Possible U.S. Policy Approaches to North Korea

Possible U.S. Policy Approaches to North Korea

Updated September 4, 2017
Possible U.S. Policy Approaches to North Korea
Since assuming office, the Trump Administration has raised
dialogue. President Trump has alternated between praising
the North Korea threat to a top-level foreign policy priority
China for its efforts to encourage North Korea to change its
in response to the regime’s demonstrations of rapid military
behavior and threatening China with diplomatic and
advances. Officially called the Democratic People’s
economic measures if Beijing does not apply more
Republic of Korea (DPRK), North Korea has rebuffed U.S.
pressure.
and South Korean offers to negotiate on denuclearization
since 2009 and has continued to develop its nuclear and
In addition, Cabinet Members often have issued statements
ballistic missile programs. In 2017, North Korea conducted
that many observers contend contradict the President or one
its sixth and most powerful nuclear weapons test, and
another. In September 2017, President Trump tweeted
carried out two tests of long-range ballistic missiles that
criticisms of South Korea’s attempts to initiate low-level
some observers believe have intercontinental range. All of
dialogue with North Korea, calling the efforts
these tests violate United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
“appeasement.” However, the following day, the National
resolutions.
Security Council reportedly said in an official letter to
South Korean counterparts that there was no gap in the two
North Korea is on track to develop and deploy the
allies’ approaches. (See CRS Report R41481, U.S.-South
capability to attack the U.S. homeland with nuclear-armed
Korea Relations.) Taken together, for many observers the
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). U.S.
apparently contradictory statements have created
intelligence estimates note that North Korea already likely
uncertainty about which Administration statements are
has the capability to mount nuclear warheads on medium-
authoritative.
range ballistic missiles that can reach Japan and Guam, both
of which have major U.S. military installations. Official
Despite the lack of clarity, key components of the
statements by the Kim Jong-un government suggest it is
Administration’s approach appear to be:
striving to build a credible regional nuclear warfighting
capability that could evade regional missile defenses. (See
 raising the priority level of the North Korea threat;
CRS In Focus IF10472, North Korea’s Nuclear and
 increasing public displays of U.S. military might and
Ballistic Missile Programs.)
public threats to use military force;
 pushing China, which accounts for over 90% of North
The Trump Administration’s North
Korea’s trade, to fully implement UNSC sanctions and
Korea Policy
take other steps to pressure North Korea;
The Trump Administration conducted a North Korea policy
 pushing for the UNSC to adopt new, increasingly tough
review in early 2017. According to a five-paragraph, April
international sanctions against North Korea and
26, 2017, statement, the Administration will seek to
expanding the use of U.S. sanctions, including
“pressure North Korea into dismantling its nuclear, ballistic
“secondary sanctions” that target foreign entities that
missile, and proliferation programs by tightening economic
facilitate trade with North Korea; and
sanctions and pursuing diplomatic measures with our Allies
 expanding efforts to convince other countries to curtail
and regional partners.” The statement also says that the
or shut down their interactions with the DPRK.
Administration hopes pressure will “convince the [DPRK]
The Administration has cast its approach as a departure
regime to de-escalate and return to the path of dialogue.”
from the Obama Administration’s policy, known as
Administration officials have said they seek to apply
“maximum pressure” on the regime to achieve these goals.
“strategic patience.” However, many of the elements
remain: expanding U.S. and international sanctions,
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has said that the
emphasizing China’s ability to pressure North Korea, and
Administration is seeking neither a change in nor a collapse
coordinating policy with U.S. allies.
of the Kim regime.
U.S. Policy Options
Some U.S. and South Korean commentators have
characterized Administration officials’ remarks on North
The United States faces a range of North Korea policy
options, many of which may not be mutually exclusive.
Korea as contradictory, perhaps deliberately so, particularly
One set of approaches involves increasing diplomatic
on the questions of under what conditions the United States
engagement, such as by resuming the Six-Party Talks
would negotiate with North Korea and whether the United
among China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea,
States is prepared to launch a preventive attack against
and the United States, which were last held in 2008. The
North Korea. In repeated public remarks, Trump
Administration’s April 26 statement provides that it is
Administration officials, including the President, have
“open” to talks that lead to denuclearization, but did not
emphasized a possible preventive military attack against
outline preconditions. Since April, some Administration
North Korea. At other times, President Trump and other
officials’ remarks on North Korea policy have not
Administration officials have said they would be open to
mentioned negotiations, while others have. A number of
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Possible U.S. Policy Approaches to North Korea
experts, as well as China’s government, have proposed that
programs, and/or pushing or helping countries to fully
negotiations should begin with the more limited goal of a
implement existing sanctions.
freeze on North Korean nuclear and missile tests, in return
for U.S. concessions, such as halting military exercises with
Congress could press the Trump Administration to enforce
South Korea. The United States has refused to return to
or expand U.S. sanctions, such as those in the North Korea
negotiations based on North Korea’s insistence that talks
Sanctions and Policy Enforcement Act (P.L. 114-122), that
should go forward without preconditions, that it should be
call for imposing secondary sanctions. This tactic could
recognized as a nuclear-weapons state, and that the United
affect firms and international banks, mostly in China, that
States take steps such as reducing its military presence on
have financial dealings with Pyongyang. In the summer of
the peninsula. Short of the resumption of negotiations, the
2017, Congress and President Trump took a step in this
six parties may pursue the establishment of crisis hotlines
direction with the passage and signing into law of H.R.
between the United States and North Korea in the event of a
3364/P.L. 115-44, the Countering America’s Adversaries
military confrontation.
Through Sanctions Act. Other acts to increase penalties
against North Korea and those that interact with North
In the past, the United States has dismissed the option of
Korea have been introduced. In 2016, the U.S. Treasury
launching military strikes on North Korea due largely to
Secretary determined that North Korea is a jurisdiction of
the threat of a potentially devastating DPRK counterattack
money laundering concern (recommended by P.L. 114-
on South Korea or Japan, and the possibility of creating a
122); this determination could be replicated in other
humanitarian crisis on the peninsula. However, North
countries that engage in banking with North Korean
Korea’s advances in missile and nuclear capabilities in
entities. The President could designate DPRK entities for
2017, which may increase the vulnerability of the U.S.
suspected involvement in cyber security threats. The United
homeland to a North Korean attack, have led some
States could also seek to shut down other countries’
policymakers and analysts to suggest that the United States
bilateral programs with North Korea, such as those that
should launch a preventive strike against the DPRK. Most
import North Korean labor, which generate funds for the
experts warn that any military attack could lead to a
DPRK. (See CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative
widespread outbreak of war, with uncertain factors such as
Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions.)
China’s involvement and the control of North Korea’s
nuclear arsenal. Analysts expect that the DPRK would
The United States could enhance military cooperation
attack the Seoul area (with a population of over 20 million)
with allies to further strengthen U.S. alliance commitments.
with conventional artillery situated along the inter-Korean
This could include increasing military exercises with South
border, likely leading to thousands of civilian casualties.
Korea and Japan that feature advanced weaponry. An overt
Members of Congress might consider proactively adopting
improvement in ballistic missile defense cooperation among
measures supporting or opposing a U.S. military attack.
Japan, South Korea, and the United States could also send a
signal to the Kim regime. The U.S.-South Korean decision
Some offensive military options fall short of direct
to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
intervention. The Obama Administration, according to
(THAAD) missile defense system could facilitate a more
some media reports, used cyber techniques to sabotage
integrated regional ballistic missile system among U.S.
North Korea’s missile tests. Upgrading U.S. intelligence
allies, though South Korea’s left-of-center parties, which
resources dedicated to North Korea could clarify the state’s
currently rule the country, historically have resisted many
capabilities and weaknesses, including possible internal
forms of defense cooperation with Japan. In September
power struggles. Congress might also consider increasing
2017, the United States approved South Korea’s request to
the flow of anti-regime information into the country to
lift restrictions on its missile payload capabilities.
spread awareness among North Korean citizens of the
regime’s abuses. Some analysts have urged Congress to
Congress could commit additional resources to support
consider the use of approaches that could destabilize the
interdictions of North Korean shipments of arms or other
regime, while others have counseled against such
illicit goods that provide hard currency to the regime.
approaches, in part because the United States may be
Similarly, additional support for law-enforcement measures
unprepared or unwilling to engage in reconstruction efforts
that target North Korean counterfeiting, money laundering,
in the event of a collapse of the DPRK government.
or narcotics trafficking may further increase pressure.
Congress could urge or mandate that the United States push
Another set of approaches involves the expansion of
for cooperation with foreign governments and private
international sanctions to choke off the Kim regime’s
companies, especially in China, on preventing transfers to
sources of hard currency and to weaken the North Korean
North Korea through transshipment networks of controlled
economy. Although many sanctions are in place, more
goods that contribute to missile and nuclear program
countries could follow Japan’s approach in banning
advancements.
virtually all trade. Washington and its allies at the United
Nations could press for eliminating exemptions in existing
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs
UNSC sanctions that would further reduce trade. Other
Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
measures to strengthen and/or expand international
sanctions could include adding new industrial sectors to the
IF10467
sanctions, targeting North Korea’s official labor export

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Possible U.S. Policy Approaches to North Korea

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