NATO: Senate Floor Consideration of the Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland

NATO: Senate Floor Consideration of the Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland

98-669 F
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
NATO: Senate Floor Consideration of the
Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland
August 10, 1998
(name redacted)
Research Assistant
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
(name redacted)
Senior Specialist in International Security Policy
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Abstract
This report summarizes the key issues in the 1998 Senate floor debate on NATO
enlargement. It includes as appendices the Resolution of Ratification approved by the Senate
on April 30, 1998, a record of the final vote on the Resolution, texts of key amendments
considered in the debate, and a summary of executive reporting requirements included in the
Resolution. Other CRS reports relating to this topic include IB 95076, NATO: Congress
Addresses Expansion of the Alliance and CRS Reports 98-214, NATO Policy: Selected
Legislation in the 103d, 104th, and 105th Congresses; 97-708, NATO’s Evolving Role and
Missions; and 97-1041, Senate Consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty and Subsequent
Accessions: Historical Overview. This report will not be updated.

NATO: Senate Floor Consideration of the Accession of the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland
Summary
The 1998 Senate debate on the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty by the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland was spread across eight days from March 17
to April 30. Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was
favored by the leadership of both parties, and during the debate the Resolution of
Ratification was widely expected to pass. Opponents of NATO enlargement
structured most of their arguments and amendments as expressions of concern about
the future of the Alliance as it moves into the 21st century. The Senate gave its
advice and consent on April 30, voting 80-19 in favor of ratification.
The central point of contention between supporters and opponents of NATO
enlargement was a disagreement over if and how NATO should change its Strategic
Concept to fit the post-Cold War world. Supporters of enlargement generally
believed the Alliance should continue its evolution into a versatile defender of
Western interests. Opponents viewed such evolution as not conforming to the terms
of the 1949 Washington Treaty.
The American share of enlargement costs concerned Senators on both sides of
the debate. Supporters tended to accept lower cost estimates and to declare that
enlargement was a worthwhile expense. Opponents worried that the Senate was
signing a “blank check” which could spiral out of control, and sought to lower the
U.S. share of the NATO's common costs from the current level of around 25 percent.
Two issues with open-ended implications played key roles in the debate. The
first was Russia. Opponents were concerned that adding the three applicants would
bolster extreme factions in Russia and strain United States-Russia relations. Most
supporters cited Alliance efforts to engage Russia and to aid its transition to
democracy; they argued that Russia would eventually see NATO's defensive nature.
The second issue was how enlargement would affect European stability and U.S.
security. Supporters focused on the need to maintain U.S. engagement in Europe and
its ability to meet new security threats. Opponents warned of Russia becoming a
regional destabilizer and argued that adding three countries to those the United States
is committed to defend would further stretch what many considered an already
overburdened military.
Little debate took place about any moral responsibility the West might have
concerning the past injustices done to the three applicants; these issues, however,
were clearly important to many enlargement supporters. Many viewed enlargement
as the fulfillment of American promises during the Cold War and a way by which the
West could redeem itself for the abandonment of Eastern Europe in the wake of the
Second World War.
Two conditions on ratification were also debated by the Senate. The first
mandated a three year pause before any future rounds of accession; the second linked
NATO and European Union membership. The sponsors of the resolution of
ratification argued that such conditions would limit NATO's effectiveness.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Strategic Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Future of the Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Supporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Opponents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Ashcroft Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Kyl Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Bingaman Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Costs / Burdensharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Opponents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Supporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
European Stability / American Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Supporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Opponents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Moral Responsibility / Historical Injustices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Moral Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Historical Injustices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Mandated Pause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Arguments in favor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Arguments in opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Linking NATO and European Union Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Arguments in favor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Arguments in opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The Final Vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix 1: Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appendix 2: Amendments Relating to the Strategic Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendix 3: Amendments Relating to Costs and Burdensharing . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix 4: Warner and Moynihan Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appendix 5: Executive Responsibilities, as Stipulated in the Resolution of
Ratification Passed by the Senate on April 30, 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

NATO: Senate Floor Consideration of the
Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland
Introduction
On April 30, 1998, the U.S. Senate, by a vote of 80-19, gave its advice and
consent to the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the North
Atlantic Treaty. The wide-ranging debate included consideration not only of the
qualifications of the three candidates but, perhaps more importantly, of the quality
of the Alliance itself. Senators discussed NATO's evolving mission, cost and
questions of burdensharing, relations with Russia and other matters. This report
summarizes the main issues in the debate.
Strategic Concept
The question of how, if at all, NATO should adapt its mission to fit the security
environment of the post-Cold War world sparked some of the Senate's most
contentious debate. From the outset of the debate, enlargement was linked to the
development of NATO's Strategic Concept and the degree to which it should focus
on new missions beyond collective defense. Many supporters of enlargement
believed a broader mission profile would strengthen NATO by ensuring its relevance
in a new European security structure. Others argued that the redefinition of the
Strategic Concept amounted to “treaty creep” -- that is, it would create a NATO
organization beyond the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty. Senators John Ashcroft
(R-Missouri), John Kyl (R-Arizona), and Jeff Bingaman (D-New Mexico) introduced
amendments designed to give the Senate a voice concerning the Alliance's transition
toward its new roles.
The Future of the Alliance
Supporters. Most Senators who advocated adding the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland to the Alliance also supported using NATO to meet the new
security challenges that have emerged since the end of the Cold War. Senator John
McCain (R-Arizona) entered into the Congressional Record (CR) a statement by the
New Atlantic Initiative, an organization composed primarily of former government
officials. The statement declared that NATO has rightfully closed the door on its
successful mission to prevent Soviet domination of Western Europe, but that “Its
larger purpose of ensuring peace and freedom in Europe and the Atlantic region
endures.” It outlined a new identity for NATO, as “an alliance aiming to promote
peace and stability in the Atlantic region, devoted to the spread and consolidation of
democratic ways in Europe, and capable of protecting Western interests against such

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future threats as may emerge.” The statement tied this vision of the future to the
legislation at hand, pronouncing, “Crucial to this process of adaptation is NATO's
willingness to admit new members ... Otherwise it will remain a relic of the Cold
War of diminishing relevance to the contemporary world.” (CR, 18 March 1998,
S2200) Senator John Kerry (D-Massachusetts) said that “NATO has already begun
a kind of transition expanding its mission to include other tasks.” The Alliance, he
said, “has an expanded vision of the range of potential rivalries within Europe to
global threats, such as terrorism or nuclear proliferation, but also a greater
willingness to undertake certain kinds of missions to cope with those threats.” (CR,
30 April 1998, S3848)
Supporters of enlargement and an expanded role for the Alliance contended that
the original text of the North Atlantic Treaty provided for the new missions being
proposed for NATO. (These missions are often referred to as “non-Article 5”
missions because they would not be in response to a direct attack on a member's
territory, which, under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, would be considered an
attack against all members.) Specifically, they cited Article 4 of the Treaty, which
reads: “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them,
the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is
threatened.” Senator William Roth (R-Delaware) spoke about the flexibility of the
1949 treaty:
Some fifty years ago, the drafters of the Washington Treaty included
provisions not only to provide for the territorial defense of the North
Atlantic region, but also for the possibility of common action to protect
other interests of the North Atlantic Community. It was the United States
that insisted upon this provision -- Article 4 of the Charter -- and a
construction of the Charter that would permit actions beyond the narrow
scope of territorial defense. (CR, 30 April 1998, S3861)
Senator Roth went on to cite a memorandum recounting a press conference given by
Secretary of State Dean Acheson on March 18, 1949: “Asked if there was no
limiting clause the Secretary stated that there was no limiting clause. ... Asked if the
Treaty stipulated that if armed attack should originate outside of the area no action
might be taken, the Secretary replied in the negative.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3862)
Yet while they argued that non-Article 5 missions are acceptable under the
terms of the Washington Treaty, proponents of enlargement reaffirmed the centrality
of Article 5 to the mission of the Alliance. Senator Roth said, “The resolution makes
crystal clear that the Senate firmly believes that NATO's first priority must be the
mission of collective defense.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3861) He pointed out that
Section 3(B)(i) of the protocols on accession states that “in order for NATO to serve
the security interests of the United States, the core purpose of NATO must continue
to be the collective defense of the territory of all NATO members.”
Opponents. Senators against enlarging the Alliance and broadening its
operational purview argued that NATO is straying from its original mission and that
the Washington Treaty is far more limited than supporters of enlargement claim.

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Senator Ashcroft began by questioning NATO's transition from a Cold War
institution to its current security role. He said:
We have to ask ourselves at this juncture, “What is the purpose of the
treaty?” Is it appropriate or possible to change the treaty, without
amending the treaty, just by beginning to lean everyone in one direction,
to turn the treaty to one side or another, or begin to assert that there are
new things to be considered because the treaty is evolving? I have to tell
you ... I don't believe in treaty evolution any more than I believe in the
evolution of the Constitution. (CR, 27 April 1998, S3627)
Senator Larry Craig (R-Idaho) also expressed concern that the proposed evolution
of NATO's mission would create an institution different from what the founders of
the Alliance envisioned: “It is my concern that the President's vision of a new
NATO will signal the end of NATO as a defensive alliance and begin its role as a
regional peacekeeping organization.” (CR, 23 March 1998, S2446) Senator Warner
said, “...we are in danger of turning this fine Alliance into a 'mini-UN.'” (CR, 19
March 1998, S2275) Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-New York) entered into
the Congressional Record an address he gave to a meeting of the Associated Press
in celebration of its 150th anniversary; his remarks surveyed the resolution of
ratification's mention of Article 4-based missions (Section 3(B)(ii)) and asked, “Does
this not read suspiciously like a license to get into a fight just about anywhere?”
(CR, 27 April 1998, S3612)
Challenging the notion that Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty allows the
type of changes to NATO's mission being proposed, Senator Ashcroft asked, “Is this
what was intended when this NATO agreement came into existence? Was it
designed to have this kind of elasticity? ... Not according to the folks who presided
in the U.S. Senate in 1949 when this great treaty organization was ratified.” He then
quoted Senator Tom Connally (D-Texas), chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations in 1949: “Let us not forget that this treaty is limited in scope. Its
main purpose is to maintain the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. We
do not propose to stretch its terms to cover the entire globe.” (CR, 27 March 1998,
S3628) Senator Ashcroft argued that Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty was
designed to play a supporting role to Articles 5 and 6, the latter of which specifies
what is to be considered an attack on a member of the Alliance, limits NATO to
actions of collective defense:
The geographic scope of the article V commitment was defined explicitly
in article VI to make sure there was not any confusion. ... It said the United
States would defend ... the territory of NATO members -- not the interests,
not the commercial transactions, but the territory of the NATO members.
... undergirding NATO's collective defense mission was the purpose of
Article IV. Article IV was not a loophole for any military operation the
North Atlantic Council could dream up. (CR, 27 April 1998, S3628)
Ashcroft Amendment
Senator Ashcroft introduced an amendment (No. 2318) designed to prevent
NATO from taking on missions he believed would require amendment of the

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Washington Treaty. He said his amendment would “make sure that the Senate will
not be endorsing what I call ‘treaty creep’ where we just allow a creeping mission
to get us to the place where we are no longer able to sustain those things which ought
to be sustained.” (CR, 27 April 1998, S3629) The amendment stipulated that the
United States would oppose all NATO military operations unless:
! the operation is intended for the purpose of collective self-defense in response
to an armed attack on the territory of an Alliance member; or
! the operation is in response to a threat to the territorial integrity, political
independence, or security of a NATO member.
Senator Ashcroft described the purpose of his amendment:
My amendment is tailored not to constrain NATO’s effectiveness in the
future, nor is it intended to micromanage NATO’s military planning from
the Senate floor. The central portion of the amendment is taken directly
from the North Atlantic Treaty itself. My amendment states that any
military operation outside Article V must be based on the principle of
collective defense, namely, the territorial integrity, political independence,
or security of a NATO member. (CR, 19 March 1998, S2284)
The amendment faced strong opposition, led by Senator Roth, from supporters
of NATO enlargement. Senator Roth argued against the amendment, saying, “At its
best this amendment is unnecessary to achieve the goals of its sponsors. At its worst,
the amendment would undercut the Alliance’s will and capability to defend the
security interests of the North Atlantic community of democracies.” The fact that
NATO acts only by consensus made the amendment unnecessary, he said, because
the United States can never be forced to participate in a NATO operation. He argued
that the authors of the Washington Treaty did envision non-Article 5 missions and
that the United States should not set the precedent of unilaterally reinterpreting the
Washington Treaty, an action which he said “runs counter to the spirit and traditions
of the Alliance” and would encourage the other members of the Alliance to do the
same. Senator Roth closed by asking, “In a world of rogue states with biological,
chemical and nuclear weapons increasingly at their disposal, why would we ... want
to ... discard one of the best vehicles through which to prompt allied support for U.S.
security interests?” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3861)
In the closing hours of the debate on April 30, Senator Joseph Biden (D-
Delaware) made a motion to table the amendment. The roll call vote succeeded, with
82 yeas and 18 nays, and the amendment was tabled.1
Kyl Amendment
On April 28th, prior to the vote on the Ashcroft amendment, Senator Kyl
introduced Amendment No. 2310, which added to the Resolution of Ratification a
statement of the Senate's “understanding” of U.S. policy toward NATO's Strategic
1 The tally of votes can be found in the Congressional Record of 30 April 1998, p.
S3862. The text of the amendment can be found in Appendix 2.

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Concept. Senator Kyl argued that the Senate should have a voice in the revision of
the Strategic Concept:
In my view, the current resolution focuses too much on what NATO
should not be and should not do. The resolution does not attempt to lay
out a comprehensive set of principles to guide development of the strategic
concept. And so this proposed amendment will establish the Senate's
vision of the future of NATO and, I hope, help to lay the foundation for
American positions on the strategic concept. (CR, 28 April 1998, S3695)
He went on to say, “Our principal objective here ... is to ensure that NATO remains
an arm of U.S. power and influence. NATO ... must remain the principal foundation
for the security interests of its members. This means NATO must be prepared to
defend against a range of common threats to our vital interests.” (CR, 28 April 1998,
S3695) The amendment identified post-Cold War concerns like weapons of mass
destruction and access to natural resources as legitimate. However, the amendment
tempered its recognition of the threats of ethnic or religious rivalries and historic
disputes with a statement that only threats of this type occurring in the North Atlantic
area should be within NATO's purview.
Senator Kyl's amendment faced little opposition. Senators Warner and
Moynihan asked for several points of clarification, but both eventually voted in favor
of the amendment. The Senate approved the amendment by a vote of 90 yeas to 9
nays.2
Bingaman Amendment
Senator Bingaman’s amendment, No. 2324, sought to set a condition on future
rounds of accession. Senator Bingaman said that his amendment “would withhold
inviting additional countries other than Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for
NATO membership until after NATO has approved a revised strategic concept.”
(CR, 27 April 1998, S3631) He said, “Right now we in the Senate are being called
upon to sign up to a policy of enlarging the alliance without a clear, coherent
explanation of how expansion of NATO will serve NATO’s strategic interests. I am
concerned because NATO itself does not seem to have an agreed upon strategic
military mission.” (CR, 27 April 1998, S3630-S3631) With a new Strategic Concept
due to be approved at the 1999 Washington summit, the Senator argued that his
amendment was not likely to cause a delay in future enlargement processes.
Despite Senator Bingaman’s statement that he had “great difficulty seeing why
anyone would object to this,” Senator Biden asked his colleagues to reject the
amendment. (CR, 30 April 1998, S3854) Senator Biden argued that, if implemented,
the amendment could be a tool for those wishing to slow down or stop the process
of enlargement; by refusing to agree to a new Strategic Concept, any NATO member
could quietly stop enlargement. The amendment, Senator Biden said, would provide
2 The tally of votes can be found in the Congressional Record of April 28, 1998, p.
S3698. The text of the amendment can be found in Appendix 2.

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a “pocket veto,” for a country opposed to enlargement but unwilling to make its case
publicly. Senator Bingaman’s amendment failed by a vote of 23 yeas to 76 nays.3
Costs / Burdensharing
Senators on both sides of the debate were concerned with how much the
enlargement of NATO would cost the Alliance generally and the United States in
particular. Estimates of the total cost of enlargement cited in the debate ranged from
$1.5 billion to $125 billion (the cost would be shared among the 19 members of an
enlarged Alliance). Senators who questioned the costs of the process focused on the
potential for enlargement to become an open-ended financial commitment; in
general, supporters concentrated on the non-monetary benefits of enlargement and
expressed confidence in the lower cost estimates.
Opponents. Critics of the figures given by the Administration and by NATO
complained that no accurate estimate of the cost involved in admitting the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland was available for them to examine. The estimates
that were available -- prepared by the U.S. Government, NATO itself, and several
non-governmental organizations -- all made assumptions of force size and strategic
posture that were highly debatable in the rapidly changing European security
environment. Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) said, “I have seen projections range
from $125 billion down to $1.5 billion. When you have that wide a variance,
something is very strange.” (CR, 17 March 1998, S2145) Senator Harkin went on
to mention a problem with current cost estimates:
Another piece of the puzzle we are missing is how new members are to
address their military shortfalls. Although the shortfalls were to be
identified in December 1997, the countries’ force goals will not be set until
this spring. In other words, we are without a plan to address the force
goals and the price tag associated with it. I am very uncomfortable signing
the American taxpayer’s name to a potentially ballooning blank check.
(CR, 17 March 1998, S2145)
Senator Larry Craig (R-Idaho) expressed similar concerns: “... all of this cost related
information will be made available to Congress only after the Senate’s advice and
consent to expansion is final and irrevocable. That means if the information is not
satisfactory to the Senate, we will have no recourse.” (CR, 23 March 1998, S2446)
Historian John Lewis Gaddis, in a New York Times opinion piece inserted into
the Congressional Record, identified another source of ambiguity: “What will
expansion cost? The Administration’s estimate ... sounds like a bargain, but the
estimate assumes no change in the current security environment. Has it occurred to
the Administration that the act of expanding NATO, especially if former Soviet
states are included, could itself alter the current security environment?” (CR, 28
April 1998, S3704)
3 The tally of votes can be found in the Congressional Record of April 30, 1998, p.
S3863. The text of the amendment can be found in Appendix 2.

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Senator Harkin was also vocal on the issue of burdensharing. Currently the
United States pays approximately 25 percent of NATO’s common operational costs;
opponents of enlargement worried that the addition of the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland would create upward pressure on the U.S. share of costs. These fears
were exacerbated by the recent trend among European countries toward reducing
defense spending and conflicting reports of whether or not the French had agreed to
help pay the cost of enlargement. Senator Harkin introduced an amendment (No.
2312) stipulating that the United States would be limited to paying no more than 25
percent of the expenditures involved in integrating the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland into the Alliance. He stated, “What my amendment says is what is good
for one side ought to be good for another. ... If 25 percent is good for the common
budgets, it ought to be good for the national budgets.” The amendment was defeated
by a roll call vote of 76 nays to 24 yeas.4
Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) introduced two amendments designed to reduce
the U.S. share of the Alliance’s common budget and to impose tighter congressional
control over expenses incurred in the process of integrating the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland into NATO’s command structure. Senator Stevens originally
introduced both amendments (Nos. 2065 and 2066) on March 23, 1998 (CR, S2437-
S2438) and later said, “My original intent in proposing these amendments was to
bring some greatly needed accountability to the critical issue of recognizing and
clarifying all the costs to the United States to enlarge the NATO alliance.” (CR, 30
April 1998, S3845) Amendment No. 2065 stipulated that none of the costs involved
in admitting new members to the Alliance could be paid by the United States unless
Congress specifically authorized the funds. Amendment No. 2066 would have cut
off all U.S. funding to NATO beyond the current fiscal year unless the Secretaries
of State and Defense certified to the Congress that the United States would
contribute no more than 20 percent of the total common budget. The effect of this
second amendment would be an immediate 5 percent cut in the share of NATO’s
common budget paid by the United States.
Both of Senator Stevens’ amendments were significantly modified through
negotiation with the supporters of ratification. Inserted into Amendment No. 2065
was the language “other than through the common-funded budgets of NATO,” which
left intact the existing channels of authorization for common budget funding but
asserted congressional control over any additional assistance given to new Alliance
members. The second amendment, No. 2066, was broken into two parts over the
course of the debate. The first section of the revised amendment was a non-binding
statement of the “sense of the Senate” which declared that the President should,
every year for five years beginning in fiscal year 1999, propose to NATO a one
percent reduction in the share of the common budget paid by the United States. The
second section of the amendment carried the force of law and stipulated that the total
U.S. commitment to the NATO common budget in any fiscal year after October 1,
1998 may not exceed the total of all such payments made in fiscal year 1998, unless
specifically authorized by the Congress.
4 The tally of votes can be found in the Congressional Record of April 28, 1998, p.
S3687. The text of the amendment can be found in Appendix 3.

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In their original forms, both of Senator Stevens’ amendments were opposed by
the sponsors of the Resolution of Ratification. Upon further negotiation, however,
both were accepted as “friendly” amendments and passed by voice votes. Senator
Stevens voted in favor of the final text of the Resolution of Ratification.5
Supporters. Many Senators who advocated enlargement also expressed
concern about the financial burden that would be borne by the United States. They
differed from their opponents, however, in that they were generally satisfied with the
studies that produced lower cost estimates. Enlargement supporters also proposed
that the United States would reap money-saving benefits from the stability they
expected an enlarged Alliance to create.
Advocates balked at some of the estimates of the cost of enlargement. Senator
Biden called the high-end figures “bizarre.” (CR, 27 April 1998, S3638) The
Department of Defense (DoD) in February 1997 provided the Congress with a report
projecting the cost of enlargement to be between $27 and $35 billion; the DoD study
encompassed both costs to all 19 national defense budgets as well as NATO common
budget funds. NATO itself studied the issue after the July 1997 invitations to join
had been made to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland; NATO’s December
1997 figure, which was restricted to increases in the common budget, was
approximately $1.5 billion. This estimate subsequently was accepted by both the
DoD and the General Accounting Office (GAO). Senator Carl Levin (D-Michigan)
argued that the NATO study should be accepted by the Senate as reliable because it
was conducted with the knowledge of which countries had been invited (earlier
estimates had planned for the possible inclusion of a fourth country) and more
precise information regarding the state of the Polish, Hungarian, and Czech military
establishments than had previously been available. Senator Levin said, “... that
original estimate of the administration was way off and it was way high, and the
revised estimate done by NATO after on-site visits and looking only at the direct
costs resulting from the increase in the size of NATO, that assessment has been
approved by the GAO and by the DoD.” (CR, 19 March 1998, S2254)
Other Senators chose to focus on the non-monetary benefits of NATO
enlargement. Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-Maryland) spoke on this point:
... opponents of enlargement point to the cost. ... But ... what is the cost of
not enlarging NATO? I believe the cost of not enlarging NATO will be
far higher. ... What will be the cost to European security? What will be the
cost to the new democracies of Eastern Europe? ... What would be the
long-range cost to America of failing to prepare NATO for the 21st
century? The cost would be instability in Europe and the increased chance
of being pulled into yet another conflict. The cost of preventive security
is always less than the cost of war. (CR, 18 March 1998, S2197)
5 Acceptance of Amendment No. 2065 can be found in the Congressional Record of
April 28, 1998, p. S3859; acceptance of Amendment No. 2066 can be found in the Record
of the same day, p. S3847. The texts of both amendments can be found in Appendix 3.

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Senator Max Cleland (D-Georgia) concurred: “For a long time I have asked myself
the question, ‘Can we afford it?’ ... I now ask myself, ‘Can we afford not to do it?’”
(CR, 29 April 1998, S3748)
Many supporters of accession also noted that while the dollar-value of U.S.
contributions to the common budget might increase in an enlarged NATO, the
percentage contribution would decrease slightly from the current level of around 25
percent. Nonetheless, advocates of enlargement fought to defeat Senator Harkin’s
amendment requiring a percentage spending cap. Senator Biden argued that the
amendment was a “hamstringing of our national defense budget, unrelated to
NATO.” (CR, 28 April 1998, S3670) He claimed it would hinder U.S. interests by
prohibiting bilateral weapons sales or other defense assistance to the new Alliance-
member countries unless the other nations of the Alliance were willing to pay 75
percent of the cost.
Russia
Concerns. A key point in the Senate’s debate was the issue of how Russia
would respond to having a NATO member state abutting its westernmost border
(Kaliningrad, Russia’s isolated piece of territory on the Baltic Sea). Given the
history of the Alliance as a deterrent against Soviet expansionism during the Cold
War, several Senators worried that NATO expansion would poison the U.S.-Russia
relationship at a time when the nurturing and engagement of the newly democratic
regime in Moscow are widely viewed as critical to its longevity.
Opponents of enlargement argued that, having spent much of the past fifty years
fighting the Cold War in part to break through the “Iron Curtain” imposed on Europe
after World War II, NATO should not take actions which might simply replace the
old lines with new ones. Senator Paul Wellstone (D-Minnesota) said, “... there is
peace between states in Europe, between nations in Europe, for the first time in
centuries. We do not have a divided Europe, and I worry about a NATO expansion
which could redivide Europe and again poison relations with Russia.” (CR, 19 March
1998, S2257) Opponents said that the accession to the Alliance of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland -- three invitees in a field of twelve hopefuls --
would create an “us versus them” atmosphere instead of fostering the idea of a
unified Europe.
The current danger to Alliance members, it was argued, is not the threat of
attack by the once-powerful Russian military but instead its continued deterioration
as a competent fighting force: Senator Wellstone said, “The Russian military has
collapsed, the Russian Army’s ability to quell tiny, ill-equipped Chechen forces
raises doubts about Russia’s capability to threaten its former Eastern bloc allies in
the foreseeable future.” (CR, 19 March 1998, S2257) Security measures designed
for the proper storage of Russia’s arsenal of weapons of mass destruction are
breaking down, increasing the likelihood of proliferation of such weapons among
rogue states. NATO enlargement, opponents argued, makes Russian cooperation on
initiatives such as the Nunn-Lugar program to safeguard nuclear weapons less likely
and therefore exacerbates the threat of proliferation.

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Lastly, there was the contention that NATO enlargement was simply the wrong
way to treat the former Soviet Union in the wake of its defeat in the Cold War. The
concern was voiced that NATO expansion would strengthen nationalistic and anti-
democratic forces in Russia and that it would, as former Ambassador George F.
Kennan stated in an often-cited New York Times opinion piece, “impel Russian
foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.” (CR, 19 March 1998,
S2259) Senator Bob Smith (R-New Hampshire) said that enlargement “is basically
kicking the Russians for no reason. History tells us that this is unwise.” (CR, 17
March 1998, S2108) Senator Pat Roberts (R-Kansas) entered into the Congressional
Record an opinion piece by historian John Lewis Gaddis that compared the current
Russian situation to that of postwar Germany and argued that the West should not
make the same mistakes it made with the Weimar Republic after World War I.
Although in the end he voted in favor of ratification, Senator Roberts said that by
enlarging NATO “We are poking the Russian bear.” (CR, 28 April 1998, S3703)
Opponents of enlargement argued that western policy should strive to strengthen
democratic forces in Russia; enlargement, they argued, will only bolster hard-line
nationalist and communist elements in the Russian political arena and weaken
democratic forces by wounding national pride and creating a sense of insecurity
among the Russian public. Senator Wellstone argued:
... European security and stability is greatly dependent on Russia’s
successful transition to democracy. That, I think, is the central point. A
democratic Russia is unlikely to threaten its neighbors. I am worried, I am
terribly worried. I think this is a profound mistake. I think this NATO
expansion could threaten that democracy in Russia, and I think, if we do
not have a successful transition to democracy in Russia, that, in turn,
threatens European security and stability. (CR, 19 March 1998, S2257)
With the rise of such anti-democratic forces, opponents argued, will come increasing
intransigence in the area of arms reduction. The communist-dominated Russian
Duma has yet to follow the Senate in ratifying the second Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START II), and Kennan believed that “it might make it much more difficult,
if not impossible” to secure ratification of this treaty and others, including the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. (CR, 19 March 1998, S2259)
Responses. Proponents of NATO enlargement, led by Senators Roth and
Biden, countered each objection raised by the opposition with contrasting
interpretations of Russian behavior in the face of accession by the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland.
Responding specifically to the notion, advanced chiefly by Senator Moynihan,
that tensions along the Poland-Russia border would be increased by Poland’s
membership in the Alliance, Senator Biden noted that since NATO’s inception in
1949 Norway has bordered Russia’s heavily fortified Kola Peninsula without
incident. In the same speech on April 30, Senator Biden reasserted the position that
was central to the proponents’ stance on the issue of Russia: the Alliance is
defensive in nature, and thus “NATO simply does not threaten Russia. Never did --
never will.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3870) He cited evidence that American troop
levels as part of NATO deployments have declined from a peak of over 300,000
during the Cold War to around 100,000 today and that the trend is toward still

CRS-11
smaller numbers; NATO at the end of the Cold War abandoned forward-deployed,
stationary defenses for less obtrusive rapid deployment forces. Senator Biden further
noted that the Alliance publicly stated in December 1996 that it had “no intention,
no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members”
and in March 1997 it stated that there was no need to deploy combat troops in the
new member countries. (CR, 30 April 1998, S3870)
Senator Roth characterized as “dead wrong” the argument that NATO
enlargement punishes Russia when it is weak just as the Versailles Treaty punished
a defeated Germany. He cited the NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed on 27 May
1997, which “provid[ed] the foundation for not only enhanced consultation, but also
unprecedented defense cooperation.” (CR, 17 March 1998, S2111) Russian troops
today serve with NATO forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and since 1991 the West
has contributed nearly $100 billion to aid democratic and economic reforms in
Russia. Senator Biden noted U.S. support for Russian efforts to join the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the World Trade
Organization and for the inclusion of Russia in what has become the G-8 conference
of leading industrial nations.
Advocates of enlargement argued that an expanded NATO should not poison
relations with Russia. Senator Biden expressed hope that “over time Moscow can
come to realize that enlargement of NATO by moving the zone of stability eastward
to Central Europe will increase her own security, not diminish it.” (CR, 18 March
1998, S2181-2) Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), Chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, advanced another view of Russian behavior as a reason for
enlargement, saying: “Some have said that NATO expansion is unnecessarily
provocative to Russia. ... If anything, it will make it easier for us to maintain friendly
relations with Russia, because an expanded NATO will shut off Russia’s avenue to
more destructive patterns of behavior.” (CR, 27 April 1998, S3604)
Conceding that differences exist with Russia over such issues as its failure to
ratify START II and its policies in the Middle East, proponents of ratification
insisted that these disagreements were not caused by the prospect of NATO
enlargement. Senator Biden offered an explanation of the Duma’s opposition to
START II: “Russian Communists and ultranationalists were against ratifying
START II before NATO enlargement was even a gleam in the eyes of Lech Walesa
and Havel, let alone U.S. policy. Why were the Russian Communists and
ultranationalists against it? ... Because American arms control negotiators did a heck
of a job, and Russia knew it.” (CR, 27 April 1998, S3640) As evidence of Russian
cooperation with the West, he cited the Duma’s ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and President
Boris Yeltsin’s pledge to ratify START II.
Senator Biden also cited data from a March 14, 1998 Gallup Poll which showed
the Russian public to be in favor of allowing the three candidate states to join the
Alliance. He said, “... 53 percent say Poland should be allowed to join NATO. ...
57 percent say the Czech Republic should be allowed to join NATO; 54 percent say
Hungary should be allowed to join NATO, and 25 percent had no view on the
matter.” (CR, 27 April 1998, S3639) Senator Biden argued that the polling data
confirmed that most Russians had accepted NATO enlargement: “Don't you kind of

CRS-12
find it fascinating that a majority of the Russian people say these countries should
be able to join? ... So let's give the Russians a little credit for being intelligent,
thinking people who are not captives of outdated, ideological propaganda. From the
Gallup Poll I read you, clearly they are not.” (CR, 27 April 1998, S3640)
In response to the contention that enlargement will damage the prospects of
democracy’s success in Russia, proponents argued that refusing to expand NATO
would in fact be more detrimental than enlargement might be because it would give
hard-line nationalists and communists a victory over democrats, who had tacitly
accepted enlargement as reality. Senator Roth declared: “Moscow will always have
its own independent motivations. Unfortunately, there are still those in Moscow who
reject NATO enlargement out of a desire to preserve Russia’s sphere of influence.
Let us not give credibility to the likes of Vladimir Zhirinovsky by acceding to these
demands.” There was further concern that by changing course because of Russian
misgivings, NATO would effectively give a veto to Russia over what ostensibly are
internal decisions. Several Senators reacted strongly against giving Russia undue
influence, including Senator Christopher Bond (R-Missouri), who stated, “Do not let
the Russians run our foreign policy.” (CR, 19 March 1998, S2259)
NATO enlargement was also put forth as a hedge against the possibility that
Russia will be resurgent or that its experiment with democracy might fail at some
point in the future. Senator Gordon Smith (R-Oregon) said, “We cannot be certain
what the European security environment will look like in three, five, or ten years, but
if we act now, we will be better prepared for any outcome.” (CR, 19 March 1998,
S2261) If Russia does attempt to regain parts of its empire, an enlarged NATO will
be ready. According to Senator Roth, “...the bottom line is that if Russia cannot
accept the legitimate right of its neighbors to choose their own defensive security
arrangements, then NATO’s role in Central and Eastern Europe is even more
important.” (CR, 17 March 1998, S2111)
European Stability / American Security
Stability and security were frequently cited among the many reasons for
NATO’s creation in 1949 and its continued endurance today. The preamble of the
Washington Treaty states that members of the Alliance “seek to promote stability
and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for
collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.” Thus, central to
the Senate’s debate on enlargement were questions of if and how stability and
security would be enhanced if the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were to join
the Alliance. The Senate was divided: supporters of the Resolution of Ratification
felt that enlargement would create a safer and more stable Europe, while opponents
of ratification believed the process would instead create dangerous instability in the
European security environment.
Supporters. Advocates of NATO enlargement looked to the past performance
of the Alliance as an indicator of the stable environment they expected to exist in
Europe if the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were to become members of
NATO. Noting the relative tranquility and well-being of the North Atlantic area
since the creation of the Alliance, Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska) said

CRS-13
enlargement “ensures and enhances the prospects for peace, prosperity, and harmony
throughout Europe. ... an expanded NATO will make the world safer simply because
we are expanding the area where wars will not happen. ... I think this will bind these
countries closer together and ensure stability throughout the continent.” (CR, 19
March 1998, S2250) Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) agreed: “What is at stake
here and now is order and stability in Europe as a whole. And that is why American
interests are involved.” (CR, 27 March 1998, S3617) Senator John Kerry (D-
Massachusetts) said that NATO membership would “heighten the sense of security
within those three countries not only through the extension of NATO’s military
guarantee but also through the psychological benefits of being ... a member of the
NATO club, and interactions within the alliance will clearly help to strengthen the
new democracies and their abilities to assimilate themselves into Europe both
economically and politically, and obviously militarily within NATO’s integrated
force structure. (CR, 30 April 1998, S3848)
Many Senators cited the historical ties between European stability and
American security and promoted NATO enlargement as a way to maintain U.S.
engagement in Europe. Senator William Roth spoke about this link:
[The vote before the Senate] is about America’s role in Europe and the
ability of the transatlantic community to respond to challenges of the
future -- both of which hinge on whether the United States wishes to
remain a European power and whether we desire a unified, democratic,
and larger Europe to remain linked to America. ... Throughout its history,
Europe has been a landscape of many insecure small powers, a few
imperialistic great powers, and too many conflicting nationalist policies,
each creating friction with the other. Twice in this century, these
dynamics pulled America into wars on the European continent. ... And the
potential for them to create conflict in the future is all too real unless we
seize opportunities like the one before us. ... As [Czech Republic
President] Vaclav Havel put it, ‘If the West does not stabilize the East, the
East will destabilize the West.’ Every time America has withdrawn its
influence from Europe, trouble has followed. This we cannot afford. (CR,
17 March 1998, S2111)
Senator Joseph Biden offered similar thoughts, saying “For political, economic,
strategic, and cultural reasons, Europe remains an area of vital interest to the United
States of America. We are a European power, and for our own safety’s sake, in my
view, we must remain a European power. Stability on that continent is fundamental
to the well-being of our country.” (CR, 18 March 1998, S2176) Senator Dianne
Feinstein (D-California) viewed a U.S. commitment to NATO enlargement as a
small price to pay to avoid being drawn into another European war. She said, “It has
often been said that vigilance is the price of freedom. NATO remains a form of
vigilance.” (CR, 19 March 1998, S2256)
Enlargement was linked to NATO’s ongoing transition from a purely collective
defense alliance to one with a broader agenda for action. Senator Kerry said, “[The
three applicants’] membership will enhance stability in Central Europe and
strengthen NATO itself through the acquisition of additional forces and personnel

CRS-14
to cope with future threats and missions.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3848) Senator
Barbara Mikulski (D-Maryland) delineated some of these new threats:
We have civil wars, ...; we have hot spots caused by ethnic and regional
tensions ...; we have international crime, drugs, and terrorism; and we have
the very real threat of the spread of weapons of mass destruction. NATO
must meet the needs of these new threats, and I believe it will do so by
changing and expanding. Europe’s new democracies will help us meet
these challenges. ... These new democracies will contribute to America’s
security by making NATO stronger. They are adding troops and
equipment. They will provide additional strategic depth to NATO. (CR,
18 March 1998, S2196 - S2197)
Opponents. The Senators arguing against NATO enlargement were joined by
several of their colleagues who favored enlargement in general but expressed
concerns about enlargement's affect on stability and security. This group worried
that admitting the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the Alliance would create
unnecessary instability in an already volatile Eastern European security environment.
Several Senators were concerned that enlargement would replace Europe's old
“Iron Curtain” dividing line with a new one further east. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-
Vermont) asked, “Would enlargement result in a more united and secure Europe?
More united, probably yes. But what if expansion does not extend to the republics
of the former Soviet Union, or even to certain other Eastern European countries.
Then we have simply created a new dividing line between those inside NATO and
those that are excluded.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3858) Senator Wellstone argued that
rather than bringing the nations of Europe closer together, as many supporters
claimed it would, “NATO expansion would re-create a dividing line in Europe, only
further to the east than the original cold war dividing line, and I do not consider that
to be progress for the world.” (CR, 19 March 1998, S2257)
Many of the concerns of Senators opposed to enlargement focused on the
West’s relationship with Russia. These concerns are dealt with in detail in a separate
section of this report, but some aspects of the debate may be mentioned here as well.
Senator Bob Smith said, “... I cannot imagine a worse long-term strategy for
European security than jeopardizing United States-Russian relations.” (CR, 17 March
1998, S2108) The deteriorating state of the Russian nuclear arsenal was at the
forefront of several Senators’ minds during the debate. In his previously cited
address to a meeting of the Associated Press, Senator Moynihan said, “Allow me to
suggest that wandering in this void we may stumble into the catastrophe of nuclear
war with Russia. This would come about not from Russian strength, but from
Russian weakness. This is an idea we find difficult to absorb and understandably so.
But we had better do. Russians have been trying to tell us this.” (CR, 27 April 1998,
S3613) Senator Moynihan also entered into the Record a letter from former
Ambassador Paul Nitze: “... the open-ended expansion being proposed for the
alliance points toward increasing friction with post-Communist Russia for years to
come. Driving Russia into a corner plays into the arguments of those most hostile
to forging a productive relationship with the United States and its allies. It is not a

CRS-15
sound basis for future stability in Europe, particularly when no current or projected
threats warrant extending the alliance.” (CR, 27 April 1998, S3611)
Senator Bingaman, although a supporter of the final resolution, thought that
other national security problems should have higher priority than NATO
enlargement:
The question of whether we admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic to NATO needs to be judged in the overall context of our
security needs in this post-cold war period. ... New threats dominate our
national security agenda. ... They are the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, terrorism and regional instability created by rogue states ...,
the specter of accidental nuclear launch and other high priority military
threats. Those are the immediate security concerns we have. ... it does not
strike me that enlarging NATO is likely to help us meet those threats. ...
I am concerned that this near-sighted emphasis on NATO enlargement
may increase rather than decrease our threat to security interest in Europe.
At best, NATO enlargement is a distraction in that it diverts our attention
from other higher priority concerns and alternative solutions, and, at worst,
it could undermine our ability to address these more immediate threats ...
(CR, 27 April 1998, S3630)
Senator Leahy, a ratification opponent, conceded that “NATO would probably not
suffer, it might even benefit” from the proposed round of expansion. He worried,
however, that the current round would create pressure for future enlargements; the
prospect of such pressure concerned him because he believed that adding all of the
proposed twelve new participants to the Alliance’s system of consensus among
members would make NATO “unwieldy, even less decisive, and weakened,” thereby
reducing European stability. (CR, 30 April 1998, S3858)
Moral Responsibility / Historical Injustices
Most of the debate in the Senate focused on the strategic and policy
implications of NATO enlargement. Several Senators advocating the accession of
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland suggested that the United States had a
responsibility, as the principal defender of democracy in the world and as a key
player in deciding the structure of the post-World War II world, to admit these three
nations to the Alliance. Several Senators made specific references to the ties
between the people of United States and the populations of the three candidate states.
Opponents of NATO enlargement generally chose to concentrate on some of the
less emotional issues of accession instead of moral responsibility, but some Senators
did express concern for the candidate nations that were left out of this round of
enlargement and for Russia. Senator John Warner said, “I do believe this replaces,
symbolically, the Iron Curtain that was established in the late forties, which faced
west, with now an iron ring of nations that face east to Russia.” (CR, 19 March 1998,
S2271)

CRS-16
Moral Responsibility. Having fashioned itself as a bastion of freedom during
the period of oppression of Central and Eastern Europe by Nazi and communist
regimes, some Senators viewed enlargement as a way in which the United States
could fulfill the rhetorical promises made to these oppressed countries. Senator Carl
Levin argued that if the Senate were to reject enlargement, “we will be effectively
dimming the flame of liberty that sustained these courageous peoples through
decades of first Nazi and then communist darkness.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3814)
Senator John McCain said, “Protecting freedom was the beacon of our policy in
Europe during the cold war. It would be an incomprehensible tragedy for us to
abandon that stance now when the opportunities for freedom in Central Europe are
greater than ever and the risks are far lower than at any time during the cold war.”
(CR, 18 March 1998, S2199) Senator Gordon Smith spoke of the American dream:
In America, we often talk about the American dream. But really it isn’t
America’s dream, it is a human dream. It is a dream that all people aspire
to. It is just that we enjoy it in great abundance -- life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. And we must continue to defend it in the world for
our sakes, not just for theirs. (CR, 19 March 1998, S2260)
Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-Connecticut) viewed enlargement as an extension of
the original purpose of the NATO alliance, which he described as, “a military
alliance in defense of a principle.” He asked his fellow Senators: “Will we now turn
our backs on [the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland] and the principle, the idea,
the value of freedom that motivated us throughout the cold war and motivates them
today? I hope not. I do not think so. I do not believe we will.” (CR, 27 April 1998,
S3625)
Historical Injustices. The circumstances of the coerced inclusion of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland in the communist bloc at the end of the Second
World War often was cited in the arguments made by proponents of accession. The
“Big Three” conference at Yalta in 1945 was widely viewed as the moment at which
Central and Eastern Europe were lost to communist domination, but perceptions of
blame differed among Senators; some faulted Soviet leader Josef Stalin, while others
said that these conquered nations were “sold out” by the West.
Senator McCain espoused the first view: “Let us be clear, these countries were
forced into communism against their will by an occupying power. ... While the
United States and NATO staunchly defended freedom in the West, we could do little
in the East other than offer our moral support, because the risk of nuclear war was
too great.” (CR, 18 March 1998, S2198) Senator Smith of Oregon said, “I suggest
one of many reasons that we should expand NATO is that we have a moral
obligation to live up to the terms that were made at Yalta but went unfulfilled.” (CR,
19 March 1998, S2260)
Other Senators chose to focus on the mistakes made by the West following
World War II. Senator Helms spoke about what he perceived as the West’s mistakes
at Yalta:
... half of the 20th century ago, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
were consigned to communist domination because of expedient and short-

CRS-17
sighted policies of the West. ... In approving this resolution the Senate has
the opportunity to remedy this historical injustice of Yalta ... By accepting
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO, we reconnect them
to the democratic West -- a union that was severed by first Hitler, then
Stalin. (CR, 17 March 1998, S2106-S2107)
Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-Maryland) mentioned her own Polish heritage and said,
“I know that the Polish people did not choose to live behind the Iron Curtain. They
were forced there by the Yalta agreement, by Potsdam, and because they and the
Baltic States and the other captive nations were sold out by the free world.” (CR, 18
March 1998, S2196)
Mandated Pause
Senator John Warner sponsored an amendment to the Resolution of Ratification
(No. 2322) which would have mandated a three year pause to considering additional
states for membership after the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland to the Alliance. This amendment garnered more support than others proposed
by opponents to NATO enlargement, but it was rejected by a vote of 59 nays to 41
yeas.6
Arguments in favor. Those Senators in favor of mandating a three year pause
after the current round of enlargement centered their argument around some
uncertainties involved in the current round of accession: the cost of enlargement and
the difficulty of integrating the new members’ militaries into the NATO command
structure, the current state of NATO’s Strategic Concept, and the pressure future
Presidents may face to enlarge the Alliance further.
Senator Warner based much of his argument on the presupposition that the
protocols of accession would, at the end of the day, be approved by the Senate. He
proposed a three year pause as a period of time during which the costs and challenges
of the first round of enlargement could be analyzed. He declared that he offered the
amendment “because we don’t know what the costs are of this first round. ... We
don’t know how quickly these three new nations can bring themselves up in terms
of military interoperability with NATO forces today ... and how long it will take
them to be a positive, full partner with NATO and not what I would regard as a user
of NATO security ....” (CR, 19 March 1998, S2272) Senator Byron Dorgan (D-
North Dakota) concurred, saying, “Let’s wait for three years before we admit any
more nations into NATO. Let’s pause and try to understand what all of this will cost,
what exactly is the threat, and what our response should be.” (CR, 30 April 1998,
S3835) Senator Warner later went on to say, “I say to my colleagues, think of the
American taxpayer. ... We do not have a firm estimate of the costs and therefore in
all probability there will be an expense to the American taxpayer associated with
including these three countries.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3844)
6 The tally of votes can be found in the Congressional Record of April 30, 1998, p.
S3844. The text of the amendment can be found in Appendix 4.

CRS-18
Senator Warner also noted that NATO will not approve an updated Strategic
Concept until the 1999 Washington summit. He and other Senators critical of the
timing of enlargement argued that NATO's guiding strategic document should
logically first be agreed upon, with enlargement to follow. Senator Warner said:
We are also asked to approve this measure without full knowledge as to
the strategic concept of what NATO is and is not going to do in the years
to come. We are operating under a 1991 doctrine today. ... Ironically, it
is not until ... the summit at which these three nations will be admitted
when NATO will finalize the doctrine for the future. ... I ask you, is that
the way to do business? Not in my judgment. And that is why I say if
three are a reality, then we should stop and study a reasonable period of
time. Let another President, let the American people ... have a careful
examination of what NATO brings forth a year from today as to the new
mission and adoption. (CR, 30 April 1998, S3827-S3828)
Senator Warner believed that the current round of accession would create
pressure for the United States and other NATO governments to move quickly toward
another period of enlargement. He argued that by mandating a three year pause
before the next round of accession, his amendment would alleviate this pressure and
allow for careful analysis of issues of enlargement. He said:
I think the next President should be given the opportunity to assess the
merits and such disadvantages as may arise by virtue of the accession of
three more nations before we leap forward under pressure, which will be
unrelenting. That pressure will begin the day 1 year from now when these
three nations will be accessed. ... The march will begin to bring in other
nations perhaps numbering as many as nine. I say to my colleagues,
should not the next President be given the opportunity to study the record,
make an assessment, and then give his advice or her advice ... to the
people of the United States? (CR, 30 April 1998, S3827)
Arguments in opposition. Supporters of the accession of the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland, most of whom opposed Senator Warner's amendment, argued
that mandating a three year pause was both unnecessary and impractical.
Senator Biden tried to reassure those Senators advocating a pause that the first
round of enlargement would not instigate a flood of new Alliance members. He
declared, “There is no urgency to move to the next round.” and offered his own
opinion that “we should say that there will be no second round until all these three
nations are fully integrated into NATO's integrated command structure.” Using a
parenting analogy to make his point, Senator Biden said, “Let's not argue about what
college our daughter is going to when she is only two years old.” (CR, 18 March
1998, S2186) Senator John McCain argued that a mandated pause was “scarcely
necessary, given there will be a de facto pause as the alliance absorbs the first round
of new members.” (CR, 18 March 1998, S2202)
In response to Senator Warner's contention that a three year pause would shield
a future President from pressure for a second round, opponents of the amendment
contended that the measure instead would “tie our own hands and those of a future

CRS-19
President.” (CR, 18 March 1998, S2202) Senator Charles Robb (D-Virginia) argued
that legislating a required pause would limit the options of future Administrations:
Critical national decisions based on carefully reasoned and supported
judgements are subjugated to an artificial time line that could actually end
up proving harmful to our military interests. We need to be flexible rather
than arbitrary about future entrants into NATO: If the first round goes
well, the Partnership for Peace program will keep the door open for new
members. Present and future security considerations will then dictate the
pace and scope of enlargement. (CR, 30 April 1998, S3837)
Senator Roth declared that “NATO enlargement is ... driven by moral imperatives,
strategic self-interest, and objective criteria concerning military readiness and
political and economic reform.” He said, “any proposal to freeze enlargement ...
subordinates these factors to an arbitrary timeline.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3839)
Several Senators stated that the amendment would contravene Article 10 of the
North Atlantic Treaty -- which states that membership is open to “any other
European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute
to the security of the North Atlantic area” -- thereby removing an incentive for other
European nations to prepare for NATO accession. Senator Roth said that the
amendment “would send a dangerous message to the reformist governments of
Central Europe. They would suppose -- and not incorrectly -- that the United States
is slamming the door shut concerning their possible accession into the Alliance.”
(CR, 30 April 1998, S3839) Senator Spencer Abraham (R-Michigan) said that
mandating a three year pause “would send exactly the wrong signal at this critical
point in history ... and will only lead to further feelings of abandonment and
exclusion by nations wanting to join the West.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3836)
Lastly, opponents of the amendment worried that requiring a pause before the
next round of enlargement would further strain already tenuous relations with the
nations of Central and Eastern Europe and strengthen nationalist forces in Russia.
Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) praised NATO's open-door entrance policy:
To retract the open-door policy ... would risk undermining tremendous
gains that have been made for peace throughout the region. The result of
a “closed-door” policy would be the creation of new dividing lines across
Europe. Those nations outside might become disillusioned and insecure
and, thus, inclined to adopt the competitive and destabilizing security
policies of Europe's past. (CR, 27 April 1998, S3618)
Senator Roth expressed concerns about Russia, saying, “an arbitrary freeze on
NATO enlargement would harm Russia's historic reconciliation with NATO and the
United States. A freeze would appear to give Moscow a veto over enlargement. It
certainly would be interpreted as a victory ... by those who still advocate a Russian
sphere of influence.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3839)

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Linking NATO and European Union Membership
Opponents of enlargement argued during the Senate’s debate that the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland should not be admitted to the Alliance until they
have secured membership in the European Union (EU). This position was taken by
Senators Moynihan and Warner, who cosponsored an amendment to the protocols
of accession stipulating such a NATO-EU link. Advocates of enlargement countered
that making prior EU membership a condition for NATO membership was unwise
given the differing missions of the two organizations and the relevant interests of the
United States.
Arguments in favor. Senator Moynihan, the amendment’s lead sponsor,
argued that the risks of NATO enlargement -- specifically involving Russia --
outweigh the costs:
Ambassador [Richard] Holbrooke said, what? Because Brussels won’t
expand the European Union, NATO expansion must fill a void. Is it filling
a void because they cannot agree on a common agricultural policy in
Europe? So filling a void to bring back the prospect of nuclear war, is that
worth it? ... Give them access to a global market they have never been
allowed into. Give them a common agricultural policy that will give their
farmers a living. This is what they deserve. ... Poland has had enough in
this 20th century. We do not want another period of hostilities that could
lead not just to war but to annihilation. (CR, 27 April 1998, S3616-S3617)
Senator Wellstone buttressed Senator Moynihan’s argument with the contention that
many of the declared goals of NATO expansion -- democracy, stability, open
markets -- could be achieved by pressuring the European Union to admit the newly
democratic states of Eastern Europe. He said, “The European Union, that is where
we should be using our leverage as a nation -- expand the European Union. That is
about markets, that is about democracy.” (CR, 27 April 1998, S3616)
Senator Warner focused on the costs involved in the integration into the NATO
command of the militaries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. He cited
the wide divergence among the various estimates of these costs and argued that EU
membership would be a signal that the three countries’ economies are prepared to
handle the economic burdens of NATO membership:
There is a blank check involved in these votes today. EU membership
would be a way to evaluate the economic ability of these three countries
to meet their financial obligations to NATO. Should those financial
obligations fall short ... guess who is going to pick it up. The United
States of America, in participation with nations and other countries, by
virtue of the EU giving their imprimatur on these countries will be further
assurance that they will have economic productivity and the like to
generate the dollars to meet their requirements to pay the bill to upgrade
their militaries... All of that is going to be a very, very hefty bill. I would
like to see the EU pronounce their economic viability as nations, which
gives us a certain amount of assurance in return that the American

CRS-21
taxpayer will not be picking up a greater and greater portion of their
obligation to modernize their forces. (CR, 30 April 1998, S3823)
Arguments in opposition. Advocates of NATO enlargement fought to defeat
Senator Moynihan’s amendment. Most Senators concentrated on the contrasting
missions of the two entities and on what type of voice the United States would have
if a link between NATO and EU accession were to be established.
Senator Roth spoke about the proposed NATO-EU link. He began by
mentioning a key difference between NATO, a military alliance, and the European
Union: “The EU is a strictly political-economic organization of which the United
States is not a member and has no say.” He agreed that EU enlargement is “highly
desirable” and noted that the Resolution of Ratification before the Senate stated that
the official policy of the United States is to encourage EU enlargement. The
Moynihan amendment, Senator Roth argued, “is inconsistent with the Washington
Treaty. Article 10 of the Treaty states that membership in NATO is open to ... ‘any
European State in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute
to the security of the North Atlantic area.’” Senator Roth pointed out that five
current NATO-member nations -- the United States, Canada, Iceland, Norway, and
Turkey -- are not members of the EU. “Are they any less effective members of the
Alliance because they are not part of the EU?” he asked. “The answer is
unambiguously no.” Requiring EU membership of NATO-candidate countries
would create an artificial “second tier” for non-EU countries, he argued. Norway has
in fact chosen not to join the EU based on an assessment of its own interests, as
could the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland even if they were to be invited.
According to Senator Roth, requiring them to join would create “an arbitrary
standard that is not necessarily a reflection of a NATO aspirant’s state of economic
and political well-being.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3825)
Several Senators objected to the prospect of basing NATO accession on
membership in an organization of which the United States is not a member. Senator
Biden called it “sheer folly” and asked, “Why would we want to place such a key
element of our national security decisionmaking in the hands of the European Union
-- an organization to which we do not belong?” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3825) Senator
Gordon Smith said, “... the European Union may be many things, but it is certainly
not a substitute for U.S. leadership in Europe.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3822) Senator
Roth spoke on this issue as well:
... by conditioning NATO membership on attainment of EU membership,
this amendment would strip the Alliance of control over its own future --
specifically its decisions over future membership -- and transfer it over [to]
the European Union. The EU is not a transatlantic organization. It has no
effective security or defense capability or policy for that matter. ... Do we
really want the EU to have such significant influence over NATO? (CR,
30 April 1998, S3825)
Senator Roth closed his remarks by summarizing the arguments of those
opposed to the amendment: “In one fell swoop, this amendment would: impose an
unprecedented restriction upon the Washington Treaty; transfer key decisions over
NATO’s future to the EU...; demote the United States to a new second-class tier of

CRS-22
Alliance members; and, thereby weaken U.S. leadership of NATO.” (CR, 30 April
1998, S3825) On April 30, 1998, the Moynihan amendment was defeated, 83-17.7
The Final Vote
The Resolution of Ratification, as amended during the Senate's consideration,
came to a vote late in the evening of April 30. At the request of Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott (R-Mississippi), all 99 Senators present and voting took their
assigned seats in the chamber, rising to cast their vote when called by the Clerk of
the Senate. The final tally found 80 Senators in favor, 19 against. One Senator had
left Washington earlier in the day on official business.8
7 The tally of votes can be found in the Congressional Record of April 30, 1998, p.
S3844. The text of the amendment can be found in Appendix 5.
8 The final tally of votes can be found in the Congressional Record of April 30, 1998,
p. S3907.

CRS-23
Appendix 1: Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of
1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic
Congressional Record, 4 May 1998, S4217-S4220
(The text of resolution of ratification to the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of
1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as agreed to by
the Senate on April 30, 1998, reads as follows:)
Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),
SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO
DECLARATIONS AND CONDITIONS.
The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Protocols to the North
Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic (as defined in section 4(7)), which were opened for signature at Brussels
on December 16, 1997, and signed on behalf of the United States of America and
other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, subject to the declarations of section 2 and
the conditions of section 3.
SEC. 2. DECLARATIONS.
The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the Protocols to the North
Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic is subject to the following declarations:
(1) REAFFIRMATION THAT UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN NATO
REMAINS A VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST OF THE UNITED
STATES.--The Senate declares that--
(A) for nearly 50 years the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has
served as the preeminent organization to defend the territory of the countries in the
North Atlantic area against all external threats;
(B) through common action, the established democracies of North America and
Europe that were joined in NATO persevered and prevailed in the task of ensuring
the survival of democratic government in Europe and North America throughout the
Cold War;
(C) NATO enhances the security of the United States by embedding European
states in a process of cooperative security planning, by preventing the destabilizing
renationalization of European military policies, and by ensuring an ongoing and
direct leadership role for the United States in European security affairs;
(D) the responsibility and financial burden of defending the democracies of
Europe and North America can be more equitably shared through an alliance in
which specific obligations and force goals are met by its members;
(E) the security and prosperity of the United States is enhanced by NATO's
collective defense against aggression that may threaten the territory of NATO
members; and

CRS-24
(F) United States membership in NATO remains a vital national security
interest of the United States.
(2) STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT.--The Senate
finds that--
(A) notwithstanding the collapse of communism in most of Europe and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and its NATO allies face threats
to their stability and territorial integrity, including those common threats described
in section 3(1)(A)(v);
(B) the invasion of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, or their
destabilization arising from external subversion, would threaten the stability of
Europe and jeopardize vital United States national security interests;
(C) Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, having established democratic
governments and having demonstrated a willingness to meet all requirements of
membership, including those necessary to contribute to the territorial defense of all
NATO members, are in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area; and
(D) extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
will strengthen NATO, enhance security and stability in Central Europe, deter
potential aggressors, and thereby advance the interests of the United States and its
NATO allies.
(3) SUPREMACY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN NATO
DECISION-MAKING.--The Senate understands that--
(A) as the North Atlantic Council is the supreme decision-making body of
NATO, the North Atlantic Council will not subject its decisions to review, challenge,
or veto by any forum affiliated with NATO, including the Permanent Joint Council
or the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, or by any nonmember state participating
in any such forum;
(B) the North Atlantic Council does not require the consent of the United
Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or any other
international organization in order to take any action pursuant to the North Atlantic
Treaty in defense of the North Atlantic area, including the deployment, operation,
or stationing of forces; and
(C) the North Atlantic Council has direct responsibility for matters relating to
the basic policies of NATO, including development of the Strategic Concept of
NATO (as defined in section 3(1)(F)), and a consensus position of the North Atlantic
Council will precede any negotiation between NATO and non-NATO members that
affects NATO's relationship with non-NATO members participating in fora such as
the Permanent Joint Council.
(4) FULL MEMBERSHIP FOR NEW MEMBERS.--
(A) IN GENERAL.--The Senate understands that Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic, in becoming NATO members, will have all the rights, obligations,
responsibilities, and protections that are afforded to all other NATO members.
(B) POLITICAL COMMITMENTS.--The Senate endorses the political
commitments made by NATO to the Russian Federation in the NATO-Russia
Founding Act, which are not legally binding and do not in any way preclude any
future decisions by the North Atlantic Council to preserve the security of NATO
members.

CRS-25
(5) NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP. The Senate finds that it is in the interest
of the United States for NATO to develop a new and constructive relationship with
the Russian Federation as the Russian Federation pursues democratization, market
reforms, and peaceful relations with its neighbors.
(6) THE IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.--
(A) SENSE OF THE SENATE. It is the sense of the Senate that--
(i) the central purpose of NATO is to provide for the collective defense of its
members;
(ii) the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is a fundamental
institution for the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, crisis prevention, and
post-conflict rehabilitation and, as such, is an essential forum for the discussion and
resolution of political disputes among European members, Canada, and the United
States; and
(iii) the European Union is an essential organization for the economic, political,
and social integration of all qualified European countries into an undivided Europe.
(B) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. The policy of the United States is--
(i) to utilize fully the institutions of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe to reach political solutions for disputes in Europe; and
(ii) to encourage actively the efforts of the European Union to expand its
membership, which will help to stabilize the democracies of Central and Eastern
Europe.
(7) FUTURE CONSIDERATION OF CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERSHIP IN
NATO.
(A) SENATE FINDINGS. The Senate finds that--
(i) Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that NATO members by
unanimous agreement may invite the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of any
other European state in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area;
(ii) in its Madrid summit declaration of July 8, 1997, NATO pledged to
“maintain an open door to the admission of additional Alliance members in the
future” if those countries satisfy the requirements of Article 10 of the North Atlantic
Treaty;
(iii) other than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the United States has
not consented to invite, or committed to invite, any other country to join NATO in
the future; and
(iv) the United States will not support the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty
of, or the invitation to begin accession talks with, any European state (other than
Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic), unless--
(I) the President consults with the Senate consistent with Article II, section 2,
clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (relating to the advice and consent
of the Senate to the making of treaties); and
(II) the prospective NATO member can fulfill the obligations and
responsibilities of membership, and its inclusion would serve the overall political and
strategic interests of NATO and the United States.
(B) REQUIREMENT FOR CONSENSUS AND RATIFICATION.--The Senate
declares that no action or agreement other than a consensus decision by the full
membership of NATO, approved by the national procedures of each NATO member,
including, in the case of the United States, the requirements of Article II, section 2,

CRS-26
clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (relating to the advice and consent
of the Senate to the making of treaties), will constitute a security commitment
pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty.
(8) PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE.--The Senate declares that--
(A) the Partnership for Peace between NATO members and the partnership for
Peace countries is an important and enduring complement to NATO in maintaining
and enhancing regional security;
(B) the Partnership for Peace serves a critical role in promoting common
objectives of NATO members and the Partnership for Peace countries, including
(i) increased transparency in the national defense planning and budgeting
processes;
(ii) ensuring democratic control of defense forces;
(iii) maintaining the capability and readiness of Partnership for Peace countries
to contribute to operations of the United Nations and the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe;
(iv) developing cooperative military relations with NATO; and
(v) enhancing the interoperability between forces of the Partnership for Peace
countries and forces of NATO members;
(C) NATO has undertaken new initiatives to further strengthen the Partnership
for Peace with the objectives of
(i) strengthening the political consultation mechanism in the Partnership for
Peace through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
(ii) enhancing the operational role of the Partnership for Peace; and
(iii) providing for expanded involvement of members of the Partnership for
Peace in decision-making and planning within the Partnership;
(D) enhancement of the Partnership for Peace promotes the security of the
United States by strengthening stability and security throughout the North Atlantic
area;
(E) the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of new NATO members in the
future must not undermine the ability of NATO and the Partnership for Peace
countries to achieve the objectives of the Partnership for Peace; and
(F) membership in the Partnership for Peace does not in any way prejudice
application or consideration for accession to the North Atlantic Treaty.
(9) REGARDING PAYMENTS OWED BY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO
VICTIMS OF THE NAZIS.--
(A) DECLARATION.--The Senate declares that, in future meetings and
correspondence with European governments, the Secretary of State should
(i) raise the issue of insurance benefits owed to victims of the Nazis (and their
beneficiaries and heirs) by these countries as a result of the actions taken by any
communist predecessor regimes in nationalizing foreign insurance companies and
confiscating their assets in the aftermath of World War II;
(ii) seek to secure a commitment from the governments of these countries to
provide a full accounting of the total value of insurance company assets that were
seized by any communist predecessors and to share all documents relevant to unpaid
insurance claims that are in their possession; and
(iii) seek to secure a commitment from the governments of these countries to
contribute to the payment of these unpaid insurance claims in an amount that reflects

CRS-27
the present value of the assets seized by any communist governments (and for which
no compensation had previously been paid).
(B) DEFINITION.--As used in this paragraph, the term “victims of the Nazis”
means person persecuted during the period beginning on March 23, 1933 and ending
on May 8, 1945, by, under the direction of, on behalf of, or under authority granted
by the Nazi government of Germany or any country allied with that government.
SEC. 3. CONDITIONS.
The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Protocols to the
North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding upon the
President:
(1) THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO.--
(A) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE STRATEGIC
CONCEPT OF NATO.--The Senate understands that the policy of the United States
is that the core concepts contained in the 1991 Strategic Concept of NATO (as
defined in subparagraph (F)), which adapted NATO's strategy to the post-Cold War
environment, remain valid today, and that the upcoming revision of that document
will reflect the following principles:
(i) FIRST AND FOREMOST A MILITARY ALLIANCE.--NATO is first and
foremost a military alliance. NATO's success in securing peace is predicated on its
military strength and strategic unity.
(ii) PRINCIPAL FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF SECURITY
INTERESTS OF NATO MEMBERS.--NATO serves as the principal foundation for
collectively defending the security interests of its members against external threats.
(iii) PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES VITAL
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.--Strong United States leadership of NATO
promotes and protects United States vital national security interests.
(iv) UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP ROLE.--The United States maintains
its leadership role in NATO through the stationing of United States combat forces
in Europe, providing military commanders for key NATO commands, and through
the presence of United States nuclear forces on the territory of Europe.
(v) COMMON THREATS.--NATO members will face common threats to their
security in the post-Cold War environment, including--
(I) the potential for the re-emergence of a hegemonic power confronting
Europe;
(II) rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons and the means to deliver these weapons by ballistic or cruise missiles, or
other unconventional delivery means;
(III) threats of a wider nature, including the disruption of the flow of vital
resources, and other possible transnational threats; and
(IV) conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from ethnic and religious
enmity, the revival of historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders.
(vi) CORE MISSION OF NATO.--Defense planning will affirm a commitment
by NATO members to a credible capability for collective self-defense, which
remains the core mission of NATO. All NATO members will contribute to this core
mission.

CRS-28
(vii) CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO COMMON THREATS.--NATO's
continued success requires a credible military capability to deter and respond to
common threats. Building on its core capabilities for collective self-defense of its
members, NATO will ensure that its military force structure, defense planning,
command structures, and force goals promote NATO's capacity to project power
when the security of a NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc
coalitions of willing partners among NATO members. This will require that NATO
members possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long
distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with
the United States in high intensity conflicts.
(viii) INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE.--The Integrated Military
Structure of NATO underpins NATO's effectiveness as a military alliance by
embedding NATO members in a process of cooperative defense planning and
ensuring unity of command.
(ix) NUCLEAR POSTURE.--Nuclear weapons will continue to make an
essential contribution to deterring aggression, especially aggression by potential
adversaries armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. A credible NATO
nuclear deterrent posture requires the stationing of United States nuclear forces in
Europe, which provides an essential political and military link between Europe and
North America, and the widespread participation of NATO members in nuclear roles.
In addition, the NATO deterrent posture will continue to ensure uncertainty in the
mind of any potential aggressor about the nature of the response by NATO members
to military aggression.
(x) BURDENSHARING.--The responsibility and financial burden of defending
the democracies of Europe will be more equitably shared in a manner in which
specific obligations and force goals are met by NATO members.
(B) THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE
DEFENSE.--The Senate declares that--
(i) in order for NATO to serve the security interests of the United States, the
core purpose of NATO must continue to be the collective defense of the territory of
all NATO members; and
(ii) NATO may also, pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, on a
case-by-case basis, engage in other missions when there is a consensus among its
members that there is a threat to the security and interests of NATO members.
(C) DEFENSE PLANNING, COMMAND STRUCTURES, AND FORCE
GOALS.--The Senate declares that NATO must continue to pursue defense planning,
command structures, and force goals to meet the requirements of Article 5 of the
North Atlantic Treaty as well as the requirements of other missions agreed upon by
NATO members, but must do so in a manner that first and foremost ensures under
the North Atlantic Treaty the ability of NATO to deter and counter any significant
military threat to the territory of any NATO member.
(D) REPORT.--Not later than 180 days after the date of adoption of this
resolution, the President shall submit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives a report on the Strategic Concept of NATO. The
report shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form and shall include--
(i) an explanation of the manner in which the Strategic Concept of NATO
affects United States military requirements both within and outside the North
Atlantic area, including the broader strategic rationale of NATO;
(ii) an analysis of all potential threats to the North Atlantic area (meaning the
entire territory of all NATO members) up to the year 2010, including the

CRS-29
consideration of a reconstituted conventional threat to Europe, emerging capabilities
of non-NATO countries to use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons affecting the
North Atlantic area, and the emerging ballistic missile and cruise missile threat
affecting the North Atlantic area;
(iii) the identification of alternative system architectures for the deployment of
a NATO missile defense for the entire territory of all NATO members that would be
capable of countering the threat posed by emerging ballistic and cruise missile
systems in countries other than declared nuclear powers, as well as in countries that
are existing nuclear powers, together with timetables for development and an
estimate of costs;
(iv) a detailed assessment of the progress of all NATO members, on a
country-by-country basis, toward meeting current force goals; and
(v) a general description of the overall approach to updating the Strategic
Concept of NATO.
(E) BRIEFINGS ON REVISIONS TO THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT.--Not
less than twice in the 300-day period following the date of adoption of this
resolution, each at an agreed time to precede each Ministerial meeting of the North
Atlantic Council, the Senate expects the appropriate officials of the executive branch
of Government to offer detailed briefings to the appropriate congressional
committees on proposed changes to the Strategic Concept of NATO, including--
(i) an explanation of the manner in which specific revisions to the Strategic
Concept of NATO will serve United States national security interests and affect
United States military requirements both within and outside the North Atlantic area;
(ii) a timetable for implementation of new force goals by all NATO members
under any revised Strategic Concept of NATO;
(iii) a description of any negotiations regarding the revision of the nuclear
weapons policy of NATO; and
(iv) a description of any proposal to condition decisions of the North Atlantic
Council upon the approval of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, or any NATO-affiliated forum.
(F) DEFINITION.--For the purposes of this paragraph, the term “Strategic
Concept of NATO” means the document agreed to by the Heads of State and
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on
November 7-8, 1991, or any subsequent document agreed to by the North Atlantic
Council that would serve a similar purpose.
(2) COSTS, BENEFITS, BURDENSHARING, AND MILITARY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO.--
(A) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION.--Prior to the deposit of the United
States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that--
(i) the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO will not
have the effect of increasing the overall percentage share of the United States in the
common budgets of NATO;
(ii) the United States is under no commitment to subsidize the national expenses
necessary for Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic to meet its NATO
commitments; and
(iii) the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO does
not detract from the ability of the United States to meet or to fund its military
requirements outside the North Atlantic area.

CRS-30
(B) ANNUAL REPORTS.--Not later than April 1 of each year during the
five-year period following the date of entry into force of the Protocols to the North
Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report, which may be submitted in an unclassified and classified form, and which
shall contain the following information:
(i) The amount contributed to the common budgets of NATO by each NATO
member during the preceding calendar year.
(ii) The proportional share assigned to, and paid by, each NATO member under
NATO's cost-sharing arrangements.
(iii) The national defense budget of each NATO member, the steps taken by
each NATO member to meet NATO force goals, and the adequacy of the national
defense budget of each NATO member in meeting common defense and security
obligations.
(iv) Any costs incurred by the United States in connection with the membership
of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic in NATO, including the deployment of
United States military personnel, the provision of any defense article or defense
service, the funding of any training activity, or the modification or construction of
any military facility.
(v) The status of discussions concerning NATO membership for countries
participating in the Partnership for Peace.
(C) UNITED STATES FUTURE PAYMENTS TO THE COMMON-FUNDED
BUDGETS OF NATO.--
(i) SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING UNITED STATES SHARE OF
NATO'S COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS.--It is the sense of the Senate that,
beginning with fiscal year 1999, and for each fiscal year thereafter through the fiscal
year 2003, the President should--
(I) propose to NATO a limitation on the United States percentage share of the
common-funded budgets of NATO for that fiscal year equal to the United States
percentage share of those budgets for the preceding fiscal year, minus one percent;
and
(II) not later than 60 days after the date of the United States proposal under
subclause (I), submit a report to Congress describing the action, if any, taken by
NATO to carry out the United States proposal.
(ii) ANNUAL LIMITATION ON UNITED STATES EXPENDITURES FOR
NATO.--Unless specifically authorized by law, the total amount of expenditures by
the United States in any fiscal year beginning on or after October 1, 1998, for
payments to the common-funded budgets of NATO shall not exceed the total of all
such payments made by the United States in fiscal year 1998.
(iii) DEFINITIONS.--In this subparagraph:
(I) COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS OF NATO.--The term “common-funded
budgets of NATO” means--
(aa) the Military Budget, the Security Investment Program, and the Civil Budget
of NATO; and
(bb) any successor or additional account or program of NATO.
(II) UNITED STATES PERCENTAGE SHARE OF THE COMMON-
FUNDED BUDGETS OF NATO.--The term “United States percentage share of the
common-funded budgets of NATO” means the percentage that the total of all United
States payments during a fiscal year to the common-funded budgets of NATO

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represents to the total amounts payable by all NATO members to those budgets
during that fiscal year.
(D) REQUIREMENT OF PAYMENT OUT OF FUNDS SPECIFICALLY
AUTHORIZED.--No cost incurred by NATO, other than through the
common-funded budgets of NATO, in connection with the admission to membership,
or participation, in NATO of any country that was not a member of NATO as of
March 1, 1998, may be paid out of funds available to any department, agency, or
other entity of the United States unless the funds are specifically authorized by law
for that purpose.
(E) REPORTS ON FUTURE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO.--
(i) Reports prior to commencement of accession talks.-- Prior to any decision
by the North Atlantic Council to invite any country (other than Poland, Hungary, or
the Czech Republic) to begin accession talks with NATO, the President shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report regarding each country
being actively considered for NATO membership, including--
(I) an evaluation of how that country will further the principles of the North
Atlantic Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area;
(II) an evaluation of the eligibility of that country for membership based on the
principles and criteria identified by NATO and the United States, including the
military readiness of that country;
(III) an explanation of how an invitation to that country would affect the
national security interests of the United States;
(IV) an up-to-date United States Government analysis of the common-funded
military requirements and costs associated with integrating that country into NATO,
and an analysis of the shares of those costs to be borne by NATO members,
including the United States; and
(V) a preliminary analysis of the implications for the United States defense
budget and other United States budgets of integrating that country into NATO.
(ii) UPDATED REPORTS PRIOR TO SIGNING PROTOCOLS OF
ACCESSION.--Prior to the signing of any protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on
the accession of any country, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report, in classified and unclassified forms--
(I) updating the information contained in the report required under clause (i)
with respect to that country; and
(II) including an analysis of that country's ability to meet the full range of the
financial burdens of NATO membership, and the likely impact upon the military
effectiveness of NATO of the country invited for accession talks, if the country were
to be admitted to NATO.
(F) REVIEW AND REPORTS BY THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE.-- The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a review and
assessment of the evaluations and analyses contained in all reports submitted under
subparagraph (E) and, not later than 90 days after the date of submission of any
report under subparagraph (E)(ii), shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees setting forth the assessment resulting from that review.
(3) THE NATO-RUSSIA FOUNDING ACT AND THE PERMANENT JOINT
COUNCIL.--Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the
President shall certify to the Senate the following:
(A) IN GENERAL.--The NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint
Council do not provide the Russian Federation with a veto over NATO policy.

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(B) NATO DECISION-MAKING.--The NATO-Russia Founding Act and the
Permanent Joint Council do not provide the Russian Federation any role in the North
Atlantic Council or NATO decision-making, including--
(i) any decision NATO makes on an internal matter; or
(ii) the manner in which NATO organizes itself, conducts its business, or plans,
prepares for, or conducts any mission that affects one or more of its members, such
as collective defense, as stated under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
(C) NATURE OF DISCUSSIONS IN THE PERMANENT JOINT
COUNCIL.-- In discussions in the Permanent Joint Council--
(i) the Permanent Joint Council will not be a forum in which NATO's basic
strategy, doctrine, or readiness is negotiated with the Russian Federation, and NATO
will not use the Permanent Joint Council as a substitute for formal arms control
negotiations such as the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe, done at Paris on November 19, 1990;
(ii) any discussion with the Russian Federation of NATO doctrine will be for
explanatory, not decision-making purposes;
(iii) any explanation described in clause (ii) will not extend to a level of detail
that could in any way compromise the effectiveness of NATO's military forces, and
any such explanation will be offered only after NATO has first set its policies on
issues affecting internal matters;
(iv) NATO will not discuss any agenda item with the Russian Federation prior
to agreeing to a NATO position within the North Atlantic Council on that agenda
item; and
(v) the Permanent Joint Council will not be used to make any decision on
NATO doctrine, strategy, or readiness.

(4) REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.--
(A) PROGRESS REPORT.--Not later than January 1, 1999, the President shall
submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees on the progress of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in satisfying the security requirements for
membership in NATO.
(B) REPORTS REGARDING PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS.--Not later than January 1, 1999, and again not later than the date
that is 90 days after the date of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty by Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the Director of Central Intelligence
shall submit a detailed report to the congressional intelligence committees--
(i) identifying the latest procedures and requirements established by Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic for the protection of intelligence sources and
methods; and
(ii) including an assessment of how the overall procedures and requirements of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for the protection of intelligence sources
and methods compare with the procedures and requirements of other NATO
members for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
(C) DEFINITIONS.--In this paragraph:
(i) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.--The term
“congressional intelligence committees” means the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(ii) DATE OF ACCESSION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY BY
POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC.--The term “date of

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accession to the North Atlantic Treaty by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic”
means the latest of the following dates:
(I) The date on which Poland accedes to the North Atlantic Treaty.
(II) The date on which Hungary accedes to the North Atlantic Treaty,
(III) The date on which the Czech Republic accedes to the North Atlantic
Treaty.
(5) REQUIREMENT OF FULL COOPERATION WITH UNITED STATES
EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING OF
CAPTURED AND MISSING UNITED STATES PERSONNEL FROM PAST
MILITARY CONFLICTS OR COLD WAR INCIDENTS.--Prior to the deposit of
the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to Congress
that each of the governments of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are fully
cooperating with United States efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting of
captured and missing United States personnel from past military conflicts or Cold
War incidents, to include--
(A) facilitating full access to relevant archival material; and
(B) identifying individuals who may possess knowledge relative to captured and
missing United States personnel, and encouraging such individuals to speak with
United States Government officials.
(6) TREATY INTERPRETATION.--
(A)PRINCIPLES OF TREATY INTERPRETATION.--The Senate affirms the
applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally-based principles of treaty
interpretation set forth in condition (1) in the resolution of ratification of the INF
Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
(B) CONSTRUCTION OF SENATE RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION.--
Nothing in condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of the INF Treaty, approved
by the Senate on May 27, 1988, shall be construed as authorizing the President to
obtain legislative approval for modifications or amendments to treaties through
majority approval of both Houses of Congress.
(C) DEFINITION.--As used in this paragraph, the term “INF Treaty” refers to
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range
Missiles, together with the related memorandum of understanding and protocols,
done at Washington on December 8, 1987.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this resolution:
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.--The term
“appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations,
the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate and the Committee on International Relations, the Committee on National
Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.--
(2) NATO.--The term “NATO” means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
(3) NATO MEMBERS.--The term “NATO members” means all countries that
are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

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(4) NATO-Russia founding act.--The term “NATO-Russia Founding Act”
means the document entitled the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation
and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation”, dated May 27, 1997.
(5) NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.--The term “North Atlantic area” means the
area covered by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as applied by the North
Atlantic Council.
(6) NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.--The term “North Atlantic Treaty” means
the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241;
TIAS 1964), as amended.
(7) PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON THE
ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC. The
term “Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic” refers to the following protocols transmitted by
the President to the Senate on February 11, 1998 (Treaty Document No. 105-36):
(A) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic
of Poland, signed at Brussels on December 16, 1997.--
(B) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic
of Hungary, signed at Brussels on December 16, 1997.
(C) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Czech
Republic, signed at Brussels on December 16, 1997.--
(8) UNITED STATES INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION.--The term
“United States instrument of ratification” means the instrument of ratification of the
United States of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession
of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.--

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Appendix 2: Amendments Relating to the Strategic
Concept
Executive Amendment No. 2318 (Ashcroft)
(CR, 28 April 1998, S3793-S3794)
In section 3(1), strike “(A) THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF
COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.--” and all that follows through “interests of NATO
members.” at the end of paragraph (1)(A) and insert in lieu thereof the following new
condition:
(2) THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE SELF-
DEFENSE.--
(A) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION.--Prior to the deposit of the United
States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that--
(i) NATO is and will remain a defensive military alliance, and that Article 5 of
the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for the collective self-defense of NATO
members against armed attack, continues to constitute the heart of that treaty; and
(ii) the United States will only support a military operation under the North
Atlantic Treaty that is commenced on or after the date of adoption of this resolution
of ratification--
(I) if the operation is intended for the purpose of collective self-defense in
response to an armed attack on the territory of a NATO member; or
(II) in response to a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence, or
security of a NATO member.
(B) CONSTRUCTION.-- The Senate declares that nothing in the North Atlantic
Treaty, the Strategic Concept of NATO, or any other document setting forth the
fundamental purposes, objectives, or missions of NATO shall be construed as
altering the constitutional authority of the Congress or the President.
(C) EXCLUSIONS FROM MEANING OF “NATO MILITARY
OPERATION”.-- The term “NATO military operation” does not include any NATO
training mission or exercise.
(3) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS REGARDING THE STRATEGIC
CONCEPT OF NATO.--
Executive Amendment No. 2310 (Kyl)
(CR, 27 April 1998, S3657)
In paragraph (1) of section 3, after “(1) THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF
NATO.--” insert the following:
(A)POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE STRATEGIC
CONCEPT OF NATO.--The Senate understands that the policy of the United States
is that the core concepts contained in the 1991 Strategic Concept of NATO (as
defined in subparagraph (F)), which adapted NATO's strategy to the post-Cold War

CRS-36
environment, remain valid today, and that the upcoming revision of that document
will reflect the following principles:
(i) FIRST AND FOREMOST A MILITARY ALLIANCE.--NATO is first and
foremost a military alliance. NATO's success in securing peace is predicated on its
military strength and strategic unity.
(ii) PRINCIPLE FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF SECURITY
INTERESTS OF NATO MEMBERS.--NATO serves as the principal foundation for
collectively defending the security interests of its members against external threats.
(iii) PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES VITAL
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.--Strong United States leadership of NATO
promotes and protects United States vital national security interests.
(iv) UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP ROLE.--The United States maintains
its leadership role in NATO through the stationing of United States combat forces
in Europe, providing military commanders for key NATO commands, and through
the presence of United States nuclear forces on the territory of Europe.
(v) COMMON THREATS.--NATO members will face common threats to their
security in the post-Cold War environment, including--
(I) the potential for the re-emergence of a hegemonic power confronting
Europe;
(II) rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons and the means to deliver these weapons by ballistic or cruise missiles, or
other unconventional delivery means;
(III) threats of a wider nature, including the disruption of the flow of vital
resources, and other possible transnational threats; and
(IV) conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from ethnic and religious
enmity, the revival of historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders.
(vi) CORE MISSION OF NATO.--Defense planning will affirm a commitment
by NATO members to a credible capability for collective self-defense, which
remains the core mission of NATO. All NATO members will contribute to this core
mission.
(vii) CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO COMMON THREATS.--NATO's
continued success requires a credible military capability to deter and respond to
common threats. Building on its core capabilities for collective self-defense of its
members, NATO will ensure that its military force structure, defense planning,
command structures, and force goals promote NATO's capacity to project power
when the security of a NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc
coalitions of willing partners among NATO members. This will require that
NATO members possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over
long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly
with the United States in high intensity conflicts.
(viii) INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE.--The Integrated Military
Structure of NATO underpins NATO's effectiveness as a military alliance by
embedding NATO members in a process of cooperative defense planning and
ensuring unity of command.
(ix) NUCLEAR POSTURE.--Nuclear weapons will continue to make an
essential contribution to deterring aggression, especially aggression by potential
adversaries armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. A credible NATO
nuclear deterrent posture requires the stationing of United States nuclear forces in
Europe, which provides an essential political and military link between Europe and
North America, and the widespread participation of NATO members in

CRS-37
nuclear roles. In addition, the NATO deterrent posture will continue to ensure
uncertainty in the mind of any potential aggressor about the nature of the response
by NATO members to military aggression.
(x) BURDENSHARING.--The responsibility and financial burden of defending
the democracies of Europe will be more equitably shared in a manner in which
specific obligations and force goals are met by NATO members.
Executive Amendment No. 2324 (Bingaman)
(CR, 30 April 1998, S3854)
At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, insert the following:
( ) UNITED STATES POLICY LIMITING NATO ENLARGEMENT UNTIL
THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO IS REVISED.-- Prior to the date of
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to
the Senate that, until such time as the North Atlantic Council agrees on a revised
Strategic Concept of NATO, it is the policy of the United States not to support the
accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of, or the invitation to begin accession talks
with, any European state, other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic.

CRS-38
Appendix 3: Amendments Relating to Costs and
Burdensharing
Executive Amendment No. 2312 (Harkin)
(CR, 28 April 1998, S3667)
In section 3(2)(A), strike “and” at the end of clause (ii).
In section 3(2)(A), strike “(iii)” and insert “(iv)”.
In section 3(2)(A), insert after clause (ii) the following:
(iii) any future United States subsidy of the national expenses of Poland,
Hungary, or the Czech Republic to meet its NATO commitments, including
assistance described in subparagraph (C), may not exceed 25 percent of all assistance
provided to that country by all NATO members.
At the end of section 3(2), insert the following new subparagraph:
(C) ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE DESCRIBED. -- The
assistance referred to in subparagraph (A)(iii) includes --
(i) Foreign Military Financing under the Arms Control Export Act;
(ii) transfers of excess defense articles under section 516 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961;
(iii) Emergency Drawdowns;
(iv) no-cost leases of United States equipment;
(v) the subsidy cost of loan guarantees and other contingent liabilities under
subchapter VI of chapter 148 of title 10, United States Code; and
(vi) international military education and training under chapter 5 of part II of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Executive Amendment No. 2065 (Stevens)
(CR, 30 April 1998, S3859)
At the end of section 3(2) of the resolution, add the following:
(C) REQUIREMENT OF PAYMENT OUT OF FUNDS SPECIFICALLY
AUTHORIZED. -- No cost incurred by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), other than through the common-funded budgets of NATO, in connection
with the admission to membership, or participation, in NATO of any country that
was not a member of NATO as of March 1, 1998, may be paid out of funds available
to any department, agency, or other entity of the United States unless the funds are
specifically authorized by law for that purpose.
Executive Amendment No. 2066 (Stevens)
(CR, 30 April 1998, S3847)
At the end of section 3(2) of the resolution, add the following:
(C) UNITED STATES FUTURE PAYMENTS TO THE COMMON-FUNDED
BUDGETS OF NATO. --

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(i) SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING UNITED STATES SHARE OF
NATO’S COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS. -- It is the sense of the Senate that,
beginning with fiscal year 1999, and for each fiscal year thereafter through the fiscal
year 2003, the President should --
(A) propose to NATO a limitation on the United States percentage share of the
common-funded budgets of NATO for that fiscal year equal to the United States
percentage share of those budgets for the preceding fiscal year, minus one percent;
and
(B) not later than 60 days after the date of the United States proposal under
subparagraph (A), submit a report to Congress describing the action, if any, taken by
NATO to carry out the United States proposal.
(ii) ANNUAL LIMITATION ON UNITED STATES EXPENDITURES FOR
NATO. -- Unless specifically authorized by law, the total amount of expenditures by
the United States in any fiscal year beginning on or after October 1, 1998, for
payments to the common-funded budgets of NATO shall not exceed the total of all
such payments made by the United States in the fiscal year 1998.
(iii) Definitions.--In this subparagraph:
(I) COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS OF NATO. -- The term “common-funded
budgets of NATO” means--
(aa) the Military Budget, the Security Investment Program, and the Civil Budget
of NATO; and
(bb) any successor or additional account or program of NATO.
(II) UNITED STATES PERCENTAGE SHARE OF THE COMMON-
FUNDED BUDGETS OF NATO. -- The term “United States percentage share of the
common-funded budgets of NATO” means the percentage that the total of all United
States payments during a fiscal year to the common-funded budgets of NATO
represents to the total amounts payable by all NATO members to those budgets
during that fiscal year.

CRS-40
Appendix 4: Warner and Moynihan Amendments
Executive Amendment No. 2322 (Warner)
(CR, 30 April 1998, S3826)
At the appropriate place in section 2 of the resolution, insert the following:
( ) UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING FURTHER ENLARGEMENT
OF NATO. — Prior to the date of deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that it is the policy of the United
States not to encourage, participate in, or agree to any further enlargement of NATO
for a period of at least three years beginning on the earliest date by which Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic have all acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty.
Executive Amendment No. 2321 (Moynihan)
(CR, 30 April 1998, S3817)
At the end of section 3 of the resolution (relating to conditions), add the following:
() DEFERRAL OF RATIFICATION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT UNTIL
ADMISSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND CZECH REPUBLIC TO THE
EUROPEAN UNION.
(A) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED: Prior to the deposit of the United States
Instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic have each acceded to membership in the European
Union and have each engaged in initial voting participation in an official action of
the European Union.
(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION: Nothing in this paragraph may be construed as
an expression by the Senate of an intent to accept as a new NATO member any
country other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic if that country becomes
a member of the European Union after the date of adoption of this resolution.

CRS-41
Appendix 5: Executive Responsibilities, as Stipulated in
the Resolution of Ratification
Passed by the Senate on April 30, 1998
October 27, 1998 (180 days after the date of adoption):
Sec. 3(1)(D)
The President must submit to the Congress a report on the Strategic Concept of
NATO. The report will be provided in both classified and unclassified forms and
will include:
! an explanation of how the Strategic Concept affects the responsibilities of the
U.S. military, both within and without the North Atlantic area
! a forecast of potential threats to all Alliance members, including consideration
of “a reconstituted conventional threat to Europe,” the proliferation of
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and ballistic missile technology
among non-NATO countries affecting the North Atlantic area
! options for the deployment, as well as timetables for development and an
estimate of costs, of a missile defense system covering all member countries
that would be capable of countering the threat of “emerging ballistic and
cruise missile systems in countries other than declared nuclear powers, as well
as in countries that are existing nuclear powers”
! a country-by-country assessment of progress toward meeting NATO’s current
force goals
! a description of NATO’s approach to updating its Strategic Concept
January 1, 1999
Sec. 3(4)(A)
On or before January 1, 1999, the President must submit a report to the congressional
intelligence committees assessing the progress of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland in reaching the security requirements of NATO membership
Sec. 3(4)(B)
On or before January 1, 1999, and again no later than 90 days after the accession to
the Alliance of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, the Director of Central
Intelligence must submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that
includes:
! explanation of the latest “procedures and requirements” implemented by the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods
! an overall assessment of the general procedures and requirements of the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods and a comparison of such procedures and requirements
with those of other NATO members

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February 24, 1999 (300 days after the date of adoption):
Sec. 3(1)(E)
At least twice during this 300 day period, the Senate will be briefed by the
appropriate executive branch officials on proposed changes to NATO’s Strategic
Concept. The briefings will precede each Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic
Council and will include:
! a specific explanation of how revisions to the Strategic Concept will serve
U.S. national security interests and affect the responsibilities of the U.S.
military both within and without the North Atlantic area
! if force goals are to be revised, a timetable for implementation of these goals
by all Alliance members
! an account of any negotiations concerning the NATO’s nuclear weapons
policy
! an account of any proposal to “condition decisions of the North Atlantic
Council upon the approval” of the UN, the OSCE, or any other NATO-
affiliated organization
April 1, 1999 - April 1, 2003
Sec. 3(2)(B)
On or before April 1 of each year following the entry into force of the Protocols of
Accession (May 21, 1998), the President must submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report, in both unclassified and classified forms, that
includes the following information:
! the amount each Alliance member contributed to the common budget of
NATO during the preceding calendar year
! the proportional share required of, and paid by, each Alliance member under
NATO’s burden-sharing agreements
! the national defense budget of each Alliance member, the efforts made by
each member to meet NATO force goals, and an assessment of the adequacy
of each member’s defense expenditures in meeting “common defense and
security obligations”
! any cost borne by the United States that is connected to the membership of
Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic in NATO, including “the deployment
of U.S. military personnel, the provision of any defense article or defense
service, the funding of any training activity, or the modification or
construction of any military facility”
! the status of any discussions concerning future NATO membership for
members of the Partnership for Peace

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General Requirements
Sec. 3(2)(E)(i)
Prior to any future decision by the North Atlantic Council to invite any country to
begin accession talks with NATO, the President must submit a report on each
country being considered to the appropriate congressional committees that includes:
! evaluation of how that country will contribute to the principles of the North
Atlantic Treaty and to the security of the North Atlantic area
! evaluation of the fitness of that country for Alliance membership based on the
criteria of NATO and the United States, including that country’s “military
readiness”
! evaluation of how an invitation to that country would affect U.S. national
security interests
! a current analysis by the U.S. Government of the commonly funded military
requirements and costs associated with integration of that country into the
Alliance, and an analysis of the shares of those costs to be borne by each
NATO member
! analysis of any implications of that country’s integration for the U.S. defense
and other budgets
Sec. 3(2)(E)(ii)
Prior to the signing of any future protocols of accession, the President must submit
to the appropriate congressional committees, in classified and unclassified forms, a
report that includes:
! an update of the information provided in the report required by Sec. 3(2)(E)(i)
! analysis of that country’s ability to meet the financial demands of Alliance
membership, and the likely impact on NATO’s military effectiveness if that
country were to be admitted

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