National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies

National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies

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Updated March 14, 2023
National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G)
Mobile Technologies
The fifth generation (5G) of mobile technologies will
telecommunications companies are focusing on the less
increase the speed of data transfer and improve bandwidth
expensive sub-6 approach, while some U.S.
over existing fourth generation (4G) technologies, in turn
telecommunication providers are focused on MMW
enabling new military and commercial applications. 5G
deployments and others on sub-6.
technologies are expected to support interconnected or
autonomous devices, such as smart homes, self-driving
The Department of Defense (DOD), however, holds large
vehicles, precision agriculture systems, industrial
portions of the usable spectrum. Although DOD uses
machinery, and advanced robotics. 5G for the military
certain MMW frequencies for high-profile military
could additionally improve intelligence, surveillance, and
applications such as Advanced Extremely High Frequency
reconnaissance (ISR) systems and processing; enable new
satellites that provide assured global communications for
methods of command and control (C2); and streamline
U.S. forces, it extensively uses sub-6 frequencies—leaving
logistics systems for increased efficiency, among other
less sub-6 availability in the United States than in other
uses. As 5G technologies are developed and deployed,
countries. The Defense Innovation Board (DIB) advised
Congress may consider policies for spectrum management
DOD to consider sharing sub-6 spectrum to facilitate the
and national security, as well as implications for U.S.
build-out of 5G networks and the development of 5G
military operations.
technologies used in the sub-6 band. While DOD has been
moving toward greater spectrum sharing, it has expressed
Spectrum Management
concern that sharing presents operational, interference, and
5G technologies plan to use three segments of the
security issues for DOD users. As an alternative to
electromagnetic spectrum (“the spectrum”): high band (also
spectrum sharing, some analysts have argued that portions
called millimeter wave, or MMW), which operates between
of the sub-6 spectrum should be reserved for commercial
around 24 and 300 GHz; mid band, which operates between
use. This would require DOD to relocate certain
1 GHz and 6 GHz; and low band, which operates below 1
applications to other parts of the spectrum. DOD has argued
GHz. Mid band and low band are often collectively referred
that moving out of the 3.1-3.45 GHz band alone could cost
to as sub-6 (see Figure 1).
at least $120 billion and take decades.
Figure 1. 5G Proposed Spectrum
National Security Concerns
According to a DIB assessment, China is the current leader
in sub-6 technologies and is likely to deploy the world’s
first 5G wide-area network. Chinese companies, which
often receive government subsidies (e.g., subsidized land
for facilities, R&D grants), are therefore well-positioned as
global 5G suppliers. Huawei has signed contracts for the
construction of 5G infrastructure in around 30 countries,
including Iceland, Turkey, and Hungary.
Source: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/03/2002109302/-1/-1/0/
DIB_5G_STUDY_04.03.19.PDF.
Some experts are concerned that vulnerabilities in Chinese
equipment could be used to conduct cyberattacks or
Millimeter waves allow faster data transfer rates, which
military/industrial espionage. These experts claim
some telecommunications companies argue is required for
vulnerabilities were introduced through the poor business
autonomous vehicles, virtual reality, and other data-
practices of many Chinese companies. However, they note
intensive applications like smart cities; however, MMW
that vulnerabilities could also be intentionally introduced
travel comparatively short distances and can be absorbed by
for malicious purposes. China’s National Intelligence Law,
rain or disrupted by physical objects such as buildings and
enacted in June 2017, declares that “any organization and
vehicles. As a result, 5G MMW technologies require
citizen shall, in accordance with the law, support, provide
installing a higher number of cell sites—at much higher
assistance, and cooperate in national intelligence work, and
cost and on a much slower deployment timeline than the
guard the secrecy of any national intelligence work that
sub-6 approach. 5G deployment thus relies on MMW for
they are aware of.” Some analysts interpret this law as
high-speed, high-bandwidth communications and on sub-6
requiring Chinese companies to cooperate with intelligence
waves for nationwide coverage.
services, including compelling installation of backdoors to
provide private data to the government.
Telecommunication companies around the world are
deploying 5G in different ways. Chinese
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National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies
Other analysts argue that the risks posed by Chinese
information and synthesize it with on-board sensor data.
telecommunications equipment vary depending on the
Likewise, 5G could be used to transfer sensor data between
equipment’s location within the cellular network
operators and uninhabited vehicles and to network vehicles,
architecture. Most cellular networks are broken into two
potentially enabling new military concepts of operations,
groups: the core network, which provides the gateway to
such as swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which
the internet and ensures devices meet the provider’s
vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a task).
standards, and the radio access network, composed of the
cellular towers that broadcast and receive radio signals (see
5G technologies could also be incorporated into ISR
Figure 2). These analysts state that, while the risks posed
systems, which increasingly demand high-bandwidths to
by Chinese core networks are significant, the risks posed by
process, exploit, and disseminate information from a
Chinese radio access networks could be managed. Other
growing number of battlespace sensors. This could provide
analysts have argued that having any Chinese equipment in
commanders with timely access to actionable intelligence
the network could pose potential security concerns. Such
data, in turn improving operational decisionmaking.
concerns have prompted some analysts to argue that the
Similarly, 5G could reduce latency in other data-intensive
United States should limit intelligence sharing with any
activities, such as logistics and maintenance, and could
country operating Chinese-supplied 5G equipment.
additionally enable augmented or virtual reality
environments that could enhance training.
Figure 2. Cellular Network Architecture
Finally, command and control systems could benefit from
the high speed, low latency capability of 5G. For example,
the U.S. military currently uses satellite communications
for most of its long-distance communications. However,
satellites on orbit can significantly increase latency due to
the amount of distance a signal needs to travel, causing
delays in the execution of military operations.
DOD has selected 12 military installations as test beds for

5G applications: Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA,
Source: https://medium.com/@miccowang/5g-c-ran-and-the-
and Naval Base San Diego, CA (“smart warehouses”); Hill
required-technology-breakthrough-a1b2babf774.
Air Force Base, UT (“spectrum sharing between 5G and
In response to these security concerns, Congress passed the
airborne radar”); Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA
Secure 5G and Beyond Act (P.L. 116-129), requiring the
(“augmented and virtual reality”); Nellis Air Force Base,
President to develop a 5G protection strategy. Similarly,
NV (“survivable command and control and network
Section 254 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization
enhancement”); Naval Base Norfolk, VA (“ship-wide and
Act (NDAA) (P.L. 116-92) required the Secretary of
pier connectivity”); Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI
Defense to develop a DOD 5G strategy. These strategies
(“enhancing aircraft mission readiness”); Joint Base San
were released in March 2020 and May 2020, respectively.
Antonio, TX (“augmented reality support of maintenance
DOD released an associated 5G implementation plan in
and training” and “evaluating DOD's 5G core security
December 2020. In addition, Section 224 of the FY2021
experimentation network”); Tinker Air Force Base, OK
NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directed DOD to create a 5G
(“spectrum sharing between military communications and
governance structure, while Section 225 directed DOD to
5G”); and Camp Pendleton, CA; Ft. Hood, TX; and Ft.
demonstrate the maturity of 5G component technologies.
Irwin National Training Center, CA (“connectivity for
Finally, Section 233 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81)
forward operating bases and tactical operations centers”).
directed the service secretaries to develop a plan for 5G
Potential Questions for Congress
pilot programs on military installations; Section 221 of the

FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) directed the Secretary of
What approach to spectrum management (e.g., spectrum
Defense to identify a target date for 5G deployment at all
sharing, spectrum reallocation) will best protect DOD
installations. Section 234 of the FY2023 NDAA
missions while meeting growing commercial demands?

additionally tasked specified Assistant Secretaries with
What are the risks to U.S. national security posed by
developing three-year transition plans for 5G.
Chinese 5G infrastructure in allied and partner nations?
Can that risk be managed and, if so, how?
Implications for Military Operations
 Should the United States limit intelligence sharing with
5G technologies could have a number of potential military
countries operating Chinese-supplied 5G equipment?

applications, particularly for autonomous vehicles, C2,
Are any changes to operational concepts, force structure,
logistics, maintenance, augmented and virtual reality, and
doctrine, or posture required as a result of developments
ISR systems—all of which would benefit from improved
in or applications of military 5G?
data rates and lower latency (time delay).
To what extent would commercial 5G technologies be
vulnerable to adversary jamming attacks?
Autonomous military vehicles, like their commercial
counterparts, could potentially circumvent on-board data
This report was originally co-authored by John Hoehn.
processing limitations by storing large databases (e.g.,
Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and
maps) in the cloud. Safe vehicle operations would require
5G’s high data rates and low latency to download off-board
Global Security
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National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies

IF11251

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