“Space Force” and Related DOD Proposals: Issues for Congress

“Space Force” and Related DOD Proposals: Issues for Congress

April 8, 2019
“Space Force” and Related DOD Proposals: Issues for Congress
Over the past year, Congress saw a variety of overlapping
oversight have contributed to program delays and
proposals advanced for the reorganization of U.S. military
cancellations, cost increases, and inefficient operations. For
activities in space. Major proposals include
example, in 2012, GAO identified 60 national security

space stakeholder organizations across the U.S.
the creation of a Space Force (SF), a new branch of the
government, of which 11 had oversight responsibilities, 8
Armed Forces under the Secretary of the Air Force;
had acquisition management responsibilities, and 6 were
 the reestablishment of a United States Space Command
responsible for setting requirements. This fragmented
as an additional unified combatant command; and
leadership “contributed to poor coordination and lengthy

decision making …

[these] challenges are magnified in
the establishment of a Department of Defense Space
space programs because their technologies are frequently
Development Agency.
obsolete by the time systems are deployed.”
While few observers dispute the notion that the Department
of Defense (DOD) should better organize and manage its
Problem Two: Increased Military Threats
space capabilities, agreement ends there. Some believe all
Congress has also expressed concern over the slow pace
three proposals should be adopted; others believe only
with which DOD and the Air Force have addressed the
some, if any, should become permanent institutions within
growing threat to U.S. national security in space from
DOD. Taken together, these overlapping proposals could
adversaries, particularly Russia and China, and, to a lesser
present considerable challenges to DOD’s functioning in
extent, North Korea and Iran. This is because, in their view,
one of the most critically important operational domains.
the space domain has evolved into a war-fighting domain
Regardless, the concepts and details of these military space-
like air, land, and sea, and is a domain that is both
related proposals remain unclear—if not contradictory—at
congested and contested.
this time, prompting fundamental questions about plans to
reorganize DOD’s
Congested. Around 2,000 active satellites are in orbit today,
space programs, capabilities, and
and that number is increasing. More than 100
agencies.
governments—as well as commercial entities—from more
What Is The Role of Congress?
than 50 countries control these assets. Further, an increase
of space activities in the past 60 years has created an
Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution empowers
Congress “t
estimated 23,000 pieces of uncontrolled debris that can
o raise and support Armies … provide and
disable or destroy a satellite. In addition, the testing of
maintain a Navy … to make Rules for the Government and
antisatellite weapons by China in 2007 and recently by
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” Accordingly, the
India in 2019 have added additional pieces of debris to an
establishment of a new military service is generally viewed
already congested space environment.
as the prerogative of Congress rather than the executive
branch. Therefore, while the President has directed the
Contested. According to DOD officials and documents,
creation of a Space Force through Space Policy Directive-4,
U.S. military advantages in space are at risk. Adversaries
such a force may not officially come into existence unless
have studied U.S. warfighting concepts and focused their
and until Congress passes legislation for its establishment.
attention on U.S. space systems’ vulnerabilities. China,
In exercising its oversight and budgetary authorities,
Russia, and other nations are pursuing capabilities to target
Congress will also have the opportunity to review whether
U.S. space systems using jammers, lasers, kinetic-kill, and
the establishment of a U.S. Space Command and/or a Space
now cyberattack capabilities. Some observers contend that
Development Agency is an appropriate use of resources.
international actors are aware of U.S. space superiority and
understand the critical reliance of the United States on
What Problems Need Solving?
space systems to achieve national interests; accordingly,
Broadly speaking, two primary rationales are offered for the
some adversarial actors—Russia and China in particular—
current focus on military space activities: improving the
have made investments to counter U.S. advantages in space.
efficiency of extant space programs and better preparing
DOD to contend with current and emerging threats.
Missing: An Effective Space Proponent?
DOD is a hierarchical organization, both from an
Problem One: Program and Cost Efficiencies
organizational and cultural standpoint. In practice, this
Congress has long expressed its concerns that U.S. military
means decisions are generally made at senior levels and
programs in space have not kept pace with global
implemented at lower levels with comparatively little
technological developments. For more than two decades,
“bottom up” influence on those decisions, particularly those
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and
that affect the overall defense enterprise. Further, senior
others have found that fragmentation and overlap in
leaders often compete with each other for DOD resources—
national security space acquisition management and
the higher the rank of a given leader, the more likely it is
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“Space Force” and Related DOD Proposals: Issues for Congress
that he or she will be able to “win” those competitions on
Several observers at the time maintained that this service
behalf of their defense organization.
interference, which led to a Marine deployment to Helmand
rather than Kandahar (the campaign’s center of gravity at
Some observers therefore contend that the root of systemic
the time), may have weakened ISAF’s strategy.
challenges with military space programs is the absence of a
sufficiently senior “proponent” for space within DOD, with
Risks to Military Space Operations
enough authority to effectively manage space programs.
and Capabilities?
Instead, space programs are scattered throughout DOD,
Taking this history of DOD’s organization design into
including across the military services, and represented at
account, if all current proposals for rationalizing U.S.
comparatively lower levels of the bureaucracy. Viewed in
military space programs and assets come to fruition, DOD
this light, proposals for reorganizing DOD space activities
might risk creating chain of command confusion in space—
appear to be designed to solve the “proponent” problem by
a domain that is hardest to access, yet strategically vital. In
ensuring that there are senior-level advocates within the
the first instance, space would be the only domain upon
Department responsible for
which both a unified combatant command and military
 building, maintaining, and equipping space-focused
service would be exclusively focused. What if the SF Chief
military personnel (the Space Force);
of Staff and the Commander of SPACECOM have

differences in priorities related to operations, similar to the
conducting operations in the space domain (a U.S.
dynamics that led to Desert One?
Space Command); and

Related, given that the SF Chief of Staff will initially report
creating greater speed and coherence to space
to the Secretary of the Air Force, how might differences in
acquisitions (the Space Defense Agency, or SDA).
priorities between Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force and
What Are Some of the Risks Associated
Space Force—both four-star level positions—be
with Current DOD Space Proposals?
adjudicated? Will Air Force programmatic priorities be
given precedence over those of Space Force? Can these
While a sufficiently ranked proponent within DOD could
frictions be mitigated, and if so, how?
lead to better policy and programmatic outcomes, an excess
of such proponents has, at times, led to U.S. military
Risks to Program Coherence?
organizational and operational confusion. Proposals to
reform DOD’
Military services and their secretariats are responsible for
s space programs by creating multiple four-
buying equipment for their respective forces. Accordingly,
star level proponents could therefore have significant
bearing on the U.S. military’s ability to accomplish its
one of the primary intended functions of a new Space Force
is to create a more streamlined system of procurement for
missions in a variety of ways, including the following:
space capabilities, and, in the process, address the
Military Services vs. Combatant Commands
longstanding congressional concerns with space program
management. Some therefore express concern that the
Within DOD, military services are responsible for training
newly established SDA might duplicate those procurement
and equipping forces, while unified combatant commands
functions, creating even more complexity and confusion
are responsible for using those forces in operations. In the
when developing and purchasing space systems.
early 1980s, successive military blunders (including Desert
One, Grenada, and the Beirut Marine Barracks bombing)
Costs and Tradeoffs?
demonstrated serious shortcomings with how the different
DOD has requested $14.1 billion for space in FY2020. Of
military services, and the Department overall, interacted to
that amount, approximately $72 million will be applied to
plan and conduct operations. After more than four years’
the initial stand-up of the new Space Force (current plans
deliberations, Congress found that the interference of the
estimate that a new Space Force will cost approximately $2
military services in the planning and conduct of military
billion over five years). Yet some observers express
operations was common to all these events. Service
concern that costs might balloon in the future as the Space
interference made it difficult to determine who actually was
Force matures as a bureaucracy. Others note that the
in charge of a given operation; as a result, missions failed
administrative costs for SF itself will likely be shouldered
and U.S. lives were lost. In 1986, over the Department’s
by the Air Force Service Secretariat; the latter will likely
objections, Congress passed P.L. 99-433, the Goldwater-
have to expand to manage the acquisition and budgetary
Nichols Defense Reform Act, which clarified the chain of
requirements of both SF and the Air Force.
command and circumscribed military service roles and
responsibilities to training and equipping their respective
Congress has sought to curtail headquarters increases in
forces.
recent years, including through limiting the size of military
staffs and creating workforce reduction targets. Some
More than 30 years since the passage of Goldwater-
therefore express concern that the simultaneous creation of
Nichols, the services still at times have difficulty staying
Space Force, Space Command, and the Space Defense
out of the operational chain of command. In his memoir
Agency may contradict the intent of prior Congresses. More
Duty, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates notes that in
broadly, some express concern that resources might be
prosecuting operations in Afghanistan, the United States
better allocated to other DOD priorities such as cyber
Marine Corps managed to organize its command
defense or the nuclear program.
relationships largely outside the U.S.-led NATO
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) when it
Kathleen J. McInnis, Specialist in International Security
deployed elements to Helmand as part of the “surge.”
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“Space Force” and Related DOD Proposals: Issues for Congress

IF11172
Stephen M. McCall, Analyst in Military Space, Missile
Defense, and Defense Innovation

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