Possible U.S. Policy Approaches After North Korea’s January 2016 Nuclear Test

Possible U.S. Policy Approaches After North Korea’s January 2016 Nuclear Test

January 7, 2016
Possible U.S. Policy Approaches After North Korea’s January
2016 Nuclear Test
On January 6, North Korea announced that it had
on North Korea to denuclearize. (See CRS Report R41259,
successfully tested a hydrogen bomb, its fourth nuclear
North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and
weapon test since 2006. Despite skepticism about
Internal Situation.)
Pyongyang’s claim regarding the nature of the device (see
CRS Insight IN10428, North Korea’s January 6, 2016,
Possible alternatives to this approach include increasing
Nuclear Test), governments around the world condemned
engagement, either by resuming the Six-Party Talks
the act as a flagrant violation of several United Nations
(among the United States, North Korea, China, Japan,
Security Council resolutions. The UNSC convened an
South Korea, and Russia) or using direct channels. The
emergency meeting and began work on a resolution that
Obama Administration bilaterally negotiated the “Leap Day
would impose additional sanctions and punitive measures
Agreement” with North Korea in February 2012, which
on North Korea, although it is doing so when most analysts
committed Pyongyang to a moratorium on nuclear tests,
agree that U.S. and multilateral sanctions have not
long-range missile launches, and uranium enrichment
prevented North Korea from advancing its fledgling nuclear
activities in exchange for humanitarian aid. North Korea
weapons capability.
scuttled the deal only two months later by launching a long-
range rocket, followed by a third nuclear test in February
Reactions from China and South Korea
2013. Pressing North Korea diplomatically could be paired
China’s swift criticism of the test seemed to confirm
with other options. Chief obstacles to negotiations are
Beijing’s strained relations with Pyongyang. Under North
North Korea’s refusal to honor prior non-proliferation
commitments and its insistence on being recognized as a
Korean leader Kim Jong-Un, now entering his fifth year in
power, China’s role as North Korea’s benefactor and
nuclear-weapon state.
protector appears to have diminished. China still provides
Many observers support the expansion of sanctions to
critical assistance and trade to the isolated nation and does
choke off the Kim regime’s sources of hard currency and to
not appear to have adjusted its fundamental strategic
weaken the North Korean economy. Although many
calculus that opposes a collapse of the regime, fearing a
sanctions are in place, more countries could follow Japan’s
flood of refugees and instability on its border. However,
China’s frustration with North Korea’s provocations could
approach that bans virtually all trade; current U.N.
sanctions restrict trade in only luxury items and military
convince Beijing to enforce international sanctions more
goods. Bills circulating through Congress could expand
consistently or otherwise scale back the economic lifeline it
U.S. sanctions. Congress could seek to go even further, for
provides to Pyongyang.
instance by targeting foreign countries and entities that deal
As China’s ties with North Korea have chilled, Seoul an
with North Korea. This tactic could affect firms and
d
international banks that have financial dealings with
Beijing have enhanced their strong trade and diplomatic
Pyongyang, including, for example, those in China. (See
relationship and South Korean President Park Geun-hye has
pursued more influence over China’s Korean peninsula
CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for
U.S. Economic Sanctions.)
policy. South Korea also recently signed an agreement with
Japan to ease tension over historical issues stemming from
Another measure that could increase pressure on North
the World War II era; the agreement could make it easier
Korea is for the United States to enhance military
for the United States, South Korea, and Japan to cooperate
trilaterally on North Korea’s threats. A day after the blast,
cooperation with allies. This could include an increase in
military exercises with South Korea, and potentially Japan,
Seoul announced that it had resumed anti-North Korea
that feature advanced weaponry, similar to the overflight of
propaganda broadcasts across the border, a practice that has
two B-2 stealth bombers over the Korean Peninsula
elicited strong complaints from Pyongyang in the past.
following the 2013 nuclear test. An overt improvement in
U.S. Policy Options
ballistic missile defense cooperation among Japan, South
Korea, and the United States would also send signals to the
The steady advance of North Korea’s nuclear weapon and
regime. In the past, indications of more integrated missile
missile programs has prompted some criticism of the
defense cooperation have spurred China to exert more
Obama Administration’s “strategic patience” policy. The
pressure on North Korea.
policy eschews negotiations with the North before the
regime takes steps to follow through on its earlier
Congress could consider several options. It could urge the
commitments to denuclearization. The policy also entails
Administration to reinstate North Korea to the State
expanding U.S. and multilateral sanctions in response to
Sponsors of Terrorism list (see CRS Report R43865,
Pyongyang's provocations, aligning approaches with South
North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism
Korea and Japan, and convincing China to increase pressure
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Possible U.S. Policy Approaches After North Korea’s January 2016 Nuclear Test
List?). Congress also has the ability to fund activities that
humanitarian crisis on the peninsula. There is a range of
attempt to choke North Korea of financial resources,
more offensive options shy of direct military intervention.
including Chinese, South Korean, and Russian investment
Some analysts note that a cyberattack could disrupt North
projects in North Korea. Congress could consider whether
Korean communications networks. Upgrading intelligence
additional U.S. funding to support interdictions of North
resources dedicated to North Korea could clarify the state’s
Korean shipments of arms or other illicit goods would
weaknesses and reveal internal power struggles. Congress
reduce sources of hard currency to the regime. Provision of
may also consider whether increasing the flow of anti-
resources and diplomatic energy by the United States to
regime information into the country through radio
upgrade arrangements like the Proliferation Security
broadcasts or other digital media could spread awareness
Initiative could increase such interdictions. Similarly,
among North Korean citizens of the regime’s abuses. Some
additional funding for law-enforcement measures that target
analysts have urged Congress to consider the use of other
North Korean counterfeiting, money laundering, or
approaches that would destabilize the regime.
narcotics trafficking may put further pressure on
Pyongyang.
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
In the past, the United States has dismissed the option of
Ian E. Rinehart, Analyst in Asian Affairs
launching military strikes on North Korea due largely to the
threat of a potentially devastating counterattack on South
IF10345
Korea or Japan, and the possibility of creating a

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Possible U.S. Policy Approaches After North Korea’s January 2016 Nuclear Test

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