Theater Missile Defense: Issues for Congress

Theater Missile Defense: Issues for Congress

Order Code IB98028
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Theater Missile Defense:
Issues for Congress
Updated July 30, 2001
Robert Shuey
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Patriot PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3, MIM-104 Patriot/ERINT)
Navy Area Missile Defense
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)
Theater High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD)
Navy Theater Wide Defense
Airborne Laser (ABL)
Systems Description
Regional Theater Missile Defense Options
NATO or Russian TMD Cooperation
The Israeli “Arrow” and Regional Defense
Gulf Cooperation Council Theater Missile Defense
East Asia Theater Missile Defense
Issues for Congress
TMD Funding
Pace of Development and Schedules of Deployment
Redundancy of TMD Systems
ABM Treaty Implication
Program Management
106th Congress
LEGISLATION

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Theater Missile Defense:
Issues for Congress
SUMMARY
U.S. troops deployed abroad and U.S.
smaller programs. It also required that NTW
allies are potentially threatened by biological,
and THAAD be funded and managed as sepa-
chemical, and even nuclear weapons that could
rate programs, contrary to the BMDO plan to
be delivered by ballistic or cruise missiles.
have them compete for funds from a single
Missile production by North Korea, Iraq and
line.
Iran has caused concern and has generated
considerable support in Congress to develop
THAAD successfully intercepted
and deploy missile defense systems.
Hera target missiles on June 10 and August 2,
1999, after having failed six attempted inter-
For fiscal year 2002, the President
ception test flights. The last failure occurred
requested about $3.24 billion for programs to
in March 29, 1999. Patriot PAC-3 has
defend against theater missiles (called Theater
successfully intercepted numerous target
Missile Defense or TMD). Six U.S. theater
missile (with one recent failure) and the first
missile defense weapon systems being devel-
unit is to be equipped with PAC-3s in
oped are: Patriot PAC-3, Navy Area Defense
September 2001.
(NAD), Medium Extended Air Defense Sys-
tem (MEADS), Theater High Altitude Area
Congress has supported NTW, the other
Defense (THAAD), Navy Theater Wide
upper tier system, and some Members have
(NTW), and Airborne Laser (ABL). The
encouraged a rapid development of NTW
request included larger amounts than Congress
because it might provide some strategic missile
appropriated last year for all the programs,
defense capability.
especially PAC-3, THAAD, and ABL. Com-
pared to the FY2002 Clinton request, the Bush
Congress has also criticized the pace of
request for NTW shows a 166% increase.
development and schedules of deployment,
redundancy of the various systems, restrictions
The defense authorization act increased
that the ABM Treaty may apply, and systems
amounts in FY2001 for PAC-3, NTW and
management of missile defense. Of the several
ABL, approved requested amounts for
TMD programs, THAAD and Navy Theater
THAAD and NAD, and cut the amount for
Wide systems have received the most congres-
MEADS. For FY2000, Congress increased
sional attention.
amounts for PAC-3, NTW, and a number of
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The FY2002 budget submission includes about $3.24 billion for systems to defend
against theater missiles. All six Theater Missile Defense systems would receive more funds
than were appropriated by Congress last year, and all but MEADS would receive more funds
than were requested by President Clinton for FY2002. PAC-3, THAAD, NTW, and ABL are
particularly slated for increases. The Bush Administration would eliminate the distinction
between Theater and National Missile Defense systems and would shift management of some
of the programs between BMDO and the services.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. troops deployed abroad and U.S. allies are potentially threatened by enemy
biological, chemical, and even nuclear weapons delivered by ballistic and cruise missiles.
During the Gulf War, 23 U.S. troops were killed when an Iraqi Scud missile with a
conventional high-explosive warhead hit a barracks in Saudi Arabia. Iraq also had biological
and chemical warheads that might have inflicted far greater casualties. Three dozen countries
have ballistic missiles and scores of countries have various types of cruise missiles — mostly
anti-ship missiles. Numerous countries that have missiles also have, or are seeking, nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons. (See CRS Report RL 30669, Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Weapons and Missiles: The Current Situation and Trends.) There is considerable
support in Congress to develop and deploy theater missile defense systems with U.S. forces
overseas and to help allied countries achieve effective theater missile defense.
Justification for missile defense programs (both theater and national) is often based on
missiles produced in North Korea that threaten South Korea, Japan, and perhaps even the
United States. North Korea has exported missiles to countries such as Iran, Syria, Libya, and
Pakistan. On September 12, 1999, North Korea told U.S. officials it would not test long
range missiles while negotiations to improve relations are underway.
For fiscal year 2002, the Bush Administration has requested three and one-quarter
billion dollars for the primary theater missile defense programs. For FY 2001 Congress
appropriated slightly over $2 billion for these same programs: Patriot (PAC-3), Navy Area
Defense (NAD), Medium-Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), Theater High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD), Navy Theater Wide (NTW), and Airborne Laser (ABL). In
addition, BMDO’s budget includes funds for National Missile Defense, advanced research,
international cooperation, and support programs.
The Administration has proposed restructuring BMDO to combine Theater Missile
Defense and National Missile Defense programs under the new categories of boost phase,
mid-course, and terminal interceptor programs. PAC-3 and MEADS would be moved from
BMDO to the Army for program management; Navy Area Defense would be moved to the
Navy; and Airborne Laser, Space-Based Laser, and Space-Based Infrared System would be
moved from the Air Force to BMDO. Described below are the six major U.S. missile defense
systems that are being developed to defend against short-range, medium-range and
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intermediate-range missiles (i.e., Theater Ballistic Missiles) rather than Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles.
Patriot PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3, MIM-104
Patriot/ERINT)
The Patriot PAC-3 is the U.S. Army’s primary medium-to-long-range air defense missile
system and is the closest developmental missile defense system to being fielded. It is a major
system improvement of the Patriot used in the Gulf War, and of the subsequent PAC-2. It
will target enemy missiles in their mid-course or descent phase in the lower atmosphere, and
will be used in conjunction with the longer-range THAAD. It has completed the
Demonstration/ Validation phase and is continuing improvement in the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development phase of the acquisition process, while it proceeds in low-rate
initial production (LRIP) under contract with Lockheed Martin. When all changes have been
made, the PAC-3 will have a new hit-to-kill interceptor missile (the ERINT), improved
communications, radar, and ground support systems. The first unit to be equipped with the
final version is to receive 16 PAC-3 missiles in late September 2001 at Fort Bliss, Texas.
Full-rate production was also scheduled to begin in late 2001 but is now scheduled for
September 2002.
In April 2000, the Pentagon projected costs of PAC-3 had increased by $102 million to
$2.9 billion because of increased reliability and spares costs. A GAO report issued in July
2000 showed PAC-3 total program costs increased from $3.9 billion for 1,200 missiles
planned in 1994 to $6.9 billion for about 1012 missiles in the current plan. In April 2001,
BMDO estimated the PAC-3 acquisition costs to be $10.1 billion. BMDO and the Army are
attempting to cut the current cost of the missile to allow the purchase of additional missiles.
In September 2000, the Pentagon told Congress it could afford only 32 PAC-3 missiles in
FY2001 rather than the 40 for which funds had been requested despite heavy funding in the
authorization and appropriation acts and an additional $35 million in the FY2000
supplemental. In November 2000, DoD indicated it would buy the 40 PAC-3s but would
have to buy fewer launchers and associated equipment. One article estimated most of the cost
increase could be eliminated by increasing the rate of production (Army Times, October 2,
2000). In December 2000, the Army announced it had restructured the program to finish
testing and begin full-rate production earlier. It also plans to increase the numbers purchased
in the years 2003-2007.
For FY2002, the Bush Administration requested $784 million for PAC-3, a 76% increase
over the amounts requested and approved for FY2001 ($365.5 million for procurement and
$81 million for development).
In May 2000, DoD decided to stop development of PACM (designed to defeat cruise
missiles) because PAC-3 and improvements being made to PAC-2 systems provide a more
cost effective defense against ballistic and cruise missile threats. The decision has been
controversial, particularly among companies that would have produced PACM. But the
conference report on the FY2001 authorization bill noted no funds had been requested for
PACM and instructed the Secretary of Defense to determine if PACM production is
warranted. If he so determines, $35 million of authorized funds would be available to retrofit
existing Patriot missiles.
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On March 15, 1999, a PAC-3 intercepted a Hera target missile over White Sands Missile
Testing Range in a test of its homing guidance system. On September 10, a modified PAC-2
successfully intercepted a cruise missile target for the second time in two tries. On September
16, 1999, a PAC-3 again intercepted a Hera target missile and another intercept was achieved
on February 5, 2000. PAC-3 completed its sixth consecutive intercept of a ballistic missile
target on October 14, 2000. It detected and destroyed a maneuvering Storm target missile
even though other objects were in its field of view. A PAC-2 flight tested on the same day
failed to intercept a cruise missile-like drone. On July 22 and 29, 2000, PAC-3 missiles
intercepted low-flying cruise missiles. On March 31, 2001, a salvo of two PAC-3 missiles
attacked a Hera target missile. The first PAC-3 destroyed the target so the second PAC-3
self-destructed. The same day a PAC-2 destroyed another Patriot designed to imitate a
Russian SS-21. On May 21, 2001, Alabama National Guard units conducted three successful
PAC-2 intercepts. On July 9, 2001, a Patriot PAC-3 destroyed a target jet fighter, but
another PAC-3 failed to intercept a Hera target missile. In June 2001, Taiwan successfully
tested its Patriots for the first time from Taiwanese soil.
In March 2000, it was reported that a large number of PAC-2 systems deployed with
U.S. forces in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea needed to be replaced because the
targeting data links tended to fail after extended periods of being on alert. The Army
discovered two other problems with the missiles.
Russia has developed a guided warhead for the Scud missile that it claims has an
accuracy of 10-20 meters, can defeat Patriot missile defenses, and is immune to jamming and
electronic countermeasures. It was reported in March 2001 that Russia is offering this
warhead for sale to a number of countries in the Middle East that have Scud missiles.
Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, and Israel have Patriot systems and are in various
stages of upgrading them. Japan produces Patriots under license. South Korea is considering
buying Patriots or some other missile defense system. Taiwan is acquiring a modified Patriot
system from U.S. defense industries. See the section below on issues for Congress for a brief
discussion of an Asian regional missile defense.
Navy Area Defense
The Navy Area Defense (NAD) system, formerly known as Navy Lower Tier, is based
on modified Aegis air defense ships and improved Standard missiles. NAD is designed to
detect and destroy short-range missiles in a 100-kilometer by 50-kilometer area.
(Bloomberg.com, July 23, 2001) It is in the Engineering and Manufacturing phase. In April
2001, BMDO estimated NAD acquisition costs to be $7.3 billion. On June 29, 2000, Defense
Department conducted the first of eight tests in the Engineering and Manufacturing phase of
the Standard Missile Block IVA. The missile’s guidance, auto-pilot, and aerodynamic stability
were successful. On August 24, 2000, a successful flight test demonstrated the missile’s
structural integrity, maneuverability, auto-pilot, and stability. NAD was scheduled to have
intercept flight tests in 2001 and the first ship is to be equipped in 2003. A draft DoD report
in November 2000 indicated NAD development had slipped 13 months and would not meet
the initial deployment by 2003. In July 2001 the Navy announced that technical problems
with the guidance and integrating computer software have delayed the program an additional
20 months. Full rate production is now planned for December 2004 and deployment in 2005.
DoD officials predict a cost overrun of $63 million or 13%. (Defense Week, July 16, 2001)
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(Navy officials had indicated in April 2001 that existing Aegis destroyers could be
deployed in 12 to 18 months with Enhanced Air Defense that could destroy North Korean
missiles launched from a coastal site. The system would use the Standard Missiles SM-2
Block IVA that will be used in NAD. Another Navy proposal would employ SM-3 missiles
that are being developed for Navy Theater Wide. Two ships would deploy 50 such missiles
in 2008 at a cost of $3.5 billion to $4.5 billion. NTW has failed to intercept a target missile
in its two attempts. The proposed use of TMD systems to defend against intercontinental
ballistic missiles blurs the distinction between TMD and NMD. )
In September 1997, the Navy announced a new “evolutionary deployment approach” in
which it will attain initial operating capability for Navy Area Defense and Navy Theater Wide
systems as soon as possible rather than waiting to develop and deploy the highest levels of
technology. The Navy plans to use new acquisition techniques to speed the deployment of
missile defense using current Aegis and vertical launch capabilities, and Standard missiles
(with slight modifications to the Block IV system). It may double the number of ships
equipped with Navy Area Defense in the first few years. Subsequently, the Navy will modify
the warhead and, perhaps, other subsystems.
The Bush Administration requested $395 million for FY2002, a 44% increase over the
amount requested and approved by Congress for FY2001 (274.2 million). The Administration
plans to shift NAD management from BMDO to the Navy. BMDO requested $272.2 million
for RDT&E in FY2000 but H.R. 1401 shifted $55 million from procurement to development.
In 1999, Congress added $41.8 million for Navy Area R&D.
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)
The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), formerly the U.S. Army’s Corps
Surface-to-Air (Corps SAM), is a multinational, ground-based, mobile, air and missile defense
system. It is essentially a composite of existing technologies with either similar or enhanced
capabilities. It will cover the lower-tier of the layered air and theater missile defense and will
operate in the division area of the battlefield to protect key maneuver units against various
airborne threats. As an integral part of the air and missile defense family of systems, MEADS
complements the other lower- and upper-tier systems and provides some overlap in ballistic
missile defense. One of the distinguishing characteristics of MEADS is its ability to maneuver
and deploy quickly. It will be able to accompany troops within the theater and will require
less manpower and logistical support to operate than other missile defense systems. Of the
various TMD systems, only MEADS will provide 360-degree coverage. MEADS will use
the Patriot PAC-3 missile with its hit-to-kill warhead, designed to intercept multiple and
simultaneous short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), low cross-section cruise missiles and
aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. MEADS will eventually replace the aging HAWK air
defense system.
The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) serves as the U.S. acquisition
executive authority and is responsible for program direction and system architecture and
integration. The Army will operate the system. The Bush Administration proposes shifting
the management of MEADS and PAC-3 to the Army from BMDO. In addition to fulfilling
operational requirements for limited air defense, the program is also expected to reinforce
interoperability of NATO forces and to reduce the U.S. burden of cost for helping to maintain
European defense.
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Under the initial May 1996 Memorandum of Understanding, Germany and Italy
committed to fund 25% and 15% of the program, respectively, for the next 10 years.
According to press accounts, Germany and Italy have committed to 45% of the costs, and in
March 1999, DOD asked the Europeans to assume 50% of the costs. R e s p o n d i n g t o
congressional criticism of the program’s costs for FY 2001, Pentagon officials suggested that
Germany and Italy coproduce the Patriot PAC-3 interceptor for incorporation into MEADS.
In April 2000 it was reported that Germany and Italy had tentatively agreed to use the Patriot
rather than a new interceptor, but still plan to develop a new seeker radar. In October 1999,
the U.S. briefly denied the allies access to detailed information on PAC-3 for security reasons.
In late May 2000, U.S. and German officials announced their agreement on a plan to share
PAC-3 missile technology for incorporation into the MEADS program.
In October and December 2000, the German military questioned the number of MEADS
units it would need and whether it could afford them, the German Parliament balked at
approving its share of development costs, and the German government then asked to have the
program restructured to reduce its $22 billion cost, even if that requires reduced capability.
In July 2001, the NATO MEADS Management Agency granted a three-year, $216 million
risk reduction contract to MEADS International (a team consisting of Lockheed Martin,
Alenia Marconi, and the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company). The U.S. will
pay 55% of the risk reduction program, Germany 28%, and Italy 17%. The agreement was
modified to divide German funding and commitment into three phases to ease the Defense
Ministry’s negotiations with Parliament. Germany has also decided to stop upgrading their
Patriot batteries until they determine whether MEADS will duplicate Patriot’s capabilities.
The definition phase of development has been extended three years thus putting deployment
off till 2009.
For FY2002, the Administration requested $74 million for development of MEADS,
$20 million more than was appropriated for FY2001 (the defense authorization act for
FY2001decreased the requested amount by $9.7 million.) The Clinton FY2002 budget
request also included $74 million for MEADS.
Since May 1995, MEADS has been at the Project Definition-Validation (PD-V) stage
of research and development. The Lockheed-Martin Corp. and the Hughes Aircraft and
Raytheon Company consortium represented the U.S. partners of two competing international
teams. Alenia of Italy, and European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (formerly
Daimler-Chrysler Aerospace) of Germany, represent the European group. In May 1999, the
three governments selected the team headed by Lockheed Martin to develop MEADS.
Target production and fielding dates were set for 2006 but have slipped to 2009.
In May 1996, France rescinded its initial commitment to fund 20% of the MEADS
program. Despite budgetary constraints, however, it is still interested in developing ballistic
missile defense (BMD) capabilities, perhaps an indigenous system. The United Kingdom is
not a participant in the program and to date has taken no official position on BMD, but is
concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and is considering options
for countering this potential threat. The Netherlands and Turkey have also considered
participating in the joint endeavor.
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Theater High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD)
The Theater High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) is the U.S. Army’s weapon system
designed to destroy non-strategic ballistic missiles before they reenter the atmosphere or in
the upper atmosphere. It uses a single stage, solid propellant rocket and a hit-to-kill
interceptor that is to destroy the target missile with the kinetic energy of impact. Unlike the
lower-tier, short-range systems (Patriot PAC-3, MEADS, and Navy Area Defense), THAAD
is intended to help protect wide areas against missiles and falling debris of missiles and
possible nuclear, biological, or chemical materials. In April 2000, the Pentagon released the
Selected Acquisition report stating the projected costs of THAAD had increased by $898
million to $9.5 billion because of a revised estimating methodology. In April 2001, BMDO
estimated THAAD acquisition costs to be $16.8 billion and the life cycle costs to be $23
billion.
THAAD entered the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase on June 28,
2000 (progressing from the Program Demonstration/Validation phase) and is to be deployed
in 2007. A more advanced version designed to defeat missiles employing countermeasures is
scheduled for 2011. In an accelerated development proposal being studied by the Army in
October 2000, the first THAAD unit equipped could be moved from FY2007 to FY2006.
In mid-2001, DoD is still studying the possibility of accelerating the program. DoD is relaxing
the requirement that THAAD be able to intercept targets both within and outside the
atmosphere, raising the altitude at which it must be able to conduct an intercept. The
minimum intercept altitude had been 40 kilometers.
Earlier technological problems in THAAD’s development jeopardized support for the
system. But on June 10, 1999, after THAAD had failed in six previous interceptor flight
tests, the first success was achieved. In those six unsuccessful intercept flight tests, a different
subsystem failed in each test. On August 2, 1999, for the second time, a THAAD missile
successfully intercepted a target missile.
After the second successful intercept, Lockheed Martin had submitted a proposal for
moving THAAD into Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) but the Army
Space and Missile Defense Command rejected the proposal in early April 2000 because of
management and testing plan deficiencies. Lockheed Martin responded to the problems, and
the Army later recommended the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) begin its review of
THAAD advancing to EMD.
Because of concerns that the THAAD and NTW were not being tested against target
missiles with the speed and other characteristics of likely enemy missiles (such as the North
Korean Taep’o-dong 1, Representative Vitter introduced legislation in 1999 (H.R. 2596) that
would require BMDO to use target vehicles with the speed of a Taep’o-dong 1 and to adjust
program management and consider making adjustments in the characteristics of NTW and
THAAD systems to improve the likelihood of successful intercepts. H.R. 1282 in the 107th
Congress has similar language.
In a similar vein, H.R. 4205 in the 106th Congress would have required BMDO to modify
its defense systems to be able to counter ballistic missiles with ranges between 1,500 and
2,500 miles. The HASC FY 2001 report indicated current TMD systems would be able to
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counter missiles with ranges of 1240 miles (2000 km) while North Korea and Iran are both
developing missiles with greater ranges.
[In November 2000, Russia demanded the U.S. stop using the Hera target missile in tests
and destroy its stocks, claiming the Hera is a medium range missile banned under the INF
Treaty. Further more they argue, the Hera is based on two stages of the Minuteman-2 missile
and uses the guidance system of the Pershing-2 which were banned.]
For FY 2002, the Bush Administration has requested $923 million for THAAD which
is a 68% increase over the amount requested and appropriated for FY2001 ($549.9
million)and a 32% increase over the amount requested for FY2002 by the outgoing Clinton
Administration. The FY2000 defense authorization required THAAD and NTW to be funded
and managed as separate programs, reduced THAAD development funds by $83.8 million,
and allowed the DoD to proceed to Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) of
THAAD without completing three successful intercepts.
Navy Theater Wide Defense
The Navy Theater Wide (NTW) missile defense system, formerly known as Navy Upper
Tier, is in the program Definition and Risk Reduction phase, is scheduled for flight intercept
tests in 2001, and is to have the first ship fully equipped by 2010. NTW will consist of the
Standard Missile-3 carrying the Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) launched
from Aegis air defense ships. Originally, the Navy was to deploy an initial version (Block I)
capable of attacking known medium-range missile threats (such as the Al Hussein, M-9, and
Nodong) during their ascent, mid-course, and descent phases. Later, a Block II missile was
to be built to defeat new threats. In early 2001, the Navy discarded the block development
program and decided to go to the fully capable system directly. With this change the Navy
planned to shift $121 million in FY 2002 and 2003 from NTW to NAD. Standard Missile and
Lockheed Martin are the primary contractors and Raytheon and UDS are major
subcontractors. In April 2001, Raytheon said it could produce NTW missiles “by the `04 time
frame” using the block approach, noting the program is merely “funding constrained.”
(Defense Daily, April 11, 2001.)
In April 2000, the Pentagon released the Selected Acquisition report stating the
projected costs of NTW had increased by $590 million to $5 billion. In April 2001, BMDO
estimated NTW acquisition costs to be $5.5 billion.
The Bush Administration requested $656 million for NTW for FY2002, up 42% from
the amount approved by Congress for FY2001 ($462.7, which was $80 million more than
requested). The new request is 166% greater than the amount requested by the Clinton
Administration for FY2002 ($246 million). In 1999 and 1998, Congress also added funds to
the requested amounts for NTW.
Navy witnesses have told Congress NTW could be fielded as early as 2002 if additional
funds are provided and additional risks accepted. A number of advocates, including
Congressmen and Senators, contend NTW should be deployed soon as a national missile
defense. But BMDO officials suggested the risks may be too great, the development time
would be long, and that necessary funds are probably not available. The Wall Street Journal
(April 10, 2000) said a classified Pentagon study concludes a ship-based NMD system is
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technically possible. The article asserted, “one country’s TMD is another country’s NMD,”
missing the distinction that TMD protects against slower medium-range theater missiles and
NMD protects against fast intercontinental ballistic missiles. Former Secretary Cohen said
in the April 2000 issue of Seapower that an Aegis sea-based missile defense with significant
modifications could complement the NMD system but the land-based system can be deployed
sooner. In March 2001, the former head of the DoD test office said NTW is not considered
a viable national missile defense option and would not be in the near term (five years). NTW
has failed to intercept a target missile in its two attempts.
In September 1999, the first two stages of NTW were successfully tested. In June 2000,
DoD reported that inadequate materials were causing failures in the complex Divert and
Attitude Control System (DACS) of the kinetic kill vehicle. The DACS has eight thrusters
that propel and guide the warhead to the target but have generated more heat than the system
can withstand. In a flight test on July 14, 2000, the Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile
failed to separate from the second stage of the SM-3 Standard launch missile. On January 25,
2001, an Aegis cruiser successfully flight tested a Standard Missile-3.
The General Accounting Office issued a report on May 31, 2000 (GAO/NSIAD-00-121)
that found that additional funds provided by Congress were used by the Navy to reduce
technical risks and speed development of NTW, but that significant risk still exist. GAO
recommended, “the Navy revise the proposed funding profile and test schedule for the Navy
Theater Wide program to ensure that the Navy can undertake initial operational testing before
producing most of its missiles.”
Airborne Laser (ABL)
Systems Description. Modified Boeing 747-400 aircraft will use a multi-megawatt
laser to destroy missiles within 30 to 140 seconds after launch from a range of 300-600 km
(160-230 nautical miles). At that point the target missile will have climbed to about 38,500
feet and passed through cloud cover, but still be in the ascent stage, often still over enemy
territory, and would not have deployed separating warheads or countermeasures. The Air
Force is also examining whether ABL could be adapted to defend against sophisticated cruise
missiles.
ABL is budgeted and managed by the Air Force in coordination with BMDO. The Bush
Administration has proposed moving ABL and Space Based Laser and Space Based Infrared
System to BMDO . The ABL program, which is in the definition and risk reduction phase,
first called for production of seven aircraft with lasers by 2007 — with three possibly in
service by 2006. Because large cuts have been imposed on ABL, an Air Force representative
said it may not be ready until 2010; with additional funding 2008 is thought realistic
(Bloomberg.com, June 21, 2001). In April 2001, BMDO estimated ABL acquisition costs
to be $6.4 billion. Twenty-year costs for development, production, operations and support
of the fleet are estimated at $11 billion. Boeing won a contract to build a prototype aircraft,
TRW will develop the chemical oxygen-iodine laser, and Lockheed Martin will develop the
laser beam control system. In September 2000, the first Boeing 747-4000 reached the
midpoint of the modification program and is scheduled to be completed in 2002. In April
2001, the Track Illuminator Laser, one of four lasers in the ABL, was tested successfully.
The system will attempt to down a missile in 2003.
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For FY2002, the Bush Administration requested $410 million for ABL which is a 76%
increase over the amount approved by Congress for FY2001 and a 91% increase over the
amount requested by the Clinton Administration for FY2002. For FY 2001, the Air Force
requested $148.6 million for ABL, less than half the amount requested and approved the
previous year. An Air Force official said the cut would delay the program several years. The
defense authorization act (H.R. 4205, P.L. 106-398) added $85 million and required BMDO
to approve any major changes to the Air Force’s Airborne Laser program and to report to
Congress an assessment of the program. (The House bill had originally called for shifting the
ABL program to BMDO because the Air Force had tried to cut funding.) The appropriation
bill (H.R. 4576, P.L. 106-259) approved the requested amount. The Supplemental
Appropriation bill for FY001, H.R. 2216, included $153 million for ABL.
Regional Theater Missile Defense Options
NATO or Russian TMD Cooperation. In addition to MEADS, which the United
States, Germany, and Italy are co-developing, in July 1999 NATO began studying the
feasibility of developing a low-to-high altitude TMD employing ground stations, ships,
aircraft, and satellites. NATO officials predict ship-based defense against low-level missiles
will be available within a couple of years. In June 2001, NATO awarded two $13.5 million,
18-month contracts to study the feasibility of a multilateral layered TMD system and examine
costs, risks, timing, and types of systems that might be used. Lockheed Martin and Science
Applications International Corporation won the contracts. In 2004 NATO should be ready
to select a TMD system and it could be fielded by 2010. NATO countries are generally less
interested in high-altitude missile defense although the United States is encouraging its allies
to acquire such systems.
The U.S. Navy in the fall of 2000 is encouraging international partners, in addition to
Japan, to cooperate in the development and production of a future maritime missile defense
system. Three multinational groups are developing the Evolved Sea Sparrow, the Aster 1,
and the Principal Anti-Air Missile System, which could provide NATO ships protection
against aircraft and missile attacks. Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy meet quarterly with
the U.S. as members in a Maritime TBMD Forum. Representatives of the navies of Australia,
Canada, and Spain attend as observers.
Representative Curt Weldon visited Russia in February and proposed that the United
States, Russia, and Europe cooperate on developing Russia’s S-500 theater missile defense
system. On returning to the U.S. he said it is time to call Russia’s bluff and charged that
Russia’s calls for cooperative missile defense were merely efforts to drive a wedge between
the United States and Europe. (Inside Missile Defense, March 7, 2001; Defense News,
February 26, 2001.) In May 2001 U.S. officials floated the idea that the U.S. might purchase
S-300 air defense missiles form Russia for inclusion into a missile shield over Europe. The
Russian foreign and defense ministers rejected this notion (Moscow Times, May 31, 2001).
The Israeli “Arrow” and Regional Defense. The Arrow Anti-Tactical Ballistic
Missile (ATBM) system was jointly funded and developed by the United States and Israel,
with the requirement to demonstrate a theater missile defense system capable of intercepting
Scud B, Scud C, and SS-21 Scarab short range ballistic missiles, and hopefully the Iraqi Al-
Hussein and the longer range Chinese CSS-2 missiles that Saudi Arabia bought. The Arrow
II, which was declared operational in October 2000, is believed to have a maximum intercept
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altitude of 50 km, with a maximum range of 90 km, and a speed of just under 3 km per
second. The system also includes the Green Pine early warning and target acquisition system
that was developed by an Israeli Aircraft Industries subsidiary, and the Citron Tree fire-
control and battle management system developed by Tadiran. In December 2000, Israel
Aircraft Industries selected Boeing to coproduce Arrow in the United States.
The FY 2002 budget reportedly includes $46 million for the Arrow program. The
FY2001 U.S. budget request included $81.2 million to support continued Israeli acquisition
of a third Arrow battery. In the authorization act, Congress added $8 million for the Arrow
System Improvement Plan (ASIP) which is intended to develop a defense against missiles
such as the Shahab 3 that has a range of about 1500 km (930 miles). In mid-November 2000,
the Administration requested a $750 million supplemental appropriation to support Middle
East Peace. The package included $200 million for Israeli defense systems such as Arrow II,
boost phase intercept, and radar aircraft. In December 2000, the U.S. and Israel signed a
memorandum of agreement covering the first year of the ASIP in which a feasibility study will
examine the technological improvements needed. This first phase will cost $16 million; the
total ASIP will run through FY 2007 and cost about $380 million.
Israel is also developing a Boost-Phase Intercept (BPI) system which will intercept
missiles shortly after they have been launched. The BPI employs an unmanned aerial vehicle
that fires a modified air-to-air missile at the ascending ballistic missile. Israel decided not to
develop BPI as a joint program with the United States. Another new concept is being
referred to as Pre-Launch Intercept (PLI) or Boost Phase Launcher Intercept (BPLI) which
could be designed to detect and destroy ballistic missile launchers. The BPLI also reportedly
involves Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles that could hover over enemy territory, identify and
strike missile launchers with heat seeking air-to-surface missiles. Israel has sought U.S.
political and financial support to develop the BPLI but was turned down because U.S.
officials said it did not qualify as a missile defense program and some in Congress thought it
could not work without good intelligence. (Jane’s Defence Week, July 26, 2000: 28)
In April 1999, Moshe Arens, then Israeli Minister of Defense, suggested the Arrow may
be used to provide protection not only for Israel but for Turkey, Jordan, and the Palestinian
Authority as well. Identifying the threat as a “serious regional problem,” Arens said the
Arrow’s range is sufficient to protect Jordan. However, a Jordanian official reportedly stated
that Amman has never expressed any interest in the Arrow, and does not plan to engage in
regional defense with Israel. Also, a representative for the Palestinian Authority reportedly
discarded the idea.
Turkey has expressed an interest in acquiring the Arrow, however, Israel is restricted
from transferring the Arrow system because of the U.S. role in funding and developing the
system. Israel could export some of the technologies associated with the project, but only
with prior U.S. agreement. In May 2001, Israel was reported to be ready to ask U.S.
permission to export the Arrow. (Turkish Daily News, May 30, 2001) Turkey and Israel have
signed a memorandum of understanding to study the Turkish need for an ATBM. system.
Turkey is also interested in PAC-3. However, Turkey apparently see the missile threat as a
long-term concern and currently has higher defense priorities. The U.S. hosted a meeting on
TMD with Israel and Turkey in late November 2000.
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Gulf Cooperation Council Theater Missile Defense. In 1997, the defense
ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states agreed on a collective purchase of
a $500 million ground-based early warning system that would link the GCC states’ radars and
communication systems. More recently, the Clinton Administration promoted further
cooperation through the deployment of a GCC-wide theater missile defense (TMD) system
to counter the threat of increasing Iranian ballistic missile capabilities and of any missiles
retained by Iraq. (See CRS Report RL30093, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy,
1999, by Kenneth Katzman.) In his October 1998 visit to the Gulf, then-Secretary of Defense
William Cohen, told the GCC states that it was “imperative” that they cooperate with
Washington in the funding of the TMD system in order to counter the mentioned threats.
While Secretary Cohen described the GCC response to his proposal as “quite positive so far”,
the Gulf states are somewhat mistrustful of each other and have preferred to buy whole
systems individually rather than collectively. Criticism over Cohen’s statement came from
France, whose Defense Minister stated that a TMD system would serve as an incentive for
the development of more advanced missiles by other states, and would only escalate the arms
race in the region.
East Asia Theater Missile Defense. In the FY1999 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 105-261, H.R. 3616, Sec. 1533), Congress required the
Administration to study “the architecture requirements for the establishment and operation
of a theater missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific region” and report the results to
Congress. The Department of Defense submitted a classified report in February and an
unclassified report in May 1999. The unclassified report stated the number of theater missile
defense units (similar to THAAD, NTW Phase I and II, NA, and PAC-3) would be required
to defend Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan. It did not discuss the implications of
such TMD deployments, did not discuss boost phase intercept programs, and did not discuss
the ability of TMD systems to overcome enemy countermeasures or to destroy long range
ballistic missiles. (See CRS Report RL30379 and CRS Report 97-391.) Japan has Patriots
and is cooperating in the development of NTW; Taiwan has Patriots and is considering
acquiring additional missile defense to counter the missile buildup on the Chinese mainland;
South Korea is also considering missile defense options but most would not defend the capital
city, Seoul.
Issues for Congress
Among the significant issues in congressional consideration of TMD have been program
funding (amounts committed for long-term spending and annual budgets), the pace of
development and schedules of deployment, redundancy among the programs, any restrictions
that the ABM Treaty may apply to TMD, and systems management. Of the several TMD
programs, THAAD and Navy Theater Wide systems have received the most congressional
attention. MEADS has been the most vulnerable to budget cuts.
TMD Funding. Congress was long dissatisfied with the Clinton Administration funding
of theater missile defense and regularly approved additional funds. NTW received the most
frequent increases. Congressional support for THAAD has fluctuated with the failures and
successes of the program. In the late 1990s, Congress cut funds for ABL and MEADS, but
in the FY2001 act it restored funds for ABL that the Air Force had cut. In April 2001,
BMDO estimated the acquisition cost for PAC-3, NAD, THAAD, NTW, and ABL to be $46
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billion. The large increases requested by the Bush Administration for all the major TMD
programs may challenge other DoD budget priorities.
Pace of Development and Schedules of Deployment. Several Members of
Congress have criticized DoD’s theater missile defense program, as well as the national
missile defense program, for not developing more quickly. Congress has approved funds,
sometimes more than those requested by DoD, to help speed particular programs. The Bush
Administration is attempting to accelerate development of several programs including
THAAD, NTW, and ABL.
BMDO and two other Pentagon offices sponsored an independent study of the risks of
the flight test programs of four hit-to-kill systems: THAAD, PAC-3, AEGIS LEAP
Interceptor of NTW, and the National Missile Defense program. The study group, led by
former Air Force Chief of Staff, General Larry Welch, reported on February 27, 1998.
Among its major findings was the conclusion that the perceived urgency of the need for
THAAD and LEAP, “has led to high levels of risk that have resulted in delayed deployments
because of failures in their developmental test (DT) programs.” Failures “were typically
caused by poor design and fabrication, inadequate ground checkout discipline, and pressures
to move on to the next step.” Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles admitted that the fast-paced testing
program, dubbed by the study group as “rush to failure,” had deviated from a standard of
rigorous testing and evaluation. The group recommended the test schedule be less aggressive
— more realistic — and that ground testing be used to resolve as many issues as possible
before using test flights for verification.
Redundancy of TMD Systems. Members have questioned whether there is too
much redundancy in TMD such as the MEADS, Patriot PAC-3, and HAWK ground-based
lower tier systems. BMDO officials contend that all six TMD systems under development,
and research on advanced technology are needed to provide adequate missile defense
throughout a theater of operation. Although the Army has said it needs MEADS and DoD
values the program as an example of international cooperation, Army officials have not
wanted to reduce their other acquisition programs to fund MEADS.
ABM Treaty Implication. The United States negotiated demarcation agreements with
Russia to determine when a ballistic missile defense would be governed by the limits in the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and when a system, such as a theater missile defense, would
not be governed by it. The United States also signed a multilateral agreement extending the
treaty to four successor states of the Soviet Union. Clinton Administration officials stated
the demarcation agreements clarify that U.S. TMD systems do not qualify as ABMs and are
not governed by the treaty. The interceptors of most U.S. TMDs will not be tested at a
velocity that exceeds 3.0 kilometers/second and are therefore, according to the first
demarcation agreement, not governed by the treaty limits as long as they are tested against
target missiles with velocities below 5 kilometers/second and at ranges below 3,500
kilometers. The Navy Theater Wide defense, and any future TMD with interceptors tested
at velocities greater than 3 kilometers/second are addressed by the second demarcation
agreement. These too cannot be tested against target missiles with velocities of 5
kilometers/second or more and ranges of 3500 kilometers or more. Each country must
determine whether such TMD systems are tested “in an ABM mode,” and therefore covered
by the treaty limits. The Clinton Administration said Navy Theater Wide is ABM Treaty
compliant and not covered by its limits. The FY2001 authorization act requires the Director
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of BMDO to develop a plan to adapt missile defense systems to be able to counter “longer
range medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.” (P.L. 106-398, Sec. 233)
The Bush Administration has abandoned the distinction between TMD and NMD and has said
it will conduct necessary testing regardless of the treaty, hoping first to win Russian
agreement to scrap the treaty. (See also CRS Report 98-496, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
Demarcation and Succession Agreements: Background and Issues, by Amy Woolf.)
Program Management. The missile defense program, particularly the testing
program, has been criticized in Congress and the press. To respond to these criticisms,
General Lyles, former Director of BMDO, described to Congress a number of management
initiatives. BMDO adopted nine Mission Essential Tasks, with implementation plans, to
measure performance. It also created a Systems Architecture and Engineering Board,
Planning and Resource Board, and a Management Review Team to review all aspects of its
operations. General Lyles also instituted the use of Cost as an Independent Variable to guide
the acquisition process. In December 1999, Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, BMDO Director,
announced a new flattened organizational structure with 16 deputies reporting directly to him.
In 2001, BMDO announced plans to reorganize, eliminating programs for TMD and NMD
per se, and replacing them with branches that address boost-phase interceptors, mid-course
interceptors, and terminal defense. Some congressional staffers have questioned the wisdom
of such a reorganization.
LEGISLATION
H.Con.Res. 39 (Curt Weldon)
Honors the 28 soldiers killed by an Iraqi missile in 1991 and resolves to support
appropriate and effective theater missile defense programs. Introduced February 27, 2001;
referred to Armed Services Committee. Considered by House under suspension of the rules
and agreed to (395-0, 2 Present); received in the Senate and referred to Committee on Armed
Services on February 28.
H.R. 1281 (Vitter)
Directs BMDO to design and deploy a land-based and sea-based National Missile
Defense system capable of defending the national territory of the United States against
ballistic missile attack as soon as technologically feasible. Introduced March 28, 2001;
referred to Committee on Armed Services. Requested comment from DoD April 4, 2001.
H.R. 1282 (Vitter)
Realistic Tests for Realistic Threats National Security Act of 1999. Requires BMDO
to conduct at least one intercept test of NTW and/or THAAD against target missiles with
flight characteristics, including velocity, of North Korea’s Taep’o-dong 1 missile. It also
directs BMDO to review changes to the interceptor that would increase its speed well beyond
3 km/sec. and would use targeting data from external sources including shipboard, airborne,
ground-based, and satellite sensors. Introduced March 28, 2001; referred to Committee on
Armed Services. Referred to Subcommittee on Military R&D and requested comment from
DoD April 18, 2001.
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H.R. 1283 (Vitter)
Defense Against Regional Threats Act of 2001. Establishes U.S. policy to provide for
deployment, as soon as technologically possible, effective systems capable of defending
Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and all member nations of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization against ballistic missile attack and to seek agreements to share the costs
of those systems. Introduced March 28, 2001; referred to Armed Services and International
Relations Committees. Requested comment from DoD April 4, 2001.
H.R. 2216 (Young)
Supplemental Appropriation for FY 2001. Added $153 million for the Airborne Laser.
Reported on June 19, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-102), House passed on June 20; on July 10 the
Senate substituted the language of S. 1077, passed the measure and called for a conference;
conference committee report filed on July 19 (H.Rept. 107-148); House and Senate approved
on July 20; signed by the President July 24, 2001.
H.R. 2514 (Allen)
The Missile Defense Burdensharing Act of 2001would require the President to determine
whether any missile defense system developed by the United States is intended to protect
foreign countries and to solicit financial contributions from such countries to offset U.S.
costs. Introduced July 17, 2001; referred to the Committees on International Relations,
Armed Services, and Budget.
S.Con.Res. 19 (Santorum)
Honors the 28 soldiers killed by an Iraqi missile in 1991 and resolves to support
appropriate and effective theater missile defense programs. Introduced February 28, 2001;
referred to Armed Services Committee.
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