Russia, the Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions

Russia, the Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions

Updated August 14, 2019
Russia, the Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions
On August 6, 2018, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo
Administration expelled 60 officials intelligence operatives
determined that in March 2018 the government of Russia
and closed the Russian consulate in Seattle.
used a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom in
contravention of international law. This finding triggered
In September 2018, British authorities charged two
requirements under the Chemical and Biological Weapons
individuals for the attack. British Prime Minister Theresa
Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act;
May said that the suspects “are officers from the Russian
title III, P.L. 102-182; 22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.).
military intelligence service, also known as the GRU.” In
December 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
The CBW Act requires the President to impose economic
imposed sanctions on the two individuals charged in the
and diplomatic measures that first cut off foreign aid, arms
attack for acting on behalf of the GRU.
sales, and export licenses for controlled goods, services,
and technology, and ratchet up in intensity if certain
Russian authorities deny involvement in the attack and
conditions are not met within 90 days. As of August 2019,
possession of chemical weapons. In reference to Skripal,
the United States has imposed two rounds of sanctions on
however, Russian President Vladimir Putin said months
Russia as required by the CBW Act.
after the attack that “traitors must be punished.”
The United States also imposes sanctions against Russia for
The CBW Control and Warfare
other reasons. See CRS In Focus IF10779, U.S. Sanctions
Elimination Act
on Russia: An Overview, and CRS Report R45415, U.S.
Secretary Pompeo’s August 6, 2018, finding that a foreign
Sanctions on Russia.
government has used a chemical agent as a weapon
triggered policy actions required by the CBW Act.
The Poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal
On March 4, 2018, in Salisbury, United Kingdom, British
First Round of Sanctions
citizen Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military
When such a finding is made, the CBW Act first requires
intelligence officer once imprisoned in Russia for allegedly
the President (who, in 1993, delegated CBW Act authorities
working as a UK double agent, his daughter, and a police
to the Secretary of State) to
officer were exposed to a highly toxic and potentially lethal
 terminate foreign assistance other than that which
chemical weapon agent. In July 2018, British media
addresses urgent humanitarian situations or provides
reported that another British citizen died after she and her
food, agricultural commodities, or agricultural products;
partner allegedly came into contact with a bottle containing
the nerve agent. British authorities identified the substance
 terminate arms sales;
as a Novichok, an advanced nerve agent originally
 terminate export licenses for U.S. Munitions List
developed in the Soviet Union.
(USML) items;
 terminate foreign military financing;
On March 15, 2018, President Trump and leaders of the

UK, France, and Germany issued a joint statement
deny credit, credit guarantees, or other financial
condemning the chemical attack, calling it “the first
assistance from the U.S. government, including Export-
offensive use of a nerve agent in Europe since the Second
Import Bank programs; and
World War” and its use by a state party “a clear violation of
 deny export licenses for goods or technology controlled
the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] and a breach of
for national security reasons (Commodity Control List).
international law.”
[CBW Act, Section 307(a); 22 U.S.C. 5605(a)]
The CBW Act requires the imposition “forthwith” of these
In April 2018, the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons “confirm[ed] the findings of the United
sanctions on determining that a chemical weapon has been
Kingdom relating to the identity” of the Novichok agent
used. On August 27, 2018, Assistant Secretary of State for
and noted that it “was of high purity.”
International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher
On April 12, 2018,
the Trump Administration said it agreed “that Russia is
Ford announced the imposition of this first round of
sanctions but invoked national security waiver authority to
responsible for the attack on UK soil using a chemical
allow for the continuation of
weapon—either through deliberate use or through its failure
to declare and secure its stocks of this nerve agent.”
 foreign assistance;
 exports related to government space cooperation and
In response to the attack, the UK, the United States, and at
commercial space launches; and
least 26 other countries expelled over 150 Russian
 export licensing for national security-sensitive goods
diplomats. Britain expelled 23 diplomats. The Trump
and technology in specific categories, including exports
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Russia, the Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions
related to civil aviation safety, deemed exports or
prohibited from participating in the secondary market for
reexports, wholly owned U.S. and other foreign
Russian sovereign debt. Prohibitions do not apply to
subsidiaries operating in Russia, and commercial end-
transactions with Russian state-owned enterprises.
users for commercial purposes.
On August 2, the State Department announced the pending
Second Round of Sanctions
imposition of these sanctions, as well as a third: the
Within three months after the initial determination (in this
Department of Commerce would implement a “presumption
case, by early November 2018), the CBW Act required the
of denial” policy for export licenses for goods controlled
President to take additional punitive steps unless he
for their dual-use chemical and biological applications.
determined and certified to Congress that Russia

According to the State Department, the banking and export
“is no longer using chemical or biological weapons in
restrictions enter into effect on or around August 19, 2019,
violation of international law or using lethal chemical or
biological weapons against its own nationals,”
and “could curtail Russia’s access to billions of dollars of

bilateral commercial activity with the United States.”
 “has provided reliable assurances that it will not in the
future engage in any such activities, and”
CBW-related sanctions remain in place for at least a year,
 “is willing to allow on-site inspections by United
and may be removed only after the President determines
Nations observers or other internationally recognized,
and certifies to Congress that the three conditions stated
impartial observers, or other reliable means exist, to
above have been met and that Russia is making restitution
ensure that that government is not using chemical or
to those affected by the use of the chemical weapon.
biological weapons in violation of international law and
is not using lethal chemical or biological weapons
Lifting or Waiving CBW-Related
against its own nationals….” [CBW Act, §307(b)(1); 22
Sanctions
U.S.C. 5605(b)(1)]
The CBW Act authorizes the President to waive sanctions if
he finds it essential to U.S. national security interests to do
If the President could not certify on all these terms, he was
so or if he finds that the violating government has
required to execute, in consultation with Congress, at least
undergone fundamental changes in its leadership and
three additional measures among the following:
policies.
 oppose loans or financial or technical assistance to

Russia by international financial institutions (IFIs);
On August 2, 2019, the State Department stated that

sanctions affecting bank loans would be waived in all
prohibit U.S. banks from making loans or providing
respects other than for lending non-ruble denominated
credit to the Russian government, except for the
funds to the Russian sovereign and participating in the
purchase of food, or other agricultural commodities or
primary market for non-ruble denominated bonds issued by
products;

the Russian sovereign. It also said that Commerce would
prohibit exports to Russia of all other goods and
deny export licenses only for those chemical and biological
technology, except food and other agricultural
goods it controlled for weapons proliferation reasons.
commodities and products;
Finally, the State Department said that exports would
 restrict importation into the United States of articles that
continue for space cooperation and commercial space
are of Russia-origin growth, product, or manufacture;
launches, civil aviation safety, commercial end-users for
 downgrade or suspend diplomatic relations; and
civil end-uses, U.S. and foreign wholly owned subsidiaries

operating in Russia, and deemed export licenses for Russian
set in motion the suspension of foreign air carriers
owned or controlled by Russia “to engage in foreign air
nationals working in the United States.
transportation to or from the United States.”
Earlier CBW Determinations
[§307(b)(2); 22 U.S.C. 5605(b)(2)]
The CBW Act has been invoked on two other occasions.
On November 6, 2018, the State Department informed
On August 2, 2013, the State Department determined that
Congress that it “could not certify that Russia met the
the government of Syria had used chemical weapons, but
required conditions” and intends “to proceed in accordance
for national security reasons sanctions decisions would be
with the terms of the CBW Act, which directs the
applied on a case-by-case basis.
implementation of additional sanctions.”
On February 22, 2018, the Secretary of State determined
The Administration took its next steps on August 1-2, 2019.
that the government of North Korea was responsible for the
On August 1, President Trump issued Executive Order
lethal 2017 nerve agent attack on Kim Jong Nam, the half-
13883 to require the Secretary of the Treasury to implement
brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, in Malaysia.
measures, “when necessary,” affecting international
Sanctions that were largely redundant with restrictions
financing and access to U.S. bank loans. On August 2,
already in place went into effect on March 5, 2018.
Treasury issued a directive (the “CBW Act Directive”)
specifying that the latter measures prohibit U.S. banks from
Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy
“lending non-ruble denominated funds to the Russian
Legislation
sovereign” and participating “in the primary market for
Cory Welt, Analyst in European Affairs
non-ruble denominated bonds issued by the Russian
IF10962
sovereign.” According to Treasury, U.S. banks are not
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Russia, the Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions

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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10962 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED