When Congress Does Not Agree on a Budget Resolution: Use of Existing Budget Enforcement and Deeming Resolutions

When Congress Does Not Agree on a Budget Resolution: Use of Existing Budget Enforcement and Deeming Resolutions

June 22, 2017
When Congress Does Not Agree on a Budget Resolution: Use of
Existing Budget Enforcement and Deeming Resolutions
The Budget Resolution
In 2016, before the House and Senate had agreed upon a
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 provides for the
budget resolution for FY2017, the House moved forward on
annual adoption of a budget resolution, which is meant to
appropriations legislation by using the overall levels
reflect an agreement between the House and Senate on a
prescribed by the statutory spending limits as a basis for
budget plan. The budget resolution does not become law—
discretionary spending levels. The House Appropriations
no money is spent or collected as a result of its adoption.
Committee, citing the lack of a budget resolution, adopted
Instead, it is meant to provide an opportunity for Congress
“interim 302(b) sub-allocations.” The interim sub-
to consider and execute an overall budget framework. The
allocations did not act as an enforceable cap on
budget resolution includes certain spending and revenue
appropriations measures when they were considered on the
levels that become enforceable once both chambers have
floor. A separate House rule, however, prohibited
agreed to the resolution. In addition, agreement on a budget
amendments that would increase net spending in the bill,
resolution allows Congress to trigger the budget
thus creating a cap on individual appropriations bills
reconciliation process, which provides fast-track procedures
considered on the floor.
in the Senate.
For FY2018, the BCA discretionary spending limits are
Complications May Arise Without a
lower than they were for FY2017, and some Members of
Budget Resolution
Congress and the President have expressed support for
When Congress does not employ a budget resolution (either
increasing one or more of the limits. It may be more
because it has not considered a budget resolution or because
difficult, therefore, for the Appropriations Committees to
the chambers have not reached agreement), the
use the current spending limits prescribed by the BCA as a
consideration of budgetary legislation for the upcoming
basis for discretionary spending levels as they develop
fiscal year may become complicated. It is likely to be more
appropriations legislation for FY2018.
difficult to agree on such legislation, both within each
chamber and between the chambers, when there is no
Congress May Use a “Deeming
agreement on budgetary parameters.
Resolution” in the Absence of a Budget
Resolution
For example, without a budget resolution, committees are
In the absence of agreement on a budget resolution,
not given a committee spending allocation reflecting a limit
Congress may employ alternative legislative tools to serve
on spending within that committee’s jurisdiction (a 302(a)
as a substitute for the budget resolution. These substitutes
allocation). Lacking such an allocation, the House and
are typically referred to as “deeming resolutions,” because
Senate Appropriations Committees cannot make the
they are deemed to serve in place of an agreement between
required sub-allocations, which act as formal limits on each
the two chambers on an annual budget resolution for the
of the 12 regular appropriations bills. This may hinder the
purposes of establishing enforceable budget levels for the
development and consideration of appropriations measures
upcoming fiscal year. Using a deeming resolution, however,
that provide funding for discretionary spending programs.
does not prevent Congress from later agreeing to a budget
resolution.
In addition, without agreement on a budget resolution,
Congress cannot trigger the budget reconciliation process.
While referred to as deeming resolutions, such mechanisms
are not formally defined and have no specifically prescribed
Congress May Rely on Existing Budget
content. Instead, they simply represent the House and
Enforcement in the Absence of a Budget
Senate using alternative legislative tools to deal with
Resolution
enforcement issues on an ad hoc basis. As described below,
In the absence of a budget resolution, Congress might rely
the mechanisms vary in form and function, but they always
on other tools, such as chamber rules and statutory
(1) include or reference certain budgetary levels (e.g.,
enforcement mechanisms, that place restrictions on certain
aggregate spending limits and committee spending
types of budgetary legislation. For example, the Budget
allocations) and (2) contain language stipulating that such
Control Act of 2011 (BCA) created separate spending limits
levels are to be enforceable by points of order as if they had
for defense and non-defense discretionary spending through
been included in a budget resolution.
FY2021. These broad limits on spending may act as a guide
to Congress in developing appropriations legislation, but
Variations in Deeming Resolutions
they do not provide an enforceable limit on individual
As described below, deeming resolutions have varied in
appropriations measures in a way comparable to the 12
several ways.
committee sub-allocations.
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When Congress Does Not Agree on a Budget Resolution: Use of Existing Budget Enforcement and Deeming Resolutions
Variations in Legislative Vehicle
levels are to be enforceable as if they had been included in a
Congress initially used simple resolutions as the legislative
budget resolution. Deeming resolutions have referenced the
vehicle for deeming resolutions (which is why they are
enforceable budgetary levels either by including explicit
referred to as resolutions). Deeming resolutions, however,
dollar amounts or by referencing certain budgetary
have also been included as provisions in lawmaking
amounts, such as those included in a budget resolution
vehicles, such as appropriations bills, as well as bills
already agreed to by that chamber or those consistent with
affecting budget enforcement mechanisms, such as the
the baseline projections of the Congressional Budget
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (Division A of P.L. 113-67)
Office.
and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74).
Deeming resolutions have also varied in terms of which
Variations in Timing
budgetary levels are included. For example, in some cases
Timing of congressional action on deeming resolutions has
deeming resolutions have included only committee
varied, since deeming resolutions may be initiated any time
allocations to the Appropriations Committee, while in other
Congress regards it as necessary. Chambers have often
cases they have included allocations for all committees, as
agreed to deeming resolutions several months after they
well as aggregate spending and revenue levels. In addition,
have separately agreed to a budget resolution but have not
deeming resolutions have often included other matter, such
come to agreement with each other. Alternatively,
as points of order.
chambers have agreed to a deeming resolution on the same
day as agreeing to a budget resolution in situations when
For more information on deeming resolutions, see CRS
one chamber foresees difficulty resolving differences with
Report R44296, Deeming Resolutions: Budget Enforcement
the other chamber.
in the Absence of a Budget Resolution, by Megan S. Lynch.
Variations in Content
Megan S. Lynch, Specialist on Congress and the
Deeming resolutions always include at least two things: (1)
Legislative Process
language setting forth or referencing specific budgetary
levels (e.g., aggregate spending limits and/or committee
IF10680
spending allocations) and (2) language stipulating that such

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When Congress Does Not Agree on a Budget Resolution: Use of Existing Budget Enforcement and Deeming Resolutions

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