State Election Reform Payments: FY2018 Appropriations

State Election Reform Payments: FY2018 Appropriations

Updated July 9, 2018
State Election Reform Payments: FY2018 Appropriations
Election infrastructure in at least 21 states was targeted by
Table 1. Overview of HAVA Formula Payments
Russian hackers during the 2016 campaign, according to
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The
Main
Primary
Authorized
Basis for
omnibus spending bill enacted in March 2018 (P.L. 115-
provision
purpose
funding
formula
141) included $380 million for payments to states,
Title I
Improving
$325 mil ion
Voting-age
territories, and the District of Columbia (D.C.) to help
Sec. 101
election
population
secure their systems against such threats.
administration
The payments were authorized under the Help America
Title I
Replacing lever
$325 mil ion
Number of
Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA; P.L. 107-252). HAVA, which
Sec. 102
and punch card
precincts
was a response to issues exposed by the 2000 presidential
voting systems
using systems
election, is the only legislation to date to authorize major
Title II
Meeting the new
$3 bil ion
Voting-age
federal funding to the states for election administration.
Sec. 251
requirements
population
Prior to 2018, funds were last appropriated for HAVA’s
state payments in FY2010.
Source: CRS, from the Help America Vote Act of 2002.
Note: Sec. 251’s requirements payments could be spent on general
Background: Help America Vote Act
election administration improvements under certain circumstances.
Difficulties with the vote count in Florida delayed the result
of the 2000 presidential election by more than a month, and
The jurisdictions were each guaranteed minimum Title I
subsequent investigations revealed widespread weaknesses
and Sec. 251 payments, with some eligible for additional
in states’ election systems. Congress responded to those
funds based on voting-age population and/or number of
discoveries with more than a dozen election administration
precincts using lever or punch card voting systems.
bills in the 106th Congress and more than 40 in the 107th
Recipients of Sec. 251 payments had to submit a plan for
Congress. Features of a number of those bills were
the funding and, with the exception of some of the
incorporated into HAVA.
territories, supply matching funds equal to 5% of the sum of
the federal funds they received and the matching funds.
Key Provisions
Election administration in the United States is primarily the
FY2018 Election Reform Payments
responsibility of states, territories, and localities, but the
In September 2017, DHS informed 21 states that their
federal government also plays a role. HAVA provided for
election systems had been targeted by hackers in 2016.
three main types of federal involvement in elections:
Congress included funding in the FY2018 omnibus
 Requirements: Established national requirements for
spending bill for responses by DHS and the Federal Bureau
various aspects of election administration, including
of Investigation to threats to election infrastructure. It also
voting systems, voter registration databases, provisional
appropriated $380 million under HAVA Sec. 101 for
voting, and voter identification.
election reform payments to the jurisdictions; see Figure 1.
 Agency: Created the U.S. Election Assistance
Figure 1. Appropriations for Formula Payments
Commission (EAC) to assist states, territories, and
localities with election administration, including by
issuing voluntary guidance, certifying voting systems,
and administering funding.
 Funding: Authorized federal funding for meeting the
new national requirements and other election
administration purposes, including formula payments to
states and territories, funding for disability access and
youth participation initiatives, and grants for research
and pilot programs.
Formula Payments

The majority of the funding authorized by HAVA was for
Source: CRS, from HAVA and annual appropriations acts.
three formula-based payments to the states, D.C., Puerto
Notes: Figures are in mil ions. They include funds for administrative
Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands
expenses and do not reflect rescissions. The FY2003 act did not
(referred to herein as jurisdictions); see Table 1.
specify the distribution of funds between Secs. 101 and 102.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

State Election Reform Payments: FY2018 Appropriations
The FY2018 appropriations included minimum payments of
Some jurisdictions did not claim their funds immediately
$3 million each for the states and D.C. and $600,000 each
because they also had to meet state-level conditions, such as
for the territories, with the balance to be distributed
approval by the state legislature, or because they were
according to the voting-age population-based formula in
occupied with other elections-related obligations, such as
HAVA Secs. 101 and 103. The states, D.C., and Puerto
preparing for their 2018 primary elections.
Rico are required to match 5% of any federal funds they
receive.
Some may also have been wary of making spending
decisions too hastily. A number of states used their original
Uses of Funding
HAVA payments to purchase direct electronic recording
The FY2018 election reform payments were appropriated
(DRE) voting systems that lacked VVPAT capabilities.
under provisions of HAVA that authorized funding for
Those systems have been the subject of election security
general improvements to election administration. The
concerns.
explanatory statement accompanying the FY2018 spending
bill indicated that the funds could be used to
Issues for Congress
Assistant DHS Secretary Jeanette Manfra testified in April
 replace voting machines that do not produce a voter-
2018 that the states identified as 2016 hacking targets were
verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT),
probably not the only ones affected. Administration
 conduct post-election audits to check the accuracy of the officials have indicated that election infrastructure could be
vote count,
a target again in 2018.
 address vulnerabilities in election-related computer
One potential question for Congress is whether to provide
systems,
states and territories with additional funds in future
 provide state and local elections officials with
appropriations to address such threats.
cybersecurity training,

The original HAVA funding debate focused in part on how
institute election system cybersecurity best practices,
much discretion the federal government should have over
and
who received funds and how they spent them. If Congress
 make other improvements to the security of federal
chooses to consider providing additional funding for
elections.
election security, similar issues may be relevant:
Requests for Funding
 Distribution methods: Should the additional funding
Forty-seven states, two territories, and D.C. had requested
be distributed according to population-based formulas
FY2018 election reform payments as of July 6, 2018; see
like those in HAVA or by other methods, such as
Figure 2. The EAC reported on June 5 that it expected to
competitive grants or non-population-based formulas?
receive funding requests from all jurisdictions by the
 Permitted uses: Should the additional funding be
middle of July 2018.
available for a broad range of uses or restricted to a
Figure 2. Jurisdictions That Had Requested FY2018
more specific purpose, such as replacing DREs that lack
Election Reform Payments as of July 6, 2018
VVPAT capabilities or investing in research into new
kinds of voting technology?
 Links to standards: Should there be minimum national
standards for election security? If so, should the
additional funding be designated for use in meeting such
standards, contingent on meeting them, or neither?
 Spending timeframes: Should the additional funding
be designed for one-time expenditures, recurring costs
like training and technology upgrades, or both?
Several bills have been introduced in the 115th Congress
that would address these issues.
For additional information, see CRS Report RS20898, The
Help America Vote Act and Election Administration:
Overview and Selected Issues for the 2016 Election, by
Arthur L. Burris and Eric A. Fischer; and CRS In Focus

Source: U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
IF10677, The Designation of Election Systems as Critical
Infrastructure, by Eric A. Fischer.

The federal request process was streamlined to make the
funding available as quickly as possible. Requesters were
Karen L. Shanton, Analyst in American National
asked to submit a line item budget and a 1-3-page plan for
Government
use of the funds, and they could start spending against
IF10925
forthcoming payments before filing their paperwork.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

State Election Reform Payments: FY2018 Appropriations

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