Burma’s Peace Process: Challenges Ahead in 2017

Burma’s Peace Process: Challenges Ahead in 2017

Updated October 10, 2017
Burma’s Peace Process: Challenges Ahead in 2017
Burma (Myanmar) has been riven by a low-grade civil war
In the view of most of the EAOs, Burma’s central
between government forces and ethnic armed organizations
government and the Tatmadaw have never lived up to the
(EAOs) since it became an independent sovereign state on
promises of the Panglong Agreement. Instead, these EAOs
January 4, 1948. The Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, used
contend, the Bamar majority has used the central
the ongoing conflict—and the perceived risk that some
government and the Tatmadaw to dominate and oppress
states could secede from the federated government—to
Burma’s ethnic minorities. To the Tatmadaw and Burma’s
justify seizing power from a democratically elected civilian
past military juntas, the EAOs are insurgents threatening
government on March 2, 1962. Over the next 50 years, the
the nation’s territorial integrity. Before it will agree to a
Tatmadaw was unable either to negotiate an end to the civil
ceasefire, the Tatmadaw insists that the EAOs agree to the
war, or to win victory on the battlefield.
“Three Main National Causes”—“non-disintegration of the
Union,” “non-disintegration of national solidarity,” and “the
In 2011, Burma’s military junta, the State Peace and
perpetuation of sovereignty” of the existing government. In
Development Council (SPDC), transferred power to a
September 2015, the Tamadaw set out its “six principles for
mixed civilian/military government headed by President
peace,” which require the EAOs agree to remain part of
Thein Sein, a retired general and ex-SPDC prime minister.
Burma, accept the 2008 constitution, submit to “national
President Thein Sein made negotiating a nationwide
sovereignty” (the legitimacy of the current central
ceasefire a priority, but his efforts were only partially
government), and abide by the laws of the central
successful. While 8 of the more than 20 EAOs signed a
government.
ceasefire agreement on October 15, 2015, most of the larger
EAOs did not sign because of the exclusion of some of the
Key Issues for Peace Process
smaller EAOs from the ceasefire agreement. Since then,
Burma’s peace process involves a complex interplay of
fighting between the Tatmadaw and several of the non-
several issues, including the amount of autonomy that states
signatory EAOs has continued in the states of Kachin,
would retain within the federated nation; the status of the
Karen, Rakhine, and Shan, resulting in both civilian and
2008 constitution; control over natural resources; the future
military casualties.
status of the ethnic militias; the selection of participants in
peace negotiations; and the sequencing of steps to peace.
Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy
Most of the differences are between the Tatmadaw and the
(NLD) took control of Burma’s Union Parliament in
EAOs. However, the EAOs are a diverse group, and often
January 2016 and the nation’s executive branch in April
disagree among themselves on the best approach to
2016, after winning a landslide victory in parliamentary
relations with the Tatmadaw and the NLD-led government.
elections held in November 2015. Aung San Suu Kyi and
Like the previous Thein Sein government, the current NLD-
the NLD have announced that ending Burma’s low-grade
led government frequently finds itself positioned as
civil war is one of the highest priorities for the new
mediators between the Tatmadaw and the EAOs.
government.
Nature of the Federated Union
Causes of the Ongoing Conflict
Most of the EAOs and the UNFC seek a more decentralized
Burma is an ethnically diverse nation, in which the ethnic
federated union in which the ethnic states have a high
Bamar are a majority of the nation’s population, but several
degree of autonomy, which they contend is consistent with
other ethnic minorities—such as the Chin, Kachin, Karen,
the Panglong Agreement. The Tatmadaw prefers a stronger
Karenni, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan—are the majority of the
central government with less state autonomy, as is reflected
population in some regions. Burma’s 1948 constitution
in the 2008 constitution.
established the Union of Burma as a federated nation, in
which the separate states retained a fair amount of
Status of the 2008 Constitution
autonomy and the right to secede from the Union after 10
The Tatmadaw insists that the 2008 constitution be
years.
maintained, but may be willing to accept some
amendments. Some of the EAOs, however, have called for
The 1948 constitution was based in part on the provisions
drafting a new constitution more consistent with the
of the 1947 Panglong Agreement, negotiated between
Panglong Agreement. Other EAOs appear willing to accept
General Aung San (Aung San Suu Kyi’s father) and leaders
the 2008 constitution, provided that it is amended to
of the Chin, Kachin, and Shan ethnic minority
provide the ethnic states with sufficient autonomy.
communities. The Panglong Agreement accepted in
principle the “full autonomy in internal administration for
Control over Natural Resources
the Frontier Areas,” in exchange for the ethnic minority
Burma is a nation rich in natural resources, including some
communities joining the Bamar majority, who generally
of the world’s finest ruby and jade mines located in several
live in central Burma, to form a federated nation.
of the ethnic states. Most of Burma’s natural resources are
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Burma’s Peace Process: Challenges Ahead in 2017
owned and/or controlled by the Tatmadaw and entities
The second Panglong Peace Conference was held on May
friendly to it, causing resentment among Burma’s ethnic
24-29, 2017, with mixed results. In part due to China’s
minorities. Control over natural resources and resulting
intervention, the AA, the Kachin Independence Army,
revenues is a central factor in Burma’s peace negotiations
MNDAA, TNLA, and the United Wa State Army met with
and in the terms underlying the federated union.
Aung San Suu Kyi during the conference. Other EAOs that
had attended the first conference, however, chose not to
Future Status of the Ethnic Militias
attend. In addition, the Tatmadaw insisted on a non-
The 2008 constitution stipulates that the Tatmadaw is the
secession provision in the peace agreement, to which
“sole patriotic defense force” in the nation, and grants the
several EAOs objected.
Tatmadaw direct control over all the country’s security
forces. The Tatmadaw insists that the EAOs disarm,
Escalating Fighting
demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR). Many of the EAOs
Fighting between the Tatmadaw and some of the EAOs
wish to maintain independent state security forces; others
increased following the SPDC’s transfer of power to the
are willing to discuss terms of demobilization only after the
Thein Sein government in 2011, escalated after the NLD
Tatmadaw agrees to security sector reform (SSR).
took power in 2016, and has further intensified since the 1st
Panglong Peace Conference. In response to a sustained
Participants in the Peace Talks
Tatmadaw offensive, a coalition of four EAOs (AA, KIA,
The EAOs generally agree that the peace talks should
MNDAA, and TNLA) launched a counteroffensive in
include all the EAOs. The Tatmadaw, however, have
November 2016 that has resulted in thousands of internally
refused to participate in negotiations involving several of
displaced persons (IDPs).
the EAOs with whom it is currently fighting, including the
Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic
Issues for U.S. Policy
Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta-ang National
Identifying a path to a peace, and what constructive role, if
Liberation Army (TNLA). Some of the EAOs refused to
any, the United States can play in helping to end Burma’s
sign the October 2015 ceasefire agreement because other
civil war, raises a number of policy options, including:
EAOs were excluded. Aung San Suu Kyi has stated that she
wants the future peace negotiations to be more inclusive
1. Providing assistance to the NRPC and/or the peace
than past talks, but has generally supported the Tatmadaw’s
negotiations. Determining how best to provide that
objection to the inclusion of the three EAOs.
assistance is likely to be complicated. Donors to the MPC,
which included the United States, found that such
Sequencing Steps to Peace
assistance was seen by some EAOs as support for President
Another issue in the past ceasefire talks has been agreeing
Thein Sein and the Tatmadaw, undermining the donors’
on the sequencing of the steps to peace. The Tatmadaw
desire to serve as a neutral party to the peace process.
would prefer to negotiate the terms of a nationwide
ceasefire agreement before opening up discussion on
2. Encouraging or otherwise applying pressure on the key
possible political reforms. The EAOs, in general, want to
groups in the peace process to negotiate in good faith and
establish the general terms of a future federated Union of
compromise. Certain forms of assistance or support for the
Burma before agreeing to a nationwide ceasefire agreement.
NLD-led government, the Tatmadaw, or the EAOs could be
Several of the EAOs have also called on the Tatmadaw to
made contingent on progress in the peace process.
stop its assaults on EAOs as a precondition to peace talks.
3. Selected forms of engagement or aid could be withheld
NLD’s Approach
from parties in Burma’s peace process who are viewed as
On April 27, 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi met with
uncooperative by the United States.
representatives of the Tatmadaw and the eight EAOs that
signed the October 2015 ceasefire agreement and
Whatever action the United States may or may not choose
announced her intention to hold a “21st Century Panglong
to take, Congress and the Administration also may wish to
Conference” within the next two months. Aung San Suu
consider the role of other interested nations—such as
Kyi also renamed the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC), as the
China, India, and Japan. China reportedly has close
National Reconciliation and Peace Center (NRPC) and
relations with some of the EAOs and seeks a stable and
transformed it into a government agency reporting to the
friendly neighbor on its western border. Prime Minister
State Counselor.
Narendra Modi has continued India’s “Look East” policy in
which Burma plays an important role as a potential
The first session of the 21st Century Panglong Conference
significant trading partner and gateway into Southeast Asia.
was held in Naypyitaw on August 31–September 3, 2016
Japan is a growing investor and major provider of
(see CRS Insight IN10566, Burma Holds Peace
development assistance to the country.
Conference). While Aung San Suu Kyi was able to secure
greater participation by the EAOs, progress appeared to be
Michael F. Martin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
hampered by the Tatmadaw’s objection to inviting the AA,
MNDAA, and TNLA. Statements presented by
IF10417
Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and
several EAOs revealed different visions of a democratic
federated state of Burma and the path to creating that state.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Burma’s Peace Process: Challenges Ahead in 2017

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10417 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED