Cooperative Security in the Middle East: History and Prospects

Cooperative Security in the Middle East: History and Prospects

Updated April 11, 2019
Cooperative Security in the Middle East: History and Prospects
Since mid-2017, Trump Administration officials have
 Post-Gulf War. Weeks after the conclusion of
stated their intention to create a security pact of certain
hostilities between Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces and
Arab states to counter regional threats, including Iran and
the U.S.-led coalition, the leaders of the 6 Gulf
terrorism. This arrangement, dubbed the Middle East
Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Saudi Arabia, the
Strategic Alliance (MESA), reportedly would not include
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and
formal mutual security guarantees, but nevertheless has
Oman), Egypt, and Syria met in Damascus in March
sometimes colloquially been referred to as an “Arab
1991 and agreed on a joint framework for regional
NATO.” As Administration officials continue to consult
security known as the Damascus Declaration. Egypt and
with regional partners on the formation of MESA, many
Syria proposed to make available for collective defense
obstacles appear to exist, including ongoing disputes among
their relatively large militaries in return for economic
its prospective members and differences in their respective
assistance from the wealthy Gulf states. While the
interests, capabilities, and threat perceptions.
proposal attracted support from some U.S. officials, and
the group continued to meet at least as late as 2000, one
Forging greater security cooperation among U.S. partners in
observer in 1993 described the idea as a “dead issue.”
the Middle East has long been a stated U.S. objective.
MESA is the latest in a decades-long series of proposed
The Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama Administrations
regional security arrangements that have, to varying
promoted regional military cooperation and interoperability
degrees, involved or been overseen by the United States.
with the United States, but did not conclude formal
U.S. involvement in the creation of MESA or other similar
multilateral agreements on collective security. The Arab
potential initiatives could necessitate congressional input on
League announced its intention to create a “defense force”
or approval of specific aspects of multilateral regional
to combat terrorism after a March 2015 summit, though a
security arrangements and raise broader questions about
follow-up meeting to formalize those plans was postponed
U.S. ties with allies in the Middle East and globally.
and subsequent Arab League meetings evidently passed
without discussion of the idea. In December 2015, Saudi
Background: Past Efforts
Arabia announced plans to create an “Islamic Military
For over half a century, the United States has supported
Alliance to Fight Terrorism;” at a November 2017 summit
multiple attempts to forge a regional military pact designed
of the alliance, Saudi officials stated that 41 nations were
to thwart the perceived ambitions of successive U.S.
members. The group, which is headed by a retired Pakistani
adversaries.
general, has conducted military exercises, but has not taken
any collective defensive actions to date.
 Baghdad Pact/CENTO. In 1955, Turkey, Iraq, Iran,
Pakistan, and Great Britain signed a defensive military
While the United States did not have a direct role in these
agreement known as the Baghdad Pact as a bulwark
initiatives, President Obama directly urged Middle East
against Soviet attempts to project influence southward.
allies to take a more active role in confronting the Islamic
Iraq pulled out of the Baghdad Pact in 1959 and the
State (IS/ISIS/ISIL) and other regional threats. In 2016,
remaining states formed the Central Treaty Organization
then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter urged Arab states to
(CENTO). While the United States was not a formal
“get in the game” and argued that some Arab partners’
member of either organization, it signed bilateral aid and
expensive acquisitions of technologically complex military
mutual defense agreements with each of the signatories
platforms and arms were not best suited to confront the
and participated in the organization’s activities. In 1957,
threats arrayed against them.
President Eisenhower sought congressional
authorization to use military force to defend the
“territorial integrity and political independence” of
[MESA] will, when it comes to fruition, be a broad
countries in the Middle East seeking U.S. aid against
spectrum of countries from the Gulf and from North
“overt armed aggression” by communist countries.
Africa, all throughout the Middle East, aimed singularly
Congress declined to grant such authority, but did
at taking down threats from all across that region. It’ll
authorize military assistance programs (P.L.87-5). Due
work on economic issues, it’ll work on security issues,
to its members’ increasingly disparate threat perceptions
and we’ll work on political issues, we’ll work on
and interests, and the lack of any Arab states’
sharing meeting their energy needs as well.
participation, CENTO was not a major factor in regional
-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, March 19, 2018
security dynamics and was formally dissolved in 1979.
It is generally regarded as one of the less successful

postwar U.S.-led collective security arrangements.
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Cooperative Security in the Middle East: History and Prospects
Potential MESA Members
The ongoing GCC split highlights that divides exist
between U.S. allies on both specific policy issues and
broader regional dynamics. For example, beyond Qatar,
there are intra-GCC differences on Iran, with which Oman
and Kuwait have relatively open and normal relations.
More fundamentally, the MESA project is likely to be
undercut by the same issue that has bedeviled similar past
efforts, namely GCC states’ wariness of ceding power to
Saudi Arabia, the bloc’s largest member and de facto head.
These trust issues belie the NATO analogy often used to
describe MESA: even its most enthusiastic proponents do
not imagine anything close to the kind of mutual defense
guarantee that is at the core of NATO. Any equivalent U.S.

guarantee would require treaty consent by the Senate.
Source: Created by CRS
Possible Questions for Congress
MESA
U.S. Aid. Historically, the U.S. has leveraged assistance to
MESA reportedly would include the six GCC states and
support policy outcomes; for example, during the Gulf War,
Jordan; Egypt reportedly decided to withdraw from the
the U.S. forgave the debt of coalition partner Egypt and
effort in April 2019. According to a U.S. official, the group
froze aid to Jordan, which supported Iraq. What kinds of
“will serve as a bulwark against Iranian aggression,
U.S. aid or other incentives might be necessary to spur
terrorism, extremism, and will bring stability to the Middle
greater collaboration today? Why did the Administration
East.” No concrete progress appears to have been made in
not request funds related to MESA in its FY2020 budget?
organizing MESA, though several prospective members
have held a number of meetings on the project. The pact, as
Arms Sales. Congress has overseen billions in arms exports
reportedly envisioned, is intended to be a collaborative
to Middle Eastern states. How well do these sales address
security partnership between the U.S. and its regional allies,
the kinds of security challenges that exist in the region,
reflecting a desire by successive U.S. Administrations to
particular when it comes to confronting Iran, which tends to
see greater cooperation in areas like missile defense and
rely on more asymmetric means of power projection? What
counterterrorism. U.S. and foreign officials have also
specific platforms or programs should Congress authorize
described MESA as a forum to discuss regional issues and
to address interoperability? Are technical issues or political
adjudicate disputes between its members, as well as a
divisions more important impediments to unified Gulf
mechanism to “boost trade and foreign direct investment.”
missile defense, a longstanding U.S. national security
priority? How can Congress address both?
One key unknown element of MESA is the prospective type
and level of U.S. financial, military, or other support for the
Israel and Regional Balance. Ties between Israel and
project. On one hand, MESA can be seen as an attempt to
certain Gulf states have expanded in recent years, brought
reinforce U.S. engagement in the region at a time when
about by parallel cooperation with the U.S. and shared
U.S. partners report rising doubt about U.S. commitments
regional interests vis-à-vis Iran. How might improving
and appear willing to countenance greater security,
prospective MESA members’ capabilities affect the
political, and economic ties with U.S. competitors like
regional security balance, and Israel’s legally mandated
Russia and China. On the other hand, MESA could reflect
qualitative military edge (QME) specifically? How might
the Trump Administration’s broad goal of reducing U.S.
potential future changes in regional political alignments
overseas commitments by increasing burden sharing. Some
factor into U.S. calculations on efforts such as MESA?
have argued that while the United States shares many goals
with its regional partners, they are independent states with
Use of Force. U.S. support for partner-led operations, such
disparate agendas, and that outsourcing at least some U.S.
as that of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, have sometimes
deterrence to potentially less capable or reliable partners
drawn criticism from some Members. How can the U.S.
increases the risks of instability and unintended conflict.
ensure that U.S.-enabled operations by its partners support
U.S. interests and values? Under what mandate might
Potential Obstacles
MESA members engage in military operations? Under what
Observers note a number of significant barriers to regional
circumstances would U.S. forces join them and with what
military cooperation like that envisioned by MESA. The
authorization and financial support from Congress?
most pressing is the ongoing rift between Qatar and several
of its erstwhile GCC partners, led by Saudi Arabia. Qatar’s
Human rights and democracy. What role should human
relatively independent foreign policy, which has included
rights concerns play in Members’ deliberations over
support for regional Muslim Brotherhood-linked and –
whether to allow proposed arms sales? How significant is it
inspired movements and a relatively high degree of
that all prospective MESA members are monarchies and/or
engagement with Iran (with which Qatar shares key gas
authoritarian and what role, if any, should these states’
reserves), has long contributed to friction between it and the
political systems play in U.S. policy?
Saudi-led bloc. Since June 2017, Saudi Arabia, supported
by the UAE and others, has sought to isolate Qatar
Clayton Thomas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
economically and politically. U.S. attempts to mediate the
dispute have been unsuccessful to date.
IF11173
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Cooperative Security in the Middle East: History and Prospects

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