, Defense Primer: Military Use of the
through a ground control system.
Electromagnetic Spectrum, by John R. Hoehn
Cyberspace operations can also affect the electromagnetic

spectrum. Active electronic scanned array (AESA) radars
Other Resources
(which allow thousands of radio beams to transmit at once)
DOD. Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, February
and software defined radios (which transform how a radio
5, 2013.
wave is transmitted) rely on computer systems to manage
spectrum operations. Software can help shape how these
DOD. The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, September
radios transmit, potentially making it difficult for an
2018.
adversary to either detect or intercept radio or radar
DOD. Joint Pub. 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, Feb. 8, 2012.
transmissions. Changes to the software can easily transform
DOD. DOD Directive 3222.04 Electronic Warfare Policy,
a radar or radio from a receiver to a transmitter. Having
March 26, 2014, with Change 2, Effective August 31, 2018.
small, adjustable arrays allows AESA radars, in particular,
to focus small beams of radio energy on potential targets.

Radio systems like the multifunctional advanced data link
on the F-35 Lightning II or the intra-flight data link on the
Catherine A. Theohary, Specialist in National Security
F-22 Raptor communicate with each other by transmitting
Policy, Cyber and Information Operations
intelligence and targeting information seamlessly, while
limiting their electromagnetic signature to prevent
John R. Hoehn, Analyst in Military Capabilities and
adversaries from detecting or intercepting their
Programs
communications.
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Convergence of Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare

IF11292

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