Research and Development in Russia: An Important Factor for the Future

Research and Development in Russia: An Important Factor for the Future

98-739 STM
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Research and Development in Russia:
An Important Factor for the Future
August 24, 1998
William C. Boesman
Specialist in Science and Technology
Science, Technology, and Medicine Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

ABSTRACT
The Russian government reduced its research and development (R&D) funding by about 76%
in real dollars from 1990 to 1996 as part of the restructuring and downsizing of Russia’s
R&D system and its reorientation toward civilian research and development following the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The report assesses a number of recent changes in the
Russian R&D system, including the large funding and personnel decreases, the evolving
structure of a new Russian R&D system, and Russian R&D priorities under the new system.
The report identifies issues for Congress, including whether U.S. cooperative R&D programs,
recently established to assist Russia’s peaceful transition to a market economy, are
contributing to that goal and whether such programs should be continued in light of Russia’s
uncertain future and possible U.S. national security concerns. This report will be updated as
circumstances warrant.

Research and Development in Russia:
An Important Factor for the Future
Summary
If the U.S. government had reduced its research and development (R&D)
funding by about 76% in real dollars from 1990 to 1996, the U.S. national R&D
system would be in crisis. But even then, the situation in the United States probably
would not have been as severe as is now the case in Russia, where that percentage of
reduction in governmental R&D funding has occurred, because the United States has
a large private-sector R&D system.
The leadership under President Yeltsin continues to move Russia from the
Soviet-era command economy toward a free-market system. This involves a
restructuring and downsizing of Russia’s R&D system and its reorientation toward
civilian R&D. This restructuring, however, also has been driven to a significant extent
by the nation’s deep economic recession. Although large decreases in R&D funding
and personnel and a deterioration of R&D facilities have occurred since 1991, recent
R&D budget figures (questioned by some experts) might indicate a reversal of this
trend. The most recent changes in the government’s top-level R&D policy leaders
also suggest that R&D, despite its budget decreases, still is considered important in
Yeltsin’s reform government. Among several recent important R&D reforms was the
establishment of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research in 1993, an important
innovation in Russian R&D policy because it funds individual researchers directly
rather than their research institutes, on the model of the U.S. National Science
Foundation. A number of international financing schemes and structures to bolster
the Russian R&D system also have been created.
U.S. policy issues parallel ongoing U.S. and international programs to more fully
integrate Russia peacefully into the community of nations, thereby reducing the
potential for future conflict and increasing Russia's contribution to world economic
development. Major federal programs in support of Russian R&D accounted for
about $1.5 billion during the period from 1992 through 1998, with NASA
contributing over $900 million and DOD, DOE, and other federal agencies the rest.
One of the several new organizations established to cooperate with Russia in R&D
activities by providing research grants to Russian scientists is the U.S. Civilian
Research and Development Foundation, created by Congress in 1992. Supporting all
U.S. cooperative R&D programs with Russia is the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission
on Economic and Technological Cooperation, established in April 1993.
It appears that the U.S. cooperative R&D programs are contributing to Russia's
peaceful transition to a market economy and are successfully addressing scientific and
technological problems and opportunities of mutual concern to the United States,
Russia, and other countries. Several years of experience with U.S.-Russia
cooperative R&D programs suggest that it is both worthwhile and practicable for the
United States to identify and promote cooperative R&D programs which are mutually
beneficial to the two nations, while carefully restricting R&D and dual-use
technologies that may contribute to near-term or long-term military threats to U.S.
national security.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Post-1991 Changes in Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Research and Development in Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
R&D Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
R&D Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
R&D Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
R&D Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
List of Tables
Table 1. Selected Russian Science and Technology Indicators, 1990-1996 . . . . 6
Table 2. Major U.S. Government Programs in Support of Russian
R&D-Related Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Research and Development in Russia:
An Important Factor for the Future
Introduction
A healthy research and development (R&D) establishment is important for the
future of Russia’s economy and national security. Research and development has the
potential to contribute just as significantly to Russia’s economic strength in the long
term as it does in the United States, other western industrialized nations, and the
newly industrialized countries of Asia (the “Asian tigers”: Singapore, South Korea,
and Taiwan). The Russian economy, however, is undergoing a great upheaval during
its transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. An important aspect of
that economic transition is the proposed conversion of much of its defense industry
to civilian goods production. Russia’s economic problems in general, and its defense
industry conversion in particular, have resulted in large decreases in the government’s
funding of research and development. Before 1991, about three-fourths of Russia’s
R&D funding was supported by the defense ministries.1 Some estimates indicate that,
by 1992, Russian defense spending had dropped by one-third to two-thirds of its 1991
level.
2 By now, it may have fallen to one-tenth of its 1991 level.3 That large loss of
financial support for the Russian R&D establishment, beginning in 1991 and
continuing to the present, has not been replaced by other R&D funding sources to any
significant extent.
4
If the U.S. government had reduced its research and development funding by
about 76% in real dollars from 1990 to 1996, the U.S. national R&D system would
be in crisis. But even then, the situation in the United States probably would not have
been as severe as is now the case in Russia, where that percentage of reduction in
governmental R&D funding has occurred. About 58% of Russia's internal R&D
funding in 1996 came from the government. In the United States in 1996, by
contrast, only about 34% of national R&D funding came from the federal
government, and that decreased to about 31% in 1997.5 The remaining U.S. R&D

1 Carol Matlack, “Up From the Wreckage of Russian Science,” Business Week, 27 October
1997: 152-153; and “Science in Russia: The Diamonds in the Rubble,” The Economist, 8
November 1997: 25.
2 Mark P. Poncy, “The Need for Greater U.S. Assistance in Promoting Russian Defense
Conversion,” Law and Policy in International Business, v. 28, Winter 1997: 513-514.
Based on informal estimates of some Russian experts.
3
For Russian R&D data, see the section on “R&D Funding,” below, especially Table 1.
4
National Science Foundation,
5
National Patterns of R&D Resources: 1966 (NSF 96-333)
(continued...)

CRS-2
funds come from industry and other sources. The Russian R&D funding problem has
caused a number of structural changes in the Russian R&D system and the creation
of a number of international financing schemes and structures to bolster the Russian
R&D system.
The Soviet R&D establishment contributed significantly to the status of the
Soviet Union as a military super power before 1991. After 1991, in spite of the many
negative aspects of downsizing the Russian R&D establishment (such as the loss of
many scientific jobs and some R&D capabilities), several positive developments may
be occurring. The Soviet R&D establishment, then the largest in the world and
respected for high achievements in some areas, particularly military R&D, was bloated
and wasteful according to many accounts. A smaller, more efficient R&D system
focused on developing commercial products would be of more benefit to the evolving
Russian market economy than the old R&D system. Even with the large decrease in
R&D personnel since 1991, the Russian R&D establishment still may not have
reached such an optimal size. In addition, a decrease in military R&D, as Russia
converts its defense industry to civilian goods production, could contribute to Russia
being less of a military threat to the national security of the United States in the years
ahead than it has been in the past.
The period of transition from the well-financed, but inefficient, Soviet R&D
system to a significantly changed Russian R&D system probably will continue for
another 10 to 15 years, according to many experts on Russian science and technology
(S&T) policy. The United States may have an important role to play during this
period. It, along with other nations, could continue to contribute in major ways to the
stabilization of a smaller, more efficient Russian R&D system geared more to civilian
market goals than to the predominantly military orientation of the past. Alternatively,
the United States could reduce its support of, and cooperation with, some Russian
R&D projects if this is determined to be in long-term U.S. interests.
Background
The Russian Academy of Sciences was created by Peter the Great in 1725.
Following the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922, it became the Soviet
Academy of Sciences. In November 1991, it was reestablished as the Russian
Academy of Sciences. During the Soviet era, it was the central scientific organization
of the Soviet Union, with R&D capabilities in Russia and the other 14 Soviet
republics. Its mission was to conduct research in support of the techno-economic
and, later, military needs of the state. The prestigious research institutes of the
Academy were responsible mainly for conducting fundamental research. The R&D
organizations of the government's military and industrial branch ministries were
responsible mainly for applied research and development related to the missions of
those ministries. The institutes of higher education were responsible mainly for the
(...continued)
5
(Arlington, VA, 1996): 78; and Steven Payson, “R&D Exceeds Expectations Again, Growing
Faster than the U.S. Economy during the Last Three Years,” (NSF) Data Brief, 5 November
1997: 2.

CRS-3
education of future scientists, although they also conducted limited research. During
the Cold War, the majority of these large R&D capabilities were devoted to military
R&D. Even today, about one-half may be devoted to military R&D.6
Toward the end of the Soviet era and the Cold War, the Soviet Union,
particularly Russia, was comparable to the United States in some areas of science,
especially in several areas of theoretical science and a few areas of experimental
science. It was weaker than the United States in most other scientific areas, including
most areas of experimental science. This was due largely to the prestige historically
associated with theoretical science and mathematics in the Soviet Union, but also
because of the lack of adequate scientific equipment. The Soviet Union also was
competitive with the United States in several areas of military research, an elite area
of its R&D establishment. This elite status was achieved, however,
7

not because of a separate system but because of higher standards; and the
higher standards [were] achieved through a massive inspection system at
enormous cost. No civilian consumer could afford the real costs of the
products produced by and for the Soviet military.8
The Russian R&D system, in its economically inefficient “Soviet” configuration, has
not contributed significantly to the market system reforms instituted in the post-Soviet
era under President Boris Yeltsin. In contrast, in the United States and other
industrialized nations, civilian applied research has contributed significantly to
economic development.
One factor in Russia's favor, however, is that most of the R&D capabilities of the
former Soviet Union at the time of dissolution were in Russia. Russia had about two-
thirds of the researchers and major research institutes, and almost 60% of all research
organizations, of the former Soviet Union. These R&D capabilities are concentrated
in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Novosibirsk.9
Post-1991 Changes in Russia
Many of the current problems in Russian research and development, especially
its financial problems, were caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union in
December 1991. At the end of the Cold War, Russia underwent many changes. It
began a movement toward democratization of its political structure and the
Communist Party lost control of the government. Russia now is governed under a
See the section on “R&D Funding,” below.
6

7 William C. Boesman, Science and Technology in the Former Soviet Union: Capabilities
and Needs, Joint Economic Committee, The Former Soviet Union in Transition, Vol. 2:
Study Papers, S. Print 103-11, v. 2, 103d Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993:
610-628.

8 Harley D. Balzer, Soviet Science on the Edge of Reform (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989):
135.

9 Science and Technology in the Former Soviet Union: Capabilities and Needs: 612-613.

CRS-4
constitutional system of law, rather than by the Communist Party, and has a
functioning parliament. It would appear, however, that the former internal security
services, although reorganized and renamed, have retained much of their secret police
powers. Some of the old power structure, formerly called the
10
nomenklatura, also
appears to have been retained. However, while the government still has mor
11
e
control over the nation’s science and technology (and other sectors) than do
governments of other industrialized countries, it has much less control than
previously. This is due in part to R&D funding difficulties and the related
decentralization of R&D, and the establishment of alternatives to governmental R&D
support, including foreign partners and nongovernmental commercial organizations.
The Russian leadership under President Yeltsin, especially after the government’s
organizational reforms of early 1998, continues to move toward a free-market system
for Russia. This involves a considerable degree of demilitarization of the nation. In
1996, for example, production of major weapons systems was about 13% of the 1991
level according to Russian statistics. During the Soviet period, the military was the
12
major funder of research and development. Because military R&D often was the best
R&D performed in Russia, defense budget cuts have affected adversely some of
Russia's best R&D capabilities, even if they were inefficient in economic terms.
Another goal of the transition to a market economy is the conversion of much defense
industry production to civilian production but, apparently, very little defense
conversion has occurred thus far. This limits the amount of existing top quality
defense-related R&D that might otherwise be converted to civilian ends. There also
are concerns about “reconversion” to military ends and that some cases of
"conversion" may be only “diversification.”
13
The shift from the Soviet-era command economy toward a free-market system
requires a restructuring and downsizing of Russia’s R&D system and its reorientation
toward civilian R&D, a process that began in the early 1990s. This restructuring of
14
the Russian R&D system, however, has been driven to a significant extent by the
nation’s deep economic recession. Financial support for Russian R&D, the majority
of which is still funded by the government, has fallen dramatically since 1991. This

10 Amy Knight, “Is the Old KGB Still in Power?” The Washington Quarterly, v. 20, Winter
1997: 59-74.

11 Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite,”
Europe-Asia Studies, v. 48, July 1996: 711-733.
12 Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security
Threats to the United States, Hearing, 105th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, D.C., GPO, 1997:
61.
13 Glenn E. Schweitzer, “Conversion Activities in the Russian Weapons Laboratories,”
Technology in Society, v. 17, no. 3, 1995: 239-260; and Glenn E. Schweitzer, Moscow DMZ
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996): 139-158.
1 See, for example, Centre for Co-operation With the Economies in Transition,
4
Science,
Technology and Innovation Policies: Federation of Russia, Volume I: Evaluation Report
(Paris: OECD, 7 September 1993): 115 p.; and Peter Kneen, “Science in Shock: Russian
Science Policy in Transition,” Europe-Asia Studies, v. 47, March 1995: 281-303.

CRS-5
financial crisis in itself has contributed to a large decrease in Russia’s R&D funding
and personnel since then.
Even though the former Soviet R&D model did not have a great deal to
contribute to the evolving market economy, the R&D establishment then was held in
high esteem and received many perquisites. The current R&D establishment has
suffered a loss of national prestige, mainly because of the decreases in R&D funding,
personnel, and capabilities since 1991. Recent top-level changes in the government’s
R&D policy structure, however, discussed below, indicate that R&D still is
considered to be important by the leadership, although there appears to be no unified
view on national S&T goals.
Research and Development in Russia
Political and economic problems such as those discussed above have caused
significant changes in Russia's civilian and military R&D funding, personnel, structure,
and priorities. Reportedly, “[t]he processes of transition threaten the very survival of
the Russian S&T system.”
15
R&D Funding
The major problem, aside perhaps from the nonquantifiable loss of prestige of
Russian R&D, is decreasing funding. Since the government provides a large portion
of R&D funding, this decrease has a significant impact on S&T activities. In 1995,
about 74% of Russia's internal R&D funding came from the government; this
decreased to about 58% in 1996.16
Table 1 shows Russian R&D funding and personnel since 1990. Although some
analysts knowledgeable about Russian R&D and R&D statistics question the accuracy
of the official statistics, especially in regard to military R&D, large decreases in both
R&D funding and personnel since 1991 are apparent. The decrease in R&D funding
was due to decreasing percentages of gross domestic product (GDP) being devoted
to research and development at the same time that GDP itself was decreasing. Given
these caveats about the data, Table 1 indicates that:
! From 1990 to 1996, gross domestic expenditures on civilian and military R&D
decreased about 76% in constant 1989 rubles and about 57% as a percentage
of gross domestic product. The latter indicates not only a decrease in real
R&D funding, but a trend of overall national financial resources away from
research and development since 1990. The small increases in these figures in
1996 might indicate a reversal of this trend.

15 Science, Technology and Innovation Policies: Federation of Russia, Volume I: Evaluation
Report, 16.

16 Centre for Science Research and Statistics, Russian Science and Technology at a Glance:
1997 ( Moscow: Ministry of Science and Technological Policy of the Russian Federation and
Russian Academy of Sciences, 1998): 40-41.

CRS-6
! From 1991 to 1996, governmental civilian and military R&D appropriations
as a percentage of the total governmental budget decreased from 7.43% to
3.2%. However, there was a significant increase to 5.06% in 1997, which is
about 68% of the 1991 level. This might indicate a shifting of governmental
priorities back toward R&D funding.
Table 1. Selected Russian Science and
Technology Indicators, 1990-1996
Years
Gross Domestic Expenditures on
Govt’l
Scientific
National
R&D
R&D
Degrees
R&D
Approps
Awarded
Personnel
as a % of

Total
(Doctoral
(Resear-
Constant
Current
Percent of
a
b
Govt’l
Degrees)
chers /
c
1989
Rubles
GDP
Budget
Tech-
Rublesa
nicians)
billions
%
%
thousands
1990
10.9
13
2.03
n.a.
35,117
1,943.3
(5,067)
(1,227.4)
1991
7.3
20
1.43
7.43
35,040
1,677.8
(6,326)
(1,079.1)
1992
3.2
141
0.74
4.47
29,612
1,532.6
(5,491)
(984.7)
1993
3.1
1,317
0.77
4.58
19,790
1,315.0
(4,111)
(778.8)
1994
2.9
5,146
0.84
2.83
16,149
1,106.3
(3,185)
(640.8)
1995
2.4
12,149
0.73
3.25
14,313
1,061.0
(2,760)
(620.1)
1996
2.6
19,394
0.86
3.2
15,054
990.7
(3,022)
(572.6)
a These are “old” rubles. In early 1998, “new” rubles were issued with a face value of one-
thousandth of the old rubles.
b GDP = gross domestic product.
c Scientists and engineers engaged in R&D and usually having higher education (university or
equivalent) degrees. From the glossary in the Source.
Source: Centre for Science Research and Statistics, Russian Science and Technology at a Glance:
1997, Moscow, Ministry of Science and Technological Policy of the Russian Federation and Russian
Academy of Science, 1998: 23, 26, 40, 42.

CRS-7
As in previous years, not all of these appropriated funds actually may be
allocated due to sequestrations which have occurred because government revenues
have failed to meet budget targets. Moreover, not all Russia R&D organizations
share equally in the actual allocations of the R&D budget. In 1996, for example, the
Russian Academy of Sciences received about 78%, and the Russian Federation for
Basic Research about 37%, of their budget allocations. Many other R&D
organizations received significantly less than their allocations. The Ministry o
17
f
Science and Technology, for example, received about 50% of its budget. Th
18
e
Russian Space Agency received about 80%.
19
In addition to the amounts shown in Table 1, large amounts of R&D funds were
received from foreign nations, including the United States. It is unclear, however,
how much of the foreign funds actually went into the Russian R&D system. In 1993,
for example, OECD estimated that about $200-$300 million reached Russia from
OECD countries, but a Russian official thought that this was an inflated figure.
20
During the worst years of the Russian R&D funding crisis, 1994 to 1996, foreign
support might have reached 30% to 50% of total Russian civilian basic research
funding.21
Table 1 indicates the extreme inflation that occurred in Russia from 1990
through 1996. Gross Domestic Expenditures on R&D (GERD) was about 19.4
trillion rubles (current prices) in 1996. Most of Russia's GERD still is provided by the
government. In 1996 and 1997, the federal R&D budgets were about 11.3 trillion and
26.8 trillion rubles, respectively. The amount for 1996 slightly exceeded the 4% of
22
total federal budget required by the new federal science and technology policy law.23
In dollars, the planned Russian R&D budget for 1997 was to have been about $6.0
17 Irina Dezhina, Russian Science: Transformation and Adaption (Paper delivered at the
Georgetown University conference on Russian Science and Industrial Policy: Moscow and
the Regions, 25 March 1997): 6-7; and Irina Dezhina, “Russian Science in the Transition
Period (1991-1996),” Russian Science and Industrial Policy: Moscow and the Regions,
Conference Report (Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University, 24-25 March 1997, 68-69.
18 Personal communication with Dr. Richard J. Brody, Department of Commerce, 11
September 1997, Also see Andrey Allakhverdov and Vladmir Pokrovsky, “Science Agency
Hit with 55% Cut,” Science, v. 276, 13 June 1997: 1639.

19 Nicolay Novichkov, “Russian Space Chief Voices Dire Warnings,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, v. 146, 6 January 1997: 26.
Ibid., 38, 111.
20
21 Personal communications with Gerson Sher, U.S. Civilian Research and Development
Foundation, July 22, 1998 and August 18, 1998. Varying estimates of foreign funding are
discussed in Glenn E. Schweitzer, Experiments in Cooperation (New York: The Twentieth
Century Fund, 1997): 4 and footnote 9 on p. 156-157 (quote); and Glenn E. Schweitzer, “Can
R&D Recover in Russia?” Technology in Society, v. 17, no. 2, 1995: 124 and footnote 10
on p. 141.

22 Russian Science and Technology at a Glance: 1997, 41.
23 Russian S&T at a Glance: 1997, 41; and Article 15, Financing of Scientific and (or)
Scientific-Technical Activity, of “On Science and State Science and Technology Policy,”
approved by President Yeltsin 23 August 1996.

CRS-8
billion (about $4.0 billion for civilian and $2.0 billion for military R&D). However,
the civilian portion was slashed about 55%, to $2.2 billion, because of the
government’s large deficit. Tota
24
l R&D funding for 1997 thus was roughly one-half
civilian and one-half military. For 1998, the planned civilian R&D budget is about
25
$2.2 billion, the same as the actual funding level in 1997. If military R&D funding
26
for 1998 also is about the same as last year, total R&D funding would remain about
one-half military and one-half civilian.
The R&D funding difficulties of the past several years could have been made
significantly worse by a draft tax code approved by the Russian Cabinet in February
1997 and planned to be submitted to the Duma in April 1997. The then-existing tax
laws were in need of reform because they were contradictory and confiscatory. The
draft code, although it would have increased governmental revenues, which Russia
desperately needs, also would have eliminated almost all of the tax exemptions and
concessions that applied to the Russian R&D establishment, including universities.
It was estimated that it would have deprived Russian R&D of funds amounting to
about one-half of the 1997 budget. This threat to R&D funding was eliminated in
27
1997.
28 The new tax code passed by the Duma in July 1998 favors enterprises,
including R&D organizations, by reducing their tax burdens while increasing the tax
burden on consumers through increased sales, value added, and personal income
taxes.
R&D Personnel
Related to the significant decreases in R&D funding are similar decreases in the
number of R&D personnel and scientific degrees awarded. Table 1 shows that, from
1990 to 1996, the number of scientific degrees awarded decreased about 57% and the
number of researchers and technicians fell about 53%. Although endangered,
mathematics and scientific education in Russia is still world class. The dramatic
decreases in the numbers of scientific degrees awarded and R&D personnel may not
be entirely unfortunate because it is generally conceded that the Russian scientific and
engineering work force was bloated in comparison with most other countries. A 1993
analysis reported:

24 Richard Stone, “Reformer Named Science Minister,” Science, v. 280, 8 May 1998: 821;
and Sheila Foote, “Russia Focuses Funding on R&D; Production at Record Low,” Defense
Daily, v. 197, 9 December 1997: 2-3.
25 Also see Mikhail K. Glubokovskii, Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, Russian State
Duma Committee on Education, Culture, and Science, Presentation at the Georgetown
University conference on Russian Science and Industrial Policy: Moscow and the Regions,
24 March 1997; and Mikhail K. Glubokovsky, “The Formulation of the National Science
Budget,” Science and Technology Legislation in Russia (Paris: OECD, 1996): 24.
26 Stone, “Reformer Named Science Minister,” op. cit.

27 Andrey Allakhverdov and Vladimir Pokrovsky, “New Tax Code Threatens Science Funds,”
Science, v. 275, March 1997: 1411.
“Russian Grants to Remain Duty Free,”
28
Science, v. 276, 16 May 1997: 1019.

CRS-9
The United States employed in the late 1980s some 1 million research
scientists and engineers (RSE) in full-time equivalent (FTE) for an economy
which, in real terms, seemed three times bigger than Russia's. Japan, whose
science system is more labour-intensive, employed some 450,000 RSE for
an economy which seemed equivalent, in real terms, to Russia's. These
data give some benchmarks for the size that seems reasonable for Russia.
The latter still employed 950,000 RSE in head count in 1991 -- the
corresponding number in FTE would be somewhat smaller. The reduction
that has already occurred concerns possibly 200,000 to 300,000 persons,
so that large cuts are still to come.29
Table 1 shows that the number of Russian researchers and technicians decreased to
about 573,000 in 1996. Allowing for some differences in statistics from different
sources, the Russian R&D work force still might not have reached its optimal size,
given the evolving Russian R&D structure and priorities.
Aside from the personal hardships imposed on the unemployed scientists and
engineers involved, and the ripple effect of reduced wages throughout the economy,
the reduction in the work force has caused several other problems, but also
opportunities, for Russia.
! External brain drain. The first and greatest wave of expatriates, in 1992 and
1993, included many of Russia's scientific and engineering elite. However,
some of these persons may return. A brain drain of nuclear weapons scientists,
a potentially dangerous situation, probably is minimal because of laws
restricting the travel of such scientists and because of international programs
to encourage them to stay. The overall external brain drain has been relatively
small.30 In addition, many Russian students studying abroad probably will
return, although not until after they are 28 years old, in order to avoid the
military draft.
! Internal brain drain. Of the approximately 500,000 to 600,000 scientists and
engineers who left their professions from 1990 to 1995, possibly more than
half of them have found new careers in Russia, many in the emerging market
economy in non-scientific and non-engineering capacities. These intelligent,
31
well-educated, and motivated individuals probably have contributed
significantly to the evolving market economy. “Banking, for instance, has
recently become a prestigious and desirable career (ex-physicists and
29 Science, Technology and Innovation Policies: Federation of Russia. Volume I:
Evaluation Report, 17.

30 About 11,000 to 12,000 scientists and engineers are reported to have emigrated and another
11,000 to 12,000 are working outside Russia on contracts, according to Boris G. Saltykov,
former Russian Minister of Science and Technology Policy at the Georgetown University
conference on Russian Science and Industrial Policy: Moscow and the Regions, 24 March
1997.

31 See Table 1 and Jocelyn Kaiser (ed.), “Russian Research on the Ropes,” Science, v. 274,
13 December 1996: 1827.

CRS-10
mathematicians are its most successful practitioners).” Boris Nemtsov
32
,
former First Deputy Prime Minister, is a former nuclear physicist.
! Remaining scientists and engineers. Although many of the best Russian
scientists and engineers have retained their jobs in the institutes of the
Academy of Sciences and other elite institutions, the average age of these
remaining R&D personnel has been increasing. This has negative implications
for the future of Russian R&D.
The decrease in R&D funding has not only caused a decrease in R&D
employment, but a deterioration of R&D facilities. Old equipment cannot be
maintained or replaced, new equipment and supplies cannot be purchased, and many
facilities are closed part of the time because utility bills, no longer subsidized, cannot
be paid. Parts of some facilities have been rented for non-scientific use to raise funds.
Other facilities have been closed entirely.

R&D funding decreases also have caused some problems in maintaining Russia's
international S&T commitments. Perhaps most importantly for the United States,
Russia may not be able to fulfill its financial commitments in support of the
International Space Station (ISS). According to Rep. Sensenbrenner, chairman of
33
the House Committee on Science, this raises serious concerns about Russia's
continued participation in the project. In a letter to President Clinton on June 24,
34
1998, Rep. Sensenbrenner and Rep. Brown, ranking minority member of the House
Science Committee, “requested a plan from the President within thirty days detailing
how the Administration expects to resolve the dire problems surrounding the
International Space Station.” The letter requested the President’s persona
35
l
intervention with President Yeltsin to ensure Russia’s full compliance with its ISS
commitments. The recent troubles with the Mir space station also may lead to Russia
scaling back its planned experiments on that station. Russia also plans to decrease
36
its contribution to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER),
although it appears to be maintaining its participation in the Large Hadron Collider
(LHC) project of CERN (European Laboratory for Particle Physics).
37

32 Richard Layard and John Parker, “The Coming Russian Boom,” The American Enterprise,
v. 7, July/August 1996: 61.
33 Congressional Research Service, Space Stations, by Marcia S. Smith, CRS Issue Brief
93017, updated regularly, 16 p.

34 David Mulholland, “Sensenbrenner Urges ‘Produce or Else’ Stance On Space Station,” New
Technology Week, v. 11, 3 March 1997: 1, 11; and David Mulholland, “Goldin Expects ISS
Schedule Will Hold Up,” New Technology Week, v. 11, 10 March 1997: 1, 7.

35 Committee on Science, Committee Asks Clinton for Space Station Plan, press release, 24
June 1998: 1.

36 Tony Reichhardt, “Mir’s Problems Could Mean Scale-Down for Science,” Nature, v. 388,
28 August 1997: 818.

37 Alison Abbott, “Funding Forces Fusion Project Out of Europe,” and “Russian Contribution
for CERN Collider,” Nature, v. 382, 25 July 1996: 288.

CRS-11
The ongoing governmental R&D funding decreases give added importance to
Russia’s technology development programs conducted in support of its market reform
policies. If such programs are successful, the still small nongovernmental S&T sector
may contribute more to the nation’s research and technology development activities
than it has in the past.
A loss of prestige of Russian R&D is both a cause and an effect of the R&D
funding and personnel problems discussed above. Russian R&D is not as valued in
the evolving market economy as it was in the Soviet era. In addition, scientists and
38
engineers have lost much of the leadership role that they had in that era. This,
perhaps more than the continuous decreases in R&D funds, which might ultimately
level off and maybe even turn into increases, and the loss of R&D personnel, which
has some positive as well as negative aspects, might be the most serious factors in the
long-term health of Russian R&D.
R&D Structure
The Russian R&D structure also has undergone a number of changes since the
end of the Soviet era. In the Soviet era, the State Committee for Science and
Technology, in conjunction with the Soviet Academy of Sciences, had principal
responsibility for formulating policy for, and conducting, basic research. The Ministry
of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education was responsible for the institutes of
higher education. Immediately after the Soviet era, the Ministry of Science, Higher
Education, and Technology Policy, headed by Boris Saltykov, was established as the
principal R&D organization, responsible for policy direction and the funding of much
R&D and science education. In early 1993, it lost its responsibility for higher
education policy and became the Ministry of Science and Technology Policy. In
August 1996, it became the State Committee on Science and Technology, headed by
Vladmir Fortov, who also was a Vice Premier. On March 10, 1997, it became again
the Ministry of Science and Technology (now “Science and Technologies”) under
Fortov, but he no longer was a Vice Premier. The new deputy prime minister with
responsibility for science and technology was Vladmir Bulgak, a seasoned bureaucrat
who was the former minister of communications.39 In a cabinet reshuffle in April
1998, Bulgak was appointed Minister of Science and Technologies to replace
Fortov.
40 Although he lost his position as deputy prime minister, Bulgak subsequently
was appointed to a seat in the newly created Presidium, a select subset of the Cabinet.
This was an indication of the importance placed on science and technology in the
reform-minded government of President Yeltsin and the new Prime Minister, Sergei
Kiriyenko. After about five months in office, Kiriyenko was fired on August 23, 1998
and replaced by the former prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin. These changes are
an indication of the governmental uncertainty that still affects the Russian R&D
system.
38 Salaries of scientists, for example, have fallen from about 110% to about 80% of other
salaries, according to Boris G. Saltykov.

39 Information on these recent developments was obtained in a personal communication with
Dr. Irina Dezhina on 28 March 1997.

40 Carl Levin, “Russian Reshuffle Places Bulgak at Helm,” Nature, v. 393, 7 May 1998: 3.

CRS-12
Those changes indicate continuing rivalry among the current Russian S&T policy
leadership as to the proper level and focus of research and development. That rivalry
includes a continuing competition for scarce R&D funds between, for example, the
Ministry of Science and Technology and the Russian Academy of Sciences. In some
ways, though, the R&D structure has not changed much since the breakup of the
Soviet Union. The Russian Academy of Sciences is basically the same organization
as the former Soviet Academy of Sciences and is still the most influential and
prestigious R&D organization in Russia. It remains hostile to R&D reform. The
Ministry of Science and Technology, especially under former minister Saltykov, has
been the principal agent of reform in Russian S&T policy. Saltykov, for example,
attempted to identify Russia’s best research institutes and fund them on a priority
basis as Federal Research Centers (also referred to as State Science Centers). These
centers, now numbering about 60, about twice the number originally envisioned, are
particularly favored in the R&D budget. The program, however, has been seriously
diluted by the inclusion of the additional institutes, given the government’s limited
financial resources. After he was appointed deputy prime minister, Bulgak promoted
a reform of Russian science, including a radical restructuring of the Russian Academy
of Sciences and a substantial reduction in the number of state-supported research
institutions. His reform plan was published in October 1997. Because it lacked detail,
a time schedule, and deadlines, however, it has been criticized by other reform-minded
individuals as being too vague.41
Another important R&D reform was the establishment of the Russian Foundation
for Basic Research (RFBR) in 1993, headed, until recently, by the former Minister of
Science and Technology, Vladmir Fortov. It has provided Western-style merit-based,
peer-reviewed grants for about 54,000 research scientists. Although the Foundation
accounted for only about 4 to 6% of the federal budget allocation in 1995-97 (and
actually received only about one-third of that), it may have contributed roughly one-
42
third to one-half of salary support for Russian scientists conducting basic research.43
This is mainly because the much larger budget of the Russian Academy of Sciences
has been going principally for maintenance of its physical plant, rather than for salaries
or scientific equipment. The RFBR is an important innovation in Russian R&D policy
with potentially long-reaching ramifications because it funds individual researchers
directly rather than their research institutes, on the model of the U.S. National Science
Foundation.
Other important post-Soviet R&D organizations include the Russian Space
Agency and the Ministry of Atomic Energy, which are responsible for the military and
civilian nuclear complex. The Ministry of Defense continues to be responsible for
much military R&D. Russian R&D also is becoming more decentralized and
diversified. A significant amount of science policy is being formulated in various

41 Andrey Allakhverdov and Vladimir Pokrovsky, “Bulgak Fails to Deliver on Reform Plans,”
Science, v. 278, 14 November 1997: 1220.
42 Russian Science: Transformation and Adaption, 7-8.
43 Personal communication with Gerson Sher, U.S. Civilian Research and Develop-ment
Corporation, August 18, 1998, based on information from V. Fortov, former director of the
RFBR and later minister of Science and Technologies, M. Alfimov, current director of the
RFBR, and B. Saltykov, former minister of Science and Technology Policy.

CRS-13
regions of Russia because the regions are receiving less funding from, and are being
less influenced by, Moscow.
R&D Priorities
Article 11 of the new Russian S&T policy law sets forth the main goals an
44
d
principles of Russian R&D policy, which are to:
develop, sensibly locate and effectively use scientific-technical potential, to
enlarge the contribution of science and technology to development of the
state's economy and to attainment of the most important social objectives,
to provide for progressive structural transformations in materials
production, to raise its effectiveness and the competitiveness of its
products, to improve the ecological situation and protection of the state's
information resources, to reinforce the defense capabilities of the state and
the security of the individual, the society and the state, and to strengthen
interrelationships between science and education.
Like much else in Russia today, however, the medium-range and long-range directions
of state S&T policy “shall be determined by the President.” Article 13 states that the
President shall make his determination on the basis of a special report to be prepared
by the government.
While these activities might seem, and probably are, somewhat chaotic, they have
contributed to a number of positive changes in Russian R&D: more flexibility in the
R&D system, including increased local, regional, international, and industrial
participation; implementation of competitive, peer-reviewed research grants by the
new Foundation for Basic Research; selective support of science, for example, of the
new Federal Research Centers; support of leading scientific schools; and increased
cooperation between academic research and teaching.
45
Current Russian R&D priorities are a mix of Soviet and post-Soviet priorities as
reflected in the nation's 42 federal S&T programs, most of which are from the Soviet
period. These programs fall into four major categories: military conversion
programs, new technologies, life sciences, and “socio-oriented” programs. Most of
the R&D funding in 1995 and 1996, however, went to such programs as the
Conversion of the Defense Industry, the Federal Space Program, and the Program of
Development of Civil Aviation. At least in those years, according to a Russian analyst
familiar with Russian R&D programs, the “hidden priority still [was] defense-related
research.”
46 Although Russia is attempting to develop new commercial technologies,
about one-half of current Russian R&D funding, as noted above, might be for military
R&D. Senior Russian officials have stated that, because of budgetary constraints, the

44 On Science and State Science and Technology Policy.

45 Personal communication with Dr. Irina Dezhina on 28 March 1997 and Russian Science:
Transformation and Adaption.

46 Russian Science: Transformation and Adaption, p. 6.

CRS-14
Russian military has concentrated more on defense-related R&D than weapons
production since 1993.
47
In addition to the de facto priorities reflected in the government's R&D
programs, there exist several other lists of R&D priorities. One governmental list
includes basic research and seven critical technologies: information technologies and
electronics, production technologies, new materials and chemical products,
technologies of living systems, transport, fuel and energy, and ecology and rational
use of nature. The priorities of the Russian Academy of Sciences coincide to a large
extent with this list. Other R&D priority lists include that of the National Technology
Basis program and a separate priority list involving dual-use technologies. The
establishment and funding of the new Federal Research Centers also is an important
priority.
48 This abundance of R&D priorities, some of which may be inconsistent with
others, reflects continuing uncertainty as to the relative importance of the various
components of Russian science policy, as do the structural changes in the R&D
system noted above.
Military and space R&D historically have been two of the most important
Russian R&D priorities. Although cloaked in secrecy, Russia presumably is
maintaining its R&D capability to service some of its large nuclear weapons force.
In addition, selected areas of military R&D appear to be well funded and world class,
including advanced fighter aircraft and nuclear submarines. There is, however,
49
a
crisis in military funding. Salaries of military officers, for example, have been months
in arrears for several years. .
50
Space R&D, however, in which Russia has long played a leading role
internationally, especially in areas such as human spaceflight, has suffered several
reverses. The loss of its Mars 96 spacecraft, a serious blow to the Russian space
program,51 and the government's problems with funding the International Space
Station, noted above, are symptoms of a program in financial and technical trouble.
Issues for Congress
The policy issues involve mainly problems and opportunities in U.S. and
international support of, and cooperation with, the Russian R&D establishment.
Overall, these issues parallel ongoing U.S. and international programs to more fully
integrate Russia peacefully into the community of nations, thereby reducing the
47 Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, p. 61.
Ibid., 3-7.
48

49 Miklos Radvanyi, “A Lack of Democracy is Plaguing Russia,” The Washington Times, 30
August 1996: A17.
Congressional Research Service,
50
Russian Conventional Armed Forces: On the Verge of
Collapse? by Stuart Goldman, CRS Report 97-820F, 4 September 1997: 20.

51 Tony Reichhardt, Carl Levitin, and Ehsan Masood, “Lost Mars Mission Thrusts Russian
Space Science Further into Crisis,” Nature, v. 384, 21 November 1996: 199.

CRS-15
potential for future conflict and increasing Russia's contribution to world economic
development. In general, the policy issues can be defined as whether U.S. R&D
cooperation with Russia should be increased or decreased in the four major areas of
U.S. government support for Russian science and technology: support of Russian
efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials and the defection
of nuclear weapons scientists; support of Russian economic reforms; support of U.S.
scientists in establishing research partnerships with Russian scientists; and promotion
of technical commercialization by assisting U.S. companies gain access to advanced
Russian technologies and highly skilled technicians.
52
Major federal programs in support of Russian R&D are shown in Table 2. It is
estimated that these programs accounted for about $1.5 billion during the 1992-1997
period, of which over $900 million was for NASA's Human Space Flight programs
and a number of other NASA R&D projects. The U.S. private sector also contributed
about $300 million in R&D funding during this period, about $200 million of which
was provided by George Soros.
NASA's cooperative effort, the largest among the federal programs, draws on
Russian know-how to reduce costs in the U.S. manned space program. NASA
provided about $662 million to Russia for the Shuttle-Mir program and the
International Space Station project from 1994 through 1998, of which $190 million
was funded through a contract between the Boeing Corporation and Russia’s
Khrunichev Company. A second major NASA cooperative program is research on
global climate change. There also are a number of cooperative efforts in other areas,
including aeronautical research and development.
The “Nunn-Lugar” Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program of the
Department of Defense (DOD) promotes the national security of the United States
53
by facilitating the reduction of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear
weapons, in the former Soviet Union; expediting their destruction; establishing
proliferation safeguards, including the prevention of an external brain drain of
weapons scientists and engineers; and expanding defense contacts between the United
States and Soviet successor states. Very little of this involves research and
development. The program provided about $50 million in direct support of Russian
scientists through the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and about
$5 million through the U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF),
discussed below. DOD's “Non-Nunn-Lugar” programs include a number of
cooperative projects with DOD and the Department of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force and the purchase of Russian technologies.
52 Details on the federal R&D cooperative and assistance policies, programs, and activities
discussed in this section are taken mainly from a personal communications with Dr. Richard
J. Brody, Department of Commerce, 11 September 1997 and 17 July 1998, and Cathleen
Campbell, Department of Commerce, 17 July 1998; and Experiments in Cooperation, 25-46,
130-131.

53 Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, Title II of P.L. 102-228, 106 Stat. 1693, 12
December 1991, as amended.

CRS-16
Table 2. Major U.S. Government Programs in Support of Russian
R&D-Related Activities
($ millions)
U.S. Government Programs
Estimated R&D
Funding,
1992-1997
NASA
912a
Department of Defense
“Nunn-Lugar” Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program
(55)b
“Non-Nunn-Lugar” Programs
150c
Department of Energy
150d
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
135
Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF)
16
Other Federal Programs
127e
a Includes $662 million for the Mir and International Space Station projects, part of NASA's
Human Space Flight programs ($472 million provided directly by NASA and $190 million
funded through Boeing Corp. and spent in Russia); and $250 million for various R&D
programs.
b About $50 million for the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and about $5
million for the Civilian Research and Development Foundation, included in the ISTC and
CRDF figures, below.
c Includes a number of cooperative projects with DOD and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force.
d Mainly DOE's Initiative for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) and other cooperative projects funded
through DOE national laboratories.
e Includes a number of research projects involving NSF, NIH, USDA, NIST, and other agencies.
Source: Individual organizations and Glenn E. Schweitzer. Experiments in Cooperation (New
York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1997): 130-131.
The Department of Energy programs involve mainly bilateral R&D projects with
Russia in the areas of nuclear materials protection and nuclear reactor safety. The
Initiative for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) and other R&D projects totaled about
$150 million during this period.
The National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, the National Institute of Standards and Technology and
about 17 other federal agencies also have cooperative research programs with Russia,
which accounted for about $275 million from 1992 through 1996. The Freedom
Support Act (FSA) of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)54
indirectly funds programs in support of U.S. AID's economic and technical assistance
goals in Russia and other former Soviet nations, including energy efficiency projects,

54 Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act
of 1992, P.L. 102-511, 106 Stat. 3320, 24 October 1992.

CRS-17
environmental quality demonstration projects, public health services, and the exchange
and training of undergraduate and graduate students. Other than providing about $85
million to the ISTC, only about $2 million of FSA funding has been for research and
development, mainly the International Business Technology Incubation project.
Three new organizations have been established specifically to cooperate with
Russia in these types of R&D activities by providing research grants to Russian
scientists. The first, the International Science Foundation (ISF), was established by
George Soros in 1992. It expended about $100 million on long-term basic research
grants for Russian researchers before it ceased operations by 1996. The secon
55
d
organization, the International Science and Technology Center, is a joint cooperative
effort of Russia, the United States, Japan, the European Union, and a few other
nations. The ISTC was established in March 1994 after extended negotiations
between the parties. The Center has committed about $135 million
56
to encourage
57
Russian nuclear weapons scientists, who might otherwise wish to emigrate, to stay in
Russia and reorient their research to non-military ends. The third organization is the
U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation for the Independent States of
the Former Soviet Union, established under the Freedom Support Act. It bega
58
n
funding in 1996 and has committed about $16 million for Russia by 1998 to
strengthen civilian R&D collaboration, defense conversion, and the emerging market
economies of Russia and other former Soviet states.
59
A recent initiative is the Program for Basic Research and Higher Education
(BRHE), a joint effort of the U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation and
the Russian Ministry of Education. Its purpose is to eliminate the historical separation
between the approximately 325 research institutes of the Russian Academy of
Sciences and Russian universities, which have never conducted much research. The
initiative “would create a cadre of elite research centers at universities that can help
attract and train the next generation of scientists.” This initiative apparently has the
60
support of the leadership of the Russian Academy of Sciences. If successful, the
initiative would dramatically change the structure of Russian science by creating a
research institute-university link with similarities to those existing in France and
Germany.
Supporting the cooperative R&D programs with Russia is the U.S.- Russian
Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation, created by President

55 Based on Irina Dezhina, The Role of the International Science Foundation (ISF) in
Support of Science in the Former Soviet Union (1997): 29-54, especially pp. 32 and 49.
Schweitzer, “Conversion Activities in the Russian Weapons Laboratories.”
56
Richard Stone, “The Perils of Partnership,”
57
Science, v. 275, 24 January 1997: 470.

58 Section 511 of Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets
Support Act of 1992.
59 U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation, Progress Report 1995-1997
(Arlington, VA, 1997): 5, 7.
6 Richard Stone, “A New Initiative for Russian Science,”
0
Science, v. 280, 29 May 1998:
1336.

CRS-18
Clinton and President Yeltsin at their Vancouver summit meeting in April 1993.
Chaired by Vice President Gore and the Russian prime minister, the Commission has
proven to be exceptionally successful in eliminating obstacles to, and in breaking new
ground in, U.S.-Russian R&D cooperation. A number of R&D projects have been
brought under the aegis of the Commission and a number of new R&D agreements
have been made. The high-level Commission apparently has continued to operate
smoothly even during periods of stress in U.S.-Russian relations and thus has been a
stabilizing factor and an important channel of official cooperation during such periods.
Improving the success rate of joint Russian-U.S. commercial technology
ventures is important to both the U.S. private sector and Russia. At its February 1997
meeting, the Commission agreed to design an initiative to improve the
commercialization of Russian technologies. The U.S. government has identified four
potential areas of activity that could contribute significantly to overcoming existing
difficulties in commercial cooperation between the two countries: resolution of at
least some of Russia’s systemic legal and regulatory impediments to technology
commercialization; increased availability of information for U.S. companies on
Russian research institutes, scientists, and specializations; education and training in
a host of “transaction” areas (import/export regulations, partnering arrangements,
etc.) and intellectual property rights relevant to doing business in Russia; and case
studies of successful and unsuccessful joint technology commercialization projects.61
Also in 1997, CRDF established its Next Steps to the Market Program to “stimulate
cooperation in applied R&D through the support of projects designed to facilitate and
expedite the commercial utilization of research results.”62
Even with all these U.S. and other cooperative R&D programs and activities,
however, the near-term future of Russia and Russian R&D still appears to be perilous.
Some observers, though, believe that the longer-term future, following the transition
period, may be rather bright for Russian R&D if a smaller, but more efficient, R&D
system is adequately funded.
Now is a time of both danger and opportunity for U.S.-Russian R&D
cooperation. The Russian economy still is in financial crisis. Foreign direc
63
t
investment in Russia, which would ameliorate this situation, is small in comparison to
global, and even eastern European, investment patterns. Foreign direct investment
64
in major technological projects, which generally includes both funding and foreign
corporate management of research and development, might be crucial to increased
R&D funding in Russia because the government probably will continue to find it
difficult to allocate more of its constrained budgets for research and development in
61 Richard J. Brody, “U.S.-Russian Initiative on Commercializing Russian Technologies
Highlights Opportunities and Impediments,” East/West Executive Guide, v. 7, March 1997:
13-14.
CRDF announcement, 23 June 1997.
62
Congressional Research Service,
63
The Russian Financial Crisis: An Analysis of Trends,
Causes, and Implications, by William H. Cooper, CRS Report 98-578E, 26 June 1998, 6 p.
64 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report Update April
1998(London, 1998): 12.

CRS-19
the near future. Russia particularly needs additional foreign direct investment in
energy and telecommunications, which typically involve significant R&D components.
Privatization and foreign and domestic purchase of ownership shares of, for example,
the Russian telecommunications giant, Sviazizvest, and major Russian energy
companies are important for sustaining much of Russia’s R&D and for increasing its
technological competitiveness. Fortunately, prospects for this are good. The
economic downward trend was arrested in 1997. Although it recurred with sudden
severity in 1998, optimistic forecasts project small increases in growth but only if and
when the financial crisis coincident with the governmental changes of August 1998
is resolved, an open question at this moment. If the Russian economic situation,
including foreign direct investment and the tax collection process, does not improve,
there likely will be continuing serious ramifications for Russian R&D, because
adequate R&D funding depends upon an improved economy, a more productive tax
base, and direct foreign investments. If the Russian economy does begin to revive
65
and grow, the Russian R&D system, although smaller, may be stronger after the
transition period (perhaps 10 to 15 years) than it was in the Soviet era, especially if
it continues to receive outside help.
U.S. and other cooperative R&D programs are enhancing Russia's peaceful
transition to a market economy and are successfully addressing scientific and
technological problems and opportunities of mutual concern to the United States,
Russia, and other countries. U.S. R&D cooperation with Russia also is one of the
few areas in current U.S.-Russia relations in which both countries can promote mutual
goals in a constructive way involving many U.S. government agencies. Some may
argue that the contributions already made by these efforts support the case for
increased U.S. and international R&D cooperation with Russia.
Others may caution that, with increased cooperation and a relaxation of
international tensions, much U.S. and foreign R&D and many dual-use technologies,
including computers and telecommunications, may ultimately find their way into
Russia's military efforts and be counterproductive in regard to U.S. national security.
This Cold War issue surfaced again in early 1997 with the sale of powerful U.S.
computers to two Russian nuclear weapons laboratories. Another security issu
66
e
came to light recently when the U.S. government imposed sanctions against seven
Russian entities suspected of contributing to Iran’s missile program.
67

65 Personal communication with John P. Hardt, Congressional Research Service, 1 July 1998.
Also see John P. Hardt, “Commentary on the IMF Led Russian Assistance Program,”
presented at a panel discussion of the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., July 23, 1998.
6 pp.; and Congressional Research Service, Russia’s Opportunity to Enter a New Stage in
the Transition: Update, by John P. Hardt, CRS Report 97-977 E, 29 October 1997, 44 p.
For the policy positions of the U.S. government, the International Monetary Fund, and the
World Bank in regard to foreign investment in Russia, see the various papers of the U.S.-
Russia Business Council conference on U.S.-Russian Trade and Investment Forecast '97, 1
April 1997, Washington, D.C.

66 Daniel Sneider, “Of Supercomputers and National Security: Can U.S. Keep ‘War Games’
Computers from Russia?” The Christian Science Monitor, 4 March 1997: 3.

67 Richard Stone, “U.S. Blacklists Russian Institutes,” Science, v. 280, 24 April 1998,: 513;
(continued...)

CRS-20
The most difficult policy issue in regard to continued U.S. support of Russian
R&D might be how to achieve a balance between these two important national
concerns. Several years’ experience with U.S.-Russian cooperative R&D programs
suggests that it is both worthwhile and practicable for the United States to identify
and promote the large number of cooperative R&D programs which are mutually
beneficial to the two nations, while carefully restricting R&D and dual-use
technologies that may contribute to near-term or long-term military threats to U.S.
national security.
(...continued)
67
and “Russia: Russian Firms Hit by U.S. Iran ‘Blacklist,’” Izvestiya, 30 July 1998: 1
(translated text from FBIS-SOV-98-210).