Women in the Armed Forces

Women in the Armed Forces

Order Code IB92008
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Women in the Armed Forces
Updated September 29, 1998
David F. Burrelli
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Current Status
Military Women in Combat Actions Abroad
Should the Armed Forces Expand Recruitment of Women?
Should Women Be Barred from Combat Positions?
What is the Status of Single-Sex Military Academies?
What Provision for Motherhood?
Sexual Harassment
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Women in the Armed Forces
SUMMARY
Women have become an integral part of
merous inconsistencies in policy among the
the armed forces, but they are excluded from
different branches and practical problems in
most combat jobs. Several issues remain. One
having a growing number of persons in the
is whether to reduce, maintain, or expand the
armed forces prohibited from combat posts but
number of women in the services as the total
representing a substantial part of the forces
forces are being reduced. Difficulties in
and serving in combat support units. The
obtaining enough qualified males led to
deployment of approximately 40,000 women
increasing recruitment of women during the
to Saudi Arabia provided the most extensive
1970s and 1980s, and women now comprise
experience to date.
more than 13% of the armed forces. The
percentages vary among the services from
Some observers contend that additional
5.3% for the Marines to over 17% for the Air
military jobs could be opened to women.
Force. The reduction of armed forces, in
Others contend that adding more women to
response to a changing world situation and
non-combat posts reduces the number of
budget pressures, and the availability of
rotation slots available for men in combat
enough qualified males, could change the
units. In either event, since the main mission
perception of need for military women.
of the armed forces is to deter war by being
prepared to wage one if it occurs, there is a
A second question is to what extent
limit to the extent to which the armed forces
women should continue to be excluded from
can increase the number and expand the
some combat positions by policy. Women are
assignments of women as long as there are
not assigned to certain jobs including many
restrictions on assigning women to combat
that form the core of defense in actual battle,
posts.
such as the infantry. All legal barriers have
been removed. In 1991, Congress repealed the
The two basic considerations involve
law prohibiting women serving on combat
national security and the role of women in
aircraft in the Air Force and Navy. In 1993,
American society. Would national security be
Congress repealed the law barring women
jeopardized or enhanced by increasing reliance
from Navy combat ships. Policy on
on women in the armed forces? Should
assignment of women to combat was left to
women have equal opportunities and
the Air Force and Navy, as it already was to
responsibilities in national defense? Or do role
the Army, which excludes women from most
and physical differences between the sexes, the
combat jobs. Congress, in P.L. 103-160, also
protection of future generations, and other
required advance notice of changes in policies
social norms require limiting the assignments
to open or close assignment of women to
of women in the armed forces? Opinion in the
combat units, indicating its intent to monitor
United States is deeply divided on the
policy on this issue.
fundamental issues involved.
U.S. military actions in Grenada, Libya,
the Persian Gulf, and Panama revealed nu-
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
As a result of complaints concerning sexual harassment and fraternization, particularly
at training facilities, some have advocated that basic training should be administered on a
“gender-segregated” basis. Currently, only the Marine Corps conducts basic training in
this manner. The FY 1999 National Defense Conference Report included compromise
language that would require gender-segregated housing for male and female recruits during
recruit training.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Two major factors led to the expansion of the role of women in the armed forces. First,
after the end of the draft and the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force in December 1973, the
military services had difficulty in recruiting and retaining enough qualified males, thereby
turning attention to recruiting women. Women were recruited in increasing numbers and
assigned to a wider variety of occupations as one method of meeting shortfalls in enlistments
by qualified men.
Second, the movement for equal rights for women led to demands for equal opportunity
in all fields, including national defense, and a gradual removal of restrictions against them.
The Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 356-75) had given women a permanent
place in the military services by authorizing women in the regular Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps. However, it had limited the number of enlisted women to 2% of enlisted
strength, the number of female officers (excluding nurses) to 10% of enlisted female strength,
and the rank a female officer could achieve to Lieutenant Colonel (or Commander in the
Navy).
During the 1960s and 1970s, the movement for equal opportunity for women gave new
momentum to efforts to eliminate discriminatory treatment of women in the armed forces.
Changes were brought about by policy directives from the services, court decisions, and
legislation. In 1967, P.L. 90-130 repealed the limitation of 2% for female enlisted strength.
In 1974, the age requirement for enlistment of women without parental consent was made the
same as for men (P.L. 93-920). In 1976, women were admitted to the three major service
academies: Military, Naval, and Air Force (P.L. 94-106); women had already been admitted
to the U.S. Coast Guard and Merchant Marine Academies by administrative action.
In 1978, P.L. 95-485 modified Section 6015 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which had
precluded women from serving on Navy ships, to permit women to be assigned to permanent
duty on vessels not expected to be assigned combat missions, and up to 6 months of
temporary duty on other Navy ships. In 1991, the Defense Authorization Act for FY1992
and FY1993 repealed the limitations on assignment of females to combat aircraft in both the
Air Force and Navy. Congress in the Defense Authorization Act for FY1994 repealed the
ban on women on combat ships.
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Current Status
Women have become an integral part of the U.S. armed forces over the past few
decades. The percentage of women in the armed forces steadily increased from less than 2%
at the end of FY1972 to 13.9% at the end of September 1997, although the total number
decreased from 210,048 in FY1992 to 200,526 in September 1997 as part of a general
reduction in military force levels. The percentages of women vary among services: Army,
14.8% (72,827); Navy, 13.3% (52,578); Marines, 5.3% (9,286); Air Force, 17.4% (65,835).
(See tables at end, Active Duty Enlisted and Officer End Strengths.) Also, the number of
career fields and military jobs open to women has steadily increased. Although it has been
argued that women are essential to fill the ranks, the recent downsizing statistics shows this
not to be the case. Women have never accounted for more than 14% of the armed forces.
During the draw down following the end of the Cold War, approximately 33% of the entire
active duty force was removed. In other words, statistically speaking, the recruitment of
women was no longer necessary merely to fill the ranks.
Although women have not achieved the status that some would like, others believe the
services have gone too far. In addition to remaining a growing minority, the percentage of
women in the higher officer and enlisted ranks continues to be lower than the percentage of
women in service. (See table at end, Distribution of Active Duty Women By Rank and
Percentage of Total Personnel in Each Rank.) The disparity is much greater if medical
officers, which includes nurses, were excluded. The Department of Defense has explained
that the clustering of women in the middle to lower officer grades is a reflection of women
entering in the lower ranks in large numbers beginning in 1972, and that with time the
distribution of women officers has begun to approximate that of men. However, as long as
combat jobs are closed to women, there is likely to be a lower proportion of women in the
senior officer grades, as these tend to be filled by officers whose careers have been involved
in the central mission of the armed forces, which is combat.
A primary barrier to the expansion of the number of women in the services has been that
women are not allowed in most combat jobs and many combat-related jobs. Under Defense
Department policy, they have been excluded from many other combat- related assignments
and occupational specialties. In 1988 the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that
about half of the active duty military positions were open to women and half were closed. The
GAO concluded that “the services limit the number of jobs that women may hold beyond the
requirements of the combat exclusion and related program needs. As a result women may not
compete for all jobs identified by the services as unrestricted by the combat exclusion or their
program needs.” Some of this exclusion is related to the need to maintain a rotation base for
personnel returning from sea or overseas duty.
In February 1988, the Defense Department adopted a “risk rule” that excludes women
from non-combat units or missions if the risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or
capture are equal to or greater than the risk in the combat units they support. It permitted
women to be assigned to noncombat units or positions if the risk is less than comparable to
the combat units with which they are associated. In September 1988, the Secretary of
Defense said that to protect combat readiness, decisions of the Military Departments to assign
women to certain units must be made with the understanding that they would be so assigned
in times of peace and conflict.
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On Jan. 14, 1994, then-Secretary Aspin announced that the risk rule would be lifted in
October 1994. The new rule would be replaced by the following three criteria of direct
ground combat, all of which would have to be met to exclude jobs from women: “Women
may not serve in units that engage an enemy on the ground with weapons, are exposed to
hostile fire, and have a high probability of direct physical contact with the personnel of a
hostile force.” On July 29, 1994, then-Secretary of Defense William Perry announced the
service would open more than 80,000 additional positions to women, effective Oct. 1, 1994,
after which date more than 92% of the career fields and 80% of the total jobs would be open
to women. As more women have been recruited, the rate of women failing to complete basic
training has increased above that of men.
A service-by-service review found the following:
! Air Force: The Air Force has, for several years, had a higher percentage of women
than the other services primarily because a small percentage of Air Force personnel
serve in direct combat positions. The Defense Authorization Act of 1989 prohibited
the Air Force from setting a minimum or maximum percentage of persons according
to gender for original enlistments for skill categories or in any other way basing
acceptance of a person on gender, except for enlistments for training for duty
assignments prohibited by the combat exclusion. A legal ban on women in combat
aircraft was removed in December 1991 by P.L. 102-190. On Apr. 28, 1993, then-
Secretary Aspin lifted the policy ban on women in combat aircraft slots, and women
began fighter training. On May 27, 1993, the Air Force reported it had opened all
aircraft assignments to women. By June 1994, the Defense Department said, 99% of
Air Force duty positions were open to women. On Feb. 15, 1994, Air Force Chief of
Staff Merrill McPeak presented Lt. Jeannie Flynn, who had just completed training on
the F-15E Eagle fighter-bomber, as the first Air Force female combat pilot.
! Army: With then-Secretary Perry’s approval of a plan effective to open more jobs to
women, effective Oct. 1, 1994, the Army expected to open approximately 32,700
positions to women in the active and reserve forces. The number of Army career fields
open to women would rise from 61% to 91%. Special Operations Forces aircraft units
and some air cavalry units remained closed to women because they deploy with close
ground combat units. On June 1, 1994, Secretary of the Army Togo West, in a
memorandum published in Inside the Army, recommended assigning women to
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) units, Special Operations Forces aircraft, air
cavalry troop and support, and several other MOSs that have been closed to women.
After vigorous objections from Army generals, a compromise was worked out in
which 32,000 new combat posts will be opened. Women are still barred from some
career fields including Armor, Infantry, Special Forces, Cannon Field Artillery,
Multiple Launch Rocket Artillery, and Forward Area Air Defense Artillery. On Nov.
22, 1994, a company at Ft. Leonard Wood was the first group to complete coed basic
training under a renewed policy of gender-integrated basic training for many
noncombat jobs. Given recent developments at Aberdeen Proving Grounds and other
Army facilities, some are beginning to openly question the value of such training—see
below.
! Navy: In Section 541 of the Defense Authorization Act for FY1994, P.L. 103-160,
Congress repealed the law, 10 U.S.C. 6015, prohibiting women from serving on
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combat vessels. On Mar. 7, 1994, the Navy issued its first orders for women to take
up assignments aboard a combat ship, the aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower. The Navy
assigned between 400 and 600 women to the aircraft carrier and to other combat ships
later in that year. Closed jobs include those specifically associated with submarines,
such as submarine sonar technician or gun or missile crew member. Reserving some
positions to permit ship-to-shore rotations also limits the number of women. As of
Oct. 1, 1994, 94% of the jobs and 96% of the Navy career fields were to be open to
women. On May 3, 1994, then-Chief of Naval Operations Jeremy Boorda said he
wanted to recruit more women into the Navy and that the goal was to allow women
on all ships. Navy Secretary John Dalton has directed that the issue be reexamined
annually, with the next report due in April 1995. As the Navy has broadened its
recruitment of women, the number failing to complete their first tour of duty has
increased. The Navy is the only service in which the “wash out” rate is higher for
women than men. On Oct. 25, 1994, a Navy female combat pilot, Lt. Kara S.
Hultgreen died attempting to land an F-14 fighter on the deck of the USS Abraham
Lincoln. Some have attributed her death to the Navy’s haste in advancing women.
! Marines: The Marine Corps, which plans to expand the number of women to 10,493
in the next two decades, has the smallest percentage of women largely because a
higher proportion of Marines than members of the other services are serving in combat
roles. As of Oct. 1, 1994, 48,000 new positions were to be open to women, including
assignments on combatant vessels and Marine Corps Air/Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) Headquarters and Air Defense Artillery Battalion Headquarters. The career
fields open to women would rise from 33% to 93%. Women already serve as Marine
Security Guards for U.S. Embassies overseas and may serve as Hawk Missile
technicians and operators. All pilot positions remained closed to women at the end of
1992, but after then-Secretary Aspin’s announcement of Apr. 28, 1993, the Marine
Commandant said women would in the future compete for aviation slots on a
gender-neutral basis.
Military Women in Combat Actions Abroad
Considerable experience has been gained in recent years with the deployment of women
in the armed forces to military actions abroad. According to the Department of Defense, over
1,200 females have been stationed in Haiti. Women were included in actions in Grenada in
October 1983, Libya in 1986, the Persian Gulf in 1987, and Panama in December 1989.
More than a thousand women troops were stationed in Somalia during the operation there
from December 1992 to 1994. The largest deployment was to Saudi Arabia and the Persian
Gulf in 1990 and 1991, Operation Desert Storm, so it is discussed here to illustrate both the
progress women have made in the military services and the policy dilemmas.
Women were included in the forces sent to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf soon after
the U.S. deployments to halt Iraqi aggression against Kuwait began on Aug. 8, 1990. From
that time and throughout the hostilities that started Jan. 16, 1991, they served both in
traditional roles such as nurses and non-traditional roles such as aircraft ground crews,
intelligence, and communications specialists. According to the Defense Department, 7% of
the service personnel in the area were women. The following is the Defense Department
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breakdown by service of the total number of women deployed during Operation Desert
Storm, as of July 11, 1991.
Women Deployed during Operation Desert Storm
Branch of Service
Active Duty
Reserves
Total
Army
19,590
11,265
30,855
Navy
3,400
1,049
4,449
Marines
1,098
134
1,232
Air Force
2,978
1,268
4,246
Total
27,066
13,716
40,782
Operation Desert Storm showed that women could satisfactorily perform many jobs
traditionally held by men and that they could be in danger even if restricted from combat
posts. The action also called into question the belief that the American public would be
unable to accept female casualties or the idea of female prisoners of war. Casualties among
female military personnel, which included 13 deaths and two prisoners of war, appeared to
be viewed in the same spirit among the American people as casualties among males. A GAO
study of July 1993 found that health and hygiene problems were minor for both men and
women and had no negative effects on mission accomplishments. But Operation Desert
Storm also dramatized the broad social issues involved as mothers, as well as fathers, were
separated from their children for long periods during the deployment. Moreover, one of the
female prisoners of war testified that she had been sexually abused by an Iraqi guard. In
addition, the Army Times revealed that at least 24 U.S. Army servicewomen had been raped
or sexually assaulted while serving in the Persian Gulf region.
According to an Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR Fact Sheet released by the Pentagon,
women assigned to duty in the former Yugoslavia “can be assigned to positions already open
to them in the air and ground units and Naval vessels. Current assignment policy does not
allow women to be assigned to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to
engage in direct combat on the ground.” The issue of sexual activity has also been raised in
Yugoslavia. It has been reported that, on average, every three days a women has been
rotated out of Bosnia due to pregnancy.
Should the Armed Forces Expand Recruitment of Women?
One issue is whether to expand the number of women in the armed forces. As the total
size of forces decreases, an increase in the number of women would rapidly increase the
percentage of women. The question of whether the percentages should be increased or
decreased could become more acute during the 1990s as active duty military personnel
strengths decline greatly, and the military services can meet their recruiting requirements with
men as qualified as any women applicants. Thus far, the proportion of women has been
increasing even while the total force number declined. From 1989 until 1997, the active duty
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female strength declined from 232,823 to 200,526, but the proportion of women increased
from 10.9% to 13.9%.
At issue are the qualifications needed for modern armed forces, whether women meet
these qualifications, the effect more women in the services would have on the ability of the
armed forces to carry out their missions, and the effect on society.
One qualification is education, which some believe is becoming more important with the
growing complexity of modern weapons systems. The services have been able to achieve
higher standards for women recruits than for men because of the small recruitment levels for
women. A principal argument in favor of increasing the numbers of women in the armed
forces has been that it would be better to raise the number of women recruits who are better
educated than to recruit less educated men. If the number of women recruits is increased,
however, and the male recruiting requirements decline, the differences in education level
between male and female recruits has narrowed. Moreover, some argue that while
educational credentials may indicate a recruit’s likelihood of completing an enlistment term,
they are not necessarily an indicator of ability to perform a military mission.
Another qualification is aptitude for the needed jobs. In aptitude tests given by the Army,
men as a group have consistently scored higher than women as a group in three areas:
electronics, general mechanics, and motor mechanics. Men and women have scored roughly
the same in the general technical and clerical composites, with women scoring slightly higher
in the clerical. Some contend that these differences might be expected as a result of
differences in the educational and cultural backgrounds of men and women, and that the tests
do not reliably predict the performance of properly trained women in fields such as electronics
and mechanics. Others note that the issue is not one of the origins of aptitude differences, but
the assignments of individuals to the military position for which they are best suited, and that
aptitude tests correlate interest, ability, and speed in learning skills.
A related question is the kind of jobs to which women should be assigned. Should jobs
be assigned on the basis of aptitude testing without regard to gender, or should special effort
be made to train women for jobs in the traditionally non-female occupations even if they do
not initially have high aptitudes in these fields? Most women have traditionally been assigned
to the administrative and medical occupations in which their aptitudes and preferences are
higher. Some favor continuing this policy since most women prefer these jobs and there is
room for more women in these areas. Studies by the Department of Defense have shown that
enlisted women have much higher rates of retention in the service when they are assigned jobs
in the traditionally female skills (administrative and clerical, and medical and dental) and lower
retention rates in traditionally non-female occupations (mechanical and electrical equipment
repair.) Other observers believe that assigning women in the whole range of military jobs is
required for equal opportunity in the military services and, with proper training, women will
demonstrate they are capable of performing most military jobs.
A third issue involves the entire range of physiological differences between men and
women. One aspect is physical size and strength. The average female recruit has from
50%-70% of the strength, stamina, and muscle mass of the average male recruit with the
greatest disparity existing in the female’s upper body strength. Since the major physical
capacity requirements for many military jobs are deemed to be lifting and carrying, upper
body strength is a limiting factor for women in these jobs. The Army has developed criteria
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for determining whether individuals could meet the strength requirements for each job.
Section 543 of the Defense Authorization Act for FY1994 required that for any military
occupational specialty for which the Secretary of Defense determines certain physical
qualifications are demanded, the Secretary must prescribe specific physical requirements and
apply the requirements on a gender-neutral basis. It also required notice to Congress when
changes in occupational standards are expected to result in an increase or decrease of at least
10% in the number of females assigned to that occupational field. The U.S. Army Research
Institute of Environmental Medicine conducted a study showing that a physical fitness
regiment can substantially increase the strength of women. The study has been criticized
because it did not include men under the same experimental conditions, thus making any
comparisons futile.
Another aspect of the physiological differences involves pregnancy and childbirth. There
is concern that because of these uniquely female conditions, and the related traditional
responsibility of mothers for child care, women will lose more time away from duty, be less
able to deploy rapidly, and have shorter service careers. (This, in part, explains the lower
number of women in senior positions.) With more women, the services are likely to be faced
with an increasing number of persons who have sole or primary responsibility for children or
dual military couples in which both parents are in the military. Some believe that the military
services could meet this challenge by providing adequate child care facilities. Others argue
that assuming responsibility for child care would be too costly and is not a part of the defense
mission. In 1996, an Academy graduate and now helicopter pilot, Lt. Emma Cuevas, sued
the service because the army refused her request for a discharge so that she could nurse her
new born. Some claim that to accept her resignation would allow her to walk away from
nearly $500,000 in training paid for by the taxpayers. At an April 8, 1997 hearing, District
Judge Kessler refused to issue an injunction that would have forced the Army to discharge
Cuevas or provide her with a temporary leave of absence, thereby forcing her to fulfill her
Army commitment.
Some look beyond individual qualifications to group performance and contend that even
if they meet all necessary qualifications and can perform the necessary tasks, women will
decrease the efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces. In their view, having women
in large numbers might impair the cohesion and efficiency of men who have taken pride in the
masculinity of their profession. According to reports, a U.S. Army Research Institute, a “1994
test program found mixed-sex training caused a striking increase in morale and performance
of women, but had little or a negative effect on ‘unit cohesion,’ or a unit’s ability to fight
together. Although the training is coed and the treatment in most areas is supposed to be
equal, many men still complain the physical performance requirements for women are too
easy.” (See Washington Post, Feb. 5, 1997: A1, A7). Critics contend that the United States
already has a greater percentage of women in its armed forces than almost all other countries
and view this as a weakness. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Army conducted integrated
basic training, only to abandon it. As noted above, the Army and the Navy have now
integrated basic training. This integration has resulted in increasing opportunities of
disruptive sexual behavior between personnel, including harassment and rape. On December
16, 1997, the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues
submitted its report. Among its any recommendations, the committee concluded that limits
should be placed on gender integration at training installations. Secretary of Defense Cohen
appears to be unwilling to push for segregated training despite the recommendations of the
commission he appointed. Shortly afterwards, a report was released by DACOWITS
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(Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services) arguing for greater gender
integration of training. Critics contend that this is further evidence of the ‘feminist bias’ of
DACOWITS and that DACOWITS has outlived its usefulness as an ‘objective’ advisory
organization. In February 1998, the House and Senate appointed members to a special panel
that is to consider the issue of segregated/integrated training of men and women. Language
adopted by the House Personnel Subcommittee in May 1998, for inclusion in the FY1999
DoD Authorization Act, directs the Army, Navy and Air Force to separate men and women
in basic training. DoD has expressed its opposition to this language and sees the Senate as
it “best hope” of maintaining integrated basic training for the Army, Navy and Air Force.
(Navy Times, May 11, 1998: 6) Shortly thereafter, according to a press release, S. 2057/S.
2060 (FY1999 DoD Authorization Act) contains language that would prohibit any changes
with “regard to separation or integration on the basis of gender” until the congressionally
appointed commission issues its report. On June 24, 1998, the Senate considered an
amendment in its version of the Authorization act that would require separate quarters for
male and female trainees. However, the amendment was made moot by a secondary
amendment stating that no change may take place until the congressionally appointed
commission is terminated. The FY 1999 National Defense Conference Report included
language that would require separate housing for male and female recruits during recruit
training. In addition, the conferees extended the reporting dates for the congressionally
appointed Military Training and Gender-Related Issues Commission. The new dates are:
initial report Oct. 15, 1998; and, final report, March 15, 1999.
Should Women Be Barred from Combat Positions?
Since the main mission of the armed forces is to be prepared to wage war if it occurs,
there is a limit to the extent to which the armed forces can increase the number and expand
the assignments of women as long as there are restrictions on assigning women to combat
posts. Operation Desert Storm brought new attention to the subject, and the Defense
Authorization Act for FY1992 and FY1993 (P.L. 102-190) and for FY1994 (P.L. 103-160)
repealed the legislated limitations on assignment of females to combat aircraft and ships. It
is now up to each service Secretary to set policy and assign personnel according to needs and
abilities. Currently, women are still barred from many combat positions by service policies.
.
Section 542 of P.L. 103-160 requires 30-days’ advance notice to the Armed Services
Committees of Congress before implementing personnel policy changes made to allow women
to be assigned to any type of combat unit or class of combat vessel that was not already open
to women. Section 542 also requires 90-days’ notice before making any changes to the
ground combat exclusion policy, including any changes in categories of units or positions
open to women.
On July 29, 1994, then-Secretary of Defense Perry announced plans to open additional
jobs to women as a result of the rescinding of the previous Risk Rule effective Oct. 1, 1994.
Secretary Aspin had announced the rescinding in a memorandum of Jan. 13, 1994, along with
the following new direct ground combat rule and definition:
A. Rule. Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are
qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade
level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground, as defined below.
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B. Definition. Direct ground combat is engaging an enemy on the ground with individual
or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of
direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place
well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by
fire, maneuver, or shock effect.
Those who emphasize equal rights and responsibilities say women in the armed forces
cannot advance to the top without combat experience. Some carry the argument further to
say that women cannot be equal in society as long as they are barred from full participation
in all levels of the national security system. In their view, modern weapons have equalized
the potential for women in combat, since wars are less likely to be fought on a hand-to-hand
basis, and have made it impossible to protect women from the destructiveness of combat; in
any event, properly trained women would be able to fight successfully and exempting them
from combat is not fair to men.
Those opposed to women in combat note that the progress of women is not the most
important issue at hand. They contend that national security has been and would further be
jeopardized because of the presence of women in the ranks. They note the Canadian
experience in which women were recruited for the 16-week infantry training course which
was identical to the men’s course. Forty-five of the 48 women recruited, failed to complete
the course. The male failure rate was 30 percent. Critics also point out that countries such
as Israel and Russia, in which women have fought in emergencies, do not now place women
in combat positions.
Since women themselves are divided on the issue, one option is to permit women who
meet the criteria to be assigned to combat positions, but not unless they volunteer for such
assignments. Critics contend that it would be unfair to permit women a choice that is not
available to men, and that to make the choice available to both men and women would make
it difficult for the services to function, especially in the event of war. According to a 1997
RAND survey, 71 percent of female army noncommissioned officers and 79 percent of army
enlisted women said they would not volunteer for combat.
What is the Status of Single-Sex Military Academies?
In July 1976, the U.S. military academies began admitting women. In so doing, a
number of accommodations were made to facilitate the living spaces and training standards
of women. In recent years, state-sponsored military academies, particularly the Virginia
Military Institute (VMI) and the Citadel have been integrated. Following legal challenges to
VMI’s single-sex tradition, an alternative program for women was established at nearby Mary
Baldwin College. Although the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Baldwin program
was an acceptable alternative to integrating women at VMI, the Justice Department sought
an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. On January 17, 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court heard
arguments in the VMI case.
Shannon Faulkner applied and was accepted to the Citadel after she had all references
concerning her sex removed from the application process. Upon learning that she was a
female, the Citadel withdrew it acceptance. After a two and one-half year legal battle, she
gained admittance into the state-funded military academy. During her first week, and prior
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to taking the oath, she fell ill, spent a few days in the infirmary and resigned. In August 1995,
22 women entered an alternative leadership program at Converse College in South Carolina.
The Court also rejected the Citadel’s appeal to remain a single sex institution.
On June 26, 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled (7-1) that the Virginia Military
Institute (VMI) can no longer exclude women as a publicly funded institution. Both VMI and
the Citadel began to comply. Proponents note that the entrance of women into these
academies will end officially-sanctioned discrimination in public academies and provide
women with the same opportunities that men have enjoyed. Opponents note that any effort
to restructure these programs to accommodate women, including softening or eliminating
“adversative training,” destroys the very programs that women sought to join. As a result of
the VMI decision, the Citadel admitted four women in 1996. Special accommodations have
been made at the Citadel. In addition, the Citadel’s elite drill platoon voluntarily disbanded
as a result of the admission of women. The group noted that the administration relaxed
requirements and physical standards to such a degree that it has been “‘altered unrecognizably
to an awkward and virtueless mutation’ of what it was before.” (Washington Times, Feb. 2,
1998: A6). On September 22, 1996, VMI’s governing board voted 9-8 to comply with the
Supreme Court’s ruling. Women have since matriculated at VMI.
What Provision for Motherhood?
Secretary of Defense Aspin also asked the implementation committee he established on
Apr. 28, 1993, to review the services’ parent and family, and pregnancy and deployability
policies, in connection with his emphasis on opening more assignments to women and
maintaining readiness and effectiveness.
Some opponents of women in combat believe a major issue is the role of women in
society as mothers and that keeping them out of combat is a method of safeguarding the
human race. Proponents of allowing women in combat agree that safeguarding infants and
children is essential, but they believe this can be achieved through flexible deployment policies
and adequate child care arrangements. Another view is that women in the military make up
such a small proportion of the population that the impact of on society of allowing mothers
in combat would be slight, so the issue should be based on the impact on operational
effectiveness of the armed forces.
Both men and women may have the primary responsibility for young children who would
have to be left behind if they were deployed in combat and orphaned if they were killed. The
potentially harmful effect on children was perhaps the principal issue raised by the deployment
of women to the Persian Gulf. Many hardship stories were published concerning single
parents or military couples sent to Saudi Arabia, leaving their children in the care of relatives,
neighbors, or whomever they could find. Defense Department figures indicated that on Feb.
13, 1991, 16,337 single parents and 1,231 military couples with children were deployed in
Operation Desert Shield. Thus, in all 17,500 families, children were separated from their
parents by the war. (The Services seek to assign military couples to the same post to the
extent possible and ordinarily couples would favor this policy, but the war in the Persian Gulf
presented a new situation.)
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In connection with the war, some Members of Congress sought to bring about policy
changes, and Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to study the policies on deployment
as they affected family responsibilities and to report to the Armed Services Committees by
Mar. 31, 1992. (Section 315, the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and
Personnel Benefits Act of 1991, P.L. 102-25). The House also stated its sense that the armed
services should strive for a uniform policy with respect to the deployment of mothers of
newborn children, and that to the maximum extent possible such policy should provide that
mothers of newborn children under the age of 6 months should not be deployed (Section 317,
P.L. 102-25.) On Aug. 21, 1991, the Defense Department directed that military mothers
should be deferred from assignments necessitating separation for 4 months after the birth of
a child.
In February 1995, Secretary of the Navy John Dalton updated Navy policy concerning
pregnancy aboard ships. These new guidelines state that pregnancy is compatible with Navy
life and that it cannot be used to shirk sea duty. In addition, any woman who is transferred
from ship to shore as a result of pregnancy is expected to be returned to the ship or to an
equivalent billet.
In August 1995, the Naval Academy modified its position on midshipmen who become
parents. Under the former policy, a midshipman who becomes a parent (or becomes pregnant
unless the pregnancy is terminated within 30 days) would be expelled. Under the new policy,
midshipmen would be granted a one-year leave of absence. Under the new rule, midshipmen
who take a leave of absence would be required to reapply to the academy and provide proof
that they are not legally responsible for the child.
Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment has been a recurrent issue for members of the military, as in civilian
occupations. Recent surveys show that reports of sexual harassment have declined.
In addition to problems during Operation Desert Storm discussed above, incidents
concerning the Tailhook Association, a private group of retired and active-duty Navy and
Marine Corp aviators, in Las Vegas in September 1991, brought the issue to the forefront.
Approximately 25 women, 13 of them naval officers, reportedly were forced to run a gauntlet
of men and encountered various assaults. The Navy’s initial investigation of the incident was
criticized as slow and ineffective, and the Navy turned the investigation over to the Defense
Department’s Inspector General. On June 26, 1992, Navy Secretary H. Lawrence Garrett
3d resigned his post, saying he accepted full responsibility for the handling of the incident.
P.L. 102-638, the supplemental appropriations act signed Sept. 23, 1992, provided an
additional $3,400,000 for the Department of Defense Inspector General to expedite the
investigation. A report issued Sept. 24, 1992, by Deputy Inspector General Derek J. Vander
Shaaf said senior Navy officials had undermined their own investigation to avoid negative
publicity, and some officers were reassigned to other duties or forced to retire. The final
report, issued Apr. 23, 1993, described the situation as “the culmination of a long-term failure
of leadership” and recommended disciplinary action against approximately 140 Navy and
Marine officers. On Oct. 15, 1993, the Pentagon announced that Navy Secretary John H.
Dalton had ordered one retired Navy admiral reduced in rank and had censured two others
for failing to prevent the Tailhook incidents, and had ordered non-punitive administrative
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actions against 30 other admirals. Administrative penalties were levied in approximately 50
of 140 cases stemming from Tailhook.
On Feb. 8, 1994, military judge Captain William T. Vest Jr. held that Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Frank B. Kelso had manipulated the investigation to shield his
involvement, and the court dismissed charges against three Navy officers. (For decision, see
Congressional Record, Feb. 10, 1994, p. H460.)
After the Tailhook incident, the Navy established a Standing Committee on Women to
assess policies on sexual harassment, and all Navy and Marine personnel were required to
complete a 3-hour training course on sexual harassment and Navy policy, which Admiral
Jesse Hernandez described as “zero sexual harassment tolerance.” The Defense Department
and the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services were already monitoring and
defining policy on complaints of sexual harassment. On July 20, 1988, the Secretary of
Defense issued a memorandum defining sexual harassment and stating Department policy that
“sexual harassment is unacceptable conduct and will not be condoned or tolerated in any
way.” Sexual harassment was defined as “a form of sex discrimination that involves
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature when (1) submission to or rejection of such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person’s job, pay, or career, or (2) submission
to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for career or employment
decisions affecting that person, or (3) such conduct interferes with an individual’s
performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment. Any person in a
supervisory or command position who uses or condones implicit or explicit sexual behavior
to control, influence, or affect the career, pay, or job of a military member or civilian
employee is engaging in sexual harassment.” On July 12, 1991, Secretary Cheney issued a
memorandum calling for each component of the Defense Department to implement a program
to underscore that sexual harassment would not be tolerated..
Despite these efforts and the Tailhook incident, sexual harassment has continued to be
a problem. A GAO report of January 1994 found that nearly 97% of military academy women
in 1991, and 80% in 1993, reported experiencing some form of sexual harassment, such as
sexist or demeaning comments. At hearings on Mar. 9, 1994, four women, representing each
of the services, complained that often the services penalized the women who complain of
harassment rather than the men who allegedly harassed them. Conversely, Cmdr. Robert
Stumpf was denied promotion to Capt. despite the fact that he was exonerated of wrongdoing
at Tailhook. The Senate Armed Services Committee requested “certifying” promotion files
for officers suspected of being involved in Tailhook by the Navy when such files are sent to
the Committee for consideration. Stumpf’s “unflagged” file was submitted and approved by
the Committee and the Senate. Later, the Navy notified the Committee of its error and the
Committee reversed itself. Navy Secretary Dalton then removed Stumpf from the promotion
list, despite conflicting opinions concerning the Secretary’s legal authority to do so. Cmdr.
Stumpf filed a suit in Federal court in Alexandria VA, accusing Secretary Dalton of
improperly blocking his promotion. On April 19, U.S. District Judge Albert Bryan, Jr.
dismissed the suit stating that military promotions are “not the court’s business.” It remained
possible that Cmdr. Stumpf would have been promoted since he was selected by promotion
selection board earlier this year. However, following a three-hour discussion with a Navy
attorney on June 13, 1996, Cmdr. Stumpf announced his decision to retire from the Navy,
effective October 1, 1996. Although the Navy states the three-hour meeting was in
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preparation for a congressional review, Stumpf and his attorney said it was a confrontational
interrogation intended to harass him.
Stumpf retired on October 1, 1996. Since then, the Senate Armed Services Committee
has modified it promotion review process. Under the new process, “Tailhook officers” who
previously had been reviewed and promoted will not be subjected to further “Tailhook
flaggings” in future promotion considerations.
In spite of the above efforts and policies, charges of sexual harassment have not
disappeared. Recent reports of senior military personnel harassing subordinates have
surfaced. At a number of Army facilities, including Aberdeen Proving Grounds and Fort
Leonard Wood, investigations and court-martials are underway or have been completed
concerning harassment, fraternization, assault and rape. The Army acted quickly in
investigating these charges, and established a “hotline” to determine the extent of these
behaviors. Some contend that the creation of the hotline was nothing more than the vehicle
for a “witch hunt” employed to mollify feminists at the expense of the accused. In addition,
some have raised the issue of race, claiming that the services are targeting black men as
suspects. Such claims have been contradicted by then-Secretary of the Army, Togo West.
Although data show that the level of harassment reported by service personnel has decreased,
the ability to eliminate harassment entirely may be unattainable.
In 1997, Air Force Lt. Kelly Flinn accepted a General Discharge in lieu of courts-martial
for allegedly filing a false statement, disobeying an order, conduct unbecoming an officer, and
violating the General Article of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice. Under the General
Article behaviors that are disruptive to good order and discipline or bring discredit to the
service, such as certain cases of adultery or fraternization, can be grounds for disciplinary
action. Lt. Flinn reportedly fraternized with an enlistment man and had an adulterous affair
with an airman’s husband. She refused to terminate the affair despite complaints from the
airman and a direct order from her commander, thereby bringing about the charges of
violating the General Article. On the heels of the Flinn discharge, Gen. Joseph Ralston
withdrew his name from consideration as nominee for Chairman of the JCS, despite a lack of
evidence that Ralston’s affair 13 years before had violated the General Article.
More recently, the Sergeant Major of the Army, Gene McKinney, was removed from
his post following allegations of sexual misconduct. The Army tried him for alleged violations
of laws pertaining to the treatment of female subordinates. On March 13, a military court
found McKinney not guilty of all 18 counts of sexual misconduct. He was found guilty of one
count of attempting to obstruct justice and was sentenced to a reduction in rank and a
reprimand. These and other incidents have lead to a reconsideration of the value gender-
integration in the services, specifically, and the appropriate role, if any, of women, generally.
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APPENDIX
Active Duty End Strengths
FY
ARMY %
NAVY %
USMC %
USAF %
TOTAL %
Enlisted Women
1964*
7,958
.9
5,063
.9
1,320
.8
4,845
.7
19,186
.8
1969**
10,721
.8
5,752
.8
2,443
.9
7,407
1.0
26,323
.9
1972
12,349
1.8
6,257
1.2
2,066 1.2
11,725
2.0
32,397
1.6
1973***
16,457
2.4
19,174
1.9
1,973 1.1
15,023
2.6
42,627
2.2
1974
26,327
3.9
13,381
2.8
2,402 1.4
19,465
3.7
61,575
3.3
1975
37,701
5.6
17,516
3.8
2,841 1.6
25,232
5.0
83,272
4.6
1977
46,094
6.8
19,464
4.4
3,506 2.0
34,610
7.3
103,674
5.8
1978
50,549
7.6
21,093
4.1
4,652 2.4
41,084
8.8
117,597
6.6
1980
61,968
9.3
30,955
6.7
6,269 3.7
52,205 11.4
151,397
8.6
1982
63,622
9.4
37,321
7.7
7,875 4.5
54,506 11.3
163,324
9.0
1986
69,151 10.4
46,796
9.3
9,246 5.2
60.694 12.3
185,887 10.1
1989
73,794 11.2
51,633 10.0
9,012 5.1
63,175 13.6
197,614 10.9
1992
61,202 12.0
50,513 10.8
7,875 4.8
55,598 14.8
175,188 11.5
1995
56,776 13.5
47,347 12.7
7,403 4.7
51,478 16.2
163,004 12.9
1996
58,509 13.4
46,248 13.0
7,814 5.0
52,129 16.9
164,700 13.4
1997
61,849 15.1
44,142 13.2
8,498 5.4
53,167 17.8
167,656 14.0
Officer Women
1964*
3,772
3.4
2,678
3.5
128
.7
4,031
3.0
10,609
3.1
1969**
5,157
3.0
2,884
3.2
284 1.1
4,858
3.6
13,183
3.1
1972
4,422
3.6
3,185
4.4
263 1.3
4,766
3.9
12,636
3.8
1973***
4,279
3.7
3,454
4.9
315 1.6
4,727
4.1
12,775
4.0
1974
4,388
4.1
3,649
5.4
336 1.8
4,767
4.3
13,140
4.3
1975
4,594
4.5
3,676
5.6
345 1.9
4,981
4.7
13,596
4.6
1977
5,696
5.8
3,791
6.0
422 2.3
5,383
5.6
15,292
5.5
1978
6,292
6.4
3,980
6.4
433 2.4
6,010
6.3
16,715
6.1
1980
7,528
8.9
5,027
8.3
453 2.7
8,876
9.0
21,884
8.4
1982
9,033
8.8
5,740
8.5
560 3.0
9,942
9.8
25,275
8.7
1986
11,263 10.3
7,260 10.1
643 3.2
12,377 11.4
31,543 10.1
1989
12,197 11.1
7,453 10.3
696 3.5
13,403 12.9
33,749 11.1
1992
11,738 12.4
8,294 12.0
649 3.4
12,683 14.0
33,364 12.2
1995
10,786 13.1
7,899 13.4
690 3.9
12,068 15.4
31,443 13.2
1996
10,584 13.1
7,825 13.6
780 4.2
12,047 15.8
31,206 13.4
1997
10,389 13.1
7,796 13.9
788 4.4
12,008 16.2
30,981 13.6
Sources: Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics);
Washington Headquarters Services. Directorate for Information.
* Last pre-Vietnam War fiscal year.
** Peak of Vietnam War, during draft period.
*** Beginning of All Volunteer Force.
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Distribution of Active Duty Women By Rank and Percentage of Total Personnel
September 30, 1997
Air

Total

Army

Navy
Marine

Force

(No.)
(%)
(No.)
(%)
(No.)
(%)
(No.)
(%)
(No.)
(%)
Officers
O-9
3
2.5
1
2.3
1
3.7
1
8.3
0
0.0
O-8
4
1.4
1
1.0
2
2.7
0
0.0
1
1.2
O-7
12
2.7
3
2.1
4
3.4
0
0.0
5
3.4
O-6
757
6.7
251
7.0
255
7.6
11
1.8
240
6.3
O-5
3,216
11.5
960
10.6
1003
14.0
50
2.9
1,203
12.0
O-4
5,753
13.3
1,802
13.7
1,606
14.8
102
3.1
2,243
14.3
O-3
11,739
15.0
3,480
14.9
2,893
14.5
146
2.8
5,220
17.6
O-2
4,428
17.4
1,556
17.7
980
15.2
180
7.0
1,712
22.3
O-1
4,115
16.6
1,597
17.3
955
15.0
179
7.1
1,384
20.6
Warrant
W-5
5
1.2
2
0.6
0
0.0
3
3.5
0
0.0
W-4
53
2.8
28
2.1
8
2.4
17
7.3
0
0.0
W-3
198
4.6
141
4.6
28
4.0
29
5.6
0
0.0
W-2
493
7.2
369
7.0
61
7.8
63
8.1
0
0.0
W-1
205
10.4
198
11.2
0
0.0
7
3.6
0
0.0
Officers Total
30,981
13.6
10,389
13.1
7,796
13.9
788
4.4
12,008
16.2
Enlisted
E-9
543
5.0
146
4.6
112
3.4
23
1.7
262
8.7
E-8
2,261
8.2
1,014
9.4
459
6.2
130
3.9
658
10.9
E-7
10,540
10.1
4,446
11.5
2,177
8.1
500
5.9
3,417
11.1
E-6
17,971
10.6
7,019
11.9
5,831
9.7
706
5.2
4,415
12.0
E-5
30,881
12.3
10,792
14.0
8,051
11.0
1,191
5.3
10,847
13.9
E-4
43,564
16.5
17,186
17.1
9,616
15.0
1,525
5.4
15,237
21.0
E-3
34,124
17.4
9,858
17.5
11,146
21.2
2,357
5.4
10,763
24.9
E-2
16,557
16.4
6,721
19.3
3,826
14.0
1,293
6.2
4,717
26.4
E-1
11,215
15.1
4,667
16.7
2,924
14.3
773
5.4
2,851
25.3
Enlisted Total
167,656
14.0
61,849
15.1
44,142
13.2
8,498
5.4
53,167
17.8
Cadets &
Midshipmen
1,889
15.5
589
14.5
640
15.6
NA
NA
660
16.4
Grand Total
200,526
13.9
72,827
14.8
52,578
13.3
9,286
5.3
65,835
17.4
*Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. Compiled by the Congressional Research Service from Department of Defense
data.
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