Sudan

Sudan

Updated August 21, 2019
Sudan
On April 11, 2019, Sudan’s military removed President
H.Res. 432, as well as in statements and correspondence,
Omar al Bashir from office after three decades in power.
may review options for U.S. support to the transition.
Four months of near-daily protests across the country had
shaken the government, and in early April, huge crowds
Figure 1. Sudan Key Facts
gathered in front of the military’s headquarters in Khartoum
to demand regime change. The protests, triggered by
austerity measures amid an economic crisis, were fueled by
a range of grievances against the ruling National Congress
Party (NCP) and Bashir, who took power in a 1989 coup.
The demonstrations did not end with Bashir’s ouster. When
the Transitional Military Council (TMC) that seized power
from Bashir defied calls for a swift transfer to civilian rule,
protesters staged a sit-in. It lasted for almost two months
before security forces violently dispersed it on June 3. Over
100 people were killed in the attack, reportedly led by the
paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF, which

Sources: CIA World Factbook and IMF data, 2019.
has roots in the Janjaweed militia and is linked to serious
abuses, has been heavily deployed in Khartoum since April.
Background
An internet shutdown that began on June 3 lasted over a
Sudan, when unified (1956-2011), was Africa’s largest
month, restricting both dissent and business activity.
country. In 2011, after decades of fighting often broadly
Sudan’s military has a long history of intervention in
described as a conflict between the predominately Muslim
politics (Bashir’s 1989 coup was the country’s fourth).
“Arab” north and non-Muslim “African” south, Sudan split
Military leaders played prominent roles in Bashir’s regime,
in two. The split did not resolve Sudan’s other conflicts;
and the extent to which the TMC represents a break from
overlapping struggles between security forces and rebels,
the NCP is debated. The African Union (AU) declared
nomadic and farming communities, and among ethnic
Bashir’s overthrow to be another coup d’état and, after the
groups have caused extensive displacement and suffering.
June 3 violence, suspended Sudan from the organization.
Northern regimes espousing Islamist ideals have dominated
government for much of Sudan’s post-independence
AU and Ethiopian mediators revived negotiations between
history, despite its diversity, pressing distant provinces to
the TMC and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) a
conform to the riverine heartland, rather than
coalition of opposition, civil society, and professional
accommodating local customs and institutions. Instead of
groups. On July 4, after another mass protest, the two sides
forging a national identity, these policies exacerbated the
agreed to a three-year power-sharing arrangement, charting
country’s racial, cultural, and religious differences.
a path toward civilian rule and elections in late 2022. They
Attempts to Arabize and Islamize the south sparked
signed a constitutional charter a month later, and on August
insurgencies. Groups in other regions also rose up
21, the TMC was dissolved and replaced by a joint military-
periodically, citing local grievances. Some in the states of
civilian Sovereign Council. A prime minister nominated by
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile joined the southern
the FFC, Abdalla Hamdok, will lead a civilian cabinet; a
rebels, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
transitional legislative council is to be formed by
November. Major challenges lie ahead. For more detail, see
The north-south wars took a heavy toll. In 2005, the
CRS Report R45794, Sudan’s Uncertain Transition.
government and the SPLM signed the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA), which enshrined the south’s right
With rampant inflation, a foreign currency shortage, and a
to self-determination after a six-year “interim period.”
heavy debt burden, stabilizing the economy is a critical
Southern Sudanese voted overwhelmingly in January 2011
priority for the new government. Arrears of $1.3 billion to
to secede and achieved independence in July of that year.
the International Monetary Fund restrict Sudan’s access to
South Sudan’s secession was a major financial blow to
international financing, as does its designation as a State
Sponsor of Terrorism by the United States. Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, which lost 75% of its oil production, two-thirds of
the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, which supported the
export earnings, and over half its fiscal revenues. A bloated
TMC, are influential with Sudan’s military leaders. The
security sector budget, mismanagement, and corruption
have all compounded Sudan’s economic troubles. The
UAE and Saudi Arabia offered $3 billion in aid during the
TMC’s tenure. As civilian authorities take office, Western
International Monetary Fund assesses that U.S. sanctions
donors are now considering how to engage. Congress,
also undermined economic growth. Major U.S. enforcement
which pressed for a civilian-led transition in S.Res. 188,
actions for sanctions violations in 2014-2015 significantly
reduced Sudan’s access to U.S. dollars and further impeded
its access to international financial markets and institutions.
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Sudan
While disputes remain, relations between Sudan and South
Ethiopia host over 300,000 refugees from those areas. Over
Sudan have improved in recent years. Sudan surprised
30,000 people are displaced in Abyei. Sudan hosts over
many when it mediated a new peace deal between South
900,000 refugees, most from South Sudan.
Sudan’s warring parties in 2018. The deal, if it holds, would
Sudan’s Foreign Relations
allow oil production in fields shut by South Sudan’s civil
war to resume, generating needed revenue for both
Strategically positioned on the Red Sea, Sudan’s political
countries. Rebel activity along the countries’ shared border
trajectory is of interest to an array of foreign actors. Egypt’s
complicates the border’s demilitarization, as does the
engagement is driven by domestic political considerations
unresolved status of contested areas, notably Abyei, which
and its concerns about the flow of the Nile. Sudan’s former
was granted special semi-autonomous status in the CPA.
ties with Iran and links to the Muslim Brotherhood under
An official referendum for Abyei residents on whether to
Bashir strained its relations with key Arab Gulf countries,
retain their special status in Sudan or join South Sudan was
which are important sources of investment. In 2014,
slated for 2011 but has been delayed indefinitely. The
struggling with the loss of oil revenue and under mounting
deployment of the U.N. Interim Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
pressure from Saudi Arabia, Sudan severed relations with
defused a violent standoff in 2011, but local tensions still
Tehran. It joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen in 2015,
have the potential to spur a larger conflict.
reportedly deploying as many as 14,000 troops, some
Conflicts
underage, in return for Gulf aid. Bashir’s refusal to cut ties
with Qatar was a source of tension with the Saudis and
The CPA did not resolve long-standing center-periphery
Emiratis. Sudanese officials worked to repair relations with
tensions in Sudan. Successive governments have responded
the United States, but Bashir also engaged Russia, already a
to the political demands of restive regions more often with
top weapons source, seeking to expand cooperation and
force than reform and have financed local militias to help
offering to host Russian naval facilities. Russian security
counter insurgencies. Those militias have been linked to
contractors have been increasingly active in the country.
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians.
U.S. Policy and Foreign Assistance
U.N. experts continue to document violations of an arms
embargo and ban on offensive military overflights
U.S. relations with Sudan have been turbulent for three
established in Security Council resolution 1591 (2005).
decades. The United States restricted aid after the 1989
coup, and in subsequent years imposed a range of sanctions
Darfur. Violence continues to plague the Darfur region of
through Executive Orders and congressional measures.
western Sudan, where peace remains elusive. Government
Restrictions on U.S. engagement are based on Sudan’s debt
forces launched a major offensive in early 2016 that led to
arrears, links to international terrorism, and pervasive
mass displacement. Fighting has diminished since Bashir
human rights violations. The State Department has
declared a ceasefire in mid-2016; some rebels withdrew to
repeatedly designated Sudan as a Country of Particular
Libya to regroup. U.N. monitors reported serious clashes
Concern under the International Religious Freedom Act.
between government forces and one rebel faction in 2018.
Sporadic skirmishes, intercommunal violence, and attacks
Sudan has long sought relief from U.S. sanctions. The
on peacekeepers, aid workers, and civilians persist. The
Obama Administration moved to ease them in January 2017
political uncertainty after Bashir’s ouster led the Security
as part of a bilateral reengagement effort, after determining
Council to pause the drawdown of the African Union-U.N.
Sudan had taken positive steps on five “tracks”: enhancing
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID); it is unclear
counterterrorism cooperation; ceasing hostilities in conflict
whether UNAMID’s planned 2020 exit will be affected.
zones; improving humanitarian access; ending negative
interference in South Sudan; and addressing the threat of a
In 2005, the U.N. Security Council granted the International
regional armed group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).
Criminal Court jurisdiction over serious crimes committed
in Darfur. The TMC rejected calls to extradite Bashir to the
In October 2017, the Trump Administration reported that
Hague, where he is wanted on Darfur-related charges of
Sudan had sustained positive actions on the five tracks and
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
permanently revoked certain sanctions. Others remain in
Instead, he now faces charges at home related to corruption
place, and in November 2018, despite reports of backsliding
and the deaths of protesters. His trial began in mid-August.
in some areas, the Administration announced “Phase II” of
the bilateral engagement framework. Under Phase II, the
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The conflict in these
states, often referred to as “the Two Areas,” is driven by
Administration stated that it would consider lifting Sudan’s
1993 State Sponsor of Terrorism designation if the country
unresolved grievances that date back to the north-south war,
met statutory criteria and made further progress on the five
when some local groups joined the SPLM rebellion. The
tracks and other areas of long-standing U.S. concern,
CPA set out a process by which the two states might
including human rights, religious freedom, outstanding
achieve greater autonomy within Sudan, but it stalled and
terrorism-related claims, and relations with North Korea.
the conflict reignited in 2011. The Sudanese government
has restricted aid agencies’ access to rebel
The United States suspended Phase II discussions after
-held areas.
Bashir’s ouster and is weighing conditions for delisting.
Humanitarian Situation
Development aid for Sudan is extremely limited, and debt
The number of Sudanese in need of aid rose from roughly
relief is restricted by Congress in annual appropriations.
5.7 million in early 2019 to 8.5 million mid-year. Roughly
The State Department requested $1.5 million in
1.8 million Darfuris are displaced internally, and Chad
nonemergency aid for FY2020, to support civil society and
hosts over 338,000 Darfuri refugees. IDP estimates for
consensus-building. The United States has provided over
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile vary; South Sudan and
$344 million in humanitarian aid to Sudan in FY2019.
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Sudan

IF10182
Lauren Ploch Blanchard,

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