Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Recruiting

https://crsreports.congress.gov

Updated November 18, 2024

Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Recruiting

Congressional Role

The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers over the Armed Forces, including the power “To raise and support Armies” and “To provide and maintain a Navy.” In the exercise of this authority, Congress has historically shown interest in military recruiting, which is critical to maintaining a fully manned and capable volunteer military workforce. Congress exercises a powerful influence on recruiting through its establishment of personnel end- strength levels for the Active and Reserve Components. Higher end-strengths generally require more new recruits, higher rates of retention among current servicemembers, or some combination of the two. Through its oversight powers, Congress monitors the performance of the executive branch in managing the size and quality of the military workforce. Congress influences the achievement of recruiting goals by the armed services in a number of ways:

• authorizing military compensation packages that are

competitive with civilian employers (e.g., basic pay, education and health benefits);

• establishing criteria that affect eligibility for enlistment

such as age, cognitive, behavioral, and citizenship requirements; and

• funding recruiting programs that provide for dedicated

recruiters, market research, advertising, and military entrance processing stations.

Successful recruiting often depends on identifying a population that is both eligible and has a propensity for enlistment. The policy levers most commonly used to address recruiting issues include increased funding for additional recruiters, advertising, and enlistment incentives (e.g., bonuses, education benefits). When recruiting shortfalls occur, or are anticipated, Congress may elect to apply additional resources to these mechanisms. Likewise, when recruiting is expected to be strong, Congress may elect to shift resources away from these areas. Congress might also consider non-monetary initiatives that reduce barriers to enlistment or otherwise increase the pool of eligible individuals (e.g., waivers, process improvements).

Recruiting

Without a robust ability to bring new personnel into the military, the armed services would lack sufficient manpower to carry out mission essential tasks in the near term. Moreover, without stable recruiting levels they would lack a sufficient pool of entry-level personnel to develop into the mid-level and upper-level leaders of the future. To maintain a healthy military force structure, each armed service sets goals for new personnel accessions each fiscal year for both its Active and Reserve Components. Officer and enlisted goals are set separately. For enlisted personnel, there are both quantity and quality goals.

Quantity Goals Quantity goals are typically based on each armed service’s projected need for new personnel (both officer and enlisted) over the course of the year to meet its congressionally authorized end-strength. Enlisted quantity goals are based on the proportion of congressionally authorized end- strength that a specific armed service and component allocates to its enlisted force, less the projected number of currently serving enlisted personnel it expects to retain through the end of the year. As a hypothetical example, assume an armed service has an authorized Active Component end-strength of 200,000 total personnel, comprised of 30,000 officers and 170,000 enlisted personnel. If it projects that it will retain 140,000 of its current enlisted personnel through the end of the fiscal year, it might set a goal of enlisting 30,000 new individuals for that year plus a certain number more to account for those new enlistees who are separated before the end of the year (for example, for medical disability). The actual number of new enlistees needed may also change during the year as new projections are made about the retention of currently serving enlisted personnel, or if the armed service must increase or decrease the total size of its force (for example, if a Service Secretary were to exercise the authority of 10 U.S.C. §115(g)(1)(A) to increase congressionally authorized active duty end-strength for that armed service by up to 2%). Table 1 lists recruit quantity goals and results for FY2022-FY2024.

Quality Goals Quality goals for non-prior service (NPS) recruits, are established through law and policy. Two principal Department of Defense (DOD) quality benchmarks apply to NPS recruits. The first is the percentage of NPS enlistees who are high school diploma graduates (HSDGs). The second is the percentage of scores above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT Categories I- IIIA). DOD’s recruit quality benchmarks stipulate that at least 90% of NPS enlistees must be HSDGs and at least 60% must score above average on the AFQT. Supplementary ways to assess the quality of enlistment cohorts include the percentage of NPS enlistees who score well-below average on the AFQT (Category IV) and the number and types of enlistment waivers granted to enlistees for medical reasons, misconduct, or drug use. Law (10 U.S.C. §520) stipulates that no more than 4% of an annual enlistment cohort may be Category IV (10th-30th percentile on the AFQT). However, the 4% threshold may be increased to 20% at the request of the Secretary with congressional notification. DOD policy specifies that those who score in Category V (1st-9th percentile on the AFQT) are ineligible to enlist. Table 2 and Table 3 list recruit quality benchmarks and results for FY2022-FY2024.

Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Recruiting

https://crsreports.congress.gov

Table 1. Non-Prior Service Accessions Data (Quantity)

Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2022-FY2024

FY2022 FY2023 FY2024

Armed

Service Goal Achieved

Percent

of Goal Goal Achieved

Percent

of Goal Goal Achieved

Percent

of Goal

Army 60,000 44,901 74.8% 65,500 50,181 76.6% 55,000 55,150 100.3%

Navy 33,400 33,442 100.1% 37,700 30,236 80.2% 40,600 35,804 88.2%

Marine Corps 28,600 28,608 100.0% 28,900 28,921 100.1% 27,500 27,500 100.0%

Air Force 26,196 26,196 100.0% 26,977 24,100 89.3% 27,200 27,303 100.4%

Space Force 521 532 102.1% 492 537 109.2% 704 716 101.7%

Source: Department of Defense Action Memo on file with author.

Table 2. Non-Prior Service Accessions Data (Quality – High School Diploma Graduates)

Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2022-FY2024

Armed Service DOD Benchmark Achieved FY2022 Achieved FY2023 Achieved FY2024

Army 90% 94.2% 94.6% 94.5%

Navy 90% 96.9% 96.7% 95.4%

Marine Corps 90% 98.9% 98.3% 97.9%

Air Force 90% 98.5% 98.6% 98.6%

Space Force 90% 99.6% 99.4% 99.9%

Source: Department of Defense Action Memo on file with author.

Table 3. Non-Prior Service Accessions Data (Quality – Above Average AFQT Score)

Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2022-FY2024

Armed Service DOD Benchmark Achieved FY2022 Achieved FY2023 Achieved FY2024

Army 60% 60.2% 61.1% 60.3%

Navy 60% 65.1% 54.5% 54.2%

Marine Corps 60% 66.5% 64.9% 64.0%

Air Force 60% 82.2% 80.1% 80.1%

Space Force 60% 99.4% 99.3% 99.3%

Source: Department of Defense Action Memo on file with author. Note: For FY2023 and FY2024 the Navy did not meet DOD benchmarks for Cat I-IIIA and Cat IV recruits. AQFT is the Armed Forces Qualification Test.

DOD Resources

DOD Instruction 1304.26, Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction

DOD Instruction 1145.01, Qualitative Distribution of Military Manpower

DOD Instruction 6130.03, Medical Standards for Appointment, Enlistment or Induction in the Military Services

DOD Instruction 1304.32, Military Services Recruiting Related Reports

Defense Manpower Data Center, DOD Personnel, Workforce Reports, and Publications

Relevant Statutes

Title 10, Chapter 31, of the U.S. Code

10 U.S.C. §115

10 U.S.C. §520

Kristy N. Kamarck, Specialist in Military Personnel Carly A. Miller, Research Librarian

IF11147

Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Recruiting

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11147 · VERSION 12 · UPDATED

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