China’s Space Program: A Brief Overview Including Commercial Launches of U.S.-Built Satellites

China’s Space Program: A Brief Overview Including Commercial Launches of U.S.-Built Satellites

98-575 STM
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
China’s Space Program: A Brief Overview
Including Commercial Launches of U.S.-Built
Satellites
September 3, 1998
Marcia S. Smith
Specialist in Aerospace and Telecommunications Policy
Science, Technology, and Medicine Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

ABSTRACT
China launched its first satellite in 1970 and has successfully placed 62 spacecraft into orbit
since that time. Most are for communications, weather, remote sensing/reconnaissance, or
scientific purposes. In 1990, China conducted its first commercial launch of a U.S.-built
communications satellite. By September 3, 1998, 24 U.S.-built satellites had been launched,
of which three suffered complete launch failures and a fourth did not reach its intended orbit.
Several congressional committees are holding hearings into whether U.S. satellite
manufacturers may have transferred technology to China that improved the reliability of
Chinese nuclear missiles during a review of one of those launch failures. This report provides
an overview of the Chinese space program since 1970, including commercial launches of
U.S.-built spacecraft. The report may be updated if there are significant developments.
NOTE
This CRS study was initiated at the request of
the Committee on Science of the U.S. House of
Representatives and is adapted for general
congressional use with permission of the
Committee.

China’s Space Program: A Brief Overview Including
Commercial Launches of U.S.-Built Satellites
Summary
China launched its first satellite in 1970. Through September 3, 1998, it had
conducted 62 launches, of which 50 were complete successes, 8 were complete
failures, and 4 were partial failures, placing satellites into incorrect orbits. That total
includes 5 failures between 1973 and 1979 that are not officially acknowledged by
China, but which are counted by Western analysts.
China launches satellites for its own use, as well as for other customers primarily
on a commercial basis. The satellites are for communications, weather, remote
sensing/reconnaissance, or science. Its first commercial launch of a U.S.-
manufactured satellite occurred in 1990. Through September 3, 1998, 24 U.S.-
manufactured satellites had been launched by China, 20 successfully. One European-
built satellite also was successfully launched. While launch failures are common in all
the countries that launch satellites, two of China’s raised particular concern because
they resulted in fatalities on the ground. Following the second of these in 1996 —
of the Loral-built Intelsat 708 spacecraft — Western insurance companies requested
Loral to establish a team to review whether China accurately diagnosed and corrected
the problem. Loral’s review team included representatives of several Western
aerospace companies, including Hughes, which had built several satellites for launch
by China. Two of those failed to reach orbit (in 1992 and 1995). According to an
April 4, 1998 New York Times article, the U.S. Department of Defense concluded in
a classified 1997 report that as a result of that review, Loral and Hughes may have
transferred technology to China that improved the reliability of Chinese nuclear
missiles. Loral concedes that in violation of its own internal policies, it sent a copy
of its report to China without first notifying the Department of State. The company
asserts, however, that no technology was transferred. The Justice Department began
a criminal investigation into the matter in 1997. Several congressional committees are
holding hearings on the issues involved in this debate. The “Loral/Hughes” issue is
discussed in more detail in CRS Issue Brief 93062, Space Launch Vehicles:
Government Requirements and Commercial Competition, and in CRS Report 98-485,
China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers from U.S. Satellite Export Policy —
Background and Chronology.
Apart from commercial satellite launches, China has bold plans for the
exploration and utilization of space, including its announced intention to launch
humans into space in 1999. Two Chinese specialists have completed training at
Russia’s Star City cosmonaut training facility. China has cooperative agreements with
several countries for joint space activities, including Brazil, Canada, Germany, Russia,
and South Korea. No government-to-government level agreement for space
cooperation exists between the United States and China, although China built magnets
that were part of a scientific instrument (the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer) flown on
a 1998 U.S. space shuttle mission and is scheduled to fly again on the International
Space Station. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) drafted
an agreement on cooperation in remote sensing activities prior to President Clinton’s
planned trip to China in June 1998, but the Loral/Hughes issue (see above) cooled the
climate for signing such an accord.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Development of the Chinese Space Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Significant Chinese Space Launch Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Commercial Launch Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Other Domestic and International Space Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Future Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

China’s Space Program: A Brief Overview
Including Commercial Launches of U.S.-Built
Satellites*
Introduction
China launched its first satellite in 1970. By September 3, 1998, China had
conducted 62 launches, of which 50 were successes, 8 were complete failures, and 4
were partial failures placing satellites into incorrect orbits (in one case, the launcher
carried two satellites, one of which reached the correct orbit). That figure includes 5
launch failures between 1973 and 1979 that have not been officially acknowledged by
China, but are counted by Western analysts. With those launches, China has
successfully placed 62 spacecraft into orbit. China’s first multiple launch (more than
one satellite on a single launch vehicle) occurred in 1981. See table 1 below for a list
of Chinese space launches.
The Chinese have not announced the missions for many of the satellites launched
in the 1970s and early 1980s. Several were recovered on Earth after a few days in
space, suggesting that they returned film images of the Earth (presumably for military
reconnaissance purposes). Others were not recovered and their missions remain
unclear. Since the mid-1980s, when more information has been made available,
China has launched satellites for communications, weather, Earth remote sensing, or
science both for itself and for other countries primarily on a commercial basis. China
undoubtedly is interested in Earth remote sensing satellites both for their civilian
scientific and military reconnaissance applications.
The Commission of Science, Technology & Industry for National Defense
oversees space activities in China, with several organizations reporting to it. Among
them are the China National Space Administration (CNSA) and the China Aerospace
Corp. (operated as a private, profit-making company). China Great Wall Industries
Corp. (CGWIC), part of China Aerospace Corp., markets commercial space launch
services. The Chinese Academy of Space Technology develops spacecraft. The
China Satellite Launch and TT&C General organization operates the launch sites and
* This report is an update of a chapter published in CRS Report 94-873 SPR, Space
Activities of the United States, CIS, and Other Launching Countries/Organizations: 1957-
1994. Detailed citations are omitted from that report for brevity’s sake, and consequently this
report does not have them. In general the sources of information are Chinese articles
translated and published by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS); Western
media sources such as Aviation Week and Space Technology, Space News, Flight
International, Jane’s Intelligence Review, and Jane’s Space Directory 1997-1998; and
information from Geoffrey Perry, M.B.E, of the Kettering Group in England.

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provides tracking and telemetry services. Funding figures for Chinese space activities
are extremely difficult to obtain. An October 14, 1996 article in the U.S. trade
magazine Aviation Week and Space Technology reported that China’s 1995 civilian
space budget was $1.38 billion. A March 28, 1998 Reuters article states that the
Import and Export Bank of China has provided $427.7 million in loans to CGWIC for
commercial satellite launches.

China has three launch sites. The oldest is Shuang Cheng-tzu (41.2 N, 100.1
o
E)
o
in the northern part of China (near Jiuquan). Versions of the Long March 2 (CZ 2)
rocket are used at this site. In 1984, the Chinese introduced the Long March 3 (CZ
3) launch vehicle, which has a cryogenic (liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen) upper stage.
T h e v e h i c l e
inaugurated use of a
new launch site at
Xichang (28 N, 103
o
E)
o
in southeastern China,
also used for versions
of the Long March 2.
The site is used for
satellites destined for
geostationary orbit
above the equator. In
1988, China initiated
use of a third launch
site, Taiyuan (38oN,
112 E),
o
together with a
new version of the
Long March (CZ 4). This site is used for satellites requiring high inclination and polar
orbits. To date those have been weather satellites or communications satellites for the
Iridium program.
Development of the Chinese Space Program
The history of the Chinese space program is still shrouded in official secrecy, but
occasionally information has been released by the government For example, the
Chinese announced in 1984 that they had flown a puppy into space on a suborbital
rocket in 1967. The puppy, named Xiao Bao (Little Leopard), was successfully
recovered. They also reported that there had been a major explosion at one of their
launch pads on January 28, 1978, which resulted in at least seven people being
seriously injured, and a dozen or more people receiving burns to their hair, eyebrows,
and faces. In addition, they honored as a martyr a young engineer who helped
develop the first geostationary satellite, but died after 6 or 7 years of suffering the
health effects of exposure to radiation during experiments related to that task.
An article in the May 1991 issue of Space Policy by Yanping Chen sheds some
light on the development of the Chinese space program, concluding that despite a
constantly changing political and economic climate, the space program has remained
relatively stable. That article and other Western accounts credit Dr. Qian Xue-sen
(also spelled Tsien Hsue-shen, Tsien Hsueh-shen, or Chien Hsue-shen) as being the
father of the Chinese space program. Born and educated in China, he came to the

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United States for advanced education and worked for the Army’s Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL). According to these accounts, in 1950 he was identified as a
security risk and after a series of stays of the deportation order was expelled from the
United States in 1955.
Dr. Chen divides the Chinese program into four distinct periods: 1956-1966,
when the space program was first established despite a number of “traumatic political
events” including the Great Leap Forward and the withdrawal of Soviet support for
Chinese science and technology; 1966-76, during which the space program was able
to maintain its course even though “virtually all sectors of Chinese society were torn
apart” by the Cultural Revolution; 1976-1986, a period when the space program was
put on the back burner, but survived, while the country recovered from the Cultural
Revolution; and 1986 forward, which Dr. Chen describes as the “heyday” of the
program as the government has made space a “cornerstone of the national science and
technology development effort.”
Significant Chinese Space Launch Failures
In the early and mid-1990s, China experienced mixed success with its launch
vehicles, though its record has improved considerably since 1997 (see table 1).
Launch failures are not uncommon in any of the launching countries, but two of
China’s captured worldwide attention because they caused deaths on the ground —
a Long March 2E in January 1995 and a Long March 3B in February 1996.
The Long March 2E was developed to serve the commercial communications
satellite market, initially for two Australian satellites AUSSAT-1 and -2 (later
renamed Optus B-1 and B-2). The first flight of the Long March 2E, from Xichang,
in 1990 was only a partial success, however. Its primary payload (a “dummy”
AUSSAT satellite) did not achieve the proper orbit. A test satellite for Pakistan,
Badr-1, aboard the same launch vehicle did achieve the correct orbit, however. In
March 1992, the first of the two AUSSATs (renamed Optus-B1) was about to be
launched, but an engine failure at the moment of ignition scrubbed the launch. It was
successfully launched that August. Optus-B2 was launched in December 1992, but
a malfunction caused an explosion enroute to orbit. Much of the satellite was found
on the ground along the flight path, although some pieces and part of the rocket
attained orbit. After a lengthy investigation by CGWIC and Hughes Space and
Communications Co. (manufacturer of the satellite), officials concluded that the
satellite, not the rocket, exploded, but neither side accepted responsibility for the
failure.
In January 1995, a more tragic failure beset the Long March 2E program. Once
again, the rocket exploded shortly after launch, but this time falling debris killed six
people and injured 23 in a nearby rural area. Like the December 1992 launch, this
carried a communications satellite (APStar 2) built by Hughes. In July 1995, CGWIC
and Hughes released a joint statement that wind shear was the apparent cause of the
failure, though they could not agree whether it was the rocket or the satellite that was
at fault structurally. Hughes released a separate background paper explaining why it
believed the rocket was at fault. Several successful launches of the CZ-2E have been
achieved since, but the earlier failures raised not only technical questions, but issues

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about the openness of the Chinese investigatory process, and how well the rockets are
instrumented to provide the requisite data to determine cause of failure.
The question of China’s openness arose again following another significant
launch failure in February 1996. A new version of the Long March 3, CZ-3B, was
used for launch of the Intelsat 708 satellite. Seconds after liftoff, the rocket inverted
itself and crashed to Earth in a village near the launch site. Officially, China reported
that 6 died, 57 were injured, and 80 homes destroyed. Western observers who were
present at the launch (and whose hotel also was severely damaged) insist that many
more must have died. An Israeli attending the launch visited the village the next day
and captured the ruin on videotape which was later shown in the West, buttressing the
view that more devastation was incurred than China was ready to admit. In this case,
Space Systems/Loral manufactured the satellite. The accident investigation board
concluded that an inertial guidance system malfunctioned. A Loral-led team reviewed
China’s assessment of the launch failure, which has subsequently led to an
investigation into whether Loral or Hughes, which also participated in the review
panel, transferred missile-related technology to China (see Commercial Launch
Services, below). Intelsat canceled two additional planned launches. The fatalities
raised questions about range safety in China. China reportedly agreed to evacuate
surrounding villages before future launches and revise launch destruct procedures.
Commercial Launch Services

Since 1986, the Chinese have been actively marketing launch services using the
Long March family of vehicles through CGWIC (often referred to simply as “China
Great Wall”). The first launches for paying customers were of materials processing
experiments using the Long March 2, first for a French company (Matra) in 1987 and
a German consortium (Intospace) in 1988.
The largest market for commercial space launch services is communications
satellites, and China has focused great attention on attempting to get contracts for
these launches. Virtually all commercial communications satellites are made by U.S.
companies or contain U.S. components, so export licenses from the United States are
required for the satellites to reach China for launch.
In 1988, the first such export license requests were made to the U.S. State
Department for two Australian satellites, AUSSAT 1 and 2, built by Hughes Space
& Communications Co., and one satellite named Asiasat-1 owned by Asiasat Ltd. that
also was built by Hughes (Asiasat-1 is the refurbished Westar 6 satellite recovered by
a 1984 space shuttle mission after it failed to achieve the proper orbit on its first
launch attempt).
In September 1988, the Reagan Administration approved export of the three
satellites to China on the condition that China sign three international treaties
concerning, among other things, liability for damage from space launches; negotiate
a fair trade agreement with the United States regarding launch services; and reach
agreement on protecting technology from being transferred while each satellite is in
China. All conditions were met by January 1989. Two of the conditions included in
the agreement were that China would seek to launch no more than nine international

CRS-5
satellites between 1989 and 1994, and that it would charge prices “on a par” with
other launch services providers.
Approval for the export of the AUSSAT and Asiasat-1 satellites was granted by
CoCom, the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls, whose
members were all the NATO countries (except Iceland), Japan and Australia (CoCom
was disbanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union). Following the Tiananmen
Square uprising in June 1989, however, the Bush Administration suspended all export
licenses for items on the Munitions List, including the three satellites. Congress
passed language in the FY1990 Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary
Appropriations Act (P.L. 101-162) and the 1990-91 Foreign Relations Authorization
Act (P.L. 101-246, Section 902) prohibiting the export of U.S.-built satellites to
China unless the President reported to Congress that (1) China had achieved certain
political and human rights reforms, or (2) it was in the national interest of the United
States. These notifications are often referred to as waivers. In December 1989,
President Bush notified Congress that it was in the national interest to export the
AUSSATs and Asiasat-1. Asiasat-1 was launched by China in April 1990, the two
AUSSATs, renamed Optus B1 and B2, were launched in 1992 (the B2 launch was a
failure as noted earlier).
The issue of whether China was adhering to its agreement with the United States
to charge fair prices for launch services under the 1989 launch service agreement was
raised by a 1990 contract between China and the Arabsat Consortium for launching
an Arabsat satellite for $25 million, much less than what many consider “on a par”
with Western companies. The main competitor for the launch was Europe’s
Arianespace, which turned to both the French and U.S. governments to prohibit
export of the satellite (the prime contractor for the satellite is French, and it includes
American components). The United States took no formal action and the issue
became moot in the spring of 1991 when the Arabsat Consortium terminated the
contract with the Chinese and signed an agreement with Arianespace. The reasons
have not been fully explained by any of the parties, and the issue of what constitutes
pricing services “on a par” remained, since it was not specified in the 1989 U.S.-
Chinese agreement (it was further delineated in a 1995 agreement, see below).
Language prohibiting the export of satellites to China unless the President certified
that China was complying with the 1989 agreement was included in the Export
Facilitation Act of 1990 (H.R. 4653). That bill was vetoed by President Bush on
November 17, 1990. Another bill in the 102d Congress (H.R. 3489) included the
same language, but did not clear Congress. China argued that because their costs are
so low, they can offer lower prices and still adhere to international norms as to what
costs are included in setting the price.
The AUSSAT export licenses expired in March 1991, and on April 30, 1991, the
Bush Administration renewed them and approved the export of components for a
Swedish satellite (Freja) to be launched by China, but simultaneously denied approval
for exporting components China wanted for building a new communications satellite
because of concerns about China exporting ballistic missiles to other countries. Two
months later, on June 16, the White House announced that because of China’s ballistic
missile proliferation policies, it would be “inappropriate for the United States to
approve any further export licenses for commercial satellite launches at this time.”
On July 17, the State Department identified CGWIC as one of two Chinese entities

CRS-6
engaged in missile technology proliferation activities that require the imposition of
trade sanctions in accordance with the Arms Export Control Act, including denial of
license applications for export items covered by the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR). Although the MTCR does not cover satellites (only satellite launch
vehicles, which are essentially interchangeable with ballistic missiles), the
identification of CGWIC as a cause of concern to the U.S. Government complicated
China’s commercial space launch services marketing plans. China subsequently
agreed to adhere to the MTCR, and the sanctions were lifted in March 1992.
China’s fortunes improved. In May 1992, the International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization (Intelsat) agreed to launch one of its Intelsat 7A satellites on
a Chinese launch vehicle. On September 11, 1992, the State Department notified
Congress that it was waiving legislative restrictions on U.S. exports for 6 satellite
projects with China: APSAT, Asiasat-2, Intelsat 7A, STARSAT, AfriStar, and
Dongfanghong 3. The first 5 are satellites China wanted to launch; the sixth is
components (the same components President Bush refused to export in April 1991)
for a new generation of satellites China itself is building (Dongfanghong 3, the first
of which was launched in 1994 and failed shortly thereafter). Many observers saw the
move as a conciliatory gesture in the wake of the U.S. decision to sell F-16s to
Taiwan.
In 1993, the United States asserted that China was selling missiles to Pakistan
and imposed sanctions, including the denial of satellite export licenses. This time, the
issue became heated within the United States as Hughes and Martin Marietta (now
Lockheed Martin, another satellite manufacturer) argued that the sanctions would
hurt the American aerospace industry, not China. Noting that three of eight satellites
at issue were not covered by the State Department’s Munitions List, but by the
Commerce Department’s Commerce Control List since they did not contain
technology of military concern, the companies and the Commerce Department
succeeded in convincing the White House to overrule the State Department. The
White House instructed Commerce to grant export licenses for those three satellites
(APStar 2, Echostar and Asiasat). However, five others reportedly contained
militarily-significant technology (such as encryption devices) and thus were governed
by the Munitions List. Those licenses were not approved. Following extensive
debate (including a House Science, Space and Technology hearing on September 29,
1994), in October 1996 the Clinton administration transferred primary responsibility
for export of commercial communications satellites from the State Department to the
Commerce Department.
In January 1995, the United States and China initialed a new 7-year agreement
on commercial launch services. It was formally signed in March 1995. The agreement
allows China up to 11 new launches for international customers to geostationary orbit
in addition to 4 launch contracts already signed under the 1989 agreement. The
number of geostationary launches is allowed to grow to 13 and then to 16 if certain
market conditions develop. Including the existing 4 contracts, that could allow China
a total of 20 launches. China agreed to price launches no less than 15 % below what
Western companies charge or a U.S. review of the price would be triggered. For low
Earth orbit (LEO) launches, it was agreed that as long as China, Russia, and Ukraine
(the non market economies offering launch services) combined do not win contracts
to launch more than 50 percent of any particular LEO satellite constellation (such as

CRS-7
Motorola’s Iridium system), China will be assumed to be in compliance with the
agreement. On October 27, 1997, the United States and China agreed to pricing
provisions for LEO launches. Only general language had been included in the 1995
agreement. Under the agreement, China will price its LEO launches on a par with
U.S. and European companies, allowing for adjustments for certain differences.
In May 1997, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative stated that it believed
China violated the pricing provisions of the 1995 agreement for launching a Loral-
built satellite for the Philippines (Agila 2, formerly called Mabuhay). Chinese officials
disagreed. On September 10, 1997, the Washington Times published a story that
Chinese entities (including CGWIC) are selling missile technology to Iran. China
denied the allegations. On February 18, 1998, the President notified Congress that
it was in the national interest to export another satellite (Chinasat 8, built by Loral)
to China.
In April 1998, issues publicly arose concerning the possible transfer of
technology by two U.S. satellite manufacturing companies, Loral and Hughes. The
multifaceted issue involves questions of whether Loral and Hughes transferred
technology to China in the wake of the 1996 Intelsat 708 failure that improved the
reliability of Chinese nuclear missiles, whether the Clinton Administration gave special
treatment to Loral, and whether the Clinton Administration should have transferred
responsibility for export of commercial communications satellites from the State
Department to the Commerce Department in 1996. Table 2 below provides a list of
U.S.-manufactured satellites launched by China through September 3, 1998, and the
ownership of those satellites. The “Loral/Hughes” issue is discussed in more detail
in CRS Issue Brief 93062, Space Launch Vehicles: Government Requirements and
Commercial Competition, and in CRS Report 98-485, China: Possible Missile
Technology Transfers from U.S. Satellite Export Policy — Background and
Chronology. The latter contains a list of the waivers that have been granted to allow
satellites to be exported to China.
Briefly, the questions center on actions taken by Loral following the 1996
Intelsat 708 failure. According to Loral, Western insurance companies asked it to
review China’s investigation of the launch. Loral formed a review committee
composed of representatives from several aerospace companies, including Hughes.
Loral concedes that, in violation of its own policies, it provided a copy of the
committee’s report to the Chinese before notifying the State Department to ensure
there were no technology transfer concerns. The company asserts that as soon as it
realized what had happened, it notified the State Department and that no transfer of
information harmful to national security occurred. However, according to an April
4, 1998 New York Times story, a classified 1997 Defense Department report
concluded that technical information had been transferred that improved the reliability
of Chinese nuclear missiles. The Justice Department began a criminal investigation
into the matter in 1997. As noted above, in February 1998, the Clinton
Administration approved the export of another Loral satellite to China. Critics claim
that the granting of that export license undermined the Justice Department’s
investigation. Media reports such as the April 4 New York Times article have alleged
that contributions to the Democratic Party by Loral’s Chairman, Bernard Schwartz,
led the Clinton Administration to treat Loral favorably. Others argue that moving
responsibility for deciding whether to export satellites to China from the State

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Department and its Munitions List to the Commerce Department’s Commerce
Control List, was a mistake. A number of congressional committees are holding
hearings on the matter.
Other Domestic and International Space Activities
As already noted, China has launched several communications satellites for its
domestic needs. The first of a new generation of communications satellites,
Dongfanghong 3, was launched in November 1994, but failed shortly after it attained
orbit. A replacement was successfully launched in 1997. China also uses satellites in
the Asiasat and APStar series. The companies that own those satellites — Asia
Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. and Asia Pacific Telecommunications Satellite
Co. Ltd, respectively — are partially owned by Chinese entities. Both are based in
Hong Kong, now part of China. In addition, China has purchased Western-made
communications satellites for its own use. One of these, Chinasat 7, was placed into
an incorrect orbit in 1996. Another, ChinaStar 1 (also called Zhongwei 1), was
successfully orbited in May 1998. In July 1998, China launched its first European-
built communications satellite, SinoSat-1, to service its domestic communications
needs. The French company Aerospatiale was the prime contractor for SinoSat-1,
built for the German-Chinese consortium EuraSpace. SinoSat-1 is managed by the
Chinese company Sino Satellite Communications Company Ltd.
The Chinese also are interested in land remote sensing satellites. They
inaugurated use of a Landsat receiving station purchased from the United States in
1986. It has been upgraded several times since to allow receipt of imagery from other
satellites, including France’s SPOT satellites, and European, Japanese and Canadian
radar satellites (ERS, JERS, and Radarsat). As discussed earlier, several Chinese
satellites reportedly have been related to development of a remote sensing capability.
Presumably, these involve using a film system (rather than scanners such as those on
Landsat and SPOT), hence the need for the payload to be recovered. As discussed
below, China is also developing remote sensing satellites in cooperation with Brazil.
China undoubtedly is interested in remote sensing both for military and civilian
purposes. The term remote sensing broadly refers to any sensing of the Earth and its
atmosphere, including weather satellites. Generally, the remote sensing data that have
the greatest military utility are those that provide precise (high resolution) images of
objects on the ground. Such data also are of use for civilian purposes such as land use
monitoring, mineral exploration, and crop forecasting. The resolution of the
recoverable Chinese satellites is not available. The planned Chinese-Brazilian system
is designed to provide 20 meter resolution, which could be useful for both military and
civilian purposes. Data with better resolution are available on the commercial market
from several countries including France (10 meter), India (6 meter), and Russia (2
meter). The best publicly available U.S. data today are from Landsat (30 meters), but
the U.S. government plans to launch a new Landsat spacecraft in 1999 with 15 meter
resolution and several U.S. companies plan to launch commercial remote sensing
satellites with as good as 1 meter resolution in the near future.
As noted, remote sensing also includes weather satellites. Following the 1988
failure of their first polar-orbit weather satellite, the Chinese launched a second in
1990, Fengyun 1-2, that apparently worked properly. Two balloons for making
atmospheric measurements were launched along with it. A geostationary weather

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satellite, Fengyun 2, was planned for launch in 1994, but was destroyed in an April
1994 explosion at the facility at Xichang where it was being readied for launch. The
explosion killed one worker and injured 31 according to China Great Wall Industry
Corp. Details of the cause of the explosion were not released. A replacement was
launched in 1997, becoming China’s first geostationary weather satellite.
Some Chinese satellites have been for scientific purposes. In 1981, China
launched three small satellites simultaneously for atmospheric physics studies. The
two commercial launches that carried foreign materials processing experiments (in
1987 and 1988) also carried Chinese materials processing experiments. Other
recoverable satellites have carried scientific experiments, including biological subjects.
China 33 carried more than 60 plants and animals (guinea pigs). China 43 in 1994
carried flower and vegetable seeds as part of space seed-breeding experiments. China
50, launched in 1996, was primarily for remote sensing, but also included materials
processing experiments performed cooperatively with Japan, and biological
experiments.
China has been involved in a number of international space activities both as
cooperative government-government agreements and as business joint-ventures. The
countries involved include Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Kazakstan, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, and Sweden. Among the
cooperative projects are the Chinese launch of an experimental Pakistani amateur
radio satellite in 1990. The satellite, Badr-1, failed after one month in orbit. An
agreement between the two countries for cooperation in peaceful applications of
space technology was signed in December 1991. China launched a Swedish scientific
satellite, Freja, in 1992. In 1993, China and South Korea signed an agreement to
jointly build a small satellite for remote sensing and communications purposes. The
four-year project was expected to cost $25 million, with launch in 1997, although the
launch has not yet occurred. In 1994, China Aerospace Co. and Germany’s Deutsche
Aerospace (now DASA) formed a joint venture, EuraSpace, to build communications
and remote sensing satellites. The first, a communications satellite called SinoSat,
was launched in July 1998 (France’s Aerospatiale built the spacecraft for EuraSpace).
China and Germany also are cooperating on a solar telescope to be launched in 2003
to study the solar magnetic field. Another joint venture, Com Dev Xi’an, was created
in 1996 between Canada’s Com Dev International and China’s Xi’an Institute of
Space Radio Technology for building satellite electronics and ground facilities.
China also has a cooperative project with Brazil to jointly build two remote
sensing satellites, CBERS-1 and -2 (China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite). The
satellites are designed to carry three imaging systems, including a CCD (charge-
coupled device) camera with 20 meter resolution. Despite a number of problems in
the program since its official initiation in 1988 (primarily lack of funding in Brazil),
the two countries rejuvenated the program in 1993, signing a supplemental protocol
that year and another in 1996. The first launch has been delayed many times and as
of August 1998 was scheduled for July 1999, with the second launch anticipated three
years later. Originally, the satellites would have been launched on Brazilian launch
vehicles, developed with Chinese assistance, but instead they will be launched on
Chinese Long March rockets. China is paying 70 percent of the project’s cost ($150
million, including launch).

CRS-10
China and Russia held discussions for several years leading to the signing of a
protocol in 1994 for broad space cooperation. Among the areas of interest are
cooperation in robotic missions to Mars and human spaceflight, including Chinese
purchase of Russian Soyuz spacecraft life support systems to assist China in its goal
of putting astronauts in orbit by the year 2000 (see below). Russian President Boris
Yeltsin signed a “joint understanding” on space cooperation with Chinese officials in
April 1996 that apparently included training Chinese specialists at Russia’s cosmonaut
training center in Star City (see below). At the end of 1996, the Russian Space
Agency reportedly was close to signing contracts with China regarding commercial
spacecraft launches although the status of that agreement is unclear. In 1997, China
reportedly was discussing with Israel the possibility of launching an Israeli student
satellite. The French launch services company Arianespace has indicated that it is
interested in possible joint development of a launch system with China. A framework
agreement on space cooperation was signed between China and Kazakstan in 1998;
details are not available.
For many years, China has sought government-to-government level cooperation
with the United States, but no formal agreement has been signed. A draft agreement
on cooperation in remote sensing satellites was prepared in advance of President
Clinton’s planned 1998 trip to China, but the Loral/Hughes controversy (discussed
earlier) apparently has cooled interest in signing such an agreement now. Among
other things, China has expressed interest in participating in the International Space
Station program, and flying experiments on the U.S. space shuttle as “get away
specials” (small, comparatively inexpensive experiments that require no crew
interaction). China did provide magnets for a scientific instrument called AMS (Alpha
Magnetic Spectrometer) that flew on a 1998 space shuttle mission (STS 91) and is
scheduled to fly again on the International Space Station. AMS is designed to search
for missing matter and cosmic sources of antimatter.
Future Plans
Chinese space officials have often expressed the intent to send humans into
space. During 1979 and 1980, China had ambitious plans for utilization of space, and
even had astronauts in training. In late 1980 and early 1981, however, they retreated
from these expansive plans because of a reassessment of the Chinese economic
situation, and announced that their human spaceflight program had been postponed
for at least the remainder of the decade. In the 1990s, they resumed making
statements about building space stations and a spaceplane. A plan released in March
1992 (Outline for China’s Long and Medium-Term Development of Science and
Technology) asserted that research into experimental spacecraft to carry crews into
space would be completed by the year 2000. Chinese space officials have repeatedly
stated since that time that they plan to launch a crew by the year 2000, to develop a
space shuttle by the year 2010, and to build a space station. Reports in the Chinese
press in 1998 repeated the oft-stated goal of launching humans into space in 1999.
Two Chinese specialists have completed cosmonaut training at Russia’s Star City
facility.
At the October 1996 International Astronautical Federation (IAF) conference in
Beijing, Chinese officials called for greater international cooperation in space. They
also discussed their long term space strategy, which continues China’s focus on

CRS-11
communications and remote sensing (including weather and radar imaging) satellites,
and on commercial space launches (including development of new launch vehicles).
They also said they plan to send probes to the Moon or other planets.

CRS-12
Table 1. Chinese Space Launches*
Name
Launch
Launch
Launch
Comments
Date
Vehicle
Site
China 1
04/24/70
CZ-1
S
Engineering test. “East is Red”
song played until 05/20/70.
China 2
03/03/71
CZ-1
S
Housekeeping test and possible
science.
——
09/18/73
FB-1
S
This apparent launch failure is
unacknowledged by the Chinese, but
counted by Western analysts.
——
07/14/74
FB-1
S
This apparent launch failure is
unacknowledged by the Chinese but
counted by Western analysts.
——
11/05/74
CZ-2
S
This apparent launch failure is
unacknowledged by the Chinese but
counted by Western analysts.
China 3
07/26/75
FB-1
S
Science? Reconnaissance? Not
recovered.
China 4
11/26/75
CZ-2C
S
Possible reconnaissance test.
Recovered. 1st CZ-2.
China 5
12/16/75
FB-1
S
Like China 3.
China 6
08/30/76
FB-1
S
Possible electronics intelligence
gathering test and/or science.
Not recovered.
——
11/10/76
FB-1
S
This apparent launch failure is
unacknowledged by the Chinese but
counted by Western analysts.
China 7
12/07/76
CZ-2C
S
Possible reconnaissance test.
Recovered.
China 8
01/26/78
CZ-2C
S
Possible reconnaissance test.
Recovered.
——
07/27/79
FB-1
S
This apparent launch failure is
unacknowledged by the Chinese but
counted by Western analysts.
China 9;
09/19/81
FB-1
S
Three scientific satellites for space
China 10;
physics experiments.
China 11
China 12
09/09/82
CZ-2C
S
Possible reconnaissance test.
Recovered.
China 13
08/19/83
CZ-2C
S
Possible reconnaissance test.
Recovered.
China 14
01/29/84
CZ-3
X
First Long March 3 launch;
upper stage failed.
China 15
04/08/84
CZ-3
X
First Chinese geostationary
communications satellite.
China 16
09/12/84
CZ-2C
S
Reconnaissance? Remote
sensing? Recovered.

CRS-13
Table 1. Chinese Space Launches*
(continued)
Name
Launch
Launch
Launch
Comments
Date
Vehicle
Site
China 17
10/21/85
CZ-2C
S
Reconnaissance? Remote
sensing? Recovered.
China 18
02/01/86
CZ-3
X
Communications.
China 19
10/06/86
CZ-2C
S
Possible reconnaissance.
Recovered.
China 20
08/05/87
CZ-2C
S
Materials processing experiment
for French company.
China 21
09/09/87
CZ-2C
S
Science. Recovered.
China 22
03/07/88
CZ-3
X
Communications.
China 23
08/05/88
CZ-2C
S
Materials processing for German
company.
Fengyun 1-1
09/06/88
CZ-4
T
Weather. 1st CZ-4.
China 25
12/22/88
CZ-3
X
Communications.
China 26
02/04/90
CZ-3
X
Communications.
AsiaSat 1
04/07/90
CZ-3
X
Communications satellite for
Asiasat Co. First Chinese com-
mercial launch of U.S.-built satellite.
BADR-1; China 29
07/16/90
CZ-2E
X
Pakistani test communication
satellite. China 29 is “dummy”
AUSSAT. Perigee kick motor failed,
leaving satellite in wrong orbit.
Fengyun 1-2; China
09/03/90
CZ-4
T
Weather satellite, plus two
31; China 32
balloons for atmospheric studies.
China 33
10/05/90
CZ-2C
S
Remote sensing and biology.
Recovered.
China 34
12/28/91
CZ-3
X
Third stage failure placed
communications satellite in
wrong orbit.
China 35
08/09/92
CZ-2D
S
Remote sensing and materials
processing. Recovered.
Optus-B1
08/13/92
CZ-2E
X
Communications satellite for
Australia.
Freja;
10/06/92
CZ-2C
S
Freja is Swedish scientific
China 38
satellite; China 38 is remote
sensing (recovered).
Optus-B2
12/21/92
CZ-2E
X
Launch vehicle broke up enroute
to orbit.
China 40
10/08/93
CZ-2C
S
Reentry module misfired.
Shijian 4;
02/08/94
CZ-3A
X
Two test satellites for new CZ-3A
China 42
variant.
China 43
07/03/94
CZ-2D
S
Science (plants, microgravity exp.)
APStar-1
07/21/94
CZ-3
X
Communications satellite for APT
Satellite Co.
Optus-B3
08/28/94
CZ-2E
X
Australian communications satellite.

CRS-14
Table 1. Chinese Space Launches*
(continued)
Name
Launch
Launch
Launch
Comments
Date
Vehicle
Site
Dongfanghong 3
11/29/94
CZ-3A
X
Communications satellite for China
(satellite failed on-orbit).
APStar-2
01/25/95
CZ-2E
X
Communications satellite for APT.
Broke apart during launch; killed 6.
AsiaSat-2
11/28/95
CZ-2E
X
Communications satellite for Asiasat.
EchoStar 1
12/28/95
CZ-2E
X
Communications satellite for
Echostar.
Intelsat 708
02/14/96
CZ-3B
X
Communications satellite for
Intelsat. Launch failure; killed 6.
APStar 1A
07/03/96
CZ-3
X
Communications satellite for APT.
Chinasat 7
08/18/96
CZ-3
X
Communications satellite for China.
3rd stage failure left in wrong orbit.
China 50
10/20/96
CZ-2D
S
Remote sensing.
Dongfanghong 3 F2
05/11/97
CZ-3A
X
Communications satellite for China.
Fengyun-2
06/10/97
CZ-3
X
1st Chinese geostationary weather
satellite.
Agila 2
08/19/97
CZ-3B
X
Communications satellite for the
Philippines.
Iridium MFS-1;
09/01/97
CZ-2C/SD
T
2 test satellites for Iridium to test new
Iridium MFS-2
launch vehicle variant (CZ-2C/SD).
APStar 2R
10/16/97
CZ-3B
X
Communications satellite for APT.
Iridium 42; Iridium
12/08/97
CZ-2C/SD
T
2 communications satellites for
44
Iridium.
Iridium 51; Iridium
03/25/98
CZ-2C/SD
T
2 communications satellites for
61
Iridium.
Iridium 69; Iridium
05/02/98
CZ-2C/SD
T
2 communications satellites for
71
Iridium.
ChinaStar 1
05/30/98
CZ-3B
X
Communications satellite for China.
SinoSat-1
07/18/98
CZ-3B
X
Communications satellite for China
(manufactured by France’s Aero-
spatiale).
Iridium 03; Iridium
08/19/98
CZ-2C/SD
T
2 communications satellites for
76
Iridium.
* Prepared by CRS based on data from Chinese news bulletins and other media sources; World-Wide
Space Activities (House Science and Technology Committee, 1977); Jane’s Space Directory 1997-
1998; and information from Geoffrey Perry, M.B.E., of the Kettering Group in England.
Chinese launch sites are designated herein as follows: S = Shuang Cheng-tzu (also known as
Jiuquan); X = Xichang; and T = Taiyuan. Launch dates are in Greenwich Mean Time, which may
differ by a day from local time. Satellites that reached orbit, but not the intended orbit, are shown
in italics. Launch failures where the satellite did not reach orbit are shown in bold italics.
Launch vehicles are designated “CZ” for Chang Zheng (Long March) or “FB” for Feng Bao (Storm).

CRS-15
Table 2. Owners of Satellites Manufactured by U.S. Companies
and Launched by the People’s Republic of China
Launch
Satellite*
Date*
Manufacturer**
Owner**
AsiaSat-1
04/07/90
Hughes
Asiasat (Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co.
Ltd.), of Hong Kong. In 1996, Asiasat’s holding
company went public. Asiasat now is owned
31% by the public, with the remaining shares
equally owned by Cable and Wireless PLC,
China International Trust and Investment Corp.,
and Hutchinson Whampoa.
Optus B1
08/13/92
Hughes
Optus Communications PTY Ltd. of Australia.
Optus B2
Launch
Hughes
Optus (Australia)
failure
12/21/92
APStar-1
07/21/94
Hughes
APT (Asia Pacific Telecommunications Satellite
Co. Ltd), of Hong Kong. APT is 75% owned
by Chinese government-backed companies.
Optus B3
08/28/94
Hughes
Optus (Australia)
APStar-2
Launch
Hughes
APT (Hong Kong)
failure
01/25/95
AsiaSat-2
11/28/95
Lockheed Martin
Asiasat (Hong Kong)
EchoStar 1
12/28/95
Lockheed Martin
Echostar Inc. (U.S.)
Intelsat 708
Launch
Loral
International Telecommunications Satellite
failure
Organization (Intelsat, a consortium of 142
02/14/96
countries)
APStar 1A
07/03/96
Hughes
APT (Hong Kong)
Chinasat 7
Failed to
Hughes
China Telecommunications Broadcast Satellite
reach
Co. of China. Satellite reached orbit, but not
intended
intended orbit due to third stage failure.
orbit
08/18/96
Agila 2 (formerly
08/19/97
Loral
Mabuhay Philippines Satellite Corp. (Philippines)
Mabuhay)
Iridium MFS
09/01/97
Motorola
China Aerospace Corp. Two test satellites
Iridium MFS
(Iridium Mass Frequency Simulators) used to test
a new version of the Long March that is used for
Iridium launches.
APStar 2R
10/16/97
Loral
APT (Hong Kong)

CRS-16
Table 2. Owners of Satellites Manufactured by U.S. Companies
and Launched by the People’s Republic of China (continued)
Launch
Satellite*
Date*
Manufacturer**
Owner**
Iridium 42
12/08/97
Lockheed Martin
Iridium (U.S.)
Iridium 44
and Motorola
Iridium 51
03/25/98
Lockheed Martin
Iridium (U.S.)
Iridium 61
and Motorola
Iridium 69
05/02/98
Lockheed Martin
Iridium (U.S.)
Iridium 71
and Motorola
ChinaStar 1 (or
05/30/98
Lockheed Martin
China Oriental Telecom Satellite Co. Ltd. of
Zhongwei 1)
China.
Iridium 03
08/19/98
Lockheed Martin
Iridium (U.S.)
Iridium 76
and Motorola
* Satellite name and launch date from CRS data. Launch dates are in Greenwich Mean Time,
which may differ by a day from local time.
** Manufacturer and owner from Jane’s Space Directory 1997-1998, media sources, or Jonathan’s
Space Report. Some satellites designated as built by Lockheed Martin were built by Martin Marietta
before its merger with Lockheed.