U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview

U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview

Updated September 1, 2021
U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview
The United States maintains sanctions on Russia related to
Malicious Cyber Activities and Influence
Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, malicious cyber
Operations
activities and influence operations (including election
Sanctions imposed on Russian persons in response to
interference), human rights abuses, use of a chemical
malicious cyber activities and influence operations in the
weapon, weapons proliferation, illicit trade with North
United States or elsewhere are based on four authorities:
Korea, support to the governments of Syria and Venezuela,
use of energy exports as a coercive or political tool, and
 E.O. 13694, as amended by E.O. 13757 (and codified by
other harmful foreign activities.
CRIEEA), against those who engage in cyberattacks
(1) against critical infrastructure, (2) for financial or
Sanctions against Russian individuals, entities, vessels, and
commercial gain, (3) to significantly disrupt the
aircraft (hereinafter, persons) may include the blocking of
availability of a computer or network, or (4) to interfere
assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction; limits on access to the
with U.S. election processes and institutions.
U.S. financial system, including transactions involving U.S.
individuals and businesses; and denial of entry into the
 E.O. 13848, against foreign persons who have “engaged
United States. The United States also tightly controls
in, sponsored, concealed or otherwise been complicit in
exports to Russia’s defense and energy sectors.
foreign interference in a United States election.”
Invasion of Ukraine
 CRIEEA, Section 224 (22 U.S.C. 9524), against those
Most Russian persons subject to U.S. sanctions are
who have engaged in activities undermining
designated in response to Russia’s 2014 invasion and
“cybersecurity against any person, including a
occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and parts of eastern
democratic institution, or government” on behalf of the
Ukraine. The United States has imposed Ukraine-related
Russian government.
sanctions on about 735 persons, including about 75
designations for a wider range of malign activities (totals
 E.O. 14024, against those responsible for or who have
throughout are current as of the start of September 2021).
engaged in malicious cyber-enabled activities, election
interference, the undermining of democratic processes
A series of executive orders issued in 2014 (E.O.s 13660,
or institutions, and other “harmful foreign activities” on
13661, 13662, and 13685), based on national emergency
behalf of the Russian government.
authorities and codified by the Countering Russian
Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA;
Under one or more of these authorities, the United States
P.L. 115-44, Title II; 22 U.S.C. 9501 et seq.), provides a
has designated about 170 Russian persons, including
framework for sanctions on those the President determines
Russia’s leading security agency (FSB) and military
have undermined Ukraine’s security, stability, sovereignty,
intelligence agency (GRU). Designations also include a
or territorial integrity, or have misappropriated state assets.
network of persons related to Russian financier Yevgeniy
The E.O.s also authorize sanctions on Russian government
Prigozhin, the Internet Research Agency Prigozhin
officials and persons who operate in the Russian arms
reportedly financed to conduct influence operations in the
sector, other key sectors of the Russian economy, or
United States, and other Prigozhin-linked operations in
occupied Crimea. In addition, they prohibit U.S. business,
Africa and elsewhere.
trade, or investment in occupied Crimea.
Under Section 231 of CRIEEA (22 U.S.C. 9525), the
Sectoral sanctions, in particular, apply to specific entities in
United States also has imposed sanctions on foreign entities
Russia’s financial, energy, and defense sectors. U.S.
engaged in “significant transactions” with Russia’s defense
persons are restricted from engaging in specific transactions
or intelligence sectors. The United States has designated
with these entities, subject to directives issued by the
Chinese and Turkish defense agencies and related persons
Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets
for taking delivery of S-400 surface-to-air missile systems
Control. Sectoral sanctions also prohibit U.S. trade related
(as well as, in China’s case, Su-35 combat aircraft).
to the development of Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore,
or shale oil projects and such projects worldwide in which
Corruption and Human Rights Abuse
specified entities have an ownership interest of at least 33%
The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of
or a majority of voting interests.
2012 (P.L. 112-208, Title IV; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) requires
the President to impose sanctions on those he identifies as
having been involved in a “criminal conspiracy” uncovered
by Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky and his subsequent
imprisonment and death. The act also requires the President
to impose sanctions on those he finds have committed gross
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U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview
violations of internationally recognized human rights
facilitate the [illicit transfer] of jet fuel to Russian forces
against individuals fighting to expose the illegal activity of
operating in Syria.”
Russian government officials or seeking to exercise or
defend human rights and freedoms. As of September 2021,
In 2019, the Trump Administration designated a bank
55 persons are designated under the Sergei Magnitsky Act.
jointly owned by Russian and Venezuelan state-owned
companies for providing support to Venezuela’s state-
Fourteen Russian persons have been designated under the
owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. Also
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (P.L.
subject to U.S. sanctions for operating in Venezuela’s oil
114-328, Title XII, Subtitle F; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) and
sector are two subsidiaries of Russian state-owned oil
E.O. 13818, which address human rights abuses and
company Rosneft, a related individual, and two Russian-
corruption more broadly. At least nine Russian nationals
flagged vessels and their registered owners.
have been publicly denied entry to the United States for
significant corruption or gross violations of human rights
Russia’s Coercive Use of Energy Exports
under authorities stated in Section 7031(c) of annual foreign
Sixteen vessels and seven entities are subject to U.S.
operations appropriations acts.
sanctions for participating in construction of Russia’s Nord
Stream 2 natural gas pipeline to Germany (or as property
Use of a Chemical Weapon and
owned by construction participants), pursuant to E.O.
Weapons Proliferation
14039 or the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of
The United States has determined that Russia used a
2019, as amended (P.L. 116-92, §503; 22 U.S.C. 9526
chemical weapon in contravention of international law in
note). One designated vessel and its registered owner also
the March 2018 and August 2020 nerve agent attacks on,
are subject to sanctions under Section 232 of CRIEEA (22
respectively, UK citizen and former Russian GRU officer
U.S.C. 9526). In May 2021, the Biden Administration
Sergei Skripal and Russian opposition figure Alexei
waived new sanctions on Nord Stream 2 AG, its chief
Navalny. Both findings triggered sanctions under the
executive officer, and corporate officers (Nord Stream 2
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
AG is a Swiss-based company that Russia’s state-owned
Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act, P.L. 102-182, Title III;
Gazprom established to construct and operate the pipeline).
22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.).
Other Sanctions and Restrictions
CBW Act-related sanctions include (among other
Pursuant to the CBW Act and a U.S. Treasury directive
restrictions) prohibitions on exporting munitions and
issued under E.O. 14024, U.S. participation in the primary
commercial goods and services that are controlled for
market for Russian sovereign bonds and lending of funds to
national security reasons, arms sales, certain Russian
the Russian government are prohibited.
imports, and U.S. government credit guarantee programs.
Some restrictions are waived, including those on foreign aid
The State Department identifies Russia as a government
and transactions related to government space program
that fails to meet minimum standards for the elimination of
cooperation. The United States also has designated the
human trafficking; this “Tier 3” designation requires limits
GRU, the FSB, other Russian entities, government officials,
on aid and U.S. support for multilateral development loans.
and FSB and GRU officers for one or both attacks.
Defense and foreign operations appropriations also restrict
assistance to the Russian government.
Under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation
Act (P.L. 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), among other
Other Available Sanctions
restrictions, state-owned arms exporter Rosoboronexport
E.O. 14024 establishes sanctions in response to Russian
and several other Russian defense entities are denied most
“harmful foreign activities,” including transnational
U.S. government procurement contracts, export licenses,
corruption; the unlawful killing or harming of U.S. persons
and trade in U.S. Munitions List-controlled items.
or U.S. ally or partner nationals; activities that “undermine
the peace, security, political stability, or territorial integrity
North Korea, Syria, Venezuela:
of the United States, its allies, or its partners”; and the
Secondary Sanctions
circumvention of U.S. sanctions. The E.O. targets Russian
About 20 Russia-related persons are subject to U.S.
government officials and entities (and officials’ spouses and
sanctions for evading U.N. sanctions restricting trade and
families); persons operating in Russia’s technology, defense
financial transactions with North Korea. Designations apply
and related material, or other sectors; and Russian persons
to persons trading in oil and oil products, financial services,
who support governments subject to U.S. sanctions or who
and exported labor, as well as for facilitating weapons of
disrupt energy supplies to Europe or Asia.
mass destruction programs.
Other Russia-related sanctions authorities exist under
Rosoboronexport, three Russian banks, and related persons
CRIEEA; the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity,
are subject to U.S. sanctions for their support to the Syrian
Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014
government. In 2018, the Trump Administration designated
(P.L. 113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.); and the Ukraine
four Russian persons as part of “a complex scheme Iran and
Freedom Support Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-272; 22 U.S.C.
Russia have used to bolster the Assad regime and generate
8921 et seq.). For more, see CRS Report R45415, U.S.
funds for Iranian malign activity.” In 2019, the Trump
Sanctions on Russia; CRS In Focus IF10962, Russia, the
Administration designated a Russian entity and associated
Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions; and CRS In Focus
persons for serving as a front company in a “scheme to
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10779 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED

U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview
IF11872, Russia: The Navalny Poisoning, Chemical
Cory Welt, Specialist in Russian and European Affairs
Weapons Use, and U.S. Sanctions.
IF10779
Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy
Legislation

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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10779 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED