Armenia’s Velvet Revolution

Armenia’s Velvet Revolution

January 16, 2019
Armenia’s Velvet Revolution
In December 2018, snap parliamentary elections
coalition from 2007 to 2012 but supported Pashinyan’s
strengthened the legitimacy of Armenia’s new prime
candidacy as prime minister in May 2018. The third party
minister, Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power in May
to enter the National Assembly, with 6% of the vote, was
2018 in what supporters called a “velvet revolution.” The
the pro-Western Bright Armenia, which was previously in
elections unseated a semi-autocratic ruling party that had
alliance with Pashinyan’s Civil Contract.
governed Armenia for almost 20 years but now failed to
enter parliament.
The RPA failed to clear the 5% threshold to enter
parliament. The nationalist Armenian Revolutionary
Armenia, a small, landlocked country in the South
Federation (ARF, or Dashnaktsutyun), frequently a junior
Caucasus (population 3 million), is dependent on Russia for
coalition partner of the RPA, also did not enter parliament.
security, trade, and investment, but it also seeks closer
relations with the United States and Europe. Whether
The National Assembly was elected under new rules
Armenia’s change of government will lead to further
established before the 2017 elections and designed to
integration with the West is unclear. For now, Armenia’s
ensure that a party or coalition that wins the most votes
government says it intends to retain its security alliance and
receives at least 54% of seats but no more than 67%. As a
economic partnership with Russia while pursuing Western-
result, My Step received two-thirds of parliamentary seats
leaning democracy and governance reforms.
(88 out of 132). Prosperous Armenia received 20% of the
seats, and Bright Armenia received 14%.
Peaceful Transfer of Power
In April-May 2018, mass protests were prompted by public
Figure 1. Republic of Armenia
discontent with the efforts of Serzh Sargsyan, Armenia’s
president for a decade, to extend his rule by becoming
prime minister, a position he held for one week. Sargsyan’s
maneuver was in line with constitutional reforms from 2015
that made Armenia’s prime minister the country’s most
powerful executive. In 2018, Armenia’s previously strong
presidency became a largely ceremonial position filled by
parliament.
After Sargsyan resigned, the then-ruling Republican Party
of Armenia (RPA) rejected the bid of Pashinyan, aged 43, a
former journalist, opposition leader, and parliamentary
deputy, to serve as prime minister. This led to a mass
general strike, after which the RPA consented to
Pashinyan’s candidacy.
Snap Parliamentary Elections
To secure a parliamentary majority, Pashinyan called for
early elections to Armenia’s unicameral legislature, the

National Assembly. To hold the elections, Pashinyan was
Source: Graphic created by CRS. Map information generated by
required to step down as prime minister in mid-October and
Hannah Fischer using data from Department of State and ArcWorld.
serve in an acting capacity.
Combatting Corruption and Abuse
Elections were held on December 9, 2018, under conditions
Since May 2018, the Pashinyan government has sought to
of “genuine competition,” according to international
expose high-level corruption, which observers consider to
observers. Pashinyan’s My Step coalition won a sizeable
have been a major driver of the anti-Sargsyan protests. The
victory, with 70% of the vote. In the last parliamentary
government charged or arrested several prominent
elections in April 2017, an opposition alliance that included
politicians and their associates, including close relatives of
Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won 9% of the vote.
Sargsyan and members of parliament, for corruption-related
offenses and other crimes.
Two other parties entered the National Assembly. In second
place with around 8% of the vote was the center-right
Authorities also arrested ex-president Robert Kocharyan on
Prosperous Armenia, led by Gagik Tsarukyan, a wealthy
charges of “overthrowing Armenia’s constitutional order,”
businessman whose party was part of an RPA-led ruling
in connection with his administration’s use of lethal force in
2008 against demonstrators protesting electoral fraud after a
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Armenia’s Velvet Revolution
controversial election that was officially won by Sargsyan
overseeing international conflict resolution efforts, have
(Kocharyan’s handpicked successor). Pashinyan was a
expressed renewed interest in settling the dispute.
leader of the 2008 protests and spent two years in jail for
allegedly “organizing mass disorder.”
Relations with Russia
Armenia traditionally relies on Russia for security
Economic Challenges
guarantees and economic support, but it also seeks to
Armenia’s velvet revolution has taken place at a time of
cultivate close relations with the West. Armenia’s change
economic growth. After four years of relatively slow
of government did not openly challenge the country’s
growth, Armenia’s gross domestic product (GDP) is
geopolitical orientation, unlike Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution
estimated to have grown by 7.5% in 2017 and by 5%-6% in
of Dignity (also known as the EuroMaidan) or the so-called
2018. The International Monetary Fund attributes this
color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine in the early 2000s.
higher growth to rising migrant remittances and exports,
higher copper prices, and a strengthening private sector.
Pashinyan and his supporters, including many young
people, insist that good governance and democracy do not
Still, Armenia continues to suffer from high rates of
require Armenia to move away from Russia and closer to
poverty, unemployment, and outmigration. According to
the West. Before being appointed prime minister,
official statistics, almost 26% of the population lived in
Pashinyan stated that Armenia would remain in Russia’s
poverty in 2017. The official unemployment rate was 18%,
orbit. He said, however, that “allied relations with Russia
and a third of the labor force works in agriculture.
should be based on friendship, equality, and mutual
Armenia’s official population has declined by around 7%
willingness to solve problems.”
since the year 2000, primarily due to migration outflows.
Large numbers of Armenians work abroad, mostly in
Russian officials, in turn, initially responded to
Russia. The World Bank estimates that remittances made
developments in Armenia with expressions of national
up around 13%-14% of Armenia’s GDP from 2015 to 2017. friendship and praise, an uncommon reaction on their part
to protest-driven regime change. Russian officials have
In 2017, Armenia’s two largest merchandise trading
expressed discontent, however, with the Pashinyan
partners were Russia ($1.71 billion, or 27% of total trade)
government’s efforts to prosecute former Armenian
and China ($604 million, 9%). Trade with the European
officials, including the secretary-general of the Collective
Union (EU), as a whole, made up around 24% of Armenia’s
Security Treaty Organization, a Russia-led security alliance,
total trade. Trade with the United States made up around
on charges of corruption or other abuses of power.
3%. Armenia’s main exports include copper ores, tobacco,
diamonds and gold, alcoholic beverages, and aluminum.
Issues for Congress
In September 2018, the U.S. State Department’s acting
Russia is the largest source of foreign direct investment in
coordinator of U.S. assistance to Europe and Eurasia told
Armenia, reportedly making up 46% of Armenia’s total
Congress that the United States can help secure “Europe’s
cumulative (stock) foreign direct investment of almost
Eastern frontier” by supporting “the democratic aspirations
$4.2 billion. The European Bank for Reconstruction and
of the people of Armenia, including preserving their
Development, of which the EU and several member states
freedom to choose further integration with the West.”
are shareholders, reports that it is Armenia’s single largest
investor, having invested over $1.4 billion in 170 projects.
Armenia was once the highest per capita recipient of U.S.
In 2015, a U.S. company acquired Armenia’s largest
assistance among post-Soviet states (an average of over
hydropower complex.
$100 million annually through 2003). As U.S. concerns
regarding democracy and governance grew, assistance
One challenge the new government faces is how to manage
declined. From FY2010 to FY2012, U.S. assistance was
conflict between the foreign owners of a gold mine project
around $45 million per year. It further dropped to an
(which the U.S. Embassy in Armenia refers to as “the single
average of $25 million a year from FY2013 to FY2017. In
largest Anglo-American investment in Armenia”) and local
October 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Armenia stated that
and environmental activists, who have blocked completion
FY2018 assistance would amount to more than $26 million.
of the mine’s construction since late June 2018.
Some U.S. assistance has sought to mitigate the effects of
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the settlement of which
Pashinyan is Armenia’s first leader in 20 years who is not
U.S. officials have said is “essential for a more secure and
from Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed Armenian-majority
prosperous future for Armenia and the South Caucasus.”
enclave that claims independence from neighboring
Since FY1998, the United States has provided more than
Azerbaijan. Like most Armenian politicians, Pashinyan
$49 million in related humanitarian assistance, most
expresses firm support for the region’s separation from
recently for demining (through FY2017). Since 2001, the
Azerbaijan. The day after he became prime minister,
United States has provided equal Foreign Military
Pashinyan visited Nagorno-Karabakh and called for the
Financing aid to Armenia and Azerbaijan in an effort not to
inclusion of local authorities in peace talks. The Azerbaijani
affect the military balance between them.
government has warned the Armenian government that it
will defend its claims to the region, which last experienced
Cory Welt, Analyst in European Affairs
a serious flare-up in April 2016. The United States and
France, which (with Russia) cochair the Minsk Group
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Armenia’s Velvet Revolution

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