Burkina Faso: Conflict and Military Rule

Burkina Faso: Conflict and Military Rule

Updated September 28, 2023
Burkina Faso: Conflict and Military Rule
Burkina Faso experienced two military coups in 2022, part
media outlets have inhibited political competition and free
of a wave of military seizures of power in Africa.
expression, as have insurgent threats.
Successive governments have been unable to contain the
spread of violence by insurgents affiliated with Al Qaeda
Figure 1. Burkina Faso at a Glance
and the Islamic State (IS). Abuses by state security forces
and militias appear to have fueled insurgent recruitment.
Conflicts have caused a spiraling humanitarian emergency
in the already impoverished country.
Following a pattern set by neighboring Mali, Burkina
Faso’s junta has ended military cooperation with former
colonial power France and pursued closer ties with
Moscow. Russia’s Wagner Group has been active in Mali
since 2021. Since the death of Wagner’s founder in August
2023, Russia’s government has signaled an intent to
exercise more direct control over the group’s operations,
and top Russian officials have engaged in outreach to
Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso and Mali have vowed to defend
the junta in neighboring Niger—where soldiers ousted the
elected president in July 2023—from regional sanctions and
from a threatened regional military intervention.
Developments in Burkina Faso, once viewed as a nascent
democracy and U.S. regional security partner, are part of a

chain of setbacks for U.S. policymakers in the region.
Source: CIA World Factbook, IMF; 2023 figures unless noted.
Militaries have seized power in seven African countries
Background
since 2020. Security and humanitarian crises in the Sahel
appear likely to deteriorate further, given tensions in Niger,
Burkina Faso has a history of military mutinies, coups, and
France’s military drawdown, the withdrawal of the U.N.
social unrest, though it was seen as relatively stable under
peacekeeping operation in Mali, resurgent hostilities
former authoritarian leader Blaise Compaoré, who came to
between Mali’s military and northern separatist rebels, and
power in a 1987 coup. A towering and controversial figure
the Wagner Group’s regional activities (however these are
in West African politics, Compaoré was ousted in a popular
restructured).
uprising in 2014 while trying to bypass constitutional term
limits. Civilian politician Roch Marc Christian Kaboré was
An Uncertain Military-Led Transition
elected in 2015, after a failed coup attempt against the
Self-declared “Transition President” Capt. Ibrahim Traoré
civilian-led transitional government by officers associated
is the world’s youngest head of state at age 35. He has
with Compaoré. Kaboré was Burkina Faso’s first post-
emphasized national sovereignty and self-reliance, themes
independence leader to enter office via elections.
with strong historical resonance in Burkina Faso.
Apollinaire Joachim Kyélem de Tambèla, a lawyer and
In his first term, President Kaboré faced growing public
media commentator, is serving as Prime Minister. Traoré
demands for security amid growing insurgent threats, along
has been in power since September 2022, when he ousted
with job creation, governance reforms, and accountability
the previous coup leader, Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo
for abuses under Compaoré. Among other controversial
Damiba. The second coup came amid a renewed wave of
actions, Kaboré oversaw the expansion of state-backed
tensions in the military and on the streets over authorities’
militias and “volunteer” fighters that human rights groups
inability to stem insurgent attacks. Rivalry among
have accused of abuses. He was reelected in 2020 in a vote
specialized military units may also have been a factor.
that local civil society observers deemed satisfactory,
Authorities have since claimed to foil several coup plots.
although opposition leaders initially claimed fraud;
insecurity prevented voting in several areas. Kaboré was
Traoré has pledged to keep his predecessor’s commitment
ousted in a coup led by Lt. Col. Damiba in January 2022.
(made under threat of regional sanctions) to hold elections
Terrorism and Insurgency
by July 2024, but prospects appear uncertain. Authorities
have not issued a clear timeline for stated transition goals,
Armed Islamist violence erupted in Burkina Faso in 2016,
including a new constitution. How conflict-affected areas
as conflicts expanded in neighboring Mali. That year, Al
might participate is also unclear. State intimidation,
Qaeda-affiliated groups carried out an unprecedented
security-related legal restrictions, and bans on several
terrorist attack in Ouagadougou (Figure 1), killing 30
people, including an American. At the same time, a locally-
led Islamist insurgency, Ansarul Islam, emerged in the rural
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Burkina Faso: Conflict and Military Rule
north. Attacks escalated in 2017, after several regional Al
and an estimated 4.7 million were in need of humanitarian
Qaeda affiliates merged to form the Group for Supporting
assistance, per U.N. data. Insurgent violence has shuttered
Islam and Muslims (aka JNIM), led by a Malian national. In
thousands of schools and health centers. Much of the
northern Burkina Faso, JNIM has subsumed Ansarul Islam
country’s north and east faces “crisis” or “emergency” level
and exploited ethnic tensions, state neglect, and grievances
food insecurity in 2023, according to the Famine Early
over corruption, patronage politics, social stratification, and
Warning System Network (FEWS NET). The district of
land disputes. Eastern Burkina Faso is a stronghold of a
Djibo, in the north, faces an even more dire risk of famine,
rival splinter movement that has affiliated with the Islamic
due to a protracted JNIM blockade. In late 2022, the junta
State. Both groups appear to be pressing southward into
expelled the top U.N. official in the country after she wrote
West Africa’s coastal states.
about insurgent violence forcing state services to shrink.
JNIM has regularly blockaded towns in the north, an
Landlocked with a largely agrarian workforce, Burkina
apparent tactic to force residents into submission and
Faso is one of the world’s poorest countries. Exports of
preclude cooperation with state security forces. This has
cotton and gold represent key sources of state revenues and
reportedly caused severe shortages of food and medicines in
foreign exchange. The COVID-19 pandemic and the ripple
some areas. Insurgents have also targeted gold mines,
effects of the Russia-Ukraine war have hurt the economy,
threatening a major economic sector and reportedly raising
driving up food and fuel prices. The economy grew by
revenues from gold smuggling.
2.5% in 2022 (anemic for a developing country with high
Traoré has vowed to defeat insurgents by force, rejecting
population growth), per International Monetary Fund data,
backchannel negotiations that previous leaders reportedly
while public debt rose from 42% of GDP in 2019 to 58% as
pursued. Abuses attributed to state security forces and state-
of early 2023. In mid-2023, the government introduced new
backed militia and “volunteer” forces may be boosting
taxes, including levies on phone services, citing the rising
insurgent recruitment, however. As in some neighboring
costs of counterinsurgency efforts.
countries, abuses during counterterrorism operations have
U.S. Policy and Aid
reportedly disproportionately targeted members of the
U.S. engagement has generally focused on regional
minority ethnic Fulani community, who are generally
security, development, and humanitarian relief efforts—
Muslim and often livestock herders, prompting some to turn
although developments in the Sahel have disrupted and
to armed groups for protection or revenge.
challenged longstanding U.S. regional counterterrorism and
Shifting International Alliances
development initiatives. Efforts to counter Russia’s Wagner
Under Capt. Traoré, Burkina Faso has expelled France’s
Group have also taken on greater salience. Under Secretary
ambassador, terminated a bilateral defense agreement, and
of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland traveled to
expelled several hundred French troops that had supported
Burkina Faso in late 2022, and stated that Capt. Traoré
regional hostage-rescue missions, counterterrorism
assured her that he had “no intention of inviting Wagner.”
operations (conducted with U.S. logistical and intelligence
The United States allocated $72 million in bilateral aid in
support), and security cooperation. At its peak, France’s
FY2022 (latest public data), of which $63 million was for
“Barkhane” counterterrorism operation in the Sahel
health programs. Additional funds have been allocated via
involved over 5,000 French troops, most based in Mali and
regional and global programs. After the January 2022 coup,
Chad. In 2022, France ended Barkhane and withdrew its
the Biden Administration applied coup-related restrictions
over 2,000 troops from Mali, amid worsening tensions with
on certain aid to the government under Section 7008 of
the Malian junta and the latter’s decision to contract with
annual aid appropriations measures. This primarily affects
the Wagner Group. In September 2023, France announced
military aid, along with some economic aid in which the
it would also withdraw some 1,500 troops from Niger.
government plays an important role. Some security
Capt. Traoré’s rejection of French military cooperation has
assistance and military cooperation has continued, either
garnered domestic support amid a wave of anti-French
because it is not bound by Section 7008, or because it is
sentiment in the Sahel. Increased engagement with Russia
authorized or appropriated “notwithstanding” other
has accompanied the shift, with Mali’s junta reportedly
provisions of law. The Millennium Challenge Corporation
facilitating Russian outreach. After referring to Russia as a
(MCC) also terminated a planned $450 million
“strategic ally” in May 2023, Traoré played a prominent
development aid compact, citing statutory eligibility
role in the July 2023 Russia-Africa Summit in St.
criteria. The Administration ended Burkina Faso’s
Petersburg, where he held talks with Russian President
eligibility for trade preferences under the African Growth
Vladimir Putin and voiced support for Russia’s “special
and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 106-200, as amended) in
military operation” in Ukraine. Putin, for his part, pledged
2023, again citing statutory requirements.
to ship free grain to Burkina Faso. Traoré has publicly
solicited increased military cooperation with Russia (and
In August 2023, the Washington Post reported that U.S.
with China), including arms transfers. While Traoré’s stated
officials were considering invoking a new waiver authority
emphasis on autonomy and indigenous solutions may limit
under Section 7008—enacted for the first time in
his willingness to engage openly with Russian military
FY2023—to provide nonlethal military aid in an effort to
contractors, official state-to-state ties may be less sensitive.
deter Burkina Faso from working with the Wagner Group.
Funds would be subject to congressional notification
Humanitarian Emergency and the Economy
requirements. Prior to 2022, U.S. officials had threatened to
Over 2 million Burkinabè were internally displaced as of
suspend security assistance due to human rights concerns.
mid-2023 (some 10% of the population)—one of the worst
and fastest-growing internal displacement crises in Africa—
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
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Burkina Faso: Conflict and Military Rule

IF10434

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