U.S.-European Relations in the 117th Congress

U.S.-European Relations in the 117th Congress

Updated January 14, 2022
U.S.-European Relations in the 117th Congress
An Evolving Relationship
driving force in liberalizing world trade. Experts point out
Since the end of the Second World War, successive U.S.
that the well-honed habits of U.S.-European political,
Administrations and many Members of Congress have
military, and intelligence cooperation are unique and cannot
supported a close U.S. partnership with Europe. Often
be easily replicated with other international actors. U.S.
termed the transatlantic relationship, the U.S.-European
engagement in Europe also helps limit Russian, Chinese, or
partnership encompasses the NATO alliance, relations with
other possible malign influences.
the European Union (EU), and extensive bilateral political
At times, some in the United States have expressed
and economic ties. Despite periodic tensions over the past
frustration with aspects of the transatlantic relationship.
70-plus years, U.S. and European policymakers have valued
Previous U.S. Administrations and many Members of
the transatlantic partnership as serving their respective
Congress have criticized what they view as insufficient
geostrategic and economic interests.
European burden sharing in NATO, and some have
The post-World War II transatlantic security and economic
questioned the costs of the U.S. military presence in
architecture came under considerable pressure during the
Europe. U.S. policymakers have long-standing concerns
Trump Administration. The unprecedented nature of
about EU regulatory barriers to trade and that the EU lacks
President Trump’s criticisms of NATO, the EU, and key
a single voice on many foreign policy issues. Some U.S.
European countries, as well as numerous U.S.-European
analysts have argued that partnering with Europe may slow
policy divisions, severely strained relations. European
certain U.S. decisions. (See also CRS Report R45745,
officials have welcomed Biden Administration efforts to
Transatlantic Relations: U.S. Interests and Key Issues.)
decrease tensions and renew the transatlantic partnership,
although various differences persist. The second session of
Europe and the Trump Administration
the 117th Congress may evaluate current U.S. interests in
During the Trump Administration, U.S.-European relations
Europe and prospects for future U.S.-European cooperation.
faced significant challenges. The Administration asserted
support for NATO and its Article 5 mutual defense
Transatlantic Relations and U.S. Interests
commitment, but critics argued that President Trump’s
U.S. policymakers have long regarded both NATO and the
perceived transactional view of NATO and his strident calls
EU as crucial to maintaining peace and stability in Europe
for more European defense spending damaged alliance
and stymieing big-power competition that cost over
cohesion. President Trump voiced support for the UK’s
500,000 American lives in two world wars. The United
decision to leave the EU (“Brexit”), contended that the EU
States spearheaded NATO’s creation in 1949 and
engaged in unfair trade practices, and imposed tariffs on
encouraged the European integration project from its
steel and aluminum imports from the EU. European
inception in the 1950s. During the Cold War, NATO and
officials complained about a perceived lack of consultations
the European project were considered essential to deterring
with the Trump Administration, especially with regard to
the Soviet threat. With strong U.S. support, NATO and the
U.S. military actions in Syria and Afghanistan and a plan to
EU have enlarged since the 1990s, extending security and
draw down U.S. forces in Germany. Other U.S.-European
prosperity across the European continent.
policy divisions existed on Russia, China, Iran, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, arms control, climate change, and
The U.S. and European economies are deeply intertwined.
managing the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
According to U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data, the
pandemic. Advocates of President Trump’s approach
transatlantic economy—including the EU and non-EU
maintain that it led to greater European efforts to spend
countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, and
more on defense and address trade inequities and note that
Switzerland—typically generates around $6 trillion per year
policy differences are a constant feature of transatlantic
in foreign affiliate sales and directly employs roughly 10
relations and are not unique to the Trump Administration.
million workers on both sides of the Atlantic. The United
States and the EU are each other’s largest overall trade and
The Biden Administration and Future Prospects
investment partners. (See also CRS In Focus IF10930, U.S.-
The Biden Administration has prioritized bolstering
EU Trade and Investment Ties: Magnitude and Scope.)
relations with Europe and rebuilding trust. President Biden
U.S. leadership of NATO and cooperation with the EU has
has reiterated strong U.S. support for NATO and Article 5,
helped to foster democratic and prosperous European allies
halted plans to reduce U.S. forces in Germany, and pledged
that, in turn, have bolstered U.S. foreign and security
to work with the EU and European governments on
policies and the multilateral trading system. The United
common global concerns. Biden’s first trip abroad as
States and Europe have worked together on many common
President was to Europe in June 2021 and included NATO
challenges—from promoting stability in the Balkans and
and EU summit meetings.
Afghanistan to addressing Russian aggression in Ukraine to
The Biden Administration views cooperation with
countering terrorism. U.S.-EU cooperation has been a
European democracies as key to countering challenges
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U.S.-European Relations in the 117th Congress
posed by China, Russia, and other authoritarian systems of
Issues for Congress
government. The United States, NATO, and the EU have
Potential areas for deliberation in the 117th Congress
offered strong backing for Ukraine amid concerns about
include the following:
Russia’s buildup of military forces near Ukraine’s borders

since late 2021, and the United States and its NATO allies
NATO. The 2021 NATO summit addressed a range of
have firmly rejected Russian demands for changes to
topics, including NATO efforts to deter Russia;
Europe’s security architecture. Moreover, U.S. officials
concerns about China; and NATO’s progress in
have pledged not to negotiate with Russia on European
addressing terrorism, cyberattacks, and hybrid threats.
security matters “without Europe.” The Administration has
Congress may examine these issues and future U.S.
coordinated human rights-related sanctions on Russian and
goals for NATO as the alliance develops its next
Chinese officials with the EU and the UK, and it restarted a
strategic concept ahead of the 2022 summit. Congress
U.S.-EU dialogue on China begun during the Trump
also may review the U.S. force posture in Europe and
Administration. European officials also have welcomed the
ongoing allied efforts to increase defense spending.
renewed U.S. commitment to multilateralism, exemplified
 U.S.-EU Agenda. At their 2021 summit, the United
by President Biden’s decisions to reverse Trump
States and the EU committed to work together on four
Administration policies and rejoin the World Health
key areas: ending the COVID-19 pandemic; addressing
Organization and the Paris Agreement on climate change.
climate change; strengthening trade, investment, and
Resolving U.S.-EU trade disputes has been another key area
technological cooperation; and supporting democracy
and global security. Congress may consider prospects
of focus for the Biden Administration. At their June 2021
summit, the United States and the EU announced a deal to
for U.S.-EU collaboration and how various issues facing
address a long-standing dispute over civil aircraft subsidies,
the EU—including economic recovery from the
pandemic, democratic backsliding in some EU
including suspending retaliatory tariffs for five years. In
October 2021, the United States agreed to replace tariffs on
members, and EU ambitions to bolster its defense
steel and aluminum imports from the EU with a tariff-rate
capabilities—could affect the U.S.-EU partnership.
quota system for these items and the EU agreed to end
 U.S.-EU Economic Relations. Congress may be
retaliatory tariffs on whiskey, motorcycles, and other
interested in examining U.S.-EU efforts to resolve trade
imports from the United States. (See also CRS In Focus
irritants and in two new initiatives launched at the 2021
IF10931, U.S.-EU Trade and Economic Relations.)
U.S.-EU Summit—a Trade and Technology Council (to
promote greater cooperation in areas such as standards
Despite the improved overall tenor of U.S.-European
for new and emerging technologies, digital governance,
relations, challenges persist. Many European policymakers
supply chain security, and global trade challenges) and a
criticized the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August
Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue.
2021 and were dismayed by the takeover of the country by
the Taliban. In September 2021, the EU appeared surprised
 Brexit. The UK exited the EU in January 2020 and
and angered by a new Australia-UK-U.S. security pact
ended its participation in the EU’s single market and
(known as AUKUS) for the Indo-Pacific region. For some
customs union in December 2020. Congress may review
European leaders, both Afghanistan and AUKUS revealed
Brexit’s implications for U.S.-UK and U.S.-EU
weaknesses in European military capabilities and prompted
relations, for NATO, and for the Northern Ireland peace
charges that the Biden Administration was not sufficiently
process. Some in Congress support a future U.S.-UK
consulting its allies and partners. AUKUS also renewed
free trade agreement; the Biden Administration has not
European concerns about a U.S. pivot toward Asia.
resumed talks begun by the Trump Administration.
Although European views toward China appear to be
 Russia. Congress has consistently condemned Russian
hardening due to the country’s military assertiveness and
aggression, including in Ukraine, and Russian influence
human rights abuses, many in Europe are wary about a
operations in Europe and the United States. Congress
possible U.S.-China “Cold War” and are mindful of
Europe’s significant
has enacted sanctions aimed at curbing Russian energy
economic ties to China. U.S.-EU
export pipelines to Europe. Transatlantic efforts to
tensions also exist on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline (from
address Russia’s actions toward Ukraine (including
Russia to Germany), approaches to potentially modifying
potential new sanctions on Russia and greater assistance
intellectual property rights obligations for COVID-19
to Ukraine), cyber capabilities, and human rights abuses
vaccines, data privacy and cross-border data flows, and
may be key areas of congressional interest.
digital technology policies, among other issues.
 China. Many Members of Congress have expressed
Some Europeans are skeptical about whether the United
concern about China’s growing strategic interest and
States will be a credible global leader and reliable partner in
financial investments in Europe, especially with respect
the long term and argue that Europe must be better prepared
to critical infrastructure projects. Congress may examine
to address future challenges on its own. The EU has put
how Chinese activities in Europe could affect
new emphasis on enhancing defense cooperation and
transatlantic relations, the extent to which European
concluding trade agreements with other countries and
views on China may be shifting due to strategic
regions, including Canada, Japan, and Latin America.
concerns or human rights issues, and possibilities for
These and other efforts to position the EU as a key
U.S.-European policy coordination toward China.
international player (especially in areas such as data
protection and climate change) are likely to remain EU
Kristin Archick, Specialist in European Affairs
imperatives for the foreseeable future.
IF11094
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U.S.-European Relations in the 117th Congress

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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11094 · VERSION 15 · UPDATED