Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda

Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda

Order Code IB98030
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nuclear Arms Control:
The U.S.-Russian Agenda
Updated April 19, 2006
Amy F. Woolf
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
START I
Treaty Provisions
Ratification and Implementation
Ratification
Weapons Deactivation
Monitoring and Verification
Compliance
START II
Treaty Provisions
Ratification
Further Reductions in Offensive Weapons
Proposed Provisions for START III
The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Treaty Provisions
The Demarcation and Succession Agreements
Agreed Statements on Demarcation
Memorandum of Understanding on Succession
The ABM Treaty and National Missile Defenses
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Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda
SUMMARY
By the late 1990s, arms control negotia-
address measures related to non-strategic
tions were not as important to the U.S.-Rus-
nuclear weapons and the warheads removed
sian relationship as they were to the U.S.-
from weapons eliminated under the treaty.
Soviet relationship during the Cold War. But
Negotiations to turn this framework into a
the United States and Russia continued to
formal agreement proved difficult. The Bush
implement existing nuclear arms control
Administration did not continued negotiations
agreements and to pursue negotiations on
towards START III or complete the ratifica-
further reductions in their strategic offensive
tion of START II. Instead, President Bush
weapons and modifications to limits on ballis-
informed President Putin of planned reduc-
tic missile defenses. This issue brief summa-
tions to 1,700-2,200 warheads in November
rizes these agreements and tracks progress in
2001. The United States and Russia
their ratification and implementation.
completed the Moscow Treaty, codifying
these reductions, in May 2002. The Senate
The 1991 START I Treaty entered into
gave its advice and consent to the Moscow
force in December 1994. It limits the United
Treaty’s ratification on March 6, 2003.
States and four successors to the Soviet Union
— Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
In September 1997, the United States and
— to 6,000 accountable warheads on 1,600
Russia signed several documents related to the
strategic offensive delivery vehicles. The
1972 ABM Treaty that established a demar-
parties completed the elimination process
cation line between ABM systems and theater
outlined in the Treaty on December 4, 2001.
missile defense systems, which are not limited
The parties continue to implement the on-site
by the Treaty. They also signed a memoran-
inspections that are a part of the Treaty’s
dum that named Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and
complex verification regimen. The United
Kazakhstan as the successors to the Soviet
States and Russia signed START II in January
Union for the ABM Treaty. The Clinton
1993. This agreement would reduce U.S. and
Administration never submitted these to the
Russian strategic offensive forces to 3,500
Senate for advice and consent. It did how-
warheads. In September 1997, the United
ever, pursue negotiations on modifications to
States and Russia signed a Protocol to START
the Treaty that would permit the deployment
II to extend the elimination period in the treaty
of national missile defenses. The Bush Ad-
to the end of the year 2007. The U.S. Senate
ministration believed the Treaty was out of
approved the Treaty’s ratification in January
date, and that the United States must withdraw
1996 and the Russian legislature did so in
to pursue missile defense. It suggested that
April 2000, but the treaty has not yet entered
the United States and Russia agree to set the
into force. In March 1997, Presidents Clinton
Treaty aside. Russia did not accept this pro-
and Yeltsin agreed that the United States and
posal. The United States announced, on
Russia would negotiate a START III Treaty
December 13, 2001, that it would withdraw
after START II entered into force. START III
from the Treaty. This withdrawal occurred six
would reduce their forces to between 2,000
months later, on June 13, 2002.
and 2,500 warheads. They also agreed to
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The United States and Russia continue to implement the monitoring and verification
provisions of the START Treaty. For example, U.S. inspectors visited a submarine base in
Russia on February 20, to confirm the numbers and types of vessels at the base.
START, which was signed in 1991 and entered into force in late 1994, is due to lapse
in 2009. According to the Treaty, the parties could choose to extend the Treaty and continue
to apply its provisions. None of the parties to the Treaty (the United States, Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan) have yet expressed their intentions or their goals for that time.
Analysts have begun to question the future of the treaty, however, particularly because the
2002 Moscow Treaty, which does not expire until 2012, relies on many of the monitoring
provisions in START for its verification.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
During the Cold War, arms control negotiations were a central feature of U.S.-Soviet
relations. Observers disagreed about whether these would enhance U.S. security by limiting
Soviet weapons and providing information about Soviet capabilities or undermine U.S.
security by limiting U.S. weapons while the Soviet Union continued to pursue more capable
systems. Many noted, however, that arms control negotiations were sometimes the only
place where the two nations could communicate and pursue cooperative efforts — even if
they did little to control arms or reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. In the late
1980s and early 1990s, the United States and Soviet Union/Russia signed several agreements
that reduced nuclear weapons.
The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) eliminated all land-based
ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 300 and 3,400 miles. The 1991 Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty, START I, mandated reductions in numbers of warheads deployed
on long-range land-based and submarine-based missiles and on heavy bombers. In January
1993, the United States and Russia signed the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty,
START II, which would further reduce the number of warheads on their strategic offensive
forces. The United States and Russia also held discussions on a START III treaty.
The Bush Administration argued that arms control negotiations and formal treaties
should not be a central feature of the U.S.-Russian relationship. The United States withdrew
from the ABM Treaty in June 2002. The United States and Russia continue to implement
START I, but START II never entered into force. And, after initially insisting that the
United States would reduce its nuclear weapons unilaterally, the United States and Russia
signed a new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in May 2002. This issue brief reviews
developments in these efforts and summarizes proposals for further arms control agreements.
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START I
Treaty Provisions
START I, signed on July 31, 1991, limits the United States and successors to the Soviet
Union to 6,000 warheads attributed to 1,600 strategic offensive delivery vehicles —
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) and heavy bombers. The treaty also limits each side to 4,900 warheads attributed
to ballistic missiles, 1,540 warheads attributed to heavy ICBMs, and 1,100 warheads
attributed to mobile ICBMs. Warheads are “attributed” to missiles and heavy bombers
through counting rules that assign each deployed missile or bomber a warhead number. The
number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs usually equals the number actually
deployed on that type of missile, but the number attributed to heavy bombers is far fewer
than the number of bombs or cruise missiles that each type of bomber can be equipped to
carry. The Treaty allows “downloading” of warheads to reduce the number of warheads
attributed and carried on some multiple warhead (MIRVed) missiles.
To monitor forces and verify compliance with START I, the parties rely on their own
national technical means (NTM) and numerous cooperative measures designed to
supplement information received through NTM. These include extensive data exchanges on
the numbers and locations of affected weapons and several types of on-site inspections (OSI),
including baseline inspections to confirm initial data, inspections of closed-out facilities or
eliminated equipment, inspection of suspect sites, and continuous monitoring of certain
facilities. The parties must also notify each other of several types of activities, such as the
movement of items limited by the treaty. The parties agreed to refrain from encrypting or
denying the telemetry (missile test data) needed to monitor many qualitative and quantitative
limits. The treaty established the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC),
where the parties meet to discuss treaty implementation issues and compliance questions.
In May 1992, the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed a
Protocol to START I that listed those four former Soviet republics as the successors to the
Soviet Union for the Treaty. In this agreement, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all agreed
to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states and to
eliminate the strategic nuclear weapons on their territories. In separate agreements, these
three states arranged to return the nuclear warheads from those weapons to Russia.
Ratification and Implementation
Ratification. The U.S. Senate gave consent to the ratification of START I on October
1, 1992. Kazakhstan ratified START I in June 1992; it joined the NPT as a non-nuclear state
on February 14, 1994. Belarus approved START I and the NPT on February 4, 1993, and
formally joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on July 22, 1993. The Russian
parliament approved START I on November 4, 1992, but stated that it would not exchange
the instruments of ratification until all three of the other republics adhered to the NPT as
non-nuclear states. Ukraine delayed action on START I for nearly two years. On January
14, 1994, Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin, and Kravchuk of Ukraine signed a Trilateral Statement
in which Ukraine agreed to transfer all the nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia and to
eliminate the treaty-accountable delivery vehicles for these warheads in exchange for
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compensation and security assurances. The Ukrainian parliament approved the Trilateral
Statement and START I in early February 1994. It eventually approved Ukraine’s accession
to the NPT in November 1994. On December 5, 1994, the United States, Russia, and Great
Britain signed a memorandum granting security assurances to Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan. Ukraine then acceded to the NPT, the five parties to START I exchanged
instruments of ratification, and START I entered into force.
Weapons Deactivation. On December 5, 2001, the United States and Russia
announced that they had eliminated all the weapons necessary to meet the Treaty’s limits of
6,000 accountable warheads on their strategic offensive nuclear weapons. The United States
had removed all of the Minuteman II missiles from their silos and had eliminated or
converted 449 of the 450 Minuteman II silos according to the provisions outlined in START.
The United States has withdrawn from service and removed the missiles from all of its
Poseidon ballistic missile submarines and had eliminated the submarines. It also had
completed the reduction or conversion of heavy bombers that would no longer be equipped
to carry nuclear weapons. The United States deactivated all of its Peacekeeper ICBMs by
September 19, 2005. However, since it will not eliminate the launchers for these missiles,
the warheads that would have been carried on them still count under the Treaty limits. As
of January 1, 2006, the United States retained 5,966 treaty-accountable warheads on 1,225
delivery vehicles.
Soviet forces declined from more than 10,000 warheads on 2,500 delivery vehicles in
1990 to 4,339 warheads on 927 delivery vehicles on January 1, 2006. All the nuclear
warheads from SS-18 missiles and weapons for bombers in Kazakhstan had been returned
to Russia by May 1995. All the nuclear weapons had been removed from Ukraine’s territory
by June 1, 1996 and all 81 of the SS-25 missiles based in Belarus had been returned to
Russia by late November 1996. Ukraine has eliminated all of the SS-19 and SS-24 ICBM
silos on its territory. Ukraine has also eliminated all 43 heavy bombers that were left on its
territory. In late 1999, Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement for Ukraine to return 11
bombers — 3 Bear H bombers and 8 Blackjack bombers — to Russia in exchange for
forgiveness of part of its natural gas debts to Russia.
Monitoring and Verification. All the parties to START I have conducted on-site
inspections permitted by the treaty. In addition to conducting routine inspections called for
in the Treaty, U.S. inspectors also monitored the elimination of 20 Russian SLBMs in early
December 1997. Although not mandated by the treaty, Russia eliminated these missiles by
launching them from submarines and destroying them shortly after launch.
Compliance. The parties to START I agree that there have been few significant
compliance questions. In 1995, however, the United States raised concerns about Russian
compliance with the treaty’s provisions on the conversion of missiles to space launch
vehicles when Russia used a converted SS-25 ICBM to launch a satellite. According to
published reports, Russia did not allow the United States to inspect the missile to confirm
that it was configured as a space launch vehicle when it exited the Votkinsk missile assembly
facility, and it failed to provide the proper notifications, as specified in START I, about the
location of the missile prior to the satellite launch. Russia claimed that it was not obligated
to follow these procedures because the missile a dedicated space launch vehicle that was not
limited by START. The United States held that it was subject to START I inspection and
notification provisions because it was a variant of a missile limited by the treaty. After
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discussions in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), the two sides
agreed that a limited number these launch vehicles could leave the Votkinsk facility without
imaging inspections. They would still have to be measured and opened to confirm that they
were not treaty-limited missiles. In November 1997, the two sides reached a final agreement
that would cover any additional space-launch vehicles assembled at Votkinsk.
In June 1998, the Russian press reported that Russian officials were concerned about
U.S. compliance with START I. For example, tests of the British Trident missiles may have
released 10-12 warheads, rather than the 8 permitted on U.S. Trident missiles. The United
States believes this is consistent with START I because the Treaty does not limit British
missiles, but some in Russia argue that the United States could gain valuable information that
would permit it to deploy its own missiles with 10-12 warheads. Some in Russia also
contend that the United States has altered the B-1 bombers to make it easier for them to carry
cruise missiles. These changes are not banned by the START I Treaty, and the United States
could equip B-1 bombers without violating its obligations, but this would change the
accounting for the bombers under START I. Most of these issues were addressed in the
JCIC. Some observers speculated that the Russian reports were designed to deflect criticism
about Russia’s failure to ratify START II. Officials in the Russian Defense Ministry repeated
the accusations of U.S. non-compliance with START I in late January 1999. The timing of
Russia’s complaint appeared to derive from U.S. funding and support for a national ballistic
missile defense system and its intentions to negotiate amendments in the 1972 ABM Treaty.
In its August 2005 report on compliance with arms control agreements, the Bush
Administration reported that the United States still has questions and concerns about some
Russian practices associated with implementation of the Treaty and its inspection provisions.
These relate to procedures used during inspections of reentry vehicles, to ensure that they do
not exceed the maximum number of allowed warheads, measurements of deployed missile
canisters, and exchange of telemetry and other data during missile launches. The two nations
have discussed and sought to resolve these issues in meetings of the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission (JCIC).
START II
Treaty Provisions
The United States and Russia signed START II on January 3, 1993. It would have
limited each side to 3,000-3,500 accountable warheads on strategic offensive delivery
vehicles, with no more than 1,750 warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs). The Treaty also banned all multiple warhead ICBMS (MIRVed ICBMs). As under
START I, the parties could reduce their deployed warheads and eliminate MIRVed ICBMs
by downloading, or removing, warheads from deployed missiles. Because the parties could
remove, at most, 4 warheads from each missile, ICBMs with 10 warheads would have had
to be eliminated, rather than downloaded. The treaty made an exception for the Russian SS-
19 missile, which carries 6 warheads. Russia could have removed 5 warheads from 105 of
these missiles so that they would count as single-warhead missiles. For the most part,
START II would have relied on the same verification regime as START I. (For details, see
CRS Report 93-35, START II: Central Limits and Force Structure Implications and CRS
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Report 93-617, The START and START II Arms Control Treaties: Background and Issues.
Both reports are out-of-print. For copies, contact Amy Woolf at 202-707-2379.)
Ratification
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on START II in March 1993,
but delayed further debate until START I entered into force. Hearings resumed in early
1995, but a dispute over plans to reorganize the State Department and eliminate the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency delayed further action. After the Senate leadership
reached agreement on those issues, the Foreign Relations Committee approved the START
II resolution of ratification for START II by a unanimous vote on December 12, 1995. The
full Senate voted 87-4, offering its advice and consent to ratification, on January 26, 1996.
The lower house of Russia’s parliament, the Duma, began considering START II in July
1995 but the debate did not proceed well. In early 1998, leaders in the Duma stated that they
would probably debate the treaty and vote on its ratification by June 1998, but this date
passed without action. The Duma resumed work on START II during its fall session, and
it had drafted a law on ratification for the treaty by the end of November, 1998. It again
planned to begin the debate in December, but this was delayed because the Duma did not yet
have a draft law on financing for the nation’s strategic nuclear forces. Nevertheless, officials
in the Yeltsin government continued to press for START II approval, and many began to
believe the Duma would act by the end of December. However, it again delayed
consideration after U.S. and British air strikes on Iraq in mid-December. The Treaty’s future
clouded again after the United States announced its plans in January 1999 to negotiate
amendments to the 1972 ABM Treaty. However, the Duma leadership sent the draft law on
ratification to President Yeltsin in late March 1999. On March 19, the Duma’s leadership
announced that it had scheduled a debate for April 2, 1999. This debate was canceled after
NATO forces began their air campaign in Yugoslavia.
After he took office at the end of 1999, President Vladimir Putin expressed his support
for START II and pressed the Duma to approve its ratification. The Duma Foreign Affairs
committee recommended START II ratification in early April, and the Duma voted to
approve ratification on April 14, 2000. The upper chamber of the Parliament, the Federation
Council, did the same on April 19, 2000.
Some Duma members objected to START II because they generally opposed President
Yeltsin and his policies. Others argued that Russia should not reduce its offensive forces as
NATO expanded into central Europe because NATO could then move its nuclear weapons
closer to Russia’s borders. And some argued that Russia should not approve START II until
it is certain that the United States will continue to abide by the 1972 ABM Treaty — they
feared that the United States could undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent if it deployed
extensive missile defenses while Russia reduced its offensive forces.
The debate over START II also revealed concerns about the substance of the Treaty.
Some argued the treaty would undermine Russia’s security by eliminating the core of
Russia’s strategic forces — the MIRVed ICBMs. In addition, Russia would need hundreds
of new single-warhead ICBMs to retain 3,500 warheads as it eliminates MIRVed ICBMs.
As a result, some in the Duma suggested that the United States and Russia skip START II
and negotiate further reductions so that the United States would have to reduce to levels that
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Russia might end up at anyway. (For details, see CRS Report 97-359, START II Debate in
the Russian Duma: Issues and Prospects, by Amy F. Woolf.)
In March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to extend the elimination
timelines in START II and established guidelines for a START III Treaty that would reduce
both sides’ forces to 2,000-2,500 warheads. On September 26, 1997, Secretary of State
Albright and Russia’s Foreign Minister Primakov signed a protocol to START II that
formalized the extension of START II deadlines. They also exchanged letters repeating the
Presidents’ agreement that the two sides would deactivate all the weapons to be eliminated
under START II by the end of 2003. The two sides agreed to work out methods for
deactivation as soon as the treaty entered into force. Russia added another provision to its
letter, noting that it expected a START III treaty to enter into force before the deactivation
deadline for START II. The United States acknowledged this statement but did not agree.
Both Yeltsin and Putin reportedly told the Duma committees that Russia could not
afford to retain strategic offensive forces at START I levels. Ratification of START II would
not only ensure that the United States reduced its forces along with Russia, but would also
permit the two nations to move on to deeper reductions in START III. These arguments
apparently swayed enough members of the Duma to win approval for the Treaty.
The Duma attached several conditions to its Federal Law on Ratification. The Law
indicates that U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty would be considered an
extraordinary event that would give Russia the right to withdraw from START II. President
Putin appeared to endorse this view when he stated that Russia would pull out of the entire
system of arms control agreements on strategic nuclear forces if the United States dismantled
the ABM Treaty. Furthermore, the Federal Law on Ratification states that Russia will not
exchange the instruments of ratification on START II until the United States approves the
ratification of the 1997 Agreed Statements on Demarcation and Memorandum of
Understanding on Succession to the ABM Treaty. The Clinton Administration never
submitted these agreements to the U.S. Senate.
The Bush Administration did not complete the ratification process, and, after the United
States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in June 2002, Russia announced that it would not
abide by the terms of START II. Russia now plans to retain its large MIRVed ICBMs,
keeping at least one regiment of its mobile, 10-warhead SS-24 missiles 138 ten-warhead S-
18 missiles through at least 2015. Even though the Treaty did not enter into force, the Bush
Administration has deactivated the 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs that would have been banned by
the Treaty. But the United States will not eliminate the launchers for these missiles as would
have been required by START II. According to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, the United
States no longer needs these missiles and the Air Force had not provided any funds to
maintain or operate them. The United States also plans to convert four Trident submarines
to carry cruise missiles and special operations forces, without eliminating the launch tubes
as it would have had to under START II.
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Further Reductions in Offensive Weapons
Proposed Provisions for START III
In March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the United States and Russia
would negotiate a START III treaty as soon as START II entered into force. This treaty
would limit each side to between 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads by December 31,
2007. The Presidents also agreed that START III should contain measures to promote the
irreversibility of the weapons elimination process, including transparency measures and the
destruction of strategic nuclear warheads removed from delivery vehicles. This responds to
a condition that the Senate added to the START I resolution of ratification and it could
address concerns about the possible theft or sale of warheads to nations seeking their own
nuclear weapons. The two sides have attempted, with little progress, to implement warhead
data exchanges for several years.
The Presidents also agreed the two sides would explore possible measures for
long-range, nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles and other tactical nuclear weapons.
Russia has long sought restrictions on U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles. The United States
unilaterally withdrew these missiles from deployment in 1991, but Russia fears that these
missiles could threaten targets in Russia if the United States redeployed them. The United
States would like further restrictions on Russian tactical nuclear weapons because these may
pose a proliferation risk; Russia would like restrictions on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to
ensure that they are not deployed on the territory of new NATO members.
During discussions on START III, both sides introduced numerous provisions that
would address all the issues outlined in the Helsinki framework, but they could not resolve
their differences. For example, the Russians proposed that the treaty reduce strategic nuclear
forces to 1,500 or fewer warheads on each side. The United States has resisted such deep
reductions in the past, and when it tabled a new proposal in January 2000, it reportedly
continued to insist that START III reduce forces to 2,000 or 2,500 warheads.
Press reports indicate that the Clinton Administration had asked DOD to assess the
implications of lower levels again, in early May 2000, in preparation for President Clinton’s
summit with President Putin scheduled for early June 2000. Military leaders reportedly
rejected lower levels again. At the time, many analysts expected the Clinton Administration
to negotiate a “Grand Bargain,” where the United States would accept lower limits for
START II if Russia accepted ABM Treaty modifications that would permit the deployment
of a U.S. NMD. However, the summit did not produce any arms control agreements.
Presidents Clinton and Putin did, however, agree to intensify their negotiations on START
III. Furthermore, during a press conference after their meetings, President Clinton said that
the United States would have to alter its strategic plans to reduce its forces to 1,500
warheads. And he indicated that such a change in plans would be more complete if the
United States knew what role missile defenses would play in the U.S. plan.
In November 2000, President Putin outlined a new proposal for reductions in offensive
forces, stating that Russia would be willing to reduce to 1,500 warheads or lower if the
United States remained committed to the ABM Treaty. President Clinton did not respond
directly to this proposal. Many analysts doubted that the United States would accept such
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a proposal because U.S. officials had indicated that the United States would only be willing
to cut its forces that deeply if Russia agreed to modify the ABM Treaty.
The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
During his first year in office, President Bush stated that the United States and Russia
could move away from formal arms control treaties and reduce forces unilaterally or in
parallel to whatever level each side decided was appropriate. At their meeting following the
G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed that the two nations would
begin consultations on offensive and defensive weapons. The Russians apparently expected
these consultations to produce agreed limits on offensive forces and minor modifications of
the ABM Treaty. The Bush Administration, however, stated that the United States did not
expect lengthy negotiations or the completion of a formal arms control treaty. The
Administration wanted to use these consultations to inform Russia of U.S. plans with respect
to offensive and defensive forces and to convince Russia to set aside the ABM Treaty.
The consultations made little progress for several months, with Russia complaining that
the United States had not outlined any specific proposals for deep reductions. The Bush
Administration responded that it was not ready to do this because DOD had not completed
its review of U.S. nuclear forces. However, on November 13, 2001, President Bush
announced that he would reduce the number of operationally deployed warheads on U.S.
strategic offensive nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 over 10 years.
“Operationally deployed” warheads do not include warheads that could be carried on
submarines or bombers undergoing overhauls. As a result, it will not count several hundred
warheads that would be included in a tally using START treaty counting rules. A tally that
included these warheads would be closer to the level of 2,500 warheads proposed for START
III. The Bush Administration has also indicated that it will not eliminate many of the
warheads removed from deployed forces, but would hold them in reserve as part of a
“responsive force” that could be returned to service if conditions warranted. In late March
2004, after completing a review of U.S. force structure plans, Ambassador Linton Brooks,
the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), noted that the
U.S. stockpile would exceed 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads because it would
also include nonstrategic nuclear weapons, logistics spares, and stored warheads that will
serve as a hedge against changes in the international security environment.
The Bush Administration indicated that it did not intend to negotiate a formal treaty; but
would reduce U.S. forces unilaterally, regardless of Russian reciprocity. President Putin
reiterated Russian intentions to reduce its forces to much lower levels. In the past, he has
called for reductions to 1,500 warheads or less. But he stated that these reductions should
be codified in a formal treaty that including control and verification measures. Some analysts
doubted that an informal arrangement would appeal to President Putin. It would not reduce
U.S. forces as far as he would like and it would leave the United States with the ability to
increase its forces with little warning. Others, however, expected that Putin would accept
the U.S. offer and approach as the best outcome he could hope for.
The two sides resumed their discussions in January 2002. Russia reportedly hoped the
two nations would devise a formal agreement that would include limits on deployed and non-
deployed warheads, along with specific monitoring and verification provisions. Russia also
wanted the agreement to contain a commitment that neither side would deploy missile
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defenses that could interfere with the offensive forces of the other side. In contrast, the
United States remained uninterested in a formal treaty and preferred a less-formal agreement
that called for data exchanges and cooperative measures that would allow each side to
monitor the reductions implemented by the other side. Nevertheless, in a concession to
Russia, Secretary of State Powell told Congress in early February that the United States
would be willing to sign a “legally binding” document on nuclear reductions. This document
might not be a treaty, but it could be an executive agreement or a joint declaration. Russian
officials praised the change in the U.S. position, but the two sides remained at odds over the
content of the agreement. Russia continued to insist that it include legally binding limits on
nuclear warheads, with strict counting rules and formal elimination procedures, while the
United States preferred a less formal declaration of intended reductions, with provisions
allowing monitoring and verification of the number of remaining warheads.
In March 2002, President Bush stated that the two sides should seek a formal agreement
— although not necessarily a Treaty — that would “outlive both of us.” But he emphasized
that the agreement should focus on transparency, calling verification “the most important
thing.” This differs from statements he made in November 2001, when he argued that the
two sides could reach an agreement based on a handshake. At the same time, though, the
emphasis on verification reflects the long-standing U.S. position that the agreement should
focus on monitoring provisions rather than strict limits on offensive strategic weapons.
Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov noted in March, that the two sides remained
at odds about the content of the agreement, but he claimed that they had not reached an
impasse. He also commented on progress that the sides had made on transparency and
verification measures, possibly signaling a shift in Russia’s position towards the U.S.
approach in favor of an agreement that focused on monitoring and verification.
After a meeting in April 2002, Secretary Powell was reportedly “pleased with the
progress” made during the talks, even though the two sides remained at odds over the means
they would use to count warheads under the new agreement. The two sides also remained
at odds over how to monitor reductions. Russia apparently had sought to incorporate
counting rules and elimination procedures, such as those used in the START Treaties, that
would complicate U.S. efforts to restore warheads to deployed delivery vehicles. This type
of approach would provide a measure of predictability and irreversibility in the reductions.
But the United States sought to count only those warheads actually deployed on operational
delivery vehicles, and it resisted proposals to eliminate either excess warheads or delivery
vehicles. It wanted to maintain the ability to reverse reductions if conditions warrant.
Instead, it offered Russia a greater number of monitoring opportunities, in essence, providing
transparency into the existing state of U.S. strategic nuclear forces without offering
predictability or irreversibility in the future. After meetings between Secretary of State
Powell and Foreign Minister Ivanov in early May, the two sides reported that they had made
progress, and in mid-May, President Bush announced that they had reached an agreement.
Presidents Bush and Putin signed the new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty on
May 24, 2002. It contains a single limit, stating that the two parties will reduce the number
of warheads deployed on their strategic offensive forces to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the
end of 2012. It contains no counting rules or definitions that identify which warheads count
under the limits. It also states that each party shall determine the structure and composition
of its forces itself; thus it does not provide deeper limits on any leg of either side’s triad or
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eliminate any particular type of weapon. Because the START II Treaty had never entered
into force, both sides can retain multiple-warhead ICBMs (MIRVed ICBMs). Furthermore,
the Treaty does not contain any new monitoring and verification provisions. Reports indicate
that the two sides had been unable to reach agreement, and had decided to continue
discussions on transparency measures at a later date. The Treaty does state that the START
I Treaty (which it refers to as the START Treaty, because START II is not in force) will
remain in force. The two sides will be able to use the inspections, data exchanges, and other
cooperative measures outlined in that agreement to monitor progress with the reductions in
the new agreement. Either side can withdraw from the Treaty with three months notice, and
both could exceed its limits after it expired in 2012. (For more details see CRS Report
RL31448, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.)
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty with Secretary of State Colin Powell on July 9, 2002, and Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld on July 17, 2002. They praised the Treaty for its brevity and for its
preservation of U.S. flexibility. The Senators generally supported the Treaty, but some
questioned the absence of precise definitions and time-tables for the reductions, noting that
these, and the absence of a dedicated verification regime, could complicate efforts to monitor
compliance. Secretary of State Powell noted that the United States and Russia continue to
operate the verification regime outlined in START I, and, when combined with the growing
cooperation between the two nations, this regime should provide enough openness and
information to allow both parties to monitor the forces limited by the new Treaty.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a Resolution of Ratification for the
Treaty on February 5, 2003; the full Senate followed, with a vote of 95-0, on March 6, 2003.
The Resolution contains two Conditions and six Declarations. The Conditions require that
the President submit an annual report to Congress on how the United States can help Russia
meet its treaty obligations with assistance provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction program and an annual report on progress the parties have made in
implementing the Treaty. The Declarations demonstrate the Senate’s interest in remaining
informed on progress made in the Treaty’s Bilateral Implementation Commission, the
Senate’s concern with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and the Senate’s view that the United
States should accelerate its reductions under the Treaty, when possible, and pursue further
reductions in the future.
On May 14, the Russian Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, approved
ratification of the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty. The upper house, the Federation
Council, approved the Treaty on May 29. The Duma had delayed its debate and vote on the
Treaty on March 18, 2003, after the United States began its military action against Iraq.
Some Members of the Duma argued that Russia should not commit to reductions in strategic
offensive forces when it might need to maintain its remaining military power. Most
Members of the Duma continued to hold a positive view of the Treaty, however, and the
delay was likely designed to show its displeasure with U.S. policy in Iraq.
Presidents Bush and Putin exchanged the instruments of ratification for the Treaty on
June 1, 2003, and the Treaty entered into force immediately. They held two meetings of the
Bilateral Implementation Commission during 2004, but had little to discuss as neither side
has determined the specific parameters of the force it will deploy under the Moscow Treaty.
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The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Treaty Provisions
The 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty prohibited the deployment
of ABM systems for the defense of the nations’ entire territories. Each side could deploy
limited ABM systems at two locations, one centered on the nation’s capital and one at a
location containing ICBM silo launchers. A 1974 Protocol further limited each nation to one
ABM site, located at the nation’s capital or around an ICBM deployment area. Each ABM
site could contain no more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles.
(Russia deployed its ABM site around Moscow; the United States deployed its site around
ICBM silos near Grand Forks, North Dakota. The United States ceased operations at its
ABM site in 1975, but the facilities continue to count under the ABM Treaty.) The Treaty
also specified that, in the future, any radars that provide early warning of strategic ballistic
missile attack must be located on the periphery of the national territory and oriented outward.
The Treaty banned the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-
based, or mobile land-based ABM systems and ABM system components (these include
interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars or other sensors that can substitute for radars).
The limits and restrictions in the ABM Treaty did not apply to defenses against shorter-
range battlefield or theater ballistic missiles. However, the Treaty stated that the parties
could not give these types of defenses the capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles
or their elements in flight trajectory. The parties also could not test these other types of
defenses “in an ABM mode.” But the ABM Treaty did not define the capabilities of a
“strategic” ballistic missile or the characteristics of a test that would be “in an ABM mode.”
The Demarcation and Succession Agreements
Agreed Statements on Demarcation. Questions about the difference between
ABM systems and theater missile defense (TMD) systems grew in importance after the 1991
Persian Gulf War. Iraq’s scud missiles alerted many in the United States to the growing
threat from shorter-range ballistic missiles and generated new interest in advanced theater
missile defenses (TMD). By 1993, some analysts and officials in the Clinton Administration
had begun to ask whether advanced TMD systems would be limited by the ABM Treaty. To
avoid possible compliance questions, the Clinton Administration sought an agreement with
Russia on a “demarcation line” to distinguish between ABM systems and TMD systems.
The United States wanted a simple rule that would define an ABM interceptor as one that
demonstrated the capability to destroy a target ballistic missile with a velocity greater than
5 kilometers per second. This would have allowed the United States to develop advanced
theater missile defense (TMD) systems without having those systems fall under the limits in
the ABM Treaty. Russia proposed a more restrictive formula to define an ABM interceptor
as one with the capability to intercept targets with a velocity of 3 kilometers per second,
rather than 5 kilometers per second, and a range of 3,500 kilometers. And, it sought to limit
the velocity of TMD interceptor missiles to 3 kilometers per second. (For a more detailed
discussion of the negotiations, see CRS Report 98-496, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
Demarcation and Succession Agreements: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.)
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After several years of negotiations, Secretary of State Albright and Russia’s Foreign
Minister Primakov signed Agreed Statements on Demarcation on September 26, 1997. In
the First Agreed Statement, the two sides agreed that TMD systems with interceptors tested
at speeds at or below 3 km/sec that were tested against a target with a speed at or below 5
km/sec and a range of less than 3,500 km would be exempt from the limits in the ABM
Treaty. The Second Agreed Statement outlined parameters for higher speed systems, those
with interceptor velocities above 3 km/second. These systems could not be tested against a
target missile with a velocity greater than 5 km/sec and a range greater than 3,500 km. In
addition, the agreement banned TMD systems with space-based interceptors. However, the
agreement did not state whether these more capable TMD systems would be covered by the
limits in the ABM Treaty. Each nation would decide whether its systems had been “tested
in an ABM mode.” The demarcation agreements would not have limited the speed of U.S.
TMD systems. They would have used the interceptors’ speed as a dividing line between
those systems that are not limited by the ABM Treaty and those that would need further
analysis to determine whether they are exempt from the Treaty limits.
Memorandum of Understanding on Succession. The 1997 Memorandum of
Understanding on Succession names Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as successors
to the Soviet Union in the ABM Treaty. Together, these states are limited to a single ABM
deployment area with no more than 100 launchers and interceptors. The MOU also states
that the geographic area covered by the provisions in the treaty would be the combined
territories of these successor states. Russia could continue to operate Soviet ABM facilities
and radars in Ukraine and Kazakhstan and construct a new early warning radar in Belarus.
The MOU also states that the Successor States may continue to use any facility covered by
the Treaty that is “currently located on the territory of any State that is not Party to the Treaty,
with the consent of such State....” Consequently, Russia can continue to operate the early
warning radar in Azerbaijan (it closed the radar in Latvia in September 1998) even though
it is outside the periphery of the participating nations.
The Clinton Administration and supporters of the ABM Treaty argued that this
agreement would allow the ABM Treaty to remain in place. They argued that, without limits
on the deployment of strategic ballistic missile defenses, Russia would be unwilling to
reduce its strategic offensive forces. Some in Congress, however, believed that the United
States should have allowed the ABM Treaty to lapse. They believed that, by adding parties
to the ABM Treaty, it would be more difficult for the United States to negotiate amendments
that would permit deployment of effective national missile defenses.
The Clinton Administration agreed to submit the demarcation and succession
agreements for Senate advice and consent as amendments to the ABM Treaty, but never did
so for fear that the Senate would defeat them. Instead, it declared in May 1998 that the
United States and Russia “clearly are parties” to the ABM Treaty. Many in Congress
objected to this declaration. Some argued that the United States should cease its
participation in the ABM Treaty so that it could build nationwide defenses.
The ABM Treaty and National Missile Defenses
In the mid-1990s, concerns about the possibility of an unintended missile launch from
Russia and the growing ballistic missile threat from other nations stimulated interest in
national missile defenses (NMD). In January 1999, the Clinton Administration added $6.6
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billion to the Defense budget for FY1999-2005 to support the deployment of an NMD
system. It planned to decide in June 2000 whether to deploy the system. The Administration
argued that the growing missile threat from North Korea would likely support such a
decision, if the technology were sufficiently mature. The Administration also moved the
projected deployment date from 2003 to 2005, to reduce the amount of risk in the program.
Some in Congress argued that the Administration should accelerate, not delay the
schedule for NMD because the threat from uncertainties in Russia and missiles in rogue
nations exists now. Some also argued that the United States may have too little warning
when new threats emerge. They point to the 1998 “Rumsfeld Report,” which notes that
nations may acquire long-range ballistic missiles without pursuing long development and
testing programs. Some Members praised the Administration for adding deployment funds
to the budget. But they continued to question the Administration’s commitment to
deployment. Others, including Senator Helms, criticized the Administration’s intention to
negotiate ABM Treaty amendments with Russia. He argued that the Treaty was no longer
in force due to the demise of the Soviet Union, and, by negotiating amendments, the
Administration would only give Russia a chance to veto U.S. NMD plans.
In 1998 and 1999, Congress debated legislation that would mandate the deployment of
nationwide ballistic missile defenses. On April 21, 1998, the Senate Armed Services
Committee approved the American Missile Protection Act of 1998 (S. 1873, S.Rept. 105-
175), which called for the deployment of a national missile defense system to protect all U.S.
territory as soon as the technology is ready. When the Senate bill came to the floor in May
and September 1998, Democrats succeeded with a filibuster. Senator Cochran introduced
this bill again in January 1999 (S. 257). The Administration threatened a veto because it
used only the state of technology as the measure for deployment, ignoring considerations
about cost, threat, and treaty-compliance. The Senate approved the bill, by a vote of 97-3,
on March 17, 1999. Democrats dropped their opposition, and the White House withdrew
its veto threat, after the Senate approved an amendment stating that it is U.S. policy to
continue to negotiate with Russia on reductions in offensive nuclear weapons.
Representative Curt Weldon introduced similar legislation on August 5, 1998 (H.R.
4402) and, again, in early February 1999 (H.R. 4). This legislation simply stated that it is
“the policy of the United States to deploy a National Missile Defense.” This legislation
passed the House, by a vote of 317-105, on March 18, 1999. The House and Senate did not
hold a conference to resolve the differences in their bills. Instead, the Senate took up H.R.
4, replaced its language with the language in S. 257, and passed the new bill. The House
then approved the new H.R. 4 on May 20, 1999. President Clinton signed the bill on July
23, 1999. However, he remained at odds with congressional Republicans about the
implications of the legislation. He contended that it was not equivalent to a deployment
decision because NMD remains subject to annual authorizations and appropriations. But
congressional supporters of NMD argued that the bill made it clear that the United States
would deploy NMD, so no further decisions would be needed.
In February 1999, U.S. and Russian officials began meetings to discuss possible
amendments to the ABM Treaty. The United States sought to reassure Russia that the
planned NMD would not interfere with Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and that the United
States still viewed the ABM Treaty as central to the U.S.-Russian strategic balance. The
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Russians continued to argue that the United States has overstated the threat from rogue
nations so that it can build a defense that will be able to intercept Russian missiles.
During their meeting in Germany in June 1999, the Presidents repeated their support for
the ABM Treaty as the “cornerstone of strategic stability.” But they also noted that the
parties are obligated, under Article XIII of the Treaty to consider possible changes in the
strategic situation that have a bearing on the Treaty and to consider proposals for further
increasing the viability of the Treaty. In November 1999, President Yeltsin warned that any
U.S. move beyond the limits in the ABM Treaty would “have extremely negative
consequences” for other arms control treaties. Russian officials also stated that Russia could
deploy new multiple-warhead missiles or retain older ones to penetrate U.S. missile defenses.
Many also continued to insist that the United States had overstated emerging threats.
In January 1999, the United States tabled a proposed Protocol to the ABM Treaty that
would allow for the deployment of a U.S. NMD site in Alaska, with 100 interceptors and an
ABM radar at a single site, and for the modification of several other early warning radars so
that they could perform ABM radar functions and support the NMD system. The Protocol
also stated that either side could request negotiations on further modifications after March
1, 200l. These talks would presumably allow the United States to seek further changes in the
Treaty’s limits on ABM interceptors and space-based sensors. The United States also offered
to exchange data and permit inspections so that Russia could remain confident in the limited
nature of the U.S. NMD. Russia reportedly did not table a counter-proposal or begin
discussions about the specific provisions in the U.S. proposal.
Some in Congress criticized these negotiations, arguing that the resulting agreement
would prove too limiting for U.S. missile defenses. In mid-April 2000, 25 Republican
Senators signed a letter to President Clinton stating that they would vote against any
agreement on modifications to the ABM Treaty. Furthermore, on April 26, 2000, Senator
Jesse Helms informed the Administration that the Foreign Relations Committee would not
vote on any arms control agreements reached by this Administration in its final months.
Nevertheless, Presidents Clinton and Putin failed to resolve their differences. President
Putin did agree that the threat from proliferation was increasing and that the ABM Treaty
could be modified to remain viable in the face of changing circumstances, but he did not
agree that the proliferation threat justified such modifications. Other Russian officials
continued to dispute the U.S. assessment of emerging threats and to argue that the U.S. NMD
system would undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Putin also proposed that Russia work
with European nations to develop defenses against shorter-range ballistic missiles.
On September 1, 2000, President Clinton announced that he had decided not to
authorize deployment of a National Missile Defense system. He stated that he could not
conclude “that we have enough confidence in the technology, and the operational
effectiveness of the entire NMD system, to move forward to deployment.” He also noted that
the delay in a deployment decision would permit the United States to continue its efforts to
convince Russia to modify the ABM Treaty. He stated that he believed it would be “far
better to move forward in the context of the ABM Treaty.”
The Bush Administration took a different approach to the ABM Treaty, arguing that the
United States would need to “leave behind the constraints” of the Treaty to pursue the
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development and deployment of missile defenses. The President called on Russia to join the
United States in developing a new framework for strategic stability and international security
in the post-Cold War era. Some Administration officials argued that the United States would
need to abandon the Treaty soon because the Treaty would inhibit testing of ballistic missile
defense concepts by late 2001.
In July 2001, the Bush Administration offered Congress a detailed description of its
missile defense plans. The Administration requested $8.3 billion for missile defense in
FY2002, an increase of more $3 billion, or 57%, from the FY2001 budget, to support a
robust research and development program into a wide range of missile defense technologies.
The Administration also reorganized the program to eliminate distinctions between theater
missile defense and national missile defense, instead dividing the programs into boost-phase,
mid-course, and terminal technologies. Furthermore, in testimony before Congress, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz stated that the United States might soon test the ability of
Aegis theater defense radars to track strategic ballistic missiles. This type of test could be
interpreted to be an effort to test non-ABM systems in an ABM mode, which is forbidden
by the ABM Treaty. Consequently, Secretary Wolfowitz noted that the United States could
bump up against the limits in the Treaty “in months” rather than in years. However, he said
that the United States would not violate the ABM Treaty. Instead, the Administration would
seek Russia’s agreement on a framework that would allow the United States to move beyond
the Treaty, and, if this was not possible, the United States could withdraw.
DOD delayed the problematic tests in October of 2001, for technical reasons. But
Secretary Rumsfeld stated that the Aegis radars would not be used in the tests when they did
occur because this would violate the Treaty. Some interpreted these comments as evidence
that the United States was seeking to reach an agreement with Russia that would not involve
violations of the Treaty. Others, however, stated that Secretary Rumsfeld hoped the
cancellations would emphasize how much the Treaty constrained U.S. missile defense
programs and would highlight the need for the United States to withdraw from the Treaty.
In June 2001, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed to hold “intensive consultations on the
interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive systems.” Many observers interpreted this
statement to mean the two sides would begin negotiations on a new agreement limiting
offensive nuclear weapons and on possible amendments or modifications to the ABM Treaty.
This may have been the type of framework President Putin had in mind. His Defense
Minister Ivanov indicated that he would recommend accepting modifications to the ABM
Treaty if the resulting defenses would not undermine Russia’s security; this acceptance
would be in exchange for deep cuts in U.S. and Russian offensive forces. However, officials
from the Bush Administration, and the President himself, stated that the United States did
not intend to participate in lengthy negotiations in search of formal arms control limits. They
viewed these consultations as an opportunity for the United States to outline its policies and
programs for both offensive and defensive weapons, and to seek Russian agreement on a
mutual withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The President said the United States would
withdraw from the treaty unilaterally if Russia did not accept the U.S. approach.
These consultations began in August and September 2001. In a meeting billed as an
“exchange of information,” not an exchange of ideas, a Russian delegation received
extensive briefings on U.S. plans for missile defense. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
traveled to Moscow in mid-August, reportedly in an unsuccessful effort to convince Russia
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that the two nations should withdraw from the ABM Treaty simultaneously. He did not
engage in discussions about possible modifications to the ABM Treaty or in negotiations on
reductions in offensive forces. In late August, Undersecretary of State John Bolton seemed
to indicate that the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty in November, if the
United States and Russia had not agreed on a plan for mutual withdrawal by the time
President Bush and President Putin met in Texas. He, and other officials, later stated that he
had not intended to set a firm deadline. President Bush also stated that the United States
would withdraw from the ABM Treaty, but would do so on its own timetable.
Russian officials complained that the two sides could not make progress in these
negotiations because they still did not know what kind of missile defense the United States
intended to build or what parts of the Treaty would cause problems for this defense.
Furthermore, in early September, Russian officials ruled out an early agreement on missile
defenses. They indicated that it could take a year or more for the two sides to reach
agreement on a framework to replace the ABM Treaty. However, at the same time, Russia
appeared willing to accept some minor modifications to the Treaty, although it continued to
reject the U.S. proposal for a joint withdrawal.
Many analysts expected President Bush to inform Russia’s President Putin of U.S.
intentions to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in October, 2001. He did not do this. Instead,
the two nations appeared close to an agreement that would allow the United States to proceed
with missile defense testing without withdrawing from or violating the Treaty. Reportedly,
Russia would have allowed the United States to proceed with some tests of missile defense
technologies as long as Russia had the opportunity to review and approve the tests before
they occurred and as long as the Treaty’s limits on deployment remained in place. The Bush
Administration reportedly rejected this approach, arguing that it needed more flexibility to
pursue its missile defense programs. It was willing to keep Russia informed about these
plans but it was not willing to allow Russia to review and reject them. Consequently, the
November summit concluded without the announcement of such an agreement.
The United States informed Russian officials in early December 2001 that it planned
to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. On December 12, the White House informed
Congressional leaders of the U.S. intent to withdraw from the Treaty, and, on December 13,
the President gave formal notice to Russia. The Treaty mandates six-months notice, so the
U.S. officially withdrew from the Treaty on June 13, 2002.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Report RL31111, Missile Defense: The Current Debate, coordinated by Steven A.
Hildreth.
CRS Report RL31448, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty,
by Amy F. Woolf.
CRS Report RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure, by
Amy F. Woolf.
CRS Report 97-359, START II Debate in the Russian Duma: Issues and Prospects, by Amy
F. Woolf.
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