Evaluating DOD Strategy: Key Findings of the National Defense Strategy Commission

Evaluating DOD Strategy: Key Findings of the National Defense Strategy Commission

March 19, 2019
Evaluating DOD Strategy: Key Findings of the National Defense
Strategy Commission
On January 19, 2018, the Department of Defense (DOD, or
interests (p. v).” The NSDC argues that the United
the Department) released an unclassified summary of the
States is both in competition and conflict with an array
congressionally mandated National Defense Strategy
of challengers, including China, Russia, Iran, and North
(NDS). On November 14, 2018, the congressionally
Korea. The United States must also contend with
appointed bipartisan National Defense Strategy
transnational organizations that pose threats to the
Commission (NDSC, or the Commission) issued its report,
United States and its allies, to include the Islamic State
Providing for the Common Defense. The NDSC’s mandate
(IS). Finally, the proliferation of sophisticated
was to critique the NDS in order to provide Congress some
technologies is enabling adversaries to challenge U.S.
alternative ideas for improving DOD. All quotations are
military supremacy in innovative and dangerous ways.
from the NDSC report unless otherwise specified.
In other words, the United States must contend with
more, and more severe, national security challenges
The National Defense Strategy (NDS)
than in previous decades.
Consistent with comparable documents issued by prior
2. “Due to political dysfunction and decisions made by
Administrations, the NDS maintains that there are five
both major political parties across administrations
central external threats to U.S. interests: China, Russia,
… America has significantly weakened its own
North Korea, Iran, and terrorist groups with global reach.
defense” (p. vi). In the NDSC’s view, the combination
The NDS mandate requires DOD to prioritize those threats.
of DOD budget reductions and the lack of stable,
In a break from previous Administrations, the NDS views
predictable defense funding have negatively affected
retaining the U.S. strategic competitive edge relative to
the size and readiness of U.S. forces. Further, DOD’s
China and Russia as a higher priority than countering
ability to buy the equipment it needs in order to contend
violent extremist organizations. Further, the NDS appears
with challenges presented by other militaries has been
conceptually consistent with the National Security Strategy
hampered.
regarding the notion that “peace through strength,” or
Failure to address these challenges has led to what the
improving the capability and lethality of the joint force in
NDSC refers to as a “crisis of national security for the
order to deter warfare, is essential to countering these
United States,” because “U.S. military superiority is no
threats. It also contends that, unlike most of the period since
longer assured and the implications for American interests
the end of the Cold War, the joint force must now operate
and American security are severe.” (p. vi).
in contested domains where freedom of access and
maneuver is no longer assured.
The 2017 National Security Strategy argues that since the
1990s, the United States has “displayed a great degree of
The NDS organizes DOD activities along three central
“lines of effort”—
strategic complacency,” (p. 27) largely as a result of
rebuilding military readiness and
improving the joint forces’ lethality, strengthening alliances
overwhelming and unchallenged U.S. military and
economic superiority. Operations in the Balkans, Africa,
and attracting new partners, and reforming the
Afghanistan, and Iraq, while challenging and complex
Department’s business practices, and argues that all three
undertakings, did not existentially challenge the capabilities
are interconnected and critical to enabling DOD to advance
and strategies of the United States. Yet both China and
U.S. objectives effectively.
Russia appear to be developing capabilities and concepts
The National Defense Strategy
that potentially demonstrate technological superiority over
Commission: Key Findings
U.S. military capabilities. As a result, the NDSC, in
assessing whether DOD is adequately prepared to meet
The Commission evaluated the NDS as well as the
these challenges, concludes that the U.S. “might struggle to
activities and priorities of the Department of Defense more
win, or perhaps lose, a war against China or Russia” (p. vi).
broadly. Overall, the NDSC endorses DOD’s strategic
approach, particularly its orientation toward strategic
This analysis rests on the Commission’s concern with six
competition with other great powers. Nevertheless, the
areas that, taken together, touch upon the structures,
Commission believes that successive Administrations and
intellectual capabilities, priorities, and funding of DOD.
Congresses have significantly underestimated the scale of
this reorientation, the urgency with which it must occur,
Realizing the Vision of the National Defense
and the resources required in order to do so. Two key trends
Strategy?
led the NSDC to this conclusion:
The Commission agrees with the NDS’s assessment of the
1. “
strategic environment and its prioritization of great power
Changes at home and abroad that are diminishing
competition, the enduring value of alliances, and its focus
U.S. military advantages and threatening vital U.S.
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Evaluating DOD Strategy: Key Findings of the National Defense Strategy Commission
on lethality and readiness. It also agrees with the
“deterring competitors and adversaries and thereby
Department’s assertions that almost two decades of war,
reducing the chances of conflict” (p. ix).
combined with fiscal uncertainty in recent years, have led to
an erosion of DOD capabilities in power projection, anti-
Readiness
submarine warfare and electronic warfare that are generally
Overall, the NDSC agrees with DOD’s emphasis on
believed necessary to win current and future fights against a
improving military readiness. Still, the NDSC contends that
near-peer adversary. However, the Commission assesses
preparing the military to win tomorrow’s wars will require
that the concepts and programs that DOD has proposed in
that soldiers, sailors, and airmen be trained to operate in a
order to better prepare the military for great power
broader, more technologically sophisticated range of
competition, such as “dynamic force employment” and
missions. In the NDSC’s view, doing so will require more
“expanding the competitive space,” lack sufficient analytic
resources as well as improving DOD’s analytic toolkit to
rigor. Further complicating the scale of the analytic and
measure readiness.
strategic challenge, some states are deliberately blurring the
lines between “conventional” and “irregular” conflict and
Civilian-Military Relations
sowing confusion as to what constitutes “civilian” versus
Civilian control and authority over military forces has been
“military” activities. The NDS Commission assesses that
a core principle by which the United States has designed
“[a]bsent a more integrated, whole-of-government strategy
and managed its forces. The NDSC expresses concern,
than has been evident to date, the United States is unlikely
however, that the relationship between civilians and the
to reverse its rivals’ momentum across an evolving,
military overall is currently unbalanced. As a result, civilian
complex spectrum of competition.” (p. vii)
views on a variety of issues across DOD have been
“muted.” Further, the NDSC maintains that recent efforts to
Operational Challenges and Concepts
centralize global force management under the Chairman of
The NDSC notes that for the past 25 years, the United
the Joint Chiefs of Staff could lead to “profound strategic
States has focused on prosecuting crisis management and
problems.” This is because, “put bluntly, allocating priority
counterinsurgency operations against adversaries that had
– and allocating forces – across theaters of warfare is not
relatively limited ability to contest U.S. and coalition
solely a military matter. It is an inherently political-military
forces. As a result, it argues, DOD has lost its intellectual
task, decision authority for which is the proper competency
appreciation for how to fight and win against capable
and responsibility of America’s civilian leaders” (p. xi).
adversaries such as Russia or China. In the NDSC’s view,
operational concepts, a key tool DOD uses to develop
Resources
theater-level plans and campaigns and, in so doing, link
The NDSC did not prepare a precise cost estimate for the
strategic objectives with capabilities and budgetary
programs it suggests DOD adopt. Instead, the Commission
priorities, urgently need updating in order to understand
notes that available resources are currently insufficient to
how to win future fights. (p. vii, 26-27). What then follows
meet DOD’s goals as articulated in the NDS. It also
is acquiring capabilities, modifying doctrine and training,
underscores that cost savings resulting from efficiencies in
and other modifications across DOD in order to do so.
business practices are unlikely to offset the expense of
reorienting DOD for great power competition.
National Security Innovation Base (NSIB)
Although not currently defined in any publicly available
Reactions to the NDSC Report
document, the NSIB is a concept that appears to refer to
Some observers have expressed skepticism regarding the
industries and infrastructure that support innovation for
NDSC’s key conclusions, in particular, that the United
national security purposes. The NDSC agrees with DOD’s
States has reached a point of national security “crisis,” and
emphasis on innovation, generally understood as the rapid
that prior Administrations have failed to adequately and
inventing, prototyping, and fielding of new technologies
predictably fund DOD. Others, including members of the
that can have an impact on battlefield success. However,
Senate Armed Services Committee, have indicated they
the NDSC argues that while this innovation is necessary, it
intend to use the NDSC report as a “blueprint” for
is not sufficient relative to the scope of the challenge. This
overseeing DOD’s activities, budgets and programs in the
is especially due to the fact that “America’s edge is
coming years.
diminishing or has disappeared,” with respect to many key
technologies that have underpinned U.S. military
superiority. As an example, they point to Chinese 5G
Further Reading
wireless technology, which is a Beijing-orchestrated “whole
of society” effort that “may yield great economic,
CRS Report R45349, The 2018 National Defense
geopolitical, and military benefits for Beijing – and equally
Strategy: Fact Sheet, by Kathleen J. McInnis
great dangers to the United States.” (p. viii).
CRS Insight IN10842, The 2017 National Security
Near- and Mid-Term Force Priorities
Strategy: Issues for Congress, by Kathleen J. McInnis
The Commission explored augmentations to U.S.
capabilities in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe to better

prepare for near-term challenges. In all instances,
maintaining a “forward posture”—a U.S. military presence
Kathleen J. McInnis, Specialist in International Security
in all these regions—is viewed by the NDSC as essential to
IF11139
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Evaluating DOD Strategy: Key Findings of the National Defense Strategy Commission

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