Nigeria in Political Transition

Nigeria in Political Transition

Order Code IB98046
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nigeria in Political Transition
Updated June 1, 2006
Ted Dagne
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical and Political Background
Transition to Civilian Rule
Elections in 1998, 1999
The 2003 Elections
Current Economic and Social Conditions
Humanitarian and Human Rights Concerns
HIV/AIDS
Sharia
Human Rights
The United States and Nigeria
U.S.-Nigerian Relations: Background
LEGISLATION

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Nigeria in Political Transition
SUMMARY
On June 8, 1998, General Sani Abacha,
In May 2001, President Obasanjo met
the military leader who took power in Nigeria
with President Bush and other senior officials.
in 1993, died of a reported heart attack and
The two presidents discussed a wide range of
was replaced by General Abdulsalam
issues, including trade, peacekeeping, and the
Abubakar. On July 7, 1998, Moshood Abiola,
HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa. President Bush
the believed winner of the 1993 presidential
pledged $200 million into a new global fund
election, also died of a heart attack during a
for HIV/AIDS. In FY2002, Nigeria received
meeting with U.S. officials. General Abubakar
$66.5 million in economic and development
released political prisoners and initiated politi-
assistance. The Bush Administration provided
cal, economic, and social reforms. He also
$75 million in FY2003, $61 million in
established a new independent electoral com-
FY2004, and an estimated $64 million for
mission and outlined a schedule for elections
FY2005. In early November 2001, President
and transition to civilian rule, pledging to
Obasanjo visited Washington to express his
hand over power to an elected civilian govern-
government’s support for the U.S.-led anti-
ment by May 1999. In late February 1999,
terrorism campaign and returned to Washing-
former military leader General Olusegun
ton in June 2002. In July 2003, President Bush
Obasanjo was elected president and was
visited Nigeria while on a five-day, five-coun-
sworn in on May 29, 1999. Obasanjo won
try trip to Africa.
62.8% of the votes (18.7 million), while his
challenger, Chief Olu Falae, received 37.2%
Nigeria continues to make progress in
of the votes (11.1 million). In mid-April
strengthening its fragile democracy but faces
2003, President Obasanjo was re-elected, and
serious economic challenges. Nigeria’s popu-
the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) won a
lation, now 133 million, is projected to grow
majority in the legislative elections. The
to over 260 million by 2025. Nigeria remains
elections, however, were marred by serious
relatively stable, although ethnic and religious
irregularities and electoral fraud, according to
clashes in some parts of the country have led
international election observers.
to massive displacement of civilian popula-
tions. Thousands of civilians have been killed
Relations between the United States and
over the past several years and many more
Nigeria improved with the transfer of power
wounded in religious clashes. Under President
to a civilian government. In late October
Obasanjo, Nigeria has emerged has a major
1999, President Obasanjo met with President
player in Africa. President Obasanjo took a
Clinton and other senior officials in Washing-
leading role in the creation of the New Part-
ton. President Clinton pledged substantial
nership for African Development (NEPAD)
increase in U.S. assistance to Nigeria. In
and the African Union (AU). He is the current
August 2000, President Clinton paid a state
Chairman of the AU. President Obasanjo also
visit to Nigeria. He met with President
played key roles in facilitating the exile of
Obasanjo in Abuja and addressed the Nige-
Liberian President Charles Taylor. Nigeria is
rian parliament. Several new U.S. initiatives
also facilitating negotiations between the
were announced, including increased support
government of Sudan and the Darfur rebels. In
for AIDS prevention and treatment programs
August 2003, Nigeria sent an estimated 1,500
in Nigeria and enhanced trade and commercial
troops to Liberia as part of a West African-led
development.
peacekeeping force.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In early April, the Nigerian Senate began to debate a bill that aims to amend the
constitution. One of the contentious proposals would allow a third-term presidency;
supporters of President Obasanjo have been pushing for this step for months. The Nigerian
constitution has a two-term limitation. In mid-May 2006, the Nigerian Senate effectively
rejected the legislation.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical and Political Background
Nigeria, the most populous nation
Nigeria At A Glance
in Africa with an estimated 128.7 million
people (World Fact Book, 2005), has
Population:
128.7 million
been in political turmoil and economic
Independence:
October 1960
crisis intermittently since independence
Comparative Area:
Slightly more than twice the
in October 1960. The current borders
size of California
were demarcated by British colonial
Religions:
50% Muslim, 40% Christian,
rulers in 1914, on the eve of World War
10% Indigenous beliefs
I, by merging the British dependencies of
Languages:
English (official)
Northern and Southern Nigeria into a
GDP:
$125.7 billion (2004)
single territory with promising economic
GDP Per Capita:
$1000 (2004)
prospects. The new Nigeria, as defined
Labor force:
55.6 million
by the British, placed over 250 distinct
Exports:
$33.9 billion (2004)
ethnic groups under a single
Imports:
$17.1 billion (2004)
administrative system. Of this large
External Debt:
$30.5 billion (2004)
number of groups, ten account for nearly
80% of the total population, and the
Source: The World Fact Book, 2005.
northern Hausa-Fulani, the southwestern
Yoruba, and the southeastern Ibo, have
traditionally been the most politically
active and dominant. Since gaining independence from Britain in 1960, Nigerian political
life has been scarred by conflict along both ethnic and geographic lines, marked most notably
by northern and Hausa domination of the military and the civil war fought by the Ibo of
Biafra from 1967 to 1970. Questions persist as to whether Nigeria and its multitude of ethnic
groups can be held together as one nation, particularly in light of the degree to which misrule
has undermined the authority and legitimacy of the state apparatus; but many Nigerians feel
a significant degree of national pride and belief in Nigeria as a state.
Nigeria’s political life has been dominated by military coups and long military-imposed
transition programs to civilian rule. The military has ruled Nigeria for approximately 28 of
its 43 years since independence. In August 1985, General Ibrahim Babangida ousted another
military ruler, General Muhammadu Buhari, and imposed a transition program that lasted
until June 1993, when Nigeria held its first election in almost a decade, believed to be won
by Chief Moshood K. O. Abiola, a Yoruba businessman from the south. In the same month,
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General Babangida annulled the presidential election because of what he called “irregularities
in the voting” and ordered a new election with conditions that Abiola and his challenger be
excluded from participating. Amid confusion and growing political unrest, Babangida
handed over power to a caretaker government in August 1993, then ousted the caretaker the
following November.
General Sani Abacha took power in November 1993. Abacha had been an active
participant in several Nigerian military coups and was an authoritarian figure who seemed
unmoved by international opinion. Beginning in 1995, Abacha imprisoned hundreds of
critics, including former military leader Olusegun Obasanjo, the only Nigerian military leader
to have handed over power voluntarily to an elected civilian government, and Moshood
Abiola, who was charged with treason after declaring himself president following the
annulled election. The senior wife of Abiola, Kudirat Abiola, was assassinated in June 1996
by unidentified men. Her daughter blamed the military junta.
In October 1995, under pressure to implement political reforms, Abacha announced a
three-year transition program to civilian rule, which he tightly controlled until his death on
June 8, 1998. Abacha established the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON),
which published guidelines for party registration, recognized five political parties in
September 1996 and officially dissolved opposition groups after refusing to recognize them.
The military professed its support for Abacha should he seek reelection as a civilian, and by
April 20, 1998, all five parties had nominated Abacha as the single presidential candidate
despite criticism by the international community and dissident groups. Major opposition
figures, especially those in exile, dismissed the transition program and called for boycotts of
the parliamentary and presidential elections. Only candidates from among the five state-
sanctioned political parties participated in state assembly elections held in December 1997
and parliamentary elections held on April 25, 1998. The United Nigeria Congress Party
(UNCP), considered by many government opponents to be the army’s proxy, won
widespread victories.
Transition to Civilian Rule
Abacha died, reportedly of a heart attack, on June 8, 1998. The Provisional Ruling
Council quickly nominated Major General Abdulsalam Abubakar to assume the presidency.
General Abubakar, a career serviceman from the Northern Hausa-speaking elite, was
regarded as a military intellectual. He served as chief of military intelligence under General
Ibrahim Babangida and was Abacha’s chief of staff. He led the investigations of reported
coup attempts by former President Olusegun Obasanjo and Lt. General Oladipo Diya,
charges that, critics argue, were fabricated by the government. Following Abacha’s death,
General Abubakar addressed the nation and expressed his commitment to uphold the October
1998 hand-over date to civilian government established by Abacha. In an effort to prove his
commitment, Abubakar released several prominent political prisoners, including General
Olusegun Obasanjo.
During a meeting with a U.S. delegation led by then Undersecretary of State Thomas
Pickering on July 7, 1998, Abiola suffered a heart attack and died soon after. Pro-democracy
leaders immediately claimed that Abiola was murdered. The autopsy report, monitored by
an independent team of Canadian, American, and British doctors, confirmed that Abiola died
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of natural causes due to a long-standing heart condition and that death as a result of
poisoning was highly unlikely. Many observers said, however, that Abiola’s care was
deliberately neglected, resulting in his early demise. His death crushed the hopes of many
democracy supporters and spurred riots for several days.
In August and September of 1998, Abubakar undertook rapid and dramatic reforms to
the Nigerian political system and economy. He replaced Abacha’s top security staff and
cabinet and dissolved the five political parties that Abacha had established. He abolished
major decrees banning trade union activity, which had been used by Abacha to put down the
political strikes that followed the nullification of the 1993 election results and ended treason
charges against Nobel Prize-winning writer Wole Soyinka and 14 others. Abubakar has also
made a concerted effort to appeal to Nigerians in exile to return home and assist in the
transition process, and many have done so, most notably Nobel Prize-winning author Wole
Soyinka in mid-October. On September 7, Abubakar released the draft constitution for the
next civilian government, which Abacha had kept secret, but announced on October 1 that
he was setting up a committee to organize and collect views from various sections of the
country, after which he would finalize changes to the draft document in order to make it
“more representative and acceptable.” In early May 1999, the government approved an
updated version of the 1979 Nigerian constitution instead of the constitution drafted by the
Abacha regime.
Abubakar outlined a specific timetable for the transition to civilian rule, with local polls
on December 5, 1998, gubernatorial and state polls on January 9, followed by national
assembly polls on February 20, 1999, and presidential polls on February 27. The official
hand-over date was set for May 29, 1999. He also nullified all of the previous state and
gubernatorial elections because they were held under the Abacha system and dismissed the
National Electoral Commission established by Abacha, replacing it with one of his own, the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), in early August. Political party
registration for elections ended after an extension on October 12, and the INEC released the
names of the nine registered parties on October 19. The three major parties were the
People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the All People’s Party (APP), and the Alliance for
Democracy (AD). In order to be registered, a party had to be considered “national,” defined
as having offices in at least two-thirds of the 36 states that make up Nigeria, and furthermore
must win at least 10% of votes in two-thirds of the states in the local elections in December
1998 in order to qualify a candidate for the national elections in February. Abubakar warned
of the dangers of a “proliferation of political parties with parochial orientation, that may lead
to disunity and instability,” while urging political leadership to represent the will of people
of all ethnic and religious groups.
The international community cautiously welcomed the transition program. Donor
governments in Europe expressed support and urged transparency. French, British, and
German delegations met with the Nigerian leadership in Abuja, the capital, in late July, and
Abubakar made numerous trips abroad in an effort to improve relations with African and
world leaders. The European Union announced in late October 1998 that, effective
November 1, some sanctions would be relaxed. The visa ban was officially removed and
some officials indicated that even the military measures might be lifted after the official
hand-over date in May. On May 31, 1999, the European Union restored full economic
cooperation with Nigeria. In late May, the Commonwealth also readmitted Nigeria as a
member, after three years of suspension.
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Highlights of Abubakar’s Transition Program
Rejected:
National Conference
National Unity Government
Accomplished:
— Debt relief talks with World Bank and IMF
— Dissolution of old electoral commission and establishment of new Independent National
Electoral Commission
— Dissolution of old political parties and registration of new parties
— Voter registration
— Annulment of elections under Abacha
— Most political prisoners freed
— Greater freedom of press, human rights better
— Publicized and amended 1995 constitution
— Dismissed Abacha officials and began investigation into misappropriated funds
— Exiled dissidents returned home
— Better-paid civil servants to combat corruption
— Repairs started on refineries, more oil imported, privatization program started
— Hand-over May 29, 1999
— Presidential elections February 27, 1999
— National assembly elections February 20, 1999
— State/Gubernatorial elections January 9, 1999
— Local elections December 5, 1998 Partial lifting of international sanctions
Elections in 1998, 1999
In early December 1998, the PDP won in 389 out of 774 municipalities in local
elections, while the All People’s Party (APP) came a distant second with 182, followed by
Alliance for Democracy. In the governorship elections in early January, the PDP won 21
states out of 36, the APP won in nine states, and the AD won in six states. Shortly after the
elections in January, the APP and AD began talks to merge the two political parties.
However, the Independent Electoral Commission rejected a merger but agreed that the two
parties “can present common candidates” for the presidential elections.
In mid-February, the People’s Democratic Party nominated General Olusegun Obasanjo
as its presidential candidate. Obasanjo won the support of more than two-thirds of the 2,500
delegates and a northerner, Abubakar Atiku, who was elected governor in the January
elections, was chosen as his running mate. The APP and AD nominated Chief Olu Falae,
a Yoruba, as their joint candidate for president. A former Nigerian security chief and a
northerner, Chief Umaru Shinakfi, was chosen as Falae’s running mate.
In late February 1999, General Obasanjo was elected president by a wide margin.
Obasanjo won 62.8% of the votes (18.7 million), while his challenger, Chief Olu Falae
received 37.2% of the votes (11.1 million). In the Senate elections, the PDP won 58% of
the votes, APP 23%, and AD 19%. In the elections for the House of Representatives, PDP
received 59% of the votes, AD 22%, and APP 20%.
On May 29, 1999, Obasanjo was sworn in president and the Nigerian Senate approved
42 of 49 members of his cabinet. In his inaugural address, President Obasanjo said that “the
entire Nigerian scene is very bleak indeed. So bleak people ask me where do we begin? I
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know what great things you expect of me at this New Dawn. As I have said many times in
my extensive travels in the country, I am not a miracle worker. It will be foolish to underrate
the task ahead. Alone, I can do little.”
The 2003 Elections
President Obasanjo was nominated by his party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP),
for a second-term bid. The All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) picked former military
strongman, General Muhammadu Buhari, as its presidential candidate. Meanwhile, the
former Biafra rebel leader, Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, who led the secessionist war in the
1960s, was picked as the presidential candidate of the All Progressive Grand Alliance
(APGA). The National Democratic Party (NDP) picked former foreign minister Ike
Nwachukwu as its presidential candidate.
In mid-April 2003, Nigerians went to the polls for the second time since military rule
gave way to a civilian government. President Obasanjo was re-elected to a second term, and
his PDP party won in legislative elections. The Independent National Electoral Commission
(INEC) declared that Obasanjo won 61.9% of the votes, while his nearest rival, General
Muhammadu Buhari of ANPP, won 32.1% of the votes. The elections, however, were
marred by serious irregularities and electoral fraud, according to international election
observers. In the Senate, the PDP won 72 seats out of 109 seats, while the ANPP won 28
and the AD 5 seats. The PDP won 198 seats in the 360-seat House of Representatives, the
ANPP 83 seats, and the AD 30 seats.
In late March 2004, elections for Local Government Council were held in thirty of the
thirty-six states. The Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition of 170 human rights
and civil society groups, monitored the elections. In its preliminary report, the TMG stated
that “in virtually all the states where elections were held , the process leading to the elections
were substantially flawed.”
Nigeria: Key Government Officials
President: Olusegun Obasanjo (Sworn for a 2nd term on May 29, 2003)
Vice President: Atiku Abubakar
President of Senate: Adolphous Wabara
Speaker of the House: Aminu Masari
Ministers
Defense: Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso
Education: Fabian Osuji
Finance: Njozi Okonjo-Iweala
Foreign Affairs: Oluyemi Adeniji
Justice: Akin Olujimi
Central Bank Governor: Joseph Sanusi
Source: Reuters, Dec. 4, 2003
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Current Economic and Social Conditions
Western officials believe that Sani Abacha may have stolen more than $3.5 billion
during the course of his five years in power. Abacha’s former national security adviser,
Ismaila Gwarzo, was accused of stealing an estimated $2.45 billion from the Nigerian
Central Bank. Swiss officials stated that about 120 accounts in Zurich and Geneva have been
frozen. In early 2000, Swiss officials charged a businessman for falsifying documents to
open a bank account for the Abacha family. In mid-May 2000, President Obasanjo
announced that his government had recovered $200 million in public funds looted by former
Nigerian dictator Abacha and his associates. In July 2000, Nigerian authorities confirmed
that Swiss officials had transferred $64.3 million of the looted money to the Central Bank
of Nigeria. In April 2002, the government of Nigeria reached an agreement with the Abacha
family on the funds said to have been stolen by the late dictator. The agreement calls for the
return of $1 billion to the government of Nigeria, while the Abacha family would be allowed
to keep $100 million. The government of Nigeria has recovered $149 million of the funds
stolen by former dictator General Sani Abacha and his family. The funds were recovered
from bank accounts in the British island of Jersey. In early December 2003, President
Obasanjo visited Switzerland in an effort to recover $618 million of looted funds by the late
dictator.
In early April 2005, Nigerian Senate Speaker Adolphus Wabara was forced to resign
after President Obasanjo accused him of taking more than $400,000 in bribes from the
Minister of Education, Fabian Osuji. The Education Minister was dismissed in March by
President Obasanjo. The Minister of Housing, Alice Mobolaji Osomo, was also fired in early
April for allocating more than 200 properties to senior government officials instead of public
sale. President Obasanjo’s anti-corruption campaign is seen as the most serious and effective
effort in decades.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has subpoenaed documents from Royal
Dutch Shell related to a probe of an alleged bribery case at a gas plant in Nigeria. The alleged
bribery case is being investigated in several countries, including France, Nigeria, and Japan.
The companies involved in the natural gas project and the alleged bribery include a
Halliburton subcontractor, Chicago Bridge and Iron, Total of France, Italy’s Eni, and the
Nigerian government.
Due to decades of economic mismanagement, political instability, and widespread
corruption, the education system has suffered from lack of funding, industry has idled,
refineries are in poor conditions, and the sixth-largest oil-producing country in the world
suffers from severe fuel shortages from time to time. The Nigerian economy depends heavily
on oil revenues; about 90-95% of Nigeria’s export earnings come from petroleum and
petroleum products, which also represent 90% of its foreign exchange earnings and 80% of
its government revenues (Energy Administration Information, March 2003). The European
Union is a major trading partner, and the United States imports more oil from sub-Saharan
Africa, primarily Nigeria, than from the Middle East. On March 9, 2005, President Obasanjo
stated that he would stop Nigeria’s foreign debt payment if parliament passes legislation to
that effect. Nigeria’s House of Representatives passed a motion recommending that Obasanjo
“cease forthwith further external debt payment to any group of foreign creditors.” Nigeria’s
foreign debt is estimated at $30 billion. Speaking on behalf of the African leaders invited to
the G-8 Summit in Scotland in July 2005, President Obasanjo of Nigeria welcomed the
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proposed aid package for Africa. Meanwhile, Nigeria reached a separate agreement with the
Paris Club to reduce its external debt burden. According to the agreement, creditors are
expected to write off 60% of Nigeria’s $30 billion in external debt.
The state of the economy has most affected the poorest segments of the population and
has sparked violence around the country, particularly in the oil-producing regions. Several
thousand people have been killed in pipeline explosions in southeast Nigeria since the late
1990s, though the largest single toll from an explosion was approximately 1,000 in October
of 1999. These explosions are triggered because people siphon off oil from holes punched
in the above-ground pipeline for personal use, resulting in a loss of what’s estimated to be
up to 200,000 barrels of oil per day (IRIN, July 15, 2003). Ethnic clashes over rights to a
promising oil prospect in the southwest also killed hundreds of people in September and
October 1999. In the Niger Delta, youths from the ethnic Ijaw tribe periodically stop the
flow of one-third of Nigeria’s oil exports of more than two million barrels per day in order
to protest sub-standard living conditions in the country’s richest oil-producing region. The
government established a national task force on surveillance of petroleum pipelines in order
to prevent a recurrence of the pipeline explosion tragedy.
In September 2004, a new rebel movement, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force
(NDPVF), launched a series of attacks against government forces and threatened to attack
foreign oil workers. The oil-rich Niger Delta has been afflicted by persistent rebellion over
the past several years. The NDPVF is demanding autonomy for the region and share of oil
revenues. An estimated 500 people were reportedly killed in September, according to
Amnesty International. The Nigerian government disputes that 500 people had died as a
result of the violence. On September 29, 2004, the NDPVF and the Nigerian government
reportedly reached a cease-fire agreement. The leader of the rebel group stated that “there
should be a cessation of hostilities on both sides. Apart from that, we have not agreed on
anything else for the time being.”
In late November 2005, the Nigerian army deployed additional troops to the oil-rich
Bayelsa State after lawmakers began impeachment proceedings against State Governor
Diepreye Alamieyeseigha. In September 2005, British authorities had charged
Alamieyeseigha, while visiting in London, with money laundering, but the governor skipped
bail and returned to Nigeria in November.
Humanitarian and Human Rights Concerns
HIV/AIDS
Nigeria’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 5.8% may seem small in comparison to some
Southern African nations with seropositivity rates of over 30% of the adult population.
However, the West African nation composes nearly one-tenth of the world’s HIV/AIDS
infected persons with 3.5 million infected people (UNAIDS 2001 estimate), the largest HIV-
positive population in Africa after South Africa. Nigeria’s population is expected to double
by the year 2025, which will multiply the spread of the HIV virus astronomically. In addition
to the devastation HIV/AIDS has caused and continues to cause among Nigeria’s adult
population, half of the current population is under the age of 15. With only 55% of primary
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school-aged children in school and the high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates among adults,
Nigeria faces serious challenges and significant obstacles in the education and health care
sectors (USAID Congressional Budget Justification, 2004). In late July 2001, the government
of Nigeria announced a major AIDS treatment program. President Obasanjo declared that
his government would provide cheap generic drugs to AIDS patients beginning September
2001. Patients are expected to pay about $7 a month for the treatment. The government of
Nigeria plans to distribute anti-retroviral drugs to an estimated 10,000 patients, but numerous
obstacles have inhibited the implementation of this program.
Sharia
Twelve of Nigeria’s states in the Muslim-dominated North of the country have adopted
Sharia law within the last four years, which has resulted in much-publicized rulings, several
of which have been criticized by human rights groups as well as by Nigerians in the Southern
and mostly Christian part of the country. Kano state ruled on September 1, 2003, that all
school girls attending government schools are to wear the hijab, Islamic head scarf,
regardless of whether they are Muslim. President Obasanjo has said that the best way to
respond to Sharia is to ignore it: “I think Sharia will fizzle out. To confront it is to keep it
alive.” In March 2002, in Katsina State, Amina Lawal was sentenced to death by stoning
after a court found her guilty of adultery. In August 2003, Ms. Lawal appealed her sentence
to the Katsina State’s Appeals Court. On September 25, 2003, Amina Lawal, won her appeal
after the Sharia Court of Appeal ruled that her conviction was invalid. The Court ruled that
“it is the view of this Court that the judgment of the Upper Sharia Court, Funtua, was very
wrong and the appeal of Amina Lawal is hereby discharged and acquitted.” In October 2001,
in another highly publicized case, a Sharia court in the Sokoto State sentenced Safiya
Hussaini to death for adultery. Ms. Hussaini appealed her sentence and was exonerated on
the grounds that she was impregnated by her former husband and that the affair took place
before Sharia law was enacted.
Human Rights
The Bush Administration is concerned about Nigeria’s poor human rights record. In
its Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2004, the Department of State wrote:
The Government’s human rights record remained poor, and the Government continued
to commit serious abuses. Nationwide local government elections held during the year
were not generally judged free and fair and therefore abridged citizens’ right to change
their government. Security forces committed extrajudicial killings and used excessive
force. There were several politically motivated killings by unknown persons during the
year. Security forces regularly beat protesters, criminal suspects, detainees, and convicted
prisoners. There were fewer reported incidents of torture by security agents than in
previous years. Impunity was a problem. Shari’a courts sentenced persons to harsh
punishments including amputations and death by stoning; however, there were no reports
of amputation or stoning sentences carried out during the year. Prison conditions were
harsh and life threatening, and conditions contributed to the death of numerous inmates.
Security forces continued to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily, including for political
reasons. Prolonged pretrial detention remained a serious problem. The judicial system
often was incapable of providing criminal suspects with speedy and fair trials.
Government authorities occasionally infringed on citizens’ privacy rights.
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In late August 2005, President Obasanjo admitted that Nigerian police and security
services have tortured and killed prisoners in their custody. Earlier, senior Nigerian
government officials had dismissed a report by Human Rights Watch, which documented
torture and extrajudicial killings of prisoners by Nigerian police.
The United States and Nigeria
Relations between Washington and Abuja began to improve shortly after General
Abubakar assumed power and have since continued to grow during President Bush’s term
in office. In September 1998, Abubakar visited the United States for the U.N. General
Assembly meeting, and also came to Washington to meet with President Clinton at the White
House. After the meeting, Abubakar said President Clinton told him that if Nigeria stayed
on its democratic course, the United States was prepared to help win some debt relief from
international lending institutions and might also allow the resumption of direct air links
between the U.S. and Nigeria. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also praised
Abubakar for “taking steps to bring Nigeria back into the world community” (New York
Times, September 25, 1998). U.S. officials applauded Abubakar’s transition program and
warmly welcomed the transfer of power to an elected civilian government and promised to
work closely with the Obasanjo government.
In mid-October 1999, then Secretary of State Albright visited Nigeria and met with
senior government officials and civil society groups. At a press briefing following her Africa
tour, Secretary Albright stated that the government and people of Nigeria are “engaged in a
dramatic and high-stakes struggle to establish a viable democratic system.” She said
President Obasanjo “appears truly committed to jump-starting the economy, fighting
corruption and resolving regional problems that remain a source of unrest within Nigeria.”
In late October 1999, President Obasanjo met with President Clinton and other senior
government officials in Washington. At a White House press briefing, President Clinton
said that “it is very much in America’s interests that Nigeria succeed, and therefore we
should assist them in their success. We intend to increase our assistance to Nigeria to expand
law-enforcement cooperation and to work toward an agreement to stimulate trade and
investment between us. We intend to do what we can to help Nigeria recover assets
plundered by the previous regime.” President Clinton stated that the United States will
support “generous debt rescheduling through the Paris Club and encourage other countries
to take further steps.”
In a meeting with President Obasanjo in Abuja on August 26, 2000, President Clinton
stated that the United States is “committed to working with the people of Nigeria to help
build stronger institutions, improve education, fight disease, crime and corruption, ease the
burden of debt and promote trade and investment in a way that brings more of the benefits
of prosperity to people who have embraced democracy.” Clinton also made an
unprecedented address before the Nigerian parliament in which he underscored the major
issues facing Nigeria today, including democratization and ethnic and religious strife.
President Clinton announced a number of new initiatives during his Nigeria visit. He
pledged $60 million for AIDS vaccine research and more than $20 million for Obasanjo’s
campaigns against malaria, polio, and HIV/AIDS. He also praised Nigeria’s regional
leadership and promised continued U.S. support for the West African peacekeeping mission
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in Sierra Leone. He pledged continued U.S. support for education, including the provision
of Internet access through the work of NGOs and universities.
In May 2001, President Obasanjo met with President Bush and other senior officials in
Washington. President Bush stated that the United States is “in the process of helping
provide technical assistance to Nigerian troops so that they are better able to keep those peace
missions.” At a joint White House press conference, President Bush pledged $200 million
to a new global fund for HIV/AIDS. President Obasanjo said he discussed a number of issues
of mutual interest, including the conflicts in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and
Sierra Leone.
President Obasanjo returned to the White House following the September 11, 2001,
attacks to discuss Nigeria’s and United States’ “mutual concern to fight and win the war
against terror.” Returning again to Washington in June 2002 and receiving President Bush
on his first official state visit to Africa in July of 2003, President Obasanjo has cultivated a
friendship with President Bush. In a speech concluding his week-long trip to Africa,
President Bush emphasized the importance of “partnerships” and underscored that “the
relationship between America and Africa will benefit both our people” (see White House
press release [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/print/20030712.html]).
The United States is offering a $2 million reward for the capture of former Liberian
president Charles Taylor, who is in exile in Nigeria. Taylor has been charged with war
crimes by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The $2 million reward was inserted in the Iraqi
Emergency Supplemental in late October 2003. The provision does not specifically refer to
Taylor, although it is widely believed that the reference is to Taylor. The Nigerian
government has said that any attempt to kidnap Taylor would be viewed as “a violation of
Nigeria’s territorial integrity.” The Bush Administration has acknowledged that Washington
encouraged the Obasanjo government to offer Taylor political asylum. The Bush
Administration also stated that Taylor should be held accountable for the crimes he
committed in Liberia and Sierra Leone. President Obasanjo is opposed to transferring Taylor
to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The Court indicted Taylor on 17 counts of war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and violation of international humanitarian law. In early May 2005,
President Obasanjo met with President Bush and other senior Administration officials in
Washington to discuss the crisis in Darfur, Sudan, debt relief, and the legal status of former
Liberian president Charles Taylor. Taylor was captured by Nigerian authorities in late March
2006, after his failed attempt to flee to neighboring countries. On March 29, 2006, a day
after Taylor was arrested by Nigerian authorities, Obasanjo visited Washington and met with
President Bush.
The International Religious Report for 2004 stated that “interreligious tension between
Christians and Muslims remained high in some areas of the country, and there were several
violent economic, ethnic, and political conflicts that took on religious overtones.”
Meanwhile, P.L. 108-199, a consolidated appropriations bill, which was signed into
law by President Bush on January 24, 2004, contains several provisions on Nigeria. A
provision in the bill restricts International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance
to Nigeria. Section 560 of the Foreign Appropriations bill states that “none of the funds
appropriated under the headings (International Military Education and Training and Foreign
Military Financing Program) may be made available for assistance for Nigeria until the
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President certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that the Nigerian Minister of
Defense, the Chief of the Army Staff, and the Minister of State for Defense/Army are
suspending from the Armed Forces those members, of whatever rank, against whom there
is credible evidence of gross violations of human rights in Benue State.”
In early March 2005, the Nigerian Minister of State for Defense, Dr. Rowland
Oritsejafor, announced that Nigeria received four gunboats from the United States and is
expecting four more. The gunboats will be used to tackle the growing illicit oil trade in the
Niger Delta, according to the Minister of Defense. Oritsejafor stated that Nigeria has “lost
over $2 billion in the oil sector as a result of illegal Activities in the Niger Delta.”
In mid-August 2005, the Nigerian Senate passed a resolution calling on the Obasanjo
government to rescind an agreement signed between the governments of Nigeria and the
United States, prohibiting extradition of American personnel suspected of war crimes to the
International Criminal Court (ICC).
U.S.-Nigerian Relations: Background
Three primary issues have dominated U.S.-Nigerian relations in the last two decades:
the absence of democracy, human rights abuses, and drug trafficking. Washington took a
series of measures against the military junta shortly after the 1993 election results were
annulled. These included suspending development assistance, terminating joint military
training with Nigeria, and imposing visa restrictions of Nigeria’s military leaders and their
family members. These measures, however, did not affect trade between U.S. companies and
Nigeria. Washington was also engaged in diplomatic efforts, albeit unsuccessful, to break
the political impasse in the West African nation. The Clinton Administration sent civil rights
leader Jesse Jackson, then-U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson, and former Ambassador
Donald McHenry as envoys to convince Abacha to implement reforms.
In response to the execution of nine Ogoni activists in 1995, the Clinton Administration
recalled its ambassador and pushed a resolution at the U.N. General Assembly that
condemned Nigeria’s action. The imprisonment of Moshood Abiola and many others was
a contentious issue in U.S.-Nigerian relations. In its Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for 1997, the Department of State wrote: “The human rights record remained
dismal. Throughout the year, Abacha’s Government relied regularly on arbitrary detention
and harassment to silence its most outspoken critics.” The report further stated that security
forces “continued to commit extrajudicial killings and use excessive force to quell anti-
government protests as well as to combat crime, resulting in the death or injury of many
individuals, including innocent civilians.” Human rights groups reported the torture of
prisoners and constant harassment of journalists under the Abacha regime.
Washington’s concern was not limited to human rights abuse allegations. Drug
trafficking by Nigeria emerged as a major issue in U.S.-Nigerian relations after the mid-
1980s. Although Nigeria is not a drug-producing country, it has become a major transit
point. An estimated 35-40% of all the heroin coming into the United States is brought by
Nigerian couriers. In 1989, the United States and Nigeria established a joint Counter-
Narcotics Task Force. Lack of cooperation by Nigerian authorities in combating the drug
trafficking problem led to a decision by the Clinton Administration in March 1998, as in
1994 and 1996, to put Nigeria on the State Department’s list of non-cooperative drug
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trafficking nations, which includes Burma and Iran. As a consequence, the U.S. had to vote
“no” on all loans to Nigeria being considered by the World Bank and the African
Development Bank, and Nigeria was ineligible for any Export-Import Bank financing of U.S.
exports. In March 2000, however, President Clinton provided a waiver, a Vital National
Interests Certification, for Nigeria in order to allow support for the democratic transition
program. In March 2001, however, the Bush Administration certified that Nigeria was fully
cooperating with U.S. officials. In January 2003, in a report to Congress, President Bush
identified Nigeria as one of 12 “major illicit drug-producing and Drug-Transit countries.”
Through legislative action, Members of Congress were active concerning Nigeria. In
1994, the House of Representatives passed H.Con.Res. 151, which called for additional
measures against the military junta by the Clinton Administration. A bill calling for the
imposition of sanctions and freezing of assets was introduced in 1996 by then-Senator Nancy
Kassebaum and Representative Donald M. Payne. Although the bill enjoyed significant
bipartisan support, it did not move out of committees, in part because of opposition by
Members of Congress who favored dialogue with the Nigerian government. Pro-Nigerian
groups and some American business interests actively opposed the bill (Washington Post,
November 24, 1996). The Nigerian Democracy Act, introduced by Representative Donald
Payne and Representative Amo Houghton in 1997, contained similar provisions, including
a ban on new U.S. corporate investment in Nigeria. In May 1998 House International
Relations Committee Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman and Representative Donald M. Payne
introduced the Nigerian Democracy and Civil Society Empowerment Act (H.R. 3890),
calling for additional sanctions and increased U.S. aid to democratic opposition groups. The
bill was also introduced in the Senate in May 1998 by Senators Feingold, Jeffords, Leahy,
and Wellstone. The bill was sent to committees in both houses, but the 105th Congress did
not act further on either piece of legislation.
Conflicts within the Clinton Administration regarding the appropriate strategy toward
Nigeria while under the control of Abacha surfaced in speeches given by senior
Administration officials and President Clinton in early 1998. Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs Dr. Susan Rice stated in a speech on March 17, 1998, that the United States
would hold “General Abacha to his three-year-old promise to undertake a genuine transition
to civilian rule this year and to establish a level playing field by allowing free political
activity, providing for an open press, and ending political detention. Let me state clearly and
unequivocally to you today that an election victory by any military candidate in the
forthcoming presidential elections would be unacceptable.” In late March, President Clinton
stated that U.S. policy toward Nigeria was “to do all that we can to persuade General Abacha
to move toward general democracy and respect for human rights, release of political
prisoners, and the holding of elections.” Referring to General Abacha’s rumored candidacy,
however, President Clinton seemed to contradict Rice by suggesting that “if [Abacha] stands
for election we hope he will stand as a civilian.” President Clinton’s March statement led
some critics to question the Administration’s policy toward Abacha and the military junta.
The Administration came to a final decision on May 28, saying that the proposed
transition was clearly “unacceptable” as long as Abacha remained the single candidate and
that current sanctions would remain (The Washington Post, May 29, 1998). Following
Abacha’s death, State Department spokesman James P. Rubin stated that Abubakar had “a
historic opportunity to open the political process and institute a swift and credible transition
to civilian democratic rule.” Rubin said that Washington would “accept” only a transition
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that included “three things: first, freeing political prisoners; second, ensuring respect for the
basic freedoms of speech, press, and assembly; and third, returning the Nigerian army to its
rightful position as a professional armed force committed to defending the constitution and
civilian rule.” U.S. officials had anticipated that Abubakar would be more cooperative with
the United States because he received military training here. On June 14, 1998, President
Clinton called Abubakar and “underscored our desire for improved bilateral relations in the
context of Nigeria taking swift and significant steps toward a successful transition to a
democratically-elected government” (Associated Press, June 14, 1998).
The U.S. officials who met with Abubakar in July 1998 reported that he appeared very
receptive to implementing the transition to democracy, although he would continue
consultations before releasing the final details of the transition. Critics asserted that the
United States should have pushed harder for Abiola’s unconditional release in order for him
to consult with advisers rather than consent to renouncing his title under political pressure.
Critics also warned that a hands-off policy could enable the regime to proceed slowly with
reforms that may escalate civil conflict to the point of war in which ethnic rivalries could
erupt on a massive scale. The Clinton Administration, nonetheless, welcomed Abubakar’s
transition program, and on October 30, 1998, the U.S. State Department announced that the
Secretary, after consulting with Members of Congress, has terminated a Presidential
Proclamation that restricted entry into the United States by high-ranking Nigerian officials
and their family members.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Nigeria
($ millions, fiscal years)
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Program
Actual
Actual
Actual
Actual
Est.
Req.
DA
15.8
23.3
13.6
14.8
14.00
21.2
CSH
36.6
47.9
42.5
28.2
21.5
19.6
ESF
8.5
3.8
4.9
4.9
4.9
5.0
FMF Grants
.990
.800
GHAI
85.9
138.1
272.0
INCLE
2.2
.990
.400
NADR-CTF
.100
.200
.600
NADR-ATA
.435
IMET
.792
.590
Total
66.5
75.1
61.1
136.2
181.9
320.1
Table Abbreviations:
DA = Development Assistance
CSH = Child Survival and Health Programs Fund
ESF = Economic Support Fund
IMET = International Military Education and Training (Notification required)
INCLE = International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement
NADR-ATF = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
GHAI = Global HIV/AIDS Initiative
FMF = Foreign Military Financing
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LEGISLATION
H.Con.Res. 127 (Royce)
Calls on the government of Nigeria to transfer former Liberian president Charles Taylor
to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Introduced April 12, 2005. Passed the House May 4;
passed the Senate May 10, 2005.
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