Potential Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change

Potential Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change

Updated April 5, 2019
Potential Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement on Climate Change
On June 1, 2017, President Trump announced his intent to
Variety of GHG Pledges in Selected NDCs
withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement (PA),
an international accord to address climate change over the
United States: Reduce GHG emissions to 26-28% below 2005
coming century. In a December 2018 meeting of the
levels in 2025.
Parties, an official U.S. statement reiterated the intent to
China: Inter alia, by 2030, peak carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions;
withdraw “absent the identification of terms that are more
lower its CO2 emissions per unit of gross domestic product
favorable to the American people.”
(GDP) by 60-65% below 2005 levels; and increase the non-fossil-
fuel share of energy consumption to around 20%.
Congress may wish to consider implications of the
President’s intent in several dimensions: foreign policy,
European Union: Reduce GHG emissions by at least 40%
economic, environmental, and legal.
compared to 1990 levels.
India: Inter alia, reduce GHG emissions per unit of GDP by 33-
What Is the Paris Agreement?
35% by 2030 from the 2005 level and reach 40% of its cumulative
The PA exists under the United Nations Framework
installed electric capacity from non-fossil-fuel sources by 2030.
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The United
Mexico: Reduce GHG and black carbon emissions by 25%
States ratified the UNFCCC in 1992 with the advice and
below business-as-usual projections by 2030, and up to 40%
consent of the Senate. In 2016, President Obama accepted
under some conditions, implying a net emissions peak in 2026.
the PA without requesting the Senate’s advice and consent;
Reduce GHG emissions per unit of GDP by around 40% from
the Department of State took the view that the PA contained
2013 to 2030.
no substantive, legal obligations for the United States
beyond those already required by the UNFCCC. Currently,
the PA has 185 Parties—governments that have ratified or
Countries have long negotiated over what would constitute
accepted the agreement, including the United States—out of
a “fair” distribution of effort under the UNFCCC. The
195 Signatories. Of the top 20 emitting nations, only Iran,
strength of the U.S. NDC compared with those of other
Russia, and Turkey are not Parties.
countries can be viewed from various perspectives (see text
box): To illustrate, under the NDCs, China’s GHG
Under the UNFCCC, the United States and the then-
emissions could grow to 2030, while U.S. GHG emissions
industrialized Parties listed in “Annex I” took on specific
would fall. Nonetheless, China’s GHG emissions per
commitments for greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation,
person would remain well below those of the United States,
financial resources, reporting, and review. The PA modified
and China would reduce its emissions per unit of GDP more
the UNFCCC bifurcation of commitments between Annex I
than the United States.
and developing country Parties to establish a single,
common set of obligations for all Parties (with flexibilities
Withdrawal Procedure
for the least capable). For example, China agreed in the PA
The Department of State notified the U.N. Secretary
to the same binding commitments as the United States.
General that the United States would provide formal
Under the PA, all Parties must submit “Nationally
notification of withdrawal “as soon as it is eligible to do
Determined Contributions” (NDC) every five years, but the
so.” Under Article 28 of the PA, this would be November 4,
content is not binding. An NDC must identify how the
2019. Withdrawal may take effect one year later—on or
Party intends to abate its GHG emissions, initially to 2025
after November 4, 2020. In the meantime, the United States
or 2030, depending on the time frame each nation chooses.
remains a Party to the PA (unless, following customary
Each nation voluntarily decides its NDC. As such, all PA
international law, the other Parties agree to allow an earlier
emissions targets, including the U.S. target, are voluntary
exit).
and nonbinding.
In the meantime, the U.S. delegation continues to
The UNFCCC requires GHG and other reporting and
participate “in order to ensure a level playing field that
review, differentiated by types of Parties. The PA makes an
benefits and protects U.S. interests,” according to the
enhanced transparency framework applicable to all Parties.
Department of State.
The PA contains cooperative compliance mechanisms but
not formal sanctions. Incentives for compliance include
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy
“name and shame” processes: Parties that do not meet their
The President’s announcement was viewed generally by
pledges may incur diplomatic and public opinion penalties.
observers as consistent with the Administration’s “America
For example, the European Union has a policy not to sign
First” approach to foreign policy. Although the
trade pacts with countries that are not parties to the PA.
Administration has arguably sent mixed signals about its
specific foreign policy intentions, some of these signals
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Potential Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change
appear to reflect, among other things, a skeptical approach
not fully mitigate adverse impacts. Optimizing policy might
toward multilateral organizations and multilateral
seek to minimize the total net costs of mitigation,
agreements and a transactional approach to alliances and
adaptation, and losses and consider distributional impacts.
international agreements.
Some observers argue that the Administration’s decision to
The trade implications of the President’s intent to withdraw
are unclear. The President’s Executive Order 13783,
withdraw from the PA will (1) reduce the U.S. standing in
Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth,
the world by making the United States an international
instructed agencies to review, and possibly rescind or
outlier on climate change, (2) strengthen perceptions that
modify, regulations that may obstruct energy development,
the United States is withdrawing from its traditional
including those that would reduce U.S. GHG emissions. As
position of world leadership and becoming more inward-
China, South Korea, and European and other countries
focused or even isolationist, (3) create an opportunity for
enact climate change policies, they promote investment in
China to assume a position of world leadership on climate
advanced energy, materials, electronics, vehicle, and other
change and perhaps other issues, and (4) make the United
technologies. They may initially raise costs, but over time,
States appear less reliable as a negotiating partner, which
they expect many technologies to become commercially
could make it harder for the United States in the future to
competitive and bring trade advantages. To date, the U.S.
secure foreign cooperation for addressing other issues of
Congress has largely continued public funding to advance
mutual interest or to call on other countries to abide by their
cleaner technologies, but the level of private sector research
commitments in other international agreements. Other
and “learning-by-doing” is uncertain with lower policy
observers either disagree with these arguments or argue that
stimulus for technology end-users.
they are offset by gains realized for Americans under the
Administration’s approach to foreign policy.
Environment
Other nations responded to the U.S. intent to withdraw
The PA contains a collective commitment to reduce GHG
largely with restrained expressions of regret; they rebuffed
emissions almost to net zero in the second half of this
the President’s proposal to reopen negotiations. Despite
century. The goal is to hold the GHG-induced increase in
initial concerns about the resolve of Parties to implement
global temperature well below 2o Celsius and to try to hold
the PA without the United States, the most recent meeting
it to 1.5oC. Reaching “net zero” would stabilize the rise of
of the Parties agreed on most of the “rulebook” for
GHG concentrations in the atmosphere and, after a lag of
implementing the PA’s provisions. China’s Special
many decades, end the induced climate change. The pledges
Representative on Climate Change stated, just prior to those
made in NDCs to 2025 or 2030 are intended as the initial
negotiations, that “the political influence of the American
steps in a multi-decadal process toward the net zero goal.
withdrawal [from the PA] was quite big.” He said that the
President Trump cited one study estimating that the initial
U.S. announcement initially “affected the resolve and
NDCs would avoid global warming of about 0.2oC by 2100.
confidence of some other countries.” He opined that the
This could be roughly 8-10% of the way to meeting the 2oC
impact of the U.S. decision has since “dissipated,” in part
goal. Compared with a no-further-policy scenario, some of
because of China’s pledge to meet its commitments in full.
the study’s authors estimated that countries’ commitments
China “sent out such a strong political signal,” he said, that
could reduce temperature by 0.6-1.1° C. Other studies
it helped “stabilize” international climate change efforts.
estimate larger or smaller temperature effects of NDCs,
depending on assumptions about future commitments.
Economy and Trade
The PA was intended to lay a path to long-term transition of
Long-Term Liabilities
the world’s economies toward “deep decarbonization”—
President Trump cited “legal liability” associated with
sustaining economic growth while delinking it from
staying in the PA. This may refer to an assertion that PA
emissions of CO2 and other GHGs. Such a transition is
obligations could prevent the federal government from
generally expected to impose near- to medium-term costs,
rescinding or modifying its domestic regulations or risk
though the magnitude and distribution would depend on
litigation under the Clean Air Act. In rebuttal, a former
policy timing and design and private investment. Trade
Department of State attorney who worked on the PA has
could be affected by differences in Parties’ NDCs and
opined that “if a domestic stakeholder sought to invoke the
policy designs. Economic and trade impacts could be
PA in a domestic challenge to withdrawing the Clean
adverse or positive for individual countries or businesses,
Power Plan, courts would almost certainly find that the
and many are building this into their economic strategies.
agreement does not constrain executive branch action.” The
EPA has since proposed to rescind the Clean Power Plan.
Experts expect that deep decarbonization would initially
Thus far, references to commitments in the PA have not
increase costs and dislocation for many populations and
featured in litigation challenging the Clean Power Plan or
businesses. Technology experts and economists expect that
comments submitted on EPA’s proposal to revise vehicle
experience with and wider use of advanced technologies
GHG emission standards.
would lower the costs of key GHG mitigation options, and
economies would adjust to new conditions.
See also: CRS Report R44609, Climate Change:
Frequently Asked Questions About the 2015 Paris
Some economists believe that the costs of mitigating GHG
Agreement, by Jane A. Leggett and Richard K. Lattanzio.
would be less than the costs that climate change would
impose on people—costs of adapting to expected climate
Jane A. Leggett, Specialist in Energy and Environmental
changes and of net losses where anticipatory action does
Policy
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Potential Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change

IF10668

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10668 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED