Al Shabaab

Al Shabaab

Updated February 14, 2023
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab (Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidin, Mujahidin
While the group has focused primarily on Somalia, it also
Youth Movement) is a Somalia-based insurgent and
threatens the countries participating in the African
terrorist group that U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in
Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, previously known
2022 labeled “the largest, wealthiest, and most lethal Al
as AMISOM) and has conducted attacks in neighboring
Qaeda affiliate in the world today.” AFRICOM reports that
countries and Uganda. Al Shabaab has been most active in
the group poses the greatest danger to U.S. citizens and
Kenya, which launched a military operation in Somalia
interests in East Africa, and is a threat to the United States.
against the group in 2011 (Kenya joined AMISOM in
Background
2012). The group has killed hundreds of Kenyans, many
through hit-and-run attacks near the Somali border. Its 2015
Al Shabaab emerged in the mid-2000s amidst a vacuum of
assault on a university in northeast Kenya, which killed at
state authority in Somalia. It evolved out of a militant wing
least 147 people, was the deadliest terrorist attack in Kenya
of the federation of Islamic Courts that took control of
since Al Qaeda’s 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy.
Mogadishu and much of southern Somalia in 2006. When
Ethiopia, which backed Somalia’s nascent transitional
Al Shabaab’s July 2022 incursion into Ethiopia is its largest
government, intervened militarily—with U.S. support—to
operation outside Somalia to date, reportedly involving
oust the Courts, Al Shabaab used historical anti-Ethiopian
some 2,000 Al Shabaab fighters. UN experts estimate that
sentiment among Somalis to draw recruits and support,
as many as 1,000 fighters remain in Ethiopia, giving it a
including among the diaspora in the United States.
foothold, despite Ethiopian claims of routing the group.
Al Shabaab held much of south-central Somalia, including
Al Shabaab has threatened U.S. and Western targets in the
the capital, from the late 2000s until African Union (AU)
region and called for attacks against the United States.
Attacks on international targets in Kenya’s capital—
forces gained momentum against the insurgency in 2011-
the
2012 and reclaimed some territory from the group. Shabaab
2013 Westgate Mall siege and the 2019 DusitD2 hotel
has nevertheless retained control over parts of the country,
assault—raised the group’s international profile. Over 50
despite international recognition of Somalia’s federal
U.S. citizens were reportedly in the Westgate mall when the
government in 2012 and a range of multilateral efforts to
attack started—all escaped but six were injured. In 2020, Al
degrade its capacity. The group also maintains influence
Shabaab killed a U.S. soldier and two U.S. contractors
and the ability to conduct attacks in government-held areas.
during a raid on Manda Bay Airfield, a Kenyan military
facility used by the U.S. military near the Somali border.
Relationship with Al Qaeda
The group has not claimed any attacks in the United States.
Some of Al Shabaab’s founding members trained with Al
It has, however, encouraged lone-wolf attacks in its
Qaeda (AQ) in Afghanistan, and senior AQ operatives in
propaganda, and in 2015, it produced a video identifying
East Africa, including Fazul Mohammed—the late
shopping malls in Europe and the United States as potential
mastermind of the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and
targets. In 2019, a Kenyan national was arrested in the
Tanzania—have been associated with the group. After
Philippines and later extradited to the United States on
expressions of allegiance to Al Qaeda in Al Shabaab’s early
charges of conspiring to hijack an aircraft on behalf of Al
years, the groups announced a formal affiliation in 2012.
Shabaab to conduct a 9/11-style attack in the United States.
While Al Shabaab’s leaders appear to broadly share Al
Objectives
Qaeda’s transnational agenda, the group operates
independently. Among other AQ affiliates, the group
Al Shabaab rejects democracy, broadly ascribing to a vision
maintains ties with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
of uniting ethnic Somali-inhabited areas of Djibouti, Kenya,
(AQAP), with which it runs a smuggling network.
Ethiopia, and Somalia in an Islamic state under its version
of Sharia law. It characterizes the Somali government as an
In 2015, some Al Shabaab members pressed for a shift in
illegitimate apostate authority that is beholden to foreign
allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Al Shabaab leadership
powers. Al Shabaab leaders have repeatedly expressed their
rejected the proposal and launched a deadly crackdown
commitment to global jihad. They justify attacks outside
against IS supporters. A small IS faction in northern
Somalia as retaliation against countries conducting military
Somalia survived the purge. Al Shabaab remains the
operations in Somalia and as retribution for alleged abuses
dominant group and appears to view the IS cell as a rival.
against Muslims. Al Shabaab described the Manda Bay and
The Threat
DusitD2 attacks in Kenya as consistent with Al Qaeda
directives to target U.S. and Israeli interests, and referred to
Al Shabaab has waged an asymmetric campaign against the
the airfield as one of the “launch pads for the American
Somali government, AU forces, and foreign targets in
crusade against Islam in the region.” Al Shabaab activities
Somalia. Per UN data, 2022 was its deadliest year since
in Kenya more broadly appear focused on sowing internal
2017, when a truck bomb in Mogadishu killed over 500
dissent and fomenting an insurgency. Its fighters have
people (Al Shabaab’s deadliest single attack to date).
specifically targeted non-Muslims in some attacks there.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Al Shabaab
Leadership
U.S. Responses
Ahmed Diriye (aka Abu Ubaidah), a Somali national, has
The United States named Al Shabaab a Foreign Terrorist
led Al Shabaab since 2014. He succeeded Ahmed Abdi
Organization (FTO) in 2008 and has designated over two
Godane, who was killed in a U.S. airstrike that the Obama
dozen related persons for sanctions, either under Executive
Administration described as responding to an “imminent
Order (E.O.) 13536 (on Somalia) or as under E.O. 13224
threat,” citing Godane’s oversight of “plots targeting
(on terrorism). Among those designated are several Kenyan
Westerners, including U.S. persons in East Africa.”
clerics implicated in fundraising and recruiting for the
Godane’s predecessor was killed in a U.S. strike in 2008.
group and members of its smuggling and weapons
trafficking network in Yemen. The United States has
Al Shabaab faced infighting under Godane, who
prosecuted several U.S. citizens for fundraising on Al
consolidated power by assassinating rivals, reportedly
Shabaab’s behalf.
including American jihadist Omar Hammami in 2013.
Some prominent commanders left the group or surrendered
The United States provides security assistance to AU and
to Somali authorities in exchange for amnesty during that
Somali forces, and has supported counter-radicalization
time. Former deputy leader Mukhtar Robow defected, and
programs in the region. In addition to airstrikes, U.S. forces
later ran for state office, drawing on support from his clan.
have engaged in “advise, assist, and accompany” missions
He was detained during his 2018 campaign and held
with Somali and AU forces since 2016.
without charge until 2022. He was released by Somalia’s
In late 2016, the Obama Administration publicly named Al
new president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and appointed
Shabaab an “associated force” of Al Qaeda in the context of
Minister of Religious Affairs. In his new role, Robow is
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF,
tasked with countering Al Shabaab’s extremist ideology.
P.L. 107-40). U.S. airstrikes in Somalia were limited until
Area of Operations and Capabilities
2015, when President Obama broadened the justification for
U.S. military action in the country—previously “to counter
AMISOM and neighboring militaries pushed Al Shabaab
Al Qaeda and associated elements of Al Shabaab”—to
from Mogadishu and other urban centers and ports between
cover support for AU, Somali, and U.S. forces operating
2011 and 2014. Al Shabaab’s control of large areas of south
there. The tempo of airstrikes rose. President Trump
and central Somalia, however, remained largely unchanged
changed the rules of engagement for U.S. operations in
from 2015, when AMISOM’s major offensive operations
Somalia in 2017, authorizing offensive airstrikes and
ceased, until 2022, when the Somali government launched a
designating parts of the country as an “area of active
new offensive in coordination with local militias and a
hostilities.” Airstrikes have continued, after a brief pause,
grassroots uprising. Al Shabaab has since lost significant
under President Biden: AFRICOM conducted over a dozen
territory in central Somalia, but it continues to conduct
airstrikes in Somalia in 2022, citing most as “collective
reprisal attacks there.
self-defense,” in support of the Somali army.
While Al Shabaab’s loss of Mogadishu and other port cities
In late 2019, three months before the Manda Bay attack, Al
initially restricted its revenue, the group has developed an
Shabaab launched an unsuccessful assault on an airfield
extensive taxation system covering all aspects of the Somali
used by the U.S. military in central Somalia—it was the
economy, per UN and other reporting. Al Shabaab extorts
largest attack on U.S. forces in the country in nearly thirty
businesses even in government areas. It generates between
years. No U.S. or Somali forces were killed. Trump ordered
$50 and $100 million annually, according to UN monitors,
the withdrawal of U.S. forces—then estimated at 700—
and uses at least 25% on military purchases; Al Shabaab
from Somalia at the end of his term; Biden authorized the
also supports Al Qaeda directly with its tax proceeds.
redeployment of U.S. troops to Somalia in May 2022.
Outlook
UN monitors report that Al Shabaab is estimated to have
After over 15 years of counterinsurgency operations against
7,000-12,000 fighters. The group capitalizes on grievances
it, Al Shabaab still poses a serious threat in Somalia and
and distrust of the government in parts of Somalia and fills
East Africa, despite the ongoing deployment of 18,000 AU
local governance roles, providing basic services and
troops. Airstrikes have eliminated some “high-value”
resolving disputes. It also forcibly recruits fighters,
targets and supported partner operations, but Al Shabaab
including children. Al Shabaab uses various propaganda
maintains the capacity to conduct complex, asymmetric
tools to spread its message in multiple languages. In Kenya,
attacks in Somalia and assaults in neighboring countries.
reportedly its largest source of foreign fighters, Al Shabaab
Over the past decade, political infighting and corruption
plays on narratives of collective punishment by the Kenyan
have hampered the Somali government’s ability to extend
government against Muslims, among other themes. Kenyan
state authority. Donor fatigue and frustration has reduced
nationals of non-Somali descent led the DusitD2 attack.
support for the AU mission, which is due to withdraw by
Despite territorial losses, Al Shabaab maintains the ability
the end of 2024. The “total war” Somalia’s new
to conduct frequent attacks in Mogadishu and other areas
government launched against Al Shabaab in 2022 could be
beyond its control, including through complex vehicle-
a turning point, but Somalia has struggled to “clear and
borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). In 2016, an
hold” when AU forces have managed to gain ground in the
Al Shabaab suicide bomber on a Somali airliner detonated a
past. For more, see CRS In Focus IF10155, Somalia.
bomb concealed in a laptop computer. (It did not destroy
the plane.) Advances in Al Shabaab’s explosives-making
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs
capacity led the UN Security Council to ban the transfer of
explosive precursors to Somalia in 2019.
IF10170
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Al Shabaab

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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10170 · VERSION 9 · UPDATED