"Fast-Track" or Expedited Procedures: Their Purposes, Elements, and Implications

"Fast-Track" or Expedited Procedures: Their Purposes, Elements, and Implications

Order Code 98-888 GOV
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
“Fast-Track” or Expedited Procedures:
Their Purposes, Elements, and Implications
Updated July 21, 2003
Christopher M. Davis
Analyst in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

“Fast -Track” or Expedited Procedures:
Their Purposes, Elements, and Implications
Summary
“Fast-track” or expedited procedures are special legislative procedures that
apply to one or both houses of Congress and that expedite, or put on a fast track,
congressional consideration of a certain measure or a narrowly defined class of
measures.
Congress typically has enacted sets of expedited procedures into law when (1)
the same law imposes a deadline for congressional action on a measure in one or both
houses, and (2) Congress wants to ensure, or at least increase the likelihood, that the
House and Senate have an opportunity to vote on the measure before the deadline is
reached. Most often, these procedures have applied to action on joint resolutions by
which Congress can disapprove some action that the President or an executive branch
official proposes to take. In other cases, Congress has enacted fast-track procedures
to expedite House and Senate action on a bill that is a “package proposal”
recommended by the President to address a complex and multi-faceted issue.
To achieve their purpose, fast-track procedures may (1) set a time limit for the
committee of jurisdiction to report the measure; (2) prevent that committee from
killing the measure by failing to act on it; (3) make the measure privileged for floor
consideration, either immediately or after a brief layover period, whether the measure
was reported from the committee of jurisdiction or that committee was discharged;
(4) prohibit floor amendments, including committee amendments, and impose
stringent time limits on debate during floor consideration of the measure and all
questions relating to it; and (5) provide for prompt floor consideration, with little or
no debate, of any identical companion bill or resolution received from the other
house. Not all sets of expedited procedures have included all these provisions.
However, failing to include any one of them, whether accidentally or deliberately,
can create significant opportunities for delay or inaction in one or both houses.
To greater or lesser degrees, expedited procedures are inconsistent with at least
five characteristics of the more conventional procedures of the House and Senate.
Fast-track procedures (1) impinge on the ability of committees to control their
agendas, schedules, and workloads; (2) create exceptions to the general practice that
the House and Senate usually consider only measures that have been approved by
their committees; (3) intrude on the power of a voting majority on the House or
Senate to determine whether a measure will be considered on the floor; (4) reduce the
authority of the majority party and its leaders to set the floor agenda and the daily
floor schedule; and (5) deny the House and Senate the ability they usually have to set
conditions for floor debate and amendment that are appropriate for each measure that
is considered. However, the house to which a set of expedited procedures applies is
free to enforce, amend, waive, suspend, ignore, or even repeal them as it sees fit, just
as if they were standing rules.
Fast-track procedures can be useful or necessary if Congress is to reach certain
legislative goals. Expedited procedures may be evaluated, therefore, by asking if or

when their utility justifies setting aside the Congress’s usual procedures and the
principles and relationships these procedures embody.

Contents
Purposes and Elements of Fast-Track Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Expedited and Conventional Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

“Fast-Track” or Expedited Procedures:
Their Purposes, Elements, and Implications
This report1 discusses certain provisions of law that commonly are known as
“fast-track” or expedited procedures. They are so labeled because these statutory
provisions contain special legislative procedures that apply to one or both houses of
Congress and that expedite, or put on a fast track, congressional consideration of a
certain measure or a narrowly defined class of measures. This report first presents
the nature, purpose, and elements of fast-track procedures. Then the report discusses
some of the most important ways in which these procedures differ from the normal
procedures of the House and Senate and, therefore, how the use of expedited
procedures can affect the legislative process in Congress.2
Most of the analysis that follows can be summarized by three basic points.
First, fast-track procedures are intended to achieve a purpose that is not common to
most other legislative procedures in Congress. Second, these expedited procedures
differ from the more conventional procedures of the House and Senate in ways that
affect the activities of congressional committees, the relationship between
committees and their parent chambers, the prerogatives of the majority and the rights
of the minority, the locus of control over the floor schedule in the House and Senate,
and the ability of individual Representatives and Senators to shape public policy
through debate and amendments. Third, therefore, fast-track procedures may be
evaluated by asking if or when their utility justifies setting aside the Congress’s usual
procedures and the principles and relationships these procedures embody.
Purposes and Elements of Fast-Track Procedures
Congress typically has enacted sets of expedited procedures into law when (1)
the same law imposes a deadline for congressional action on a measure in one or both
houses, and (2) Congress wants to ensure, or at least increase the likelihood, that the
full membership of the House and Senate have an opportunity to vote on the measure
before the deadline is reached. Most often, these procedures have applied to
congressional consideration of joint resolutions by which Congress can disapprove
1 This report was written by Stanley Bach, formerly a Senior Specialist in the Legislative
Process at CRS. Dr. Bach has since retired, but the other listed author updated the report
and is available to answer questions concerning its contents.
2 The last section of this report is based on testimony presented by Dr. Bach before the
House Rules Committee during its 1984 hearings on the implications of, and possible
congressional responses to, the Supreme Court decision in Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, in which the Court held the legislative veto to be unconstitutional.
House Committee on Rules, Legislative Veto After Chadha, hearings, 98th Cong., 2nd sess.,
Mar. 22, 1984.

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(and thereby nullify) some action that the President or an executive branch official
proposes to take. In other cases, Congress has enacted fast-track procedures to
expedite House and Senate action on a bill that is a package proposal recommended
by the President to address a complex and multi-faceted issue. Examples of the latter
are the expedited procedures for approving or disapproving recommendations for
military base closures and for enacting legislation to implement major international
trade agreements.
Fast-track procedures can affect the process of considering legislation in one or
both houses, in committee and on the floor. This process normally is governed
primarily by the standing rules of the House and Senate. However, Congress does
not adopt fast-track procedures as additional parts of these rules. Instead, expedited
procedures are written into law, even though they affect only the internal organization
and procedure of one or both houses of Congress. Congress enacts them into law
under the constitutional authority of each house to “determine the rules of its
proceedings.” These provisions of law, which are known as “rule-making”
provisions, have the same force and effect as any of the standing rules that the House
or Senate has adopted. They are no more binding on either house, and no more
enforceable in court, simply because they were enacted into law.
The house to which a set of expedited procedures applies is free to enforce,
amend, waive, suspend, ignore, or even repeal them as it sees fit, just as if they were
standing rules. For example, the House can modify or set aside any fast-track
procedures by adopting a resolution that the House Rules Committee reports for that
purpose. In the Senate, the same procedures can be waived or superseded by a
unanimous consent agreement. Congress usually decides to enact rule-making
provisions into law, rather than adopting them as rules, because those provisions are
inextricably related, politically or procedurally, to other provisions of the same law
that affect the actions of the President or executive branch officials.
Well-known laws containing rule-making provisions include the War Powers
Act of 1973, the Trade Act of 1974, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act
of 1990, and the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995. The texts of these and
other rule-making provisions are reprinted in each edition of the House Rules and
Manual3; some also appear in editions of the Senate Manual.4
Expedited procedures are designed to ensure, or increase the likelihood, that the
House and Senate will be able to act promptly on a certain bill or resolution, or on
certain kinds of measures. For example, Congress may enact a law giving a
department or agency the authority to make a decision or issue a regulation. In the
same law, Congress also may give itself the opportunity to reject that decision or
3 U.S. House of Representatives, Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual and Rules of the House
of Representatives of the United States, 108th Congress, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Doc. 107-
284 (2003), pp. 1041-1042. (Hereafter cited as the House Rules and Manual.)
4 Not all rule-making provisions of law are sets of fast-track procedures. For example, most
of the requirements and prohibitions that govern the congressional budget process were
enacted as parts of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and the Budget Enforcement Act
of 1990.

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regulation by enacting a joint resolution of disapproval. In such cases, the law also
is likely to contain a deadline by which Congress should act on a disapproval
resolution, as well as a set of expedited procedures to make it more likely that
Congress will have the opportunity to vote on the resolution before the deadline is
reached.
Fast-track procedures usually include precise definitions of the measures for
which those procedures can be used. The statute creating the procedures may specify
what kinds of provisions a bill may or must include if it is to be eligible for
consideration under the special legislative procedures. Alternatively, the expedited
procedures may contain the exact text of what the measure (usually a joint resolution)
can provide if it is to qualify for expedited consideration. If the procedures can be
used to consider various measures of the same kind, the text of the bill creating those
procedures may define the text of the measures and include one or more blanks that
are to be filled in to identify, for example, the specific regulation, action, or nation
to which the measure applies. For example, one provision of the Trade Act of 1974,
as amended, defines in the following terms the joint resolutions that Congress can
consider under certain fast-track procedures:
The term “approval resolution” means only a joint resolution of the two
Houses of Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows:
“That the Congress approves the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment with
respect to the products of __________ transmitted by the President to the
Congress on __________,” the first blank space being filled with the name of the
country involved and the second blank space being filled with the appropriate
date.
The purpose of expedited procedures is not to guarantee that one or more bills
will become law, but to help make it possible for the House and Senate to vote on
whether they should become law. The normal legislative process in Congress is a
time-consuming process that most bills do not survive. Without fast-track
procedures, there would be good reason to fear that the bills to which those
procedures apply might not reach the stage at which the House and Senate could vote
on passing them, or at least not by the deadline that a statute imposes for
congressional action.
To achieve their purpose, therefore, complete and effective sets of fast-track
procedures provide (1) that the bill or resolution to which they apply cannot be
blocked or delayed unduly in a committee of either house, (2) that the measure,
whether or not reported from committee, can reach the House or Senate floor
promptly for consideration, (3) that the measure cannot be amended, in committee
or on the floor, and (4) that a final floor vote within the time permitted cannot be
prevented through delay in either house. Because measures subject to expedited
procedures typically are not amendable, there is less need to protect against possible
delays that can occur in the process of resolving legislative differences between the
House and the Senate.

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Translating these general requirements into specific procedural arrangements,
fast-track procedures may:
1. Set a time limit for the committee of jurisdiction to report the measure;
2. Provide for automatic discharge of the committee from further consideration
of the measure, or for a privileged motion to discharge the committee, with no
debate or limited debate, if the committee fails to report within the time limit;
3. Make the measure privileged for floor consideration, either immediately or
after a brief layover period, whether the measure was reported from the
committee of jurisdiction or that committee was discharged;
4. Prohibit floor amendments, including committee amendments, and impose
stringent time limits on debate during floor consideration of the measure and all
questions relating to it; and
5. Provide for prompt floor consideration, with little or no debate, of any
identical companion bill or resolution from the other house.
Not all sets of expedited procedures have included all these provisions.
However, failing to include any one of them, whether accidentally or deliberately,
can create significant opportunities for delay or inaction in one or both houses.
As an example, consider the provisions of S. 2400 and H.R. 2621 of the 105th
Congress, reported respectively by the Senate Finance Committee and the House
Ways and Means Committee. A primary purpose of these bills was to make available
fast-track procedures during House and Senate consideration of bills to implement
certain trade agreements. For this purpose, both bills proposed to apply to each trade
implementing bill the expedited procedures previously enacted into law as Section
151 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.
The procedures in Section 151 include all the five elements listed above, and
even contain the unusual requirement that a vote on final passage of a trade
implementing bill “shall be taken in each House on or before the close of the 15th
day” of session after the committee (or committees) of jurisdiction either reported it
or was discharged from considering it further. This set of fast-track procedures is
complete and effective in that it probably would make it impossible for the opponents
of a trade implementing bill to prevent the House and Senate from voting, within the
time permitted for congressional action, on whether or not to pass it. The expedited
procedures do not guarantee that the House or Senate would pass the bill, but they
do guarantee that Members of both houses would have the opportunity to do so.
S. 2400 and H.R. 2621 also proposed to apply expedited procedures to two other
kinds of measures: resolutions affecting for how long the President could make
certain trade agreements, and resolutions affecting whether a particular trade
implementing bill could be considered under the fast-track provisions of Section 151.
However, the expedited procedures applicable to these resolutions were not quite as
complete or effective as those governing consideration of trade implementing bills.
The fast-track procedures for considering these resolutions did expedite House and

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Senate action on them—for example, by limiting debate on each such resolution and
prohibiting amendments to it. However, these procedures did not require a vote on
final passage of the resolution and, more important, they did not ensure that the
resolution would even reach the House or Senate floor at all.
The fast-track procedures applicable to one of these resolutions were to come
into play only if and when the House or Senate committee of jurisdiction chose to
report it. These procedures did not affect the authority of either committee to
effectively kill the resolution by failing to act on it. If the committee did fail to report
the resolution, the committee was not automatically discharged, nor did the expedited
procedures provide for a privileged motion to discharge. Thus, the proposed fast-
track procedures did not increase the likelihood that the House or Senate actually
would vote on every resolution to which they applied. The procedures only
expedited House and Senate action on resolutions that enjoyed committee support.
In this case, it is very likely that the expedited procedures for considering the
resolutions were left incomplete deliberately. The committees that reported the two
bills evidently wanted to retain veto power over the resolutions, but they also wanted
to expedite floor consideration of any such resolutions that the committees approved.
These fast-track procedures were ineffective in the sense that they did not ensure or
even make it more likely that a qualifying resolution would reach the House or
Senate floor for debate and for a final and timely vote. However, these procedures
probably were effective in achieving the goal of expediting final floor votes on
resolutions when the House or Senate committee wanted those votes to take place.
As S. 2400 and H.R. 2621 demonstrate, fast-track provisions can take various
forms. It is not enough to know that there are special procedures for Congress to
follow in acting on a certain bill or resolution. Instead, it is necessary to examine the
details of each set of fast-track procedures to understand how they supplant the
conventional procedures of the House and Senate, and precisely what procedural
effects they are likely to have.5
Expedited and Conventional Procedures
Some of the implications and consequences of enacting effective expedited
procedures emerge from a comparison of these procedures with more conventional
House and Senate procedures for acting on proposed legislation. In some respects,
it is difficult to talk about “conventional” procedures. First, there are variations
among the procedures that House and Senate committees generally follow. Second,
the House has as many as five different sets of procedures for considering measures
on the floor, and the House regularly adopts special rules that include procedural
arrangements and restrictions that apply to individual measures. And third, the
Senate operates under special procedures when it invokes cloture, and the Senate
frequently sets aside many of its rules in favor of simple or complex procedural
arrangements on which it agrees by unanimous consent.
5 For a review and discussion of the different forms of fast-track procedures available in the
House, see CRS Report RL30599, Expedited Procedures in the House: Variations Enacted
Into Law.

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Nonetheless, there are a number of characteristics that typify the legislative
process—more or less, and more often than not. In general, expedited procedures
are, to greater or lesser degrees, inconsistent with five of these characteristics.
1. Committees generally control their agendas, schedules, and workloads.
Congress does not usually require its committees to act on certain measures or
kinds of measures, nor do the House and Senate usually impose deadlines for
committee action. There are exceptions to this generalization, just as there are
exceptions to virtually every generalization about how Congress does its business.
For example, secondary referrals of legislation in the House usually are accompanied
by reporting deadlines, and House committees are expected to act promptly on
resolutions of inquiry. However, House and Senate committees generally have the
discretion to decide what measures within their jurisdictions they will consider, when
the committees will consider them, and if and when they will report those measures
back to the House or Senate for floor consideration.
The Appropriations and Budget Committees are exceptions in that they have
responsibility for specific and limited sets of measures, and they face time constraints
imposed by congressional rules and the fiscal calendar. However, the timetable of
the congressional budget process can be modified, waived, or ignored as Congress
sees fit. In general, whether the measure at issue is a public bill or whether it is a
simple resolution, such as a committee funding resolution or a House special rule,
the pressures on committees to act usually are grounded in political or governmental
necessity, not in procedural requirements.
Consequently, House and Senate committees generally are able to set their own
agendas, establish their own priorities, and control their own workloads. Committees
make these decisions within fairly broad and generally accepted limits: congressional
rules should be followed whenever possible; government activities should not be
halted for lack of necessary legislative action; and key presidential proposals and
intense public concerns should receive a hearing. Still, these constraints leave
committees with considerable latitude for action and inaction. And it is by inaction
that committees make one of their most important contributions to the legislative
process, as they separate the relatively few measures that, in their judgment, should
receive floor action from the many more that should not.
By contrast, expedited procedures generally deprive committees of the control
they normally enjoy over their agendas and schedules. Effective expedited
procedures typically set a time limit for committee action, and provide for automatic
discharge or a privileged motion to discharge if the committee fails to act within the
deadline. Thus, expedited procedures confront a committee with the choice between
acting within an imposed deadline or having the measure taken away from it.
Furthermore, the timing of committee action is determined largely by when the
executive branch acts or when a measure is introduced; the committee does not
control when the clock begins to run on the limited time during which it is expected
to act. The effect of expedited procedures on a committee’s workload also can be
significant, depending, of course, on how frequently they can be and are invoked.

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2. The House and Senate generally consider only measures that have been
approved by their committees.
The control that committees normally exercise over their own activities is
crucial because committee inaction often is conclusive. Again as a general rule, a bill
is likely to be moribund unless it receives favorable committee action. In this
context, however, there is a significant difference between the House and the Senate.
Although the two houses give their committees much the same discretion, the
House is more likely to abide by committee inaction or the timing of committee
action. If a House committee fails to act on a bill, or fails to act quickly enough to
satisfy its proponents, they have relatively little recourse. The discharge procedure
is so difficult as to be a last resort, and the House has amended its rules to make it
more difficult for Members to propose policy initiatives in the form of limitation
amendments to appropriations bills. The House Rules Committee has the authority
to propose a special rule for floor consideration of a bill that the committee of
jurisdiction has yet to report. However, the Rules Committee has been reluctant to
use this authority, sometimes called its power of extraction. The Rules Committee
also has been reluctant to propose waiving the House’s germaneness rule so that the
text of one bill can be offered as a floor amendment to another measure on an entirely
different subject.
By contrast, the rules of the Senate result in less deference to committee agenda
and scheduling decisions. If a Senate committee fails to report a measure, the text
of that bill or resolution can be offered as a nongermane floor amendment to most
other measures (although the fact that the committee of jurisdiction has not
considered the amendment can be a persuasive argument against it). Alternatively,
the text of a bill that remains in committee may be re-introduced as a new measure
and placed directly on the Senate’s calendar of legislative business with precisely the
same procedural standing it would have had if it had been referred to committee and
then reported. (However, a motion to call up the bill on the floor may well be
opposed by some or all of the committee’s members.) In short, while committee
inaction in the Senate is a significant impediment to legislative action, it is not as
difficult an obstacle to surmount or circumvent as it is in the House.
Notwithstanding these differences between the House and Senate, the usual
practice and expectation in both houses is that the measures considered on the floor
are measures that have been selected or developed, and then studied and approved,
by the committee or committees of jurisdiction. Effective expediting procedures, on
the other hand, alter the normal implications and consequences of committee inaction
on a measure. Instead of meaning the death of a bill or resolution, inaction means
that a committee may lose much of its control over the measure, which can reach the
floor anyway. The prospect of automatic discharge or a privileged motion to
discharge is a strong incentive for a committee to act, even if its action takes the form
of an adverse report and a recommendation that the measure not pass.
Underlying the more usual procedures of the House (and, to a lesser extent,
those of the Senate) is the fact that more measures are introduced than can possibly
be considered on the floor. From this fact follows the presumption that some
considerable deference is due to the judgments of the standing committees as they

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screen the measures referred to them. Effective expediting procedures are at odds
with this presumption, in that they permit certain measures to reach the floor because
of the general class to which they belong, not because of committee judgments about
their individual merits.
3. A voting majority of Representatives or Senators generally can determine
whether a measure will be considered on the floor.
Although the lack of committee action normally can determine which bills will
not reach the House or Senate floor, the committees normally cannot compel floor
consideration of the measures they have reported favorably. As a general rule, voting
majorities of the House and Senate retain ultimate control of their floor schedules,
at least as defined by the measures they consider.
In the House, a majority can prevent a bill or resolution from being considered
by means such as defeating a special rule from the Rules Committee for considering
the measure, or, in theory at least, by other means such as defeating the motion to
resolve into Committee of the Whole to consider a privileged general appropriations
bill, or by raising the question of consideration and voting against considering the
measure (under the Calendar Wednesday rule, for example). Motions to suspend the
rules are an exception of sorts; the House cannot decline to consider a bill that is
brought to the floor under the suspension procedure. However, passing a bill by this
procedure requires a two-thirds vote, so there usually is little point in considering a
bill under suspension if it does not clearly enjoy support by a majority of members.
Regarding the most complicated and controversial bills, the Rules Committee is
responsible for recommending an order of business through the special rules it
reports. Yet it remains for the entire House, by majority vote, to accept or reject each
such resolution.
The situation in the Senate is complicated by the absence of devices to terminate
debate by majority vote. Consequently, the votes of 60 Senators may be required to
invoke cloture on motions to consider bills, though most measures reach the Senate
floor by unanimous consent. Still, even if a simple voting majority in the Senate
cannot always call up the measures on which it wishes to act, a simple majority can
prevent consideration of measures—but not nongermane amendments—on which it
prefers not to act. Given the rights of Senators to debate (and thereby delay action)
and a natural desire of the majority party leadership to use limited floor time
efficiently and productively, the intense opposition of one Senator or a small minority
of Senators may be sufficient to postpone floor consideration of a bill, temporarily
or even indefinitely.
In this respect, the differences between expedited and more conventional
procedures lie not in the measures that the House and Senate must consider, but in
the votes that Members can be made to cast.
Expedited procedures generally do not provide for automatic or mandatory floor
consideration of the measures to which they apply. Instead, these procedures
generally make in order a privileged motion to consider, on which there can be only
limited debate or no debate at all. Either house still can vote not to consider the
measure. But a vote for or against consideration has clear and obvious policy

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implications; a bill or resolution that is not considered cannot be passed (unless as
an amendment to another measure). So a decision by roll-call vote not to consider
a measure does not protect Representatives or Senators against the need to take a
public position on the issue the measure addresses.
The difference between these and more common procedures lies in the fact that
the House or Senate usually is not even presented with a measure, or a motion to
consider it, unless there is a reasonable presumption that a majority is prepared to
pass it. Under expedited procedures, there is a greater likelihood that Members will
be presented with measures, or at least votes relating to them, that a majority may
prefer not to confront. The reason for this difference lies in the implications of
expedited procedures for majority party control over floor scheduling.
4. Setting the floor agenda and the daily schedule generally is a prerogative of
the majority party, acting through its leadership.
By and large, the majority party leadership of the House and Senate enjoy at
least a negative control over the floor agenda. Although any Senator may move to
consider any measure on the legislative calendar, such motions (or the equivalent
unanimous consent requests) actually are made only by the majority leader or another
Senator acting at his behest or with his concurrence. It is by this means that the
majority leader can exercise some control over the daily floor schedule and the more
long-term legislative agenda. If other Senators did not defer to the majority leader
in this regard, the conduct of business on the Senate floor would become far less
predictable, to the detriment of all Senators and the expedient transaction of essential
or important business.
In the House, the Rules Committee is very unlikely to report a special rule for
a bill or resolution when the majority party leadership actively opposes consideration
of that measure. Also, although a variety of matters are privileged for floor
consideration, it is the responsibility of the committee and party leaders to arrange
specific dates and times for their consideration. In the case of motions to suspend the
rules, the Speaker has the discretionary power to decide if and when such a motion
can be made on the floor. Even when a Member wishes to call up a privileged
motion or measure on the floor, the Speaker often can retain considerable discretion
over the daily floor schedule by deferring its consideration for one or more days, or
even by using his power of recognition to permit another Member to call up a
different privileged matter instead.
The agenda control of the majority party leaders is more effective as a negative
than as an affirmative power; as a general matter, these leaders in either house are
better able to prevent consideration of measures they oppose than to secure
consideration of measures they support. And there are limits on their negative power.
In the Senate, the majority leader can prevent or delay Senate floor consideration of
measures, but his control over the issues that reach the Senate floor is severely
limited by the right of Senators to propose nongermane amendments. In the House,
it is possible, in theory at least, for measures to reach the floor, through the House’s
discharge or Calendar Wednesday procedures, even over the opposition of the
Speaker and the other majority party leaders.

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To secure floor action on contentious bills, the leaders in each house require the
support of at least a majority vote on the floor. In the Senate, this takes the form of
a majority vote on the debatable motion to proceed to consideration of a bill, when
unanimous consent to consider it cannot be obtained. Should the motion be
filibustered, a minimum of 60 votes is required to invoke cloture on the motion. In
the House, scheduling most contentious bills for floor action requires the support of
a majority on the Rules Committee to report special rules for considering them
(which, in today’s House, rarely is a problem for the majority party leaders), and
majority votes on the floor to adopt these resolutions. The Speaker does have
unilateral discretion to allow the House to consider specific bills under suspension
of the rules. However, the House usually does not consider bills under suspension
in the face of widespread minority party opposition because passage of a bill under
suspension requires enough minority party support to produce a two-thirds majority
vote.
Even within these limits, the majority party leaders in each house exercise a
powerful influence, if not control, over the floor schedule and agenda. It is
noteworthy when they cannot arrange for consideration of a bill they support, or
when they cannot block floor action on a bill they oppose. By contrast, expedited
procedures tend to undermine majority party leadership control over what business
the House and Senate transact on the floor. In the House, fast-track procedures also
bypass the Rules Committee’s responsibilities for the order of business on the floor.
Expedited procedures often make the bills and resolutions to which they apply
privileged business, even if such a measure has not been reported by the committee
of jurisdiction (unlike most other privileged measures in the House). Precisely
because expedited procedures are designed to ensure an opportunity for floor action
within a limited time period, there is a strong presumption that an expedited measure
should be scheduled for consideration by the leadership. If it is not, some rule-
making statutes allow it to be called up by any Member of either party, whether or
not at the direction of the committee of jurisdiction. Other expedited procedures
make in order a non-debatable motion to consider a bill or resolution. In the latter
case, the House or Senate can vote against considering the measure in question, but
the majority party leaders cannot control whether or when this vote will take place.
Furthermore, the timing of floor action under fast-track procedures is constrained by
the date of the executive action that triggers those procedures, and by the deadline
imposed by statute for congressional action.
5. The House and Senate generally can set conditions for floor debate and
amendment that are appropriate for each measure that they consider.
The standing rules and precedents of each house specify the procedures for
debate and amendment that are to govern consideration of measures on the floor.
However, each chamber has one or more ways in which it can modify these
procedures. In the Senate, cloture can be invoked if necessary. More often, the
Senate sets aside its general rules by unanimous consent in favor of a negotiated
agreement concerning one amendment or even the entire process of considering a
measure. In the House, the Rules Committee reports special rules to supplement or
supplant certain general rules of the House—for example, by specifying the length
and control of general debate, by restricting or expanding the range of floor

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amendments that are in order, and by expediting final action in the House after the
Committee of the Whole rises and reports. The House also has available the
procedures under suspension of the rules as an alternative to considering measures
in Committee of the Whole or in the House under the one-hour rule.
By such means, the House and Senate can, and often do, adjust their floor
procedures to suit the characteristics of the specific measures before them. Some
bills require more time for debate and more opportunity for amendment than others,
and Congress’s procedures allow each house to take such differences into account.
Expedited procedures, on the other hand, typically do not permit this kind of
flexibility, though it bears repeating that the House can adopt a special rule from the
Rules Committee that supersedes or revises fast-track procedures as they would apply
to a specific measure.
More often than not, these procedures set limits on debate and prohibit all floor
amendments. These restrictions may be necessary, given the deadlines for
congressional action and the purpose of most measures considered under fast-track
procedures—namely, to approve or disapprove specific actions, regulations, or
legislative proposals proposed by the executive branch. However, the same period
for debate may not be appropriate for all measures considered under the expediting
procedures of the same statute. Furthermore, these restrictions usually permit
Congress only to approve or disapprove, but not to modify by amendment, the
proposed executive policy (except through a new statute that does not enjoy the
advantages of the expedited procedures).
When expedited procedures apply to measures other than joint resolutions of
approval or disapproval, their constraints on floor consideration can be even more
important. For instance, the procedures of the Budget Act governing Senate floor
action on reconciliation bills impose both time limitations on debate and a
germaneness requirement on amendments that would not apply to such a bill if the
Senate were to consider it under its normal rules. On the one hand, the debate
limitations prevent Senators from filibustering a reconciliation bill. On the other
hand, the germaneness requirement limits the floor amendments that Senators can
offer to such a bill, even relevant amendments that propose to achieve comparable
savings by somewhat different, though related, means.
Similarly, the expedited procedures in the Trade Act of 1974, discussed above,
that provide for House and Senate consideration of bills to implement major trade
agreements, prevent Congress from adopting any amendments to certain bills the
President proposes. For this reason, the statute that makes the expedited procedures
available also requires an elaborate process of consultation and negotiation between
executive branch officials and the appropriate congressional committees in an
attempt to ensure that congressional preferences, which cannot be expressed through
floor amendments, are taken into account when such an implementation bill is being
drafted.
It bears emphasizing that there are exceptions to each of the five generalizations
discussed here. Yet these generalizations do identify typical characteristics of the
legislative process in Congress. In significant ways, effective sets of expedited
procedures are inconsistent with these characteristics. They impose unusual

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requirements on standing committees, both as to what measures House and Senate
committees should consider and when committees should consider them. Fast-track
procedures also take from the standing committees, especially in the House, one of
their most important powers: the power to do nothing, and thereby prevent measures
from coming to the floor for debate and passage.
Fast-track procedures also create an additional and major class of privileged
measures—measures that deal with a wide array of subjects and that can vary
considerably in importance—that enjoy priority access to the floor in both houses.
Consideration of these measures can be brought to a vote on the House and Senate
floor, even over the opposition of the committees of jurisdiction. Furthermore, any
Member of either party usually can propose that the House or Senate consider one of
these privileged measures if it is not scheduled through the normal practices and
prerogatives of the majority party and its leaders. Finally, measures that the House
and Senate considers under expedited procedures generally are subject to limited
debate and no amendments. The result is to prevent or severely limit Representatives
and Senators in exercising two of their most valued rights as legislators.
Conclusion
Congress has enacted fast-track procedures in recognition of the fact that more
conventional procedures in the House and Senate generally are not well-designed to
ensure that certain measures move from introduction to conclusive floor action
within relatively short periods of time. Whether or when the House or Senate votes
on a measure usually depends on (1) agenda decisions made by the committee of
jurisdiction, (2) the schedule that the committee sets in light of the preferences of its
members, and the competing demands on its time and attention, (3) action in the
House by the Rules Committee in reporting a special rule to govern House floor
consideration of the measure (unless the House considers it instead under suspension
of the rules), and the prospects in the Senate for limiting floor debate and amending
activity by unanimous consent, (4) floor scheduling decisions usually made by the
majority party leadership in cooperation with the appropriate committee leaders, and
(5) the interest of Members in debating and amending the measure.
Expediting procedures can reduce or avoid the uncertainties that so often result
from these factors. Fast-track procedures can protect against the usual consequences
of committee inaction, they can enable any member to force a floor vote on
considering a measure, and they assure prompt disposition of the measure if the
House or Senate does consider it. Because effective fast-track procedures limit floor
debate and preclude amendments, whether germane or not, these procedures probably
have greater consequences for the Senate than for the House, given the historic
importance to the Senate and the strategic importance to Senators of the right to
filibuster and to offer nongermane amendments. The consequences for the House,
while important, are less dramatic because the House already can impose comparable
restrictions on itself by accepting them in the form of special rules proposed by the
Rules Committee. The House also can adopt special rules that waive or supersede
the application of any fast-track procedures whenever a majority of the House agrees
that the procedures are inappropriate.

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Congress is most likely to enact fast-track procedures when it places more value
on making certain timely decisions on the floor than on adhering to its normal
procedures and the principles underlying them. In evaluating expedited procedures,
Congress may ask whether they are necessary in individual cases, and what effect
they have collectively on the legislative process in the House and Senate.