Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act

Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act

Updated August 2, 2017
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
On August 2, 2017, President Trump signed into law H.R.
rights in Iran. The section has the effect of expanding
3364/P.L. 115-44, the Countering America’s Adversaries
the authority of EO 13553, which generally refers to
Through Sanctions Act. The act establishes requirements
human rights abuses against Iranians in connection
and discretionary authorities for the President to impose
specifically with the 2009 uprising in Iran (§106).
sanctions on Iran, Russia, and North Korea.
 require sanctions (those in EO 13382) on entities that
sell weapons to Iran. The weapons systems specified are
In signing the act, the President stated that several
the same as those that U.N. Security Council Resolution
provisions overstep Congress’s responsibilities established
2231 generally prohibits for sale to Iran. The provision
in the Constitution. The President identified as problematic
appears to expand the definition of prohibited weapons
the sections that could affect his authority to determine who
sales to Iran beyond those in current law, such as the
gains entry into the United States (§§104, 107, 222, 224,
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, which imposes
227, 228, 234), to recognize foreign governments (§§253,
sanctions on those who trade in “destabilizing numbers
257), or to conduct foreign policy (§§254, 257). He also
and types” of conventional weapons (§107).
noted that the congressional review procedure for Russia
sanctions, established in §216, does not meet Constitutional
 require review of designated entities to assess if such
requirements for each branch’s full participation in enacting
entities contribute to Iran’s ballistic missile program or
and implementing legislation (https://www.whitehouse.gov/
to Iranian support for international terrorism. No entities
the-press-office/2017/08/02/statement-president-donald-j-
to be delisted by the United States in October 2023,
trump-signing-hr-3364).
under the JCPOA, appear to fall into these categories;
thus the requirement would not appear to preclude
Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities
delisting any entities as required to implement the
Act of 2017
JCPOA by October 2023 (§108).
Title I of the act addresses Iran’s missile proliferation,
human rights violations, international terrorism, and
Countering Russian Influence in Europe
activities that destabilize the Middle East. A key question is
and Eurasia Act of 2017
how the provisions of the act comport with U.S. sanctions
Title II strengthens Ukraine- and cyber-related sanctions on
relief requirements of the July 2015 multilateral nuclear
Russia, currently established in executive orders. It requires
agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
the President to impose sanctions in areas that are currently
(JCPOA). According to that agreement, sanctions lifted to
left to his discretion for activities discussed below, and
implement the JCPOA—affecting Iran’s civilian economy,
establishes a mechanism for Congress to review any action
such as its energy, banking, shipping, manufacturing, and
the President takes to ease or lift sanctions.
other sectors—are not to be reimposed. The act’s Iran-
related provisions mandate sanctions already established in
Codifying and Tightening Existing Sanctions
executive orders (EOs) that address proliferation, terrorism,
The act makes permanent Ukraine-related sanctions
and human rights issues and do not appear to reimpose U.S.
provided for in four EOs from 2014 (EOs 13660, 13661,
sanctions that were suspended to implement the JCPOA.
13662, 13685) unless certain conditions are met and
The main operative provisions
Congress reviews any proposed changes (§222). The act
also makes permanent cyber-related sanctions provided for
 require imposition of penalties similar to those in EO
in EO 13694 related to malicious cyber-enabled activities,
13382 (weapons proliferation) on entities determined by
as amended by EO 13757, which expands the scope of the
the Administration to be assisting Iran’s ballistic missile
original order to include election-related activities (§222).
program (§104).

The act strengthens sectoral sanctions provided for in EO
require imposition of sanctions contained in EO 13224
13662 to prohibit persons under U.S. jurisdiction from
(terrorism) on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
providing goods, services, and technology in support of
(IRGC), its officials, agents, and affiliates. Currently,
exploration or production for deepwater, Arctic offshore,
the IRGC as a whole is sanctioned under several other
and shale oil projects in Russian territory to such projects
EOs, including EO 13382 (proliferation), but not under
worldwide that involve any designated persons that have an
EO 13224. The IRGC’s Qods Force, which supports
ownership interest of not less than 33 percent (§223).
pro-Iranian governments and factions throughout the
Middle East, is designated under EO 13224 (§105).
The act restricts new lending to designated financial
 authorize, but do not require, sanctions (such as those in
institutions to a maturity of up to 14 days (down from 30
EO 13553 on human rights abusers) on persons
days) and to designated energy companies to a maturity of
responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or other
no more than 60 days (down from 90 days) (§223).
gross violations of internationally recognized human
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
The act enlarges the scope of prohibited cyber-related
Korean Interdiction and Modernization
activities to include a range of activities conducted on
of Sanctions Act
behalf of the Russian government that undermine the
Title III strengthens the use of sanctions—in part by
cybersecurity of any U.S. or foreign person (§224).
amending the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-122)—on those who
Mandating Existing Discretionary Sanctions
facilitate North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile
The act (§225, §226) requires sanctions—currently
programs. It both requires and authorizes sanctions on those
discretionary, under the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of
who evade U.N. sanctions, use DPRK exported labor,
2014 (P.L. 113-272)—on foreign persons who make “a
provide correspondent banking, or trade in DPRK’s exports
significant investment” in special oil projects in Russia, and
in fuel, textiles, food and agricultural products.
on foreign financial institutions that fund such projects;
foreign financial institutions that engage in transactions
Possible Designation as a State Sponsor of
related to defense articles that end up in Syria, or in
Terrorism
Ukraine, Georgia, or Moldova (or other countries as
The act requires the Secretary of State to determine, within
designated by the President) without the consent of their
90 days, whether DPRK “meets the criteria for designation
governments; and foreign financial institutions that engage
as a state sponsor of terrorism” (§324).
in transactions for any person subject to Ukraine-related
sanctions.
Mandatory Sanctions
The act expands the categories of activities of those whom
The act makes mandatory sanctions that are currently
the President must designate as subject to sanctions, to
discretionary, under the Support for the Sovereignty,
include those who purchase various precious metals and
Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine
rare earth elements from DPRK; provide to DPRK fuel and
Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-95). These sanctions target Russian
related services, vessel registration, or insurance; or
government officials, associates, family members, and
maintain a correspondent bank account with any DPRK
others responsible for committing or facilitating acts of
financial institution (§311(a)).
corruption (§227).
In addition, the act names specific entities for which
Requiring New Sanctions
Congress requires a determination as to whether each
The act requires sanctions on foreign persons who violate
should be subject to sanctions under the 2016 Act
sanctions, facilitate transactions for designated persons and
(§311(d)); denies access to the U.S. financial systems to
their relatives (§228), are responsible for or support serious
any foreign financial institution that is indirectly providing
human rights abuses in territory Russia occupies or controls
banking services to a North Korean entity or person subject
(§228), or provide support to Syria (§234).
to sanctions (§312); and restricts U.S. foreign aid to any
foreign government found not to be in compliance with
The act also requires restrictions on U.S. or foreign persons
UNSC sanctions requirements (§313).
who engage in significant transactions with persons related
to Russia’s defense or intelligence sectors (§231), or make
The act requires the President to identify foreign seaports
or facilitate investments of $10 million or more that
and airports that fail to adequately inspect and interdict
contribute to Russia’s privatization of state-owned assets
vessels (authorizing seizure of such vessels); names a
where the privatization is a factor in corruption (§233).
number of ports in China, Iran, Russia, and Syria in which
Congress is particularly interested (§314); and blocks U.S.
Authorizing New Discretionary Sanctions
importation of goods made by slave labor (§321).
The act authorizes, but does not require, sanctions on U.S.
or foreign persons who trade or make investments of a
Discretionary Sanctions
certain value that enhance Russia’s ability to construct
The act authorizes the President to impose sanctions on
energy export pipelines (§232).
those who violate UN Security Council sanctions
requirements related to DPRK; acquire coal, iron, or iron
Congressional Review
ore from DPRK in excess of UNSC limits; acquire textiles,
The act adds to each existing legislative and executive
fishing rights, food, agricultural products; hire exported
branch action referred to in Title II—including the blocking
labor; trade in property or bulk cash, precious metals, or
of Russian access to diplomatic compounds in Maryland
gemstones; sell fuel to DPRK; engage in online commercial
and New York—specific conditions that the President
activities run by the North Korean government; engage in
would certify have been met when he takes steps to waive
DPRK’s transportation, mining, energy, or financial
or terminate a restriction, at which point Congress could
services sectors; or facilitate the opening and operation of a
adopt a Joint Resolution of Disapproval to block the
DPRK financial institution (§311(b)).
President’s decision. Congress, however, is not required to
approve the President’s actions. If Congress agrees with the
Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy
President, he could ease or lift sanctions without Congress
Legislation
weighing in. Each existing sanction, and modifications or
Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
additional requirements to impose new sanctions stated in
Cory Welt, Analyst in European Affairs
the act, would be subject to congressional review under
Section 216 before they could be waived or terminated.
IF10694
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10694 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED