China Primer: U.S.-China Relations

China Primer: U.S.-China Relations

Updated October 24, 2023
China Primer: U.S.-China Relations
Introduction
U.S.-PRC engagement at the leader level re-started in
Congressional oversight and legislative activities related to
November 2022, when President Biden and PRC leader Xi
the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) have
met on the sidelines of a gathering of the G-20 nations in
expanded as Members’ concerns about PRC policies,
Bali, Indonesia. Biden said at the time that he felt a
actions, and intentions have intensified. Members of the
responsibility “to show that China and the United States can
118th Congress have so far introduced more than 400 bills
manage our differences, prevent competition from
and 70 resolutions with provisions related to China.
becoming anything ever near conflict, and to find ways to
Enacted laws include S. 619 (P.L. 118-2), the COVID
work together on urgent global issues.” The U.S. and PRC
Origin Act of 2023, requiring the declassification of all
governments are preparing for a potential second in-person
information related to potential links between the PRC’s
meeting between the two leaders on the sidelines of the
Wuhan Institute of Virology and the COVID-19 pandemic.
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping’s
Other adopted measures include H.Res. 11, establishing a
leaders’ summit in San Francisco in mid-November 2023,
Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the
although Xi has yet to confirm his attendance.
United States and the Chinese Communist Party.
Senior PRC Personnel Issues
Strategic Competition
A challenge for high-level U.S.-China diplomacy is the currently
The Joseph R. Biden Jr. Administration describes the
depleted ranks of PRC government interlocutors.
United States as engaged in competition with China over
•
the shape of the future global order, part of a broader

In July 2023, PRC President Xi signed an order removing
contest between democracies and autocracies. The
China’s then-Foreign Minister, Qin Gang, from his post. In
Administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy
October 2023, Xi signed another order removing Qin
describes China as “America’s most consequential
from his post as State Councilor for foreign affairs. Each
geopolitical challenge,” and calls for the United States to
time, the PRC offered no explanation. Qin had been
“out-compete” China by (1) investing in competitiveness,
China’s second-most-senior diplomat. Top diplomat Wang
innovation, resilience, and democracy at home; (2) aligning
Yi, a Politburo member who heads the office of the CPC’s
U.S. efforts with those of allies and partners; and (3)
Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, is now also
“compet[ing] responsibly with the PRC to defend our
serving as Foreign Minister.
interests and build our vision for the future.” The document
•
Xi’s October 2023 order also removed Li Shangfu from his
states that the Administration also seeks to “engage
posts as Minister of Defense and State Councilor for
constructively with the PRC wherever we can.”
defense affairs, without explanation. The defense minister
post is currently vacant.
Senior PRC officials have publicly objected to the U.S.
See CRS In Focus IF12505, China Primer: China’s Political System.
framing of relations as driven by geopolitical competition.
Meeting in October 2023 with a bipartisan Senate
delegation—the first congressional delegation to visit the
Public reports of a PRC surveillance balloon flying over the
PRC in over four years—the PRC’s top leader, Communist
continental United States led Secretary of State Antony J.
Party of China (CPC) General Secretary and PRC President
Blinken to call off a planned February 2023 trip to China.
Xi Jinping, called for the United States and China to
He ultimately made his first visit to the PRC in his current
“properly handle their relations, respect each other, coexist
position in June 2023. Two other cabinet members followed
in peace and pursue win-win cooperation.” In downplaying
him: Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen (July 2023) and
competitive dynamics in the relationship, the PRC may
Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo (August 2023).
seek to sustain access to the U.S. market and to complicate
Other senior Administration visitors to the PRC have
U.S. efforts to build international coalitions to address
included Central Intelligence Agency Director William
perceived challenges from the PRC. When PRC leaders
Burns and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John
acknowledge frayed relations with other countries, they
Kerry. Outcomes from 2023’s U.S. high-level visits include
often portray China as a victim. In March 2023, Xi alleged
new working groups and other dialogue mechanisms under
that since 2017, “Western countries led by the United States
the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and the Treasury, and
have implemented all-around containment, encirclement
climate envoy Kerry.
and suppression of China, which has brought unprecedented
severe challenges to our country’s development.”
Critics, including some Members of Congress, have
questioned the Biden Administration’s focus on re-starting
Bilateral Engagement
high-level dialogue. Some have suggested that the effort
The PRC government kept China’s borders mostly closed
may constrain the Administration from addressing U.S.
from March 2020 to January 2023 to enforce a “zero-
concerns about such matters as PRC surveillance operations
COVID” response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In-person
directed at the United States and cyber hacking of U.S.
agency networks. Other Members have expressed support
https://crsreports.congress.gov

China Primer: U.S.-China Relations
for dialogue. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, who
capabilities. See CRS In Focus IF11284, U.S.-China Trade
led the bipartisan Senate delegation to China in October
Relations, and CRS In Focus IF10964, “Made in China
2023, stated in Beijing that the delegation and its PRC
2025” Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress.
interlocutors were in agreement that “unless we have
sincere conversations about our differences, and not pull
Taiwan
any punches, that we would never solve these problems” in
The PRC leader Xi states that the PRC seeks to unify with
the bilateral relationship.
Taiwan peacefully, but “will never promise to renounce the
use of force” to compel Taiwan to accept absorption into
Select Issues in U.S.-China Relations
the PRC. The U.S. government maintains unofficial
relations with Taiwan and supports Taiwan’s self-defense
Trade, Investment, and Technology
pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8). See CRS
China is a large market for some U.S. firms but is
In Focus IF12481, Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues.
characterized by significant trade barriers, unfair trade
practices, and a lack of reciprocity, particularly in sectors in
Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids
which PRC firms are expanding overseas. Some Members
Direct flows of illicit fentanyl from the PRC to the United
of Congress have expressed concern about China’s state-
States reportedly ceased after the PRC imposed class-wide
driven economic, investment, trade, and technology
controls over all fentanyl-related substances in 2019. The
practices and the challenges they pose to U.S. economic
U.S. government is now focused on addressing flows of
and technology leadership. Beijing still requires technology
uncontrolled PRC-produced precursor chemicals used to
transfer as a condition to operate in strategic sectors in
make fentanyl in third countries, primarily Mexico, and
China. Experts assess China to be distorting the traditional
stemming illicit fentanyl-related financial flows linked to
use of certain economic tools and using economic coercion
the PRC. See CRS In Focus IF10890, China Primer: Illicit
and intellectual property theft to advance industrial policies.
Fentanyl and China’s Role.
In addressing PRC economic practices of concern, the 118th
Human Rights
Congress has focused on risks associated with PRC digital
The Biden Administration and many Members have
platforms, such as TikTok, and on oversight of executive
criticized the PRC’s human rights record, particularly its
branch decisions on foreign investment reviews and export
treatment of ethnic and religious minorities in the western
control licensing. Congress has promoted investment in
regions of Xinjiang and Tibet. The State Department
U.S. strategic technologies, such as semiconductors, and in
assesses PRC actions in Xinjiang constitute genocide and
emerging sectors, such as electric vehicles, to counter PRC
crimes against humanity. Secretary Blinken has also
industrial policies. Congress has also considered restrictions
accused the PRC of a “crackdown on basic rights” in the
on China’s ability to buy U.S. farmland and guardrails on
PRC’s Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. See
some U.S. commercial and research ties with China.
CRS In Focus IF12265, China Primer: Human Rights.
In October 2022, the Commerce Department issued China-
Relations with Russia
specific controls on design software for advanced logic
PRC leader Xi has expressed China’s opposition to the
chips and semiconductor equipment, and on services by
threatened or actual use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but
U.S. persons to produce advanced logic and memory chips.
has otherwise expressed solidarity with Russian President
The Department also restricted exports to China of some
Vladimir Putin as Russia’s war in Ukraine continues. In
chips with artificial intelligence (AI) and supercomputing
2022, China-Russia trade increased by 29% over 2021.
applications. In response, U.S. technology firms Nvidia,
China’s exports to Russia in the first 9 months of 2023 were
AMD, and Intel said they would make chips for China at a
up 57% over the same period in 2022. Xi welcomed Putin
level just below the threshold for controls. In October 2023,
to Beijing in October 2023, and declared that “political
the Commerce Department issued interim final rules that
mutual trust” between China and Russia is “continuously
expand controls for some chips that had fallen below the
deepening.” See CRS In Focus IF12100, China-Russia
2022 threshold for controls, subject additional equipment to
Relations and CRS In Focus IF12120, China’s Economic
controls, and expand licensing requirements to apply not
and Trade Ties with Russia.
only to the PRC, but also to 21 other countries subject to a
U.S. arms embargo. The rules create license exemptions for
Relations in the Middle East
“lower performance” and consumer chips, and require
After Gaza-based Palestinian militants launched attacks
export notification of (but do not restrict) some gaming
against Israel in October 2023, and Israel retaliated with air
chips and chips that fall just below the new threshold.
strikes against targets in Gaza, the PRC’s permanent
representative to the U.N. on October 24 called for a
In response to legislation that would review and restrict
comprehensive ceasefire and for the U.N. Security Council
some U.S. investment in China, in August 2023, the Biden
to demand that Israel “cease the collective punishment of
Administration issued an Executive Order (E.O.) to create a
the people in Gaza.” He also reiterated China’s support for
process to review U.S. investments in China in advanced
a two-state solution. See CRS In Focus IF12469, China and
chips, AI, and quantum technologies. The Department of
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
the Treasury’s proposed notice on rulemaking indicates it
may not restrict financial flows, although the E.O. says that
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
venture capital and private equity investments can involve
Karen M. Sutter, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
the transfer of knowhow and fund the development of PRC
https://crsreports.congress.gov

China Primer: U.S.-China Relations

IF10119

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10119 · VERSION 120 · UPDATED