Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security, and Control Issues

Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security, and Control Issues

Order Code IB98038
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nuclear Weapons in Russia:
Safety, Security, and Control Issues
Updated August 15, 2003
Amy F. Woolf
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Nuclear Weapons After the Demise of the Soviet Union
Location of Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union
Concerns about Command, Control, Safety, and Security
Russia’s Nuclear Command and Control System
Safety and Security of Stored Nuclear Warheads
Former Soviet Nuclear Facilities and Materials
Cooperative Programs For Nuclear Threat Reduction
The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program
Program Objectives and Funding
Certifications and waivers
10+10 over 10
Implementing the Programs
International Science and Technology Centers
Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Programs
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
Nuclear Cities Initiative
Bilateral Meetings
The U.S.-Russian Commission on Economic and Technological
Cooperation (The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission)
The Strategic Stability Working Group (SSWG)
Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility Talks
Arms Control Proposals
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
Agreement on the Disposition of Weapons-grade Plutonium
Sharing Early Warning Data
Alert Rates for Strategic Nuclear Weapons
FOR ADDITIONAL READING

IB98038
08-15-03
Nuclear Weapons in Russia:
Safety, Security, and Control Issues
SUMMARY
When the Soviet Union collapsed in late
eral storage sites in Oct. 1997 and June 1998.
1991, it reportedly possessed more than
27,000 nuclear weapons, and these weapons
Reports of Russian nuclear materials for
were deployed on the territories of several of
sale on the black market, when combined with
the former Soviet republics. All of the nuclear
evidence of weaknesses in the security sys-
warheads have now been moved to Russia, but
tems have raised concerns about the possible
Russia still has around 6,000 strategic nuclear
theft or diversion of nuclear materials from
weapons and perhaps as many as 12,000
these facilities.
warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
The United States and Russia are cooper-
Many analysts in the United States and
ating in many fora to improve the safety,
Russia have expressed concerns about the
security, and control over Russia’s nuclear
safety, security, and control over these wea-
weapons and materials. Through the Nunn-
pons. Some of these concerns focus on Rus-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
sia’s nuclear command and control structure.
the U.S. Department of Defense has provided
Financial constraints have slowed the
assistance worth nearly $2 billion to help
modernization and replacement of many aging
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus
satellites and communications links, raising
safely transport and store weapons and elimi-
the possibility that Russia might not be able to
nate launchers under the START Treaties.
identify a potential attack or communicate
The Department of Energy’s Materials Protec-
with troops in the field if an attack were
tion, Control and Accounting Program is
underway. Some fear that the misinterpreta-
helping Russia and other former Soviet repub-
tion of an ambiguous event might lead to the
lics secure nuclear materials at research and
launch of nuclear weapons. Some also
other facilities in the former Soviet Union.
expressed concern that the year 2000 com-
The nations have also held bilateral meetings
puter bug could affect Russia’s command and
to identify ways in which they might cooper-
control system, but it did not.
ate to improve security and resolve concerns.
Some concerns are also focused on the
Some have proposed that the United
safety and security of nuclear warheads in
States and Russia negotiate arms control
storage facilities in Russia. Press reports and
agreements to reduce their stockpiles of
statements by Russian officials about possible
nonstrategic nuclear weapons and to improve
missing warheads have added to these
transparency and confidence in the elimination
concerns. However, General Eugene Habiger,
of those weapons. Others have proposed that
former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S.
the two sides agree to “de-alert” their strategic
Strategic Command, stated that he had no
nuclear weapons to reduce the pressures and
major concerns about security at Russian
relieve concerns about Russia’s nuclear com-
nuclear storage facilities after he visited sev-
mand and control system.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

IB98038
08-15-03
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In late July, the United States announced that it would not renew the agreements with
Russia on the plutonium disposition program and the Nuclear Cities Initiative because the
United States and Russia have been unable to agree on liability provisions. Secretary of
Energy Abraham suggested that the two sides exercise a provision in the existing agreement
to continue ongoing projects, until they are able to complete a new agreement. Without these
agreements, work funded under these two programs will end by the end of 2003.
The Conference Committee on the FY2004 Defense Authorization Bill continues to
review the threat reduction and nonproliferation provisions in the legislation and to seek
compromises between the House and Senate versions.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Nuclear Weapons After the Demise of the Soviet Union
After the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union, many analysts grew concerned that nuclear
weapons might be lost or stolen, or that some might be launched by accident or without
authorization by responsible officials. Many of these weapons were located outside Russia,
but have since been returned to storage areas in Russia. The United States has offered,
through efforts such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, to enhance
safety and security at nuclear facilities in Russia. Concerns about the long-term effects of
economic hardship and the increasing age of Soviet-era systems continue to prompt questions
about the security of Russia’s nuclear weapons and materials.
Location of Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union
When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, it possessed, according to most
estimates, more than 27,000 nuclear weapons. These included more than 11,000 strategic
nuclear weapons — warheads on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and in bombers with the range needed to
attack the continental United States — and over 15,000 warheads for nonstrategic tactical
nuclear weapons (such as artillery shells, short-range missiles, nuclear air-defense and
ballistic missile defense interceptors, nuclear torpedoes and sea-launched cruise missiles, and
nuclear weapons for shorter-range aircraft). Bye the end of 2001, Russia reportedly retained
around 5,900 warheads on its strategic nuclear weapons and, according to some reports,
between 7,000 and 12,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
In 1991, more than 80% of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, including all ballistic
missile submarines, were deployed at bases in Russia. The remaining strategic nuclear
weapons were deployed in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. By the end of 1996, these
states had all returned their nuclear warheads to Russia and begun to eliminate the launchers
for strategic nuclear weapons under the terms of the START I Treaty. By the end of 1998,
only Ukraine still had Soviet-era strategic missiles in silos on its territory, and it continued
its efforts to eliminate these missiles and their silos. The last SS-19 ICBM was eliminated
CRS-1

IB98038
08-15-03
at the end of February 1999, and all SS-24 silos were eliminated by October, 2001. After
lengthy and unsuccessful negotiations with Russia, Ukraine began to dismantle the Soviet-era
bombers on its territory. However, in August 1999, Ukraine and Russia announced that
Russia would take 8 of these aircraft as partial payment for Ukraine’s debt for natural gas
deliveries from Russia. In October, the two nations completed the details of the transaction
and noted that Russia would buy 11 of the strategic bombers from Ukraine. Table 1 depicts
the number of nuclear weapons deployed in these states in late 1991 and their status today.
Table 1. Strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Non-Russian Republics
Strategic Nuclear Weapons in
Strategic Nuclear Weapons
State
1991
Today
Belarus
81 SS-25 single-warhead mobile
All SS-25 single-warhead mobile
ICBMs
ICBMs, with warheads and
launchers, removed in Nov. 1996
Kazakhstan
104 SS-18 10-warhead silo-based
All SS-18s removed from silos
ICBMs (1,040 warheads)
and silos destroyed; all warheads,
40 Bear H bombers
bombers and cruise missiles
returned to Russia.
Ukraine
130 SS-19 6-warhead silo-based
All SS-19 silos and SS-24 silos
ICBMs
have been destroyed. Ukraine has
46 SS-24 10-warhead silo-based
completed dismantling of
ICBMs
bombers, after transferring 11 to
About 40 strategic bombers
Russia, and transferred or
More than 500 air-launched
dismantled all cruise missiles.
cruise missiles
Source: U.S. Department of Defense.
Many of the Soviet Union’s tactical nuclear weapons were also stationed outside Russia,
in Eastern Europe or in republics that were closer to prospective theaters of operation. The
weapons in Eastern Europe had reportedly been returned to Russia by 1989. In late 1991,
the majority of weapons outside Russia reportedly were in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan,
with perhaps less than 5% in Georgia and the Central Asian states (Kirghizia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.) According to officials in Russia and these other states, all
the weapons had been moved to storage areas in Russia by the end of 1992.
According to American and Russian sources, the command and control system for all
Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is centered in Moscow. This central command
would have to authorize the use of any nuclear weapons. As the Soviet Union dissolved in
December 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin replaced Soviet President Gorbachev at the
top of the command authority, but the rest of the system remained the same.
Concerns about Command, Control, Safety, and Security
Many in the United States and Russia remain concerned about safety, security, and
control over nuclear weapons in Russia. These concerns center on three general areas —
concerns about weaknesses in Russia’s command and control system; concerns about the
possible loss of nuclear warheads due to lax security or accounting at nuclear weapons
CRS-2

IB98038
08-15-03
facilities; and concerns about the loss or theft of nuclear materials from the former Soviet
Union’s nuclear weapons facilities might.
Russia’s Nuclear Command and Control System
Russia’s nuclear command and control system consists, generally speaking, of early
warning satellites and sensors that would warn of an imminent attack on Russian territory;
the senior political and military leaders who would assess the nature of the attack and, if
necessary, authorize a response using Russia’s nuclear weapons; and the communications
links that these commanders would use to consult with each other and to transmit messages
authorizing the use of nuclear weapons to commanders in the field. These messages would
contain the authorizing and enabling codes needed to “unlock” the permissive action links
(PALs) and other technologies used to make sure that nuclear weapons could not be armed
and launched without authorization from the central command authority. (For a more detailed
description of this command and control system, see CRS Report 97-586, Russia’s Nuclear
Forces: Doctrine and Force Structure Issues.)
Analysts in the United States and Russia have pointed to the degradation of Russia’s
early warning network of satellites and radars to note that Russia may soon lack the ability
to monitor and react to strategic threats to its own territory. In early 1997, Russia’s Defense
Minister Rodionov stated that he feared a loss of control over Russian strategic nuclear
forces in the future if additional funding were not available to maintain and modernize the
communications links in the nuclear command and control structure. Furthermore, in June
and July 1998, both of Russia’s geostationary early warning satellites failed; this leaves
Russia relying on its older satellites and ground radar stations for early warning of ballistic
missile attacks. These systems cannot provide continuous coverage of U.S. missile launch
sites. At the end of August, Latvia shut down the Skrunda radar, which had provided Russia
with early warning of ballistic missile attacks. Russia had hoped that Latvia would allow this
radar to continue operating until a new radar in Belarus was completed.
The U.S. Defense Department has downplayed concerns about a loss of control over
Russia’s nuclear weapons, noting that the central command structure remains in place. But
some analysts fear that Russia could respond to the degradation of the system by
disseminating codes needed to launch nuclear weapons to commanders in the field to make
sure that these commanders could launch missiles in a conflict. This might increase the
possibility of an accidental or unauthorized use of these weapons.
According to Russian press reports, strategic rocket forces personnel have faced serious
financial hardship. Inadequate funding for training and maintenance, along with low morale,
could lead to an eventual breakdown of authority. Shooting incidents at facilities that house
nuclear weapons or materials and onboard a nuclear-powered attack submarines have raised
further concerns about the reliability of Russia’s military personnel. Although problems with
the troops probably would not lead to the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, they could
make it difficult for Russia to remain confident in the reliability and effectiveness of its
nuclear deterrent. The National Intelligence Council reported, in February 2002, that these
concerns had eased somewhat in recent years, as the Russian economy had improved and
wages were restored. Russia has also implemented several programs that screen troops
responsible for nuclear weapons for psychological, drug, and alcohol problems.
CRS-3

IB98038
08-15-03
In 1999, concerns focused on the possibility that the Y2K bug could pose problems for
Russia’s military systems. The two nations established the Y2K Center for Strategic
Stability at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado in late 1999. Together they monitored
ballistic missile launches world-wide from December 30, 1999 through January 15, 2000.
Russian officers manned the center and had access to data from U.S. early warning assets.
The New Year passed with no apparent or reported missile warning problems.
Safety and Security of Stored Nuclear Warheads
In the early 1990s, Russia withdrew most nonstrategic nuclear weapons from
deployment and placed them in secure storage areas. Russia has consolidated these weapons,
reducing from several hundred to, perhaps, less than one hundred storage facilities. Russian
officials also contend that they have begun to dismantle these warheads at a rate of around
2,000 per year. The United States does not have independent confirmation of this number,
and some analysts suspect that Russia could still have 12,000 warheads for nonstrategic
nuclear weapons in its storage facilities. Many in the United States remain concerned about
the level of security at these facilities and some fear that, as a result of poor security and
inadequate record-keeping, Russia may not be able to keep track of all its warheads.
In March 1992, reports suggested that a few nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan might
have been sold to Iran. These reports stated that Iran did not have codes needed to detonate
the weapons but that it might use them to gain design information it needs for its own nuclear
weapons programs. At the time, Russian and Kazakh officials denied that nuclear weapons
were missing, and U.S. officials stated that the United States has no evidence of such a
transfer. Nevertheless, these reports resurfaced in April 1998 — the Jerusalem Post
newspaper reported that an Israeli politician had received Iranian documents showing that
Iran had received these weapons. Russia repeated its denials and U.S. officials repeated that
the United States had no evidence that any nuclear warheads were missing from Russia. The
1998 reports surfaced amidst concerns about Russia construction of nuclear power reactor
in Iran and reports that Russian firms were assisting Iran’s missile development program.
Some believe the timing was intended to apply added pressure on Russia to cease its
cooperation with Iran and on the U.S. Congress to impose sanctions on Russia.
In September 1997, former Russian Security Council head and national security advisor
Alexander Lebed alleged that Russian authorities could not locate 100 out of 250 small
portable nuclear demolition munitions. The Russian Defense Ministry responded by noting
that “the Russian system of nuclear weapons safety keeps nuclear weapons under full control
and makes any unauthorized transport of them impossible.” It also stressed that all nuclear
weapons had been withdrawn to Russia from the former Soviet republics. Other Russian
observers also discounted Lebed’s allegations. In early October 1997, Lebed appeared to
withdraw his allegation, stating that he had investigated the matter and had found no
evidence of missing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the debate in Russia continued, with
some alleging that Russia never had such small munitions and others confirming that the
munitions existed but denying that any are unaccounted for. The White House stressed that
the United States had “no credible information that any [Russian] nuclear weapon ... has
ever been available on the black market.”
In late 1997, George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence indicated that the United
States remained concerned about the possible loss or theft of nuclear weapons and materials
CRS-4

IB98038
08-15-03
in Russia due to declining social and economic conditions. He did not, however, offer any
evidence that such losses had already occurred. But conditions continued to deteriorate, and
some wages went unpaid for several months during the financial crisis that began in mid-
1998. As a result, many analysts have continued to express concerns about the “human
factor” and the possibility that low morale and poor living conditions may combine to
weaken security and controls over nuclear weapons.
General Eugene Habiger, the former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic
Command, visited nuclear weapons storage facilities in Russia to observe safety and security
procedures on two occasions, in October 1997 and June 1998. He stated that he was
impressed with what he saw, although he acknowledged the tour only focused on strategic
nuclear weapons and provided no information about security procedures at storage facilities
for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. He also noted that Russia lacked many high-tech devices
the United States used to maintain security at its nuclear bases and seemed to rely more
heavily on added manpower. But he stated that he did not have any serious concerns about
the security of Russia’s nuclear weapons.
Some in Congress remain concerned about Russia’s stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. The Senate added an amendment to the FY1999 Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
105-261) and the FY2000 Defense Authorization Bill (S. 1059) calling on the President to
press Russia to reduce these weapons in accordance with its pledges from 1991 and 1992.
The amendment also requires that the Secretary of Defense submit a report detailing the
numbers, types, strategic implications, and proliferation risks associated with Russia’s
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. A request for this report remained in the House and Senate
versions of the FY2001 Defense Authorization Bill.
After the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York in September 2001, Russian
officials reportedly increased security at nuclear weapons facilities. They also denied, on
several occasions, that any Russian nuclear weapons were missing. They insisted that
terrorists had not gained access to Russia’s nuclear arsenal.
Former Soviet Nuclear Facilities and Materials
Concerns about the loss or theft of nuclear materials from Russia have grown since the
September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Analysts and government
officials have noted that Osama bin Laden may have sought to acquire nuclear materials,
possibly to construct a nuclear explosive device, but, more likely, to construct a “dirty
bomb.” With this type of weapon, nuclear waste or other radioactive materials would be
combined with conventional explosives and dispersed over a wide area.
There have been numerous reports of nuclear materials from facilities in the former
Soviet Union appearing on the black market in Europe. In most cases, the materials lacked
the purity to be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. However, in several of the reported
cases, the materials could have been useful to a nation seeking to develop nuclear weapons.
In May 1999, the National Research Council, an arm of the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences, issued a report stating that security at Russia’s nuclear materials facilities was
worse than previously reported. The report argued for sustained cooperation between the
United States and Russia to improve security and prevent the diversion of these materials.
Officials from the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry disputed these reports and argued that
CRS-5

IB98038
08-15-03
some safeguards are Russian facilities were more stringent than those at U.S. facilities. The
National Intelligence Council also highlighted the risks of theft or diversion from facilities
housing nuclear materials in its report to Congress in February 2002.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that there may be enough weapons-
usable nuclear materials to produce 40,000 nuclear weapons at facilities in 8 countries that
were once a part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union secured most of these facilities by
placing them in closed cities or by using with gates and armed guards. But, according to
DOE, budget cuts and political upheavals have this system. Many facilities lacked fences,
monitors, alarms, and comprehensive accounting systems to keep track of materials. Reports
indicate that even those facilities with security and monitoring systems often disconnected
them to save money on electric bills and to reduce false alarms. They also have been unable
to pay the guards and officers charged with maintaining security at the facilities.
Deterioration of economic conditions and the decline in military spending has also
displaced many scientists and engineers who worked in Soviet nuclear programs. Although
reports of scientists moving to other countries have waned, the economic problems continue.
For example, on July 23, 1998, several thousand staff members at Arzamas-16, one of
Russia’s premier nuclear research facilities, stopped work during a three-hour strike. They
sought back payment for wages and budget allocations for 1997 and a pay increase for 1998.
Nuclear workers from several of the closed cities participated in a strike in mid-September
1998, with many traveling to Moscow for protests at the Atomic Ministry (MINATOM).
Cooperative Programs For Nuclear Threat Reduction
The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program
Program Objectives and Funding. In November 1991, Congress allocated $400
million in Department of Defense funds to help the former Soviet republics secure their
nuclear weapons. The funds were to provide Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
assistance in 1) the transportation, storage, safeguarding and destruction of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons and the dismantlement of missiles and launchers; 2) the prevention
of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and, 3) the prevention of diversion of
weapons-related scientific expertise. (For details on the CTR program, see CRS Report 97-
1027, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues For Congress.)
Although some Members have questioned the benefits and administration of the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, Congress has consistently supported
the central objectives of the program, allocating $400 million each year in FY1993, 1994,
and 1995 and an additional $300 million in FY1996. In FY1997, the Senate passed a new
amendment sponsored by Senators Nunn, Lugar and Domenici that added $94 million to
DOD and DOE budgets to expand U.S. efforts to contain and control nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons in the former Soviet Union. With these funds Congress provided $364.9
million to DOD for CTR, in addition to the funds for DOE, in the FY1997 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201). Congress also approved $382.2 million for CTR in
FY1998 (P.L. 105-85, H.Rept. 105-340), $440.4 million in FY1999 (P.L. 105-261, H.Rept.
CRS-6

IB98038
08-15-03
105-736), and $475 million in FY2000. However, in FY2000, Congress denied funding for
the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia.
The Clinton Administration requested $458.4 million for CTR in FY2001. The Senate
Armed Services Committee approved the full amount, but limited the use of funds for the
construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility. The House eliminated funding
for the chemical weapons destruction facility and provided only $433.4 million. The House
prevailed and the Conference Report (H.Rept. 106-945) authorized the appropriation of only
$433.4 million for CTR and precluded any expenditures on the construction of a chemical
weapons destruction facility in Russia.
The Bush Administration requested $403 million for CTR in FY2002. The reduction
of $40 million from FY2001 stems mainly from the absence of funding for the Mayak
plutonium storage facility. Russia did not need additional assistance with this project. The
Administration also requested $50 million to resume construction at the Shchuch’ye
chemical weapons destruction facility. Congress approved the request for FY2002, along
with its approval of the full request for $403 million.
The Bush Administration requested $416.7 million for CTR for FY2003. Within this
budget, funding for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination declined from $133.4 million to
$70.5 million in Russia and from $50 million to $6.5 million in Ukraine. This occured
because much of the agreed work had been completed. At the same time, the Administration
increased funding for the Shchuch’ye to $133.6. The FY2003 budget also increased funding
for biological weapons nonproliferation programs. The House and Senate both approved the
full amount for the Administration’s request, although the House reduced funding for the
chemical weapons destruction facility to $50 million. The House Armed Services
Committee argued that this program could not absorb such a large increase in one year and,
because Russia did not yet appear committed to the elimination of its chemical weapons, the
United States should not accelerate its efforts. The final language in the the FY2003 Defense
Authorization Bill (H.R. 4546) retained the reduction in funding for Shchuch’ye. However,
it stated that the Administration can use the $83.6 million removed from this project for a
number of other projects related to the storage and elimination of nuclear weapons. It could
also use the funds for chemical weapons destruction if Russia provides a “full and accurate”
disclosure of its chemical weapons stockpile.
The Bush Administration has requested $450.8 million for DOD’s CTR program in
FY2004. Much of the increase over the FY2003 total of $416.7 represents an increase in
funding for the Shchuch’ye chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia. The
Administration is seeking to accelerate construction of this facility. The Administration has
also reduced funding for strategic offensive arms reduction, in part because much of the work
is complete, but also because it has unexpended FY2003 funds, which were held up until
Congress provided the President with the authority to waive the certification requirements.
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees both approved the President’s request
for $450.8 million, although the House reduced the funding for Shchuch’ye from $200.3
million to $171.5 million. The House also linked U.S. funding for Shchuch’ye to funding
commitments from Russia and from other nations.
In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, J.D. Crouch, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, also identified new objectives for the
CRS-7

IB98038
08-15-03
CTR program. As was noted above, past legislation stated that the CTR program should
provide Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan assistance in the transportation, storage,
safeguarding and destruction of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the
dismantlement of missiles and launchers, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction; and the prevention of diversion of weapons-related scientific expertise.
The Administration’s new objectives are to dismantle weapons of mass destruction and their
associated infrastructure in the former Soviet Union; consolidate and secure weapons of mass
destruction and related technologies and materials; increase transparency and encourage
higher standards of conduct, and support defense and military cooperation with the objective
of preventing proliferation. Although these new objectives may not alter CTR priorities in
the near-term, the potential exists for significant changes in the future. In particular, funding
may shift away from the transportation, storage, and elimination of nuclear weapons towards
efforts to secure and eliminate chemical and biological weapons. In addition, as is evident
in the FY2004 budget request, the Administration is likely to support new efforts that rely
on military-to-military cooperation to enhance border security and deter and detect potential
proliferation activities. Finally, the new emphasis on encouraging “higher standards of
conduct” could produce added interest conditioning U.S. assistance on policies and activities
pursued by the recipient nations.
In its request for CTR, the Bush Administration sought authority to use up to $50
million in CTR funds for programs in nations outside the former Soviet Union. The Senate
approved the President’s request. The House, in its version of the bill (H.R. 1588), also
permits the use of up to $50 million for threat reduction programs outside the former Soviet
Union, but mandates that these funds be transferred from DOD to the State Department’s
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund.
Certifications and waivers. In early 2002, the Bush Administration stated that it
would not certify that Russia was committed to its arms control obligations under the
Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions. The law states that this
certification is necessary for a recipient nation to receive assistance under the CTR program
or the State Department nonproliferation programs. The Administration indicated that
Russia had not cooperated fully with the United States in sharing information relevant to the
implementation of these treaties. It then asked Congress to waive the requirement for the
certification, so that the United States could emphasize its concern with Russian compliance
without interrupting funding for the CTR program. Some observers criticized the
Administration’s policy, noting that even the Administration agrees that these programs serve
U.S. security interests, and that their suspension could undermine U.S. nonproliferation
policy. Some believe the Administration’s action reflects less concern about Russia’s
compliance with arms control agreements then it does the Administration’s belief that these
agreements do not work and should not remain in force.
Congress included a waiver for the remainder of FY2002 in the Supplemental
Appropriations Bill signed by the President on August 2 (H.R. 4775/P.L. 107-206), so that
Russia could continue to receive funds through the end of the fiscal year. The Senate Armed
Services Committee approved a permanent waiver in its version of the FY2003 Defense
Authorization Bill and the House approved one-year waiver; in the Conference Report on the
FY2003 Defense Authorization Bill, (H.R. 4546), Congress approved a 3-year waiver. The
President signed this waiver, and one permitting continued funding for the Shchuch’ye
chemical weapons destruction facility, in mid-January 2003. This step released $466 million
CRS-8

IB98038
08-15-03
in CTR funding, including $183 million for the Shchuch’ye facility. The 108th Congress may
revisit this issue, as some members continue to support a permanent waiver.
10+10 over 10. During the G-8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, the United States,
Russia, and other G-8 leaders agreed to establish a long term program – the G-8 Global
Partnership Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, to stop the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and related materials and technology. Under this program, known as 10+10 over
10, the United States has pledged to provide $10 billion over 10 years to sustain ongoing
threat reduction programs in Russia. The other G-8 nations agreed that they would provide,
together, up to $10 billion over 10 years. The program will initially focus on Russia, but
could eventually extend to other nations. The parties met in late September in an effort to
clarify the financial obligations of each nation and to add details to proposals for projects that
might be funded by the effort. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on
this program in October, 2002. Committee members questioned whether the United States
would increase funding for threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance and how the G-8
members would coordinate their efforts. Administration officials praised the new program
and pledged that the efforts would be coordinated with allies, to avoid duplication.
Witnesses also noted that Russia’s cooperation – with access, transparency, funding, and
legal mechanisms – was needed to ensure effective implementation. The participants
reviewed progress on this program during their meeting in Evian, France in June 2003.
Implementing the Programs. By January 2002, the Department of Defense had
obligated nearly $3 billion for CTR projects and had spent nearly $2.4 billion implementing
those efforts. Early projects focused on transportation of nuclear warheads; the United States
is also helping Russia with nuclear weapons control and accounting systems at storage
facilities. CTR projects have also helped Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan eliminate
Soviet-era strategic nuclear weapons and facilities on their territories. The two sides are also
building a storage facility at Mayak for plutonium removed from Russia’s nuclear weapons.
The facility’s design has been completed and construction is underway. However delays
have occurred because Russia has been unable to fund its portion of the project and the two
sides have been unable to agree on transparency measures that will ensure that materials
stored in the facility are not removed and returned to nuclear weapons uses.
The CTR program has funded projects that addressed a particular proliferation concerns.
In November 1997, the United States purchased 21 nuclear-capable MIG-29 aircraft from the
Republic of Moldova. In April 1998, the United States and Great Britain moved 8.8 pounds
of highly enriched uranium and 17.6 pounds of highly radioactive spent fuel from a nuclear
reactor outside Tbilisi, Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland. In September 1998, the government
of Kazakhstan announced that it planned to move 3 tons of weapons-useable nuclear
materials from a facility near the Iranian border to Semipalatinsk, on the other side of the
nation. Funds from the CTR program would help secure this material, as well.
International Science and Technology Centers
The United States, several European countries, and Japan have all provided funding to
International Science and Technology Centers (ISTC) in Moscow and Kiev. These centers
— which were originally funded through the CTR program, but are now funded by the State
Department — are designed to provide research and peaceful employment opportunities for
nuclear scientists and engineers. The Centers began operations in 1992 and have, thus far,
CRS-9

IB98038
08-15-03
funded around 450 projects at a cost of $145 million. More than 17,000 scientists and
engineers have participated in ISTC projects. Many continue to work at their primary jobs
in Russia’s research facilities. But, because most have not received their full salaries at their
primary jobs, the grants from the ISTC permit them to support their families without
contemplating selling their knowledge to nations seeking nuclear weapons. The Bush
Administration will reportedly recommend expanding the ISTCs, in part due to concerns
about the potential risk that biological weapons scientists might be lured to programs in other
nations. Its budget for FY2003 contains $52 million for a program that combines the Science
Centers and the State Department’s program for redirecting biological weapons scientists in
the former Soviet Union. Reports indicate that the Science Centers may receive about $32
million of this total amount.
Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Programs
Although the Nunn-Lugar CTR program, in its early years, focused on securing nuclear
weapons, it did include some funding for materials control and protection. But government-
to-government negotiations with Russia and the other republics proceeded slowly, so projects
at facilities with these materials did not begin until 1994. In a parallel effort that sought to
reduce these delays, experts from the U.S. nuclear laboratories also began, in 1994, less
formal contacts with their counterparts in Russia to identify and solve safety and security
problems at Russian facilities. Together, the government-to-government and lab-to-lab
projects constitute the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program,
which is funded through the U.S. Department of Energy.
The MPC&A program began with less than $3 million in the FY1993 Nunn-Lugar
budget and $11 million in FY1994. This amount grew to $73 million in FY1995. In
FY1996, Congress expanded these programs through the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
Amendment, and provided $99 million in the DOE budget for MPC&A. The program
received an additional $115 million in FY1997 and $137 million in FY1998. The
Administration requested and the Congress approved $152 million for MPC&A activities in
FY1999. The Clinton Administration requested $145 million for MPC&A activities for
FY2000 and nearly $145 million in FY2001. Congress approved both these requests,
including an additional $30 million in FY2001 that was a part of a long-term nonproliferation
initiative outlined by the Clinton Administration.
According to GAO, the Department of Energy has identified 332 buildings that require
nuclear security systems. By early 2001, DOE had helped upgrade security systems at 115
buildings that contained about 50 metric tons of nuclear materials, protecting about 32% of
the 603 metric tons that DOE believed were at risk of theft. These upgrades include the
installation of improved security systems that use modern technology and strict material
control and accounting systems. The program has also provided security training for Russian
nuclear specialists. DOE officials have noted that the program had has experienced some
problems and results have been limited because most of the materials are in Russia’s closed
nuclear cities and nuclear weapons complex. MINATOM, which is responsible for these
facilities, has been slow to provide DOE with information about and access to these facilities
because of the sensitive nature of the nuclear weapons complex.
In August 2000, the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, a private
organization, issued a report that praised the past MPC&A efforts, but criticized DOE and
CRS-10

IB98038
08-15-03
the Administration for moving too slowly to secure nuclear materials in the Former Soviet
Union. The report outlined a number of steps that it believed the next Administration should
take to accelerate and strengthen the program. It repeated many of these suggestions in a
paper released in October, 2001, noting that the September 11 attacks had renewed and
strengthened concerns about the safety and security of Russia’s nuclear materials.
The Bush Administration sharply reduced the planned funding for MPC&A programs
in FY2002. DOD had planned to request more than $200 million, but the Administration’s
budget reduced the program to 138.8 million. The Senate Armed Services Committee added
$5 million to this request and expressed its concern about that the reduced level of funding
would be inadequate to meet current and future needs. The Senate and House Appropriations
Committees, in the Energy and Water Appropriations bills for FY2002 restored funding for
the MPC&A program to its FY2001 level. Furthermore, Congress included $120 million in
additional funds for this program in a supplemental appropriations bill passed at the end of
2001. The Bush Administration requested $233 million for MPC&A programs in its budget
for FY2003; both the House and the Senate Armed Services Committees approved this
request. It has requested $226 million for MPC&A in FY2004. The House and Senate both
approved this amount.
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
The Department of Energy’s Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program,
which began in 1994, funds projects with non-military applications that have commercial
value for both the United States and the former Soviet republics. This effort is designed to
discourage scientists and engineers in Russia’s nuclear complex from seeking employment
in other nations seeking nuclear weapons. The program has coordinated lab-to-lab contacts
that sought to identify technologies at former Soviet weapons facilities that might have
commercial applications. It also matches U.S. government funds with funds provided by
U.S. companies in projects that seek to commercialize these technologies.
The IPP program received $35 million in the FY1994 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act, and funded 193 projects in 1995. In FY1996, Congress provided $10
million in the DOE budget and the program received another $20 million from the Nunn-
Lugar CTR budget. IPP received $30 million in the DOE budget each year in FY1997 and
FY1998. Through FY1998, the IPP program had obligated $115 million to 435 projects
throughout the former Soviet republics. In FY1999, DOE requested only $15 million, noting
that it had sufficient unexpended funds from previous years to continue ongoing projects
with this funding level. The Senate, however, in its version of the FY1999 Defense
Authorization Bill (S. 2057) provided $30 million for the IPP program. The Conference
Report on the Defense Authorization Bill (H.Rept. 105-736) provided $20 million for the IPP
Program. It also required that the Secretary of Defense submit a study on the number of
former Soviet nuclear weapons scientists and engineers who are likely to be unemployed or
unpaid and the extent to which commercialization projects, such as those sponsored by IPP,
might employ these people and discourage them from selling their knowledge to other
nations. The Clinton Administration requested $30 million for the IPP program for FY2000
and $22.5 million for FY2001. The Bush Administration requested $22.1 million for
FY2002, and this was supported by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
CRS-11

IB98038
08-15-03
In February 1999, the General Accounting Office issued a report that reviewed and
criticized the IPP program. The report noted that Russian institutes had received only
around one-third of the funds allocated to IPP projects — around 50% of the funds had gone
to the DOE labs for oversight and implementation and around 12% had gone to U.S.
companies that were participating in the program — and that taxes, fees, and other charges
had further reduced the amount of money available to Russian scientists. The report also
questioned DOE’s oversight of the programs, noting that program officials do not always
know how many scientists are receiving funds through the IPP program. Finally, the report
questioned whether the program was contributing to U.S. nonproliferation objectives because
none of the projects was yet a commercial success and because some scientists who received
IPP funding might still be working in Russia’s WMD programs. DOE agreed that the IPP
program needed improved oversight, but it questioned the conclusions about its contributions
to U.S. nonproliferation objectives. DOE noted that IPP has temporarily employed
thousands of scientists in around 170 institutes. DOE also stated that the program did not
subsidize scientists who were performing weapons-related work.
In response to the GAO report, the House and Senate both reduced the Administration’s
request for funding for the IPP program in FY2000 and limited the proportion of the funding
that can be allocated to the U.S. national labs. In the Conference Report on the FY2000
Defense Authorization Bill, Congress approved $25 million for IPP and specified that no
more than 35% of the funds be spent at the U.S. labs. It also mandated that the United States
seek to negotiate agreements with Russia to ensure that funds provided under this program
are not subject to taxes in Russia. Furthermore, it requested that the Secretary of Energy
review IPP programs for their commercialization potential.
Nuclear Cities Initiative
In August 1998, Vice President Gore and then-Prime Minister Kiriyenko signed an
agreement establishing the Nuclear Cities Initiative. This program is designed to bring
commercial enterprises to Russia’s closed nuclear cities, so that scientists and engineers will
not be tempted to sell their knowledge to nations seeking nuclear weapons. In September
1998, Secretary of Energy Richardson and Russia’s Minister of Atomic Energy signed an
implementing agreement for this program. It is designed to promote nonproliferation goals
by helping to redirect the work of nuclear weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians and
to develop commercial opportunities in those cities. For example, it helped finance a
computing center in Sarov, formerly known as Arzamas-16, that will produce software for
sale around the world.
The Clinton Administration requested $30 million for the NCI program in FY2000. In
its February 1999 report, the GAO recommended that DOE move slowly with this initiative
to ensure that it met its stated goals and objectives. As a result, Congress reduced funding
for this program to $7.5 million in FY2000, limiting U.S. assistance to only one of three
nuclear cities that were included in the Administration’s initiative. The Clinton
Administration has requested $17.5 million for this program in FY2001. Although most
members of Congress have questioned the value of this program, in April 2000, Senator
Domenici announced that he was considering introducing legislation that would expand
funding for the NCI program. He stated that his goal would be to expand U.S. efforts to
help Russia downsize its nuclear complex. This legislation became S.Amdt. 3760 to the
Senate version of the Defense Authorization Bill. It authorized $30 million for the NCI
CRS-12

IB98038
08-15-03
program for FY2001, and passed the Senate on July 13, 2000. The Conference Committee
accepted this level of funding for NCI in FY2001 but limited the amount that could be
expended until the Secretary of Energy implemented a review process for the program.
The Bush Administration cut funding for the NCI program sharply, requesting $6.6
million for FY2002. With this low level of funding, the program would have to withdraw
from two of the three nuclear cities that participate. The Administration has also indicated
that it would like to eliminate the NCI program and merge its remaining projects into the IPP
program. The Senate Armed Services supported the Administration’s funding request for
NCI, but did not support the Administration’s plan to merge the NCI program with the IPP
program. The House, however, required that DOE merge the NCI program with the IPP
program in by July 1, 2001. In the Conference Report on the FY2002 Defense Authorization
Bill, Congress approved the merger of the two programs, into a new Russian Transition
Initiative, but, at the Senate’s insistence, required that DOE continue to plan for and fund the
NCI programs separately. It also increased funding for the combined program from the
President’s request of $28.8 million to $42 million in the Energy and Water Appropriations
Bill and an additional $15 million in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill. The
Bush Administration has requested and received $39 million for this combined program in
its budget for FY2003. It has requested approximately the same amount for FY2004, with
$17 million allocated to NCI and $23 million allocated to IPP. However, the NCI program
may end by the end of 2003 because the United States and Russia have been unable to
complete a new implementing agreement. They remain at odds over liability protections
Bilateral Meetings
The U.S.-Russian Commission on Economic and Technological
Cooperation (The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission). In 1993, Presidents Clinton
and Yeltsin established the U.S.-Russian Commission on Economic and Technological
Cooperation, chaired by Vice President Gore and Russia’s Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.
Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin often used their meetings to address
issues, such as arms control and missile defense cooperation, on the agenda for upcoming
Presidential summits. In 1994, the commission announced that the two sides would
cooperate in building a storage facility at Mayak (described above) for plutonium removed
from Russia’s nuclear weapons. In 1994, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin also signed the agreement that established the program through which the
United States will purchase 500 metric tons of uranium removed from Russian nuclear
weapons for use in nuclear power reactors.
In June 1994, the two sides signed an agreement requiring the shutdown of nuclear
reactors that produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. Russia initially balked at this because
it used the same reactors to produce light and heat in the cities of Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk,
but the two sides agreed to find ways to replace these energy sources. Russia announced that
it had stopped producing plutonium for weapons in these reactors by the end of 1994, but it
did not shut them down because these alternatives were not yet available. The United States
had planned to contribute $80 million, through the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program, to convert the
reactors to a type that did not produce weapons materials and the two sides signed an
implementing agreement in September 1997. However, in February 2000, the Russian
government reportedly told the Clinton Administration that it wanted to cancel the project
because of delays, cost overruns, and fears of a catastrophic accident. Instead, Russia
CRS-13

IB98038
08-15-03
suggested that it would close the reactors altogether if the United States would help fund
conventional energy sources for the affected cities. Congress has prohibited the use of CTR
funds for the construction of “fossil fuel energy plants.” But the Bush Administration has
continued to work with Russia in an effort to shut down the reactors.
During their June 24, 1998 meeting, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Kiriyenko
signed two agreements on nuclear issues. The United States agreed to provide Russia with
assistance in converting plutonium from nuclear weapons to fuel for nuclear reactors. In the
second agreement, the United States pledged $3.1 million for 9 projects that are designed to
help scientists in Russia’s closed nuclear cities convert their efforts to peaceful civilian
endeavors, a project known as the Nuclear Cities Initiative. The Bush Administration has
indicated that it will not continue to address U.S-Russian issues through this high-level
bilateral commission. Instead, the Administration will establish working groups to address
individual security and economic issues as the need arises.
The Strategic Stability Working Group (SSWG). In late 1993, the United States
and Russia established an experts working group of experts to discuss ways to improve
strategic stability, increase mutual confidence, and relax the Cold War nuclear force postures.
One of the first topics the SSWG addressed was ballistic missile “detargeting.” In an
agreement that took effect on May 30, 1994, the two nations agreed that no country would
be targeted by any strategic forces on either side. Many observers praised this agreement as
an overdue sign that the United States and Russia no longer consider each other enemies.
Some also saw it as a move away from the nuclear hair-trigger and a concrete step to reduce
the risk of accidental missile launches. Others, however, argued that its benefits were strictly
symbolic because both sides could quickly retarget missiles during a crisis. Many also noted
that the measure was not verifiable, so neither side could be sure that the other’s missiles
were actually detargeted.
Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility Talks. In January 1994,
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin established a working group to consider steps to ensure the
transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons. The Safeguards,
Transparency, and Irreversibility working group produced an agreement, in principle, for the
two sides to exchange data on warhead stockpiles. But they were unable to complete an
agreement that would permit the exchange of classified data on nuclear warheads. Congress
had amended U.S. law to permit this exchange in 1994, but Russia has neither passed
legislation nor issued the necessary executive decree.
Arms Control Proposals
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. In 1991, the United States and Soviet Union each
announced the withdrawal of most of their deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The
United States and Russia have periodically exchanged information updating the status of the
withdrawals and assuring the other side that the remaining weapons are in safe and secure
storage areas. During their summit meeting in Helsinki in March 1997, Presidents Clinton
and Yeltsin agreed to explore possible arms control measures relating to tactical nuclear
weapons and warheads removed from strategic nuclear weapons during the proposed START
III negotiations, but these talks did not materialize. Some in the United States would like
further restrictions on Russian tactical nuclear weapons both because they believe these
might pose a proliferation risk and because Russia has a far greater number of these weapons
CRS-14

IB98038
08-15-03
than does the United States. Russia has resisted formal limits although it did exchange date
with NATO in April 1998. This effort was designed not only to ease Russia’s concerns
about NATO’s nuclear weapons, but also to provide NATO with information about the
thousands of tactical nuclear weapons still in service in Russia.
Agreement on the Disposition of Weapons-grade Plutonium. In Sept. 1998,
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that each nation would convert 50 metric tons of
weapons-grade plutonium to a form that could not be returned to nuclear weapons. Clinton
Administration officials estimated that this amount was approximately half of the U.S.
stockpile and perhaps 25% of Russia’s stockpile. The agreement highlighted two means for
converting the plutonium — the parties could either convert it to fuel for nuclear power
reactors or mix it with other nuclear wastes and dispose of it in a way the would preclude its
use in nuclear weapons. This agreement is designed to ease concerns about the possible theft
or diversion of weapons-grade plutonium by nations or others seeking to develop their own
nuclear weapons. Congress allocated $200 million for this program in the Omnibus
Appropriations Act passed at the end of the 105th Congress. The Clinton Administration had
planned to request $400 million for this program in FY2002, but the Bush Administration
has indicated that funding would remain at around $200 billion. After its review of U.S.
nonproliferation programs with Russia, the Bush Administration indicated that it would seek
an alternative plan, that would be less costly and less complex, to address concerns with
Russia’s stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium. Under the new plan, the two nations will
each convert plutonium to MOX fuel. But U.S. assistance to Russia for the construction of
its MOX plant may end in late 2003 because the United States and Russia have been unable
to complete a new implementing agreement. They remain at odds over liability protections.
Sharing Early Warning Data. In September 1998, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
agreed that the United States and Russia would share early warning data for all space
launches and ballistic missile launches world wide. They agreed to share data on a continual
basis, in real time (rather than providing it annually or biannually); they agreed that data
would include information on strategic, theater, and intermediate range missiles, and on
space launches; they agreed the data would be derived from early warning satellites and
ground-based radars; and they agreed to establish a multilateral pre-launch notification
system that would be open to all nations who agreed to share data prior to missile or space
launches from their territories. The Clinton Administration emphasized that this agreement
would strengthen stability and protect against the possibility of a nuclear launch triggered by
false warning of an attack. Administration officials have also highlighted the cooperative
nature of this endeavor; this Center will provide the first opportunity for U.S. and Russian
military personnel to be permanently involved in a joint military operation.
In mid-December 2000, the United States and Russia signed an agreement outlining the
types of information that would be exchanged in the newly-formed Joint Data Exchange
Center (JDEC) near Moscow. This agreement establishes a pre-launch and post-launch
notification system for ballistic missile and space launches and designed to reduce the risk
that a test, experiment, or space launch, could be misread as a ballistic missile attack. Some
critics of the planned center argued it would hinder U.S. access to space by requiring that
notifications before launches, but the military space community reportedly reviewed all the
provisions and approved of the plan because it allows for exceptions to the notification
requirement in the interest of national security. Most experts hoped the center, which is to
be based in an old school building near Moscow, would begin operations in 2001. However,
CRS-15

IB98038
08-15-03
the building’s renovations have not yet begun. Disagreements between the United States and
Russia about tax issues, along with a general cooling in the relationship between the two
countries, have been cited as reasons for the delay. Congress authorized funding for the
JDEC in 2002, but withheld 50% of the funds until Russia and the United States reach a cost-
sharing agreement and an agreement on taxes and liability for U.S. participants. In a Joint
Declaration signed during their summit meeting in Moscow in May 2002, Presidents Bush
and Putin emphasized that they remain committed to opening the center.
Alert Rates for Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Many analysts argue that Russia’s
aging satellite and communication systems, when combined with the high alert rates for U.S.
and Russian nuclear forces (both can launch on very short notice), increase the possibility
of a nuclear attack. If Russia lacks complete information about the status of U.S. forces it
might interpret ambiguous events as a missile launch. Some in the United States, such as
Bruce Blair and former Senator Sam Nunn, have proposed that the United States and Russia
“de-alert” their nuclear weapons. They argue that, if U.S. weapons were not on alert, Russia
would be less likely to assume that it were under attack if it detected ambiguous activities.
In addition, if Russia took its forces off alert, it would not have to loosen controls over them
to ensure their launch in a crisis because the missiles would not be ready to be launched in
a crisis. Those who support de-alerting have outlined several different measures, from
removing warheads from missiles and storing them separately, to removing launch keys from
control centers or removing critical data from launch computers.
Those who oppose “de-alerting” argue that it will undermine stability because warheads
in a few storage depots may be far more vulnerable to a preemptive attack than warheads
deployed on hundreds of missiles in hardened silos. Each side might also feel compelled to
“re-alert” its forces quickly if it suspected that the other side had done so, and that this could
lead to a destabilizing “alert” race, with each trying to gain an advantage over the other.
Officials in Russia have shown no interest in this proposal; instead, some Russians have
argued that “de-alerting” appears to be a U.S. attempt to disarm Russian missiles. In late
1997, an inter-agency working group assessed possible measures to “de-alert” U.S. nuclear
forces but it did not result in any changes in the alert status of U.S. nuclear forces.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
Executive Branch Reports
U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. August 1997.
U.S. Department of Energy. MPC&A Strategic Plan. January 1998.
CRS Products
CRS Issue Brief IB98030. Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda.
CRS Report 97-1027. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for
Congress.
CRS-16